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The political discourse of German Romanticism is often interpreted reductively: as either 
entirely revolutionary, reactionary, or indeed apolitical in nature. Breaking with this critical 
tradition, this dissertation offers a new conceptual framework for political Romanticism called 
wild politics. I argue that Romantic wild politics generates a sense of possibility that calls into 
question pragmatic forms of implementing sociopolitical change; it envisions imaginative 
alternatives to the status quo that exceed the purview of conventional political thinking. Three 
major fields of the Romantic political imaginary organize this reading: affect, nature, and 
religion.  
Chapter 1 examines Novalis’ politics of affect. In his theory of the fairy tale—as opposed 
to the actual fairy tales he writes—Novalis proposes a political paradigm centered on the 
aesthetic dimension of love. He imagines a new Prussian state constituted by emotional 
attachments between the citizen and the monarch. 
 Chapter 2 takes up the “new mythology” in the works of F.W.J. Schelling, Friedrich 
Schlegel, and Johann Wilhelm Ritter, the comprehensive project of reorienting modern life 
towards its most transformative potentials. Nature and the speculative natural sciences are 






utopian world of egalitarian social relations, a nation of scientist-poets discovering and 
practically applying the mysteries of the natural cosmos. 
 In an excursus, Chapter 3 turns to August Klingemann’s novel Nachtwachen (1804). Its 
critique of stereotypical Romantic practice—in terms of affect, nature, and religion—exposes the 
movement’s idealist excesses and isolation from sociopolitical reality. Policing the Romantic 
poet, but also disrupting police order, Nachtwachen’s nightwatchman figure embodies a 
Romanticism in descent, brought back down to earth and its material conditions.  
 Chapter 4 focuses on Friedrich Schlegel’s late works as he recasts Romantic wild politics 
as a religious program. Drawing on contemporary esoteric concepts and practices of the spiritual 
body, in the 1820s Schlegel relies on an apocalyptic standpoint to reject the legitimacy of post-
revolutionary political order. At the end of the Romantic movement, he prophesizes the divine 
revolution to come, and investigates the imaginative subjects and communities that would 
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INTRODUCTION. WILD POLITICS: POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN GERMAN 
ROMANTICISM 
I. Towards a New Political Aesthetics 
 Friedrich Schiller’s philosophical magnum opus, Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des 
Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen (1795), opens by rhetorically asking how any discussion of 
art and literature, any attempt to provide another “Gesetzbuch für die ästhetische Welt,” could be 
of much significance given the overwhelming sociopolitical crisis around 1800.1 The ongoing 
breakdown of traditional norms, values, and institutions started in the recent revolutionary events 
in France—and the ambiguous fear/hope that they would spread further and intensify in effect—
would seem to demand a more practical form of engagement. But Schiller wants the 
contemporary use-value of aesthetic experience to be re-adjudicated precisely in order to address 
the critical social situation at hand. So he provides a justification for art, asserted throughout the 
course of the letters, that always returns to the possibility of the most perfect artwork of all (the 
“vollkommensten aller Kunstwerke”)2 capable of fundamentally changing the sociopolitical 
status quo. For Schiller, this greatest artwork of politics would constitute the collective aesthetic 
product and productivity of a new form of humanity, and the success of its communal shift 
represents nothing less than the outstanding goal of postrevolutionary society. At this highest-
                                                 
1 “Ist es wenigstens außern der Zeit, sich nach einem Gesetzbuch für die ästhetische Welt umzusehen, da die 
Angelegenheiten der moralischen ein soviel näheres Interesse darbieten, und der philosophische Untersuchungsgeist 
durch die Zeitumstände so nachdrücklich aufgefodert wird, sich mit dem vollkommensten aller Kunstwerke, mit 
dem Bau einer wahren politischen Freiheit zu beschäftigen?” Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 8, (Berlin: 
Aufbau, 2005), 307. All citations from Schiller refer to this edition as Volume Number:Page Number. 
 






order scale, the germinal form and content of the utopian political order expresses itself as an 
aesthetic way of life: the ideal polis is just an ultimate artwork, arranged according to the 
movements of the autonomous aesthetic imagination, embodied and performed by every artist-
citizen. Thus the most perfect image of aesthetic experience is identical with the “Bau einer 
wahren politischen Freiheit,”3 as he puts it, the universal problematic,4 we may add, in whatever 
specific ideological articulation, that motivates all modern political radicality.  
Schiller suggests not so much that current poets would become the true legislators of a 
world reconstructed through new freedoms, but that all modern subject-citizens, and actual 
legislators (such as his patron, the Prince Friedrich Christian von Schleswig-Holstein-
Sonderburg-Augustenburg, to whom the letters are officially addressed),5 need to recognize the 
necessarily imaginative dimension of maximal freedom, and thereafter realize it in an alternative 
society of the future, a “neue Form der Kultur” as Herbert Marcuse describes it.6 In support of 
this, Schiller claims that the philosophical “Untersuchungsgeist”7 has already confirmed the 
contemporary connection between aesthetic and political demands, for it is now expressly 
confronted with the need (“nachdrücklich aufgefodert”)8 to think and practice freedom from the 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
  
4 I refer here to Louis Althusser’s use of the term “problematic”: “the particular unity of a theoretical formation” in a 
given text (Louis Althusser, For Marx [London: Verso, 2005], 32). Edward Said, paraphrasing Althusser, describes 
a problematic as “a specific determinate unity of a text, or group of texts, which is something given rise to by 
analysis” (Edward Said, Orientalism [New York: Vintage, 1979], 16). “Paradigm,” as used in the following, can be 
understood as a synonymous term. 
 
5 On Schiller’s letters in terms of their connection to and reception by the Prince, see Stefan Matuschek’s 
commentary in: Friedrich Schiller, Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2009), 
138-140. 
 
6 Herbert Marcuse, Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft (Springe: Suhrkamp, 2004), 154. 
 








perspective of artistic life. And yet, just what the “aesthetic” means in this context, and for that 
matter the “political” as well—or what kind of state would incorporate and transcend what 
makes both presently inadequate—is open-ended, in need of further determination, a matter of 
development even when he attempts to define it. Schiller’s particular definition, and the 
consequences of definability and limitation as such for any political aesthetic in the modern age 
of revolutions, is what is essentially at stake both in the letters and, as we will see, in the 
subsequent traditions that were so profoundly influenced by them.  
Schiller goes on to emphasize that the successful completion of this construction project 
on aesthetics and politics demands a “Kunst des Ideals,”9 a strategic art dedicated to an ideal of 
freedom, already expressed in what he understands as the dual cognitive-sensuous nature of 
aesthetic experience. Subjective freedom as the essence of the artist’s and the artwork’s unique 
sphere of life will show the path towards the practical utopia: hence the thesis to be proven: “daß 
man, um jenes politische Problem [the realization of total freedom] in der Erfahrung zu lösen, 
durch das ästhetische den Weg nehmen muß, weil es die Schönheit ist, durch welche man zu der 
Freiheit wandert.”10 As Leslie Sharpe puts it, we find here: “a concept of beauty and an account 
of aesthetic experience which transform the political analogy quoted above [beauty = freedom] 
into a literal goal of art.”11 This desired transformation, and its resulting combination of aesthetic 
productivity/receptivity with an emancipatory politics based solely on the ideal of autonomy, 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
 
10 Ibid., 309. Matuschek notes: “Im Zentrum von Schillers Briefen […] steht eine starke, vielleicht sogar die stärkste 
These über die Schönheit, die je vertreten wurde: Schönheit, insbesondere die Schönheit der Kunst, sei der einzige 
Anlass zur uneingeschränkten Selbsterfahrung des Menschen und dadurch zugleich der einize Weg zur individuellen 
wie zur gesellschaftlichen Freiheit. Griffiger gesagt: Nur Schönheit und Kunst machen den Menschen menschlich 
und frei” (Matuschek, 129). 
 






will be an imaginative Bau that finds in artistic experience the potential to qualitatively change 
reality (and thus one that shifts its ostensibly Kantian orientations—by finding in art constitutive 
powers that exceed the faculty of judgement—even while remaining ambiguously true to 
them).12 The construction of true political freedom through such an aesthetic program must 
therefore be methodologically synthetic and recuperative, positive as much as critical, and 
presentist—above all when it casts its literal analogies into the future. For Schiller, there is a 
chance to build it in the here and now, but only in a different version of modern existence, in a 
possible world that shows the state of things around 1800 to be merely provisional. Nevertheless, 
as he laments, as of yet few have taken up its design, much less attempted its realization.  
But this proposed intervention into the very reality principles of modernity would indeed 
find its adherents and apologists in the next years. As we will see throughout the present study, it 
would fall primarily to the German Romantics, and more exactly to the most obscure sub-
discourse of the movement—political Romanticism—to pursue Schiller’s thought experiment 
into a variety of fields of investment. This dissertation explores the Romantics’ effort, following 
Schiller’s impetus, to expand the concept, material, and practice of modern politics through the 
speculative application of imaginative poiesis. From the immediate postrevolutionary age 
through the Restoration period, the following chapters trace how the explicit intentions and 
resources of Romantic political aesthetics exceed the remit of the Schillerian program first 
indicated in the letters, resulting in a series of novel political imaginaries that utilize as much as 
explode its scope, becoming something quite different in nature. I refer to this general aspect of 
Romantic political imagination as a wild politics, arguing that its presence in the texts makes 
                                                 






possible a revised reading of Romanticism’s political system of thought as it develops from its 
early to late phases. 
II. From Schiller to Political Romanticism 
To return to the letters: Schiller takes the lack of political imagination under which 
modernity suffers as part of the inherent difficulty of thinking the needed ideal of human life 
under current conditions. The Kunst of the ideal subject of aesthetic experience that then, in mass 
proliferation, begins to reconstitute all social formations anew is everywhere confronted with 
theoretical and practical resistance: the vested interests determining the status quo political 
power (im)balance have already implemented strategies to refunctionalize its energy. Thus to no 
small extent, the actualization of such a utopian thought in deed must also be seen as a kind of 
problematic or mission of the future, or must be if only for the moment. The “reiner idealischer 
Mensch”13 that every empirical-historical subject carries within itself, key to the community to 
come, is still “problematisch,”14 as he puts it, a “problem yet to be solved.”15  
Were it to actually arise and come into being, the collective of such subjects would be 
able, against all odds, to reintegrate what a hypertrophic scientific-rationalist analysis 
(Zergliederung), supported by an increasingly strict social regimentation, had so far violently, 
unnaturally severed in the modern age. The general existential alienation that divides people in 
the current situation—the widespread fragmentation and exploitation of social groups through 
their isolation into instrumentalizable parts, where “Nutzen ist das grosse Idol der Zeit, dem alle 
                                                 
13 Schiller, 8:313. 
 
14 Ibid., 311. 
 
15 Keith Tribe’s translation of the same in: Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Translated by 






Kräfte fronen und alle Talente huldigen sollen,”16 the functional overspecialization in intellectual 
and material labor that obscures a global concept of the whole of human progress—all this would 
be made impossible. As Schiller sees it, the pure ideal human, scarred almost beyond recognition 
by the mutilation (Verstümmelung)17 it suffers under modernity, is nevertheless still manifest 
paradigmatically in aesthetic experience. But the secret of this aesthetic freedom is also manifest, 
potentially, in all spheres of modern life, provided they too become the critical object of the 
subject at play.  
The presupposition is a total revolution of the individual and collective sensorium, a new 
sense-apparatus and comportment of the human to come, but also a full recognition of the 
immense amount of cultural work, the basic redefinition of things that would have to be 
accomplished to bring it into reality.18 Therefore the impossible totalizing gesture of the letters as 
a manifesto, the change they require as an aesthetic liberation of the postrevolutionary subject (or 
a manifesto of education, Erziehung, as emancipation of the body politic), and thereafter for 
modern humanity as a whole. Schiller reveals—albeit cautiously and in a gesture of 
postponement and containment—a specifically political aesthetic problematic for the age as a 
future task of epochal transformation. 
To release the potential energy dormant in the separate life practices of politics and 
aesthetics one must bring them into contact, causing the one to conceptually disinhibit and 
                                                 
16 Schiller, 8:308. 
  
17 Schiller writes of the “verstümmelte Natur” of the modern subject (Ibid., 324). 
 
18 By the very last letter, Schiller has filled in this notion of a Kunst des Ideals with its properly revolutionary 
function: the Kunst des Ideals demands of the individual subject and wider collective a “totale Revolution in seiner 







practically alter the constitution, method, and goals of the other. This sought-after energetics, or 
what Marcuse calls its “explosive Eigenschaften,”19 traversing through the domain of aesthetic 
experience into the organization of modern civil society, is still ambiguous and inchoate in 
Schiller’s reflections, and despite the attempt to rigorously analyze it, his text itself remains 
decidedly speculative in logic and consequence. Its formal and material properties, the process in 
which the proposed transfer between art and politics takes place, its actual effects on real people 
and populations, its impact on societal conditions in the era of mass movements and structural 
change—all this remains a question, whether for Schiller or for the Romantic generation that 
would subsequently extend his problematic. In fact, the appearance of this kind of energetic 
union—in the concept of the aesthetic state (Staat)—comes abruptly at the conclusion of the 
letters with little explication. It is asserted as the ultimate desideratum of the age, but not 
explained in detail. It nevertheless contains the summit-point of Schiller’s entire exposition 
insofar as the political anthropology he describes throughout the letters has been aiming at it 
from the beginning. This state, arising at the very end of the text, represents a quick qualitative 
leap in thought, a synapse in the argument that helps make the final bridge between aesthetic 
experience and ideal communal organization, the latter only realized when subject-citizens at 
play fully occupy the future society. Before turning to an introduction of the Romantic model of 
wild politics, an examination of the central segments of the letters is necessary to understand this 
culminating formation of political aesthetics, especially given its significance as a conceptual 
departure point for the following exploration of the texts of political Romanticism.  
These segments describe Schiller’s well-known anthropological theory of human drives 
or impulses. According to a triadic schema, the activity of the play drive (Spieltrieb) suspends, or 
                                                 






rather makes dynamic, the constitutive psychosomatic opposition of the sensuous and formal 
impulse (Sachtrieb and Formtrieb)20 at the basis of every human life. The motive force of 
aesthetic experience (ästhetischer Zustand),21 Schiller designates the play drive in terms of its 
uniquely ludic status: play introduces a dynamic alternation between form, or active form-giving 
rational thinking, and the bodily senses, the passive sense-apparatus of natural determination. 
The dichotomous work of the drives is essential to anthropological nature, and normally (before 
Schiller’s sense of political aesthetic intervention) each drive proceeds independently within its 
respective domain, affording the human being the specific activity needed for a given cognitive 
or corporeal task. But they constantly run the risk, if they become overdeveloped, of imbalancing 
the drive-structure, resulting in mutated forms of life (the philosophical barbarian or the base 
materialist savage). With this latter aspect, Schiller introduces an influential reading of the 
pathological signature of the modern age, a kind of etiological analysis of an increasingly 
threatened modern subject, afflicted at the site of the individual physiological and collective 
political body. 
The designated therapeutic task of aesthetic education is to insert itself in-between the 
two drives. It brings them together in a transcending activity—stimulated by the impulse of 
beautiful play—that re-organizes their differing functions, modulating their potential dangers in a 
mutually reciprocal triangular relationship. Complete human capacity is reached in this state 
(Zustand and Staat) by submitting the objective materials of nature—which the artist or any ludic 
subject draws on—to the heteronomy of the subjective ego, and in a simultaneous inverse 
procedure: by grounding the freedom of thinking in the objective environment and its effect on 
                                                 
20 Schiller, 8:340-341. 
 






the bodily senses, recognizing nature’s fundamental determination of all being and human 
pursuits. Once again, such a play experience is one of freedom generated through the artwork, a 
moment of aesthetic creativity that for Schiller always conflates operations of the speculative 
imagination with the material forces of the objective natural environment, collapsing the formal-
forming work of the mind into the sensuous reactivity of bodily experience in nature. Each drive, 
essential as it is in its own respect, is to be played off and with the other. 
The general function of the play drive, then, is to unify form and content, autonomous 
subjectivity and mute matter, moral freedom and natural determination. But significantly for a 
discussion of its political dimensions, aesthetic activity so understood is also supposed to erode 
the divisions between social classes: it also brings together different forms of individual and 
interpersonal life within the ideal aestheticized Bund. Play liberates the human being at the level 
of the drives from the generalized psychosomatic repression to which it is increasingly subjected 
in modern conditions. This necessarily leads to a revision in the current norms of sociability. 
Play sociability is predicated on a primary movement of conceptual/practical amalgamation, a 
synthetic procedure of the imagination that leads to the interpenetration of all kinds of 
oppositions, including directly political ones. It is structured in explicit contradistinction to the 
domineering analytical division, mechanistic reduction, and functional instrumentalization of the 
modern subject rigorously controlled—and suffering—under the present regime of status quo 
life.22  
Schiller finds the play drive to occupy something like a universal space of free 
development that enlivens both subjective and collective life, abolishing their limiting horizons, 
                                                 






rendering them fluid and indifferentiated, whether applied to the realm of abstract ideas or 
everyday life. Since it is a basic capacity of the human organism in its drive to self-
transcendence, aesthetic play (at least in one sense) is not a matter of exclusive aristocratic 
education or of any kind of privileged specialization at all, although Schiller, as we will see, will 
vacillate precisely on this issue by the end of the letters. There is indeed much training to be 
done for it to become fully cultivated and productive, a whole new form of education that itself 
remains to be theorized adequately. But this practice of leading out (educare) is still open to the 
masses and elite alike, to all people, a core anthropological feature that the violence of modern 
experience throws into sharp relief.23  
Play thus incites the intellectual/sensuous force with which all members of the 
postrevolutionary world learn to liberate themselves from imposed repression. It is the exercise 
through which they are first educated into a cohesive egalitarian entity, a body politic 
reawakened, rejuvenated, and intent on freeing itself from the various agents and doctrines of 
alienation that historically control it. Everyone is finally brought together in perpetual concord in 
the aesthetic state, or at least this is the explicit regulative ideal involved. Aesthetic liberation 
appears in this sense as the initial task of postrevolutionary modernity because it is the 
transhistorical culmination of all human progress, the overcoming of societal divisions and the 
                                                 
23 In his discussion of the “theoretical and political operation […] at the heart of Schiller’s On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man” Jacques Rancière notes that: “Behind the Kantian definition of aesthetic judgement as a 
judgement without concepts—without the submission of the intuitive given to conceptual determination—, Schiller 
indicates the political distribution that is the matter at stake: the division between those who act and those who are 
acted upon, between the cultivated classes that have access to a totalization of lived experience and the uncivilized 
classes immersed in the parceling out of work and of sensory experience. Schiller’s ‘aesthetic’ state, by suspending 
the opposition between active understanding and passive sensibility, aims at breaking down—with an idea of art—
an idea of society based on the opposition between those who think and decide and those who are doomed to 






achievement of lasting social equilibrium. It must become the purview of the modern subject-
citizen if the self-imposed state of immaturity is to be outgrown.24  
In the wake of this anthropological shift towards a more complex, generalized sense of 
artistic sociability, the ideal political order then slots into place. This stage of political 
construction is the necessary result of the successful reorganization of the drives as interactive, 
or the liberation of the human being from the innate natural (physiological) and ideologically 
encoded (historical, social) restrictions that have previously determined it. Through the spread of 
communally-binding forms of aestheticized life, the utopian human type—and ideal polis—will 
emerge out of this imaginative self-procedure in its true, but still not yet realized, form of 
autonomous activity: “der Mensch spielt nur,” Schiller writes, “wo er in voller Bedeutung des 
Worts Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt.”25 
Jacques Rancière has done much to first elaborate the revolutionary futural core of 
Schiller’s political aesthetics, and then to track its reappearance in the Romantic system of 
thought. He takes the dual critical-utopianist tendency noted above to be the signal importance of 
the letters as a whole, its “unsurpassable” contribution to the coming tradition of avant-garde 
political imagination, its origin and “starting point.”26 More exactly, he looks to Schiller’s text 
                                                 
24 This also informs Schiller’s critique of what he takes to be the French Revolution’s complete failure in Jacobin 
Terror: the people were immature, that is, they lacked the requisite training in practical aesthetic emancipation, 
finding themselves unable to realize the true transformative potential in their own revolutionary process, instead 
develoving into an unethical state of anarchic nature and physical force. After the proposed aesthetic education 
becomes practical, and widely practiced, the resulting revolution would be automatic, and necessarily bloodless. As 
Matuschek puts it: “So lautet die Diagnose der Briefe: Das vom Adel unterdrückte Volk habe niemals erfahren 
können, was Freiheit bedeute, so dass es bei seinem ersten gewaltsamen Griff nach der Freiheit unfähig gewesen sei, 
mit ihr verantwortungsvoll umzugehen. Vor der politischen Schönheit, so folgert Schiller, müsse deshalb die 
individuelle Einübung der Freiheit liegen, die durch nichts anderes erfolgen könne als durch die Schönheit” 
(Matuschek, 130). 
 
25 Schiller, 8:355. 
 






for the decisive historic moment that couples the emergent occupational form of the artist around 
1800 to the nascent aesthetic turn emerging concurrently. The artist, developing within the on-
going structural changes of modernization—and in an increasingly self-conscious opposition to a 
status quo modernity writ large, and thus representing a new kind of aesthetic subject, the 
subject-citizen at play against the dominant trend of the times—is linked to a specifically 
modern notion of art as an autonomous regime of life: “the specific mode of being of whatever 
falls within the domain of art, to the mode of being of the objects of art.”27 Following Schiller, 
Rancière explores the revolutionary concept of aesthetic experience beginning in this period not 
in the terms of a novel political platform with a straightforwardly pragmatic effect (as, for 
example, propaganda, polemic, journalism, Tendenzliteratur, etc.), but as a kind of epipolitical 
activity characterizing a new (anti)productive occupation. An imaginative medium that 
immediately departs from but then also rebounds on the reality of the modern establishment,28 
modern art so understood freely extricates itself from “ordinary conditions,” expressing the 
innate “heterogenous power” of the otherworldly being of the imagination to do so. 
Key for Rancière is how this transgressive autonomy of the literary artwork vis-à-vis 
normative social reality is then claimed as the specific “work” of the modern artist, as the artist’s 
singular domain of “productive” existence under modern conditions. The contribution of the 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 22. 
 
28 The status of the “establishment” around 1800 in Germany bears some attention, as it forms an essential 
relationship with Romanticism. Politically, it can be summarized as the complete dominance of the aristocratic 
nobility, gentry, and church in all affairs of state. And even after the mediatization of the patchwork of territories in 
the Holy Roman Empire into larger states (Prussia, for example) by Napoleonic forces, the aristocratic nobility—
some of whom, to be sure, inititated programs of Enlightenment reform (Weimar)—retains strict control for 
decades. German-speaking lands wait until 1848 until massive structural changes occur. Culturally, the 
establishment is everything the aesthetic revolution of Romanticism stylizes itself against: a stifling neo-classicism 
most immediately expressed by Goethe and Schiller; a reductive insistence on the primacy of aesthetic doctrines of 
harmony and balance over a nascent sense of the modern, Romantic, “interesting” novel or fragment; an 
overweening rationalism, empiricism, and mechanistic thinking inherited from the Enlightenment that banishes 






artist to society becomes just the specific model of productivity of art, the kinds of estranging 
beings and worlds (and self-reflexive aesthetic theories) that artists build up in the strange 
workshop of the imagination. But for Rancière this also means that the functional understanding 
of the frequently isolated and ostracized modern artist—and thereafter the social significance of 
modern literature—becomes that of a practical agent and activity that no longer fits into the 
normative distribution of contemporary existence, quite the contrary. To read the modern poet, 
who also insists, as Rancière describes it, on the unique work that art performs,29 is to expose 
oneself to the disruptive alterity of an aesthetic “economy” positioned somewhere beyond the 
control of normative dominance (in Bohemia, so to speak). It means commiting oneself to a 
critical and, with Schiller, revolutionary standpoint vis-à-vis the dominant social environment, 
entrenched in conventional social sub-spheres that block the modern subject, at least as far as 
possible, from asserting the rights of political freedom and equality.30 After him, and above all in 
the Romantic tradition, the work of aesthetics also becomes that of a political aesthetics, or a 
literary practice that performs, at the level of form and content, an estranged world and 
emancipatory way of life. 
                                                 
29 On this sense of literary work in the aesthetic regime, see Rancière, 42-45. 
 
30 For Marcuse, Schiller’s aesthetic state posits the work of the modern artist—or the individual and group whose 
natural capacity for libidinal play is no longer repressed, but wildly expressive—as a kind of alternative “economic” 
agent, operative in an anti-economy opposed to the alienated division and experience of labor that the modern 
capitalist performance principle ideologically supports (and this already around 1800): “Jetzt verrät die Idee von 
‘Spiel’ und ‘Schein’ ihren ganzen Abstand von den Wertmaßstäben der Produktivität und Leistung; das Spiel ist 
eben deswegen uproduktiv, weil es die unterdrückenden und ausnützerischen Züge im System von Arbeit und Ruhe 
aufhebt, es ‘spielt’ nur mit der Realität” (Marcuse, 169). But here it should be emphasized that from the perspective 
of the artwork, and of the life and work ascribed to the modern artist, Schiller’s notion of political aesthetics asserts 







Rancière refers to this notion of the artist and artistic activity as the beginning of the 
“aesthetic regime of the arts” around 1800, finding its exemplary instance in Schiller’s letters. 
The aesthetic regime: 
strictly identifies art in the singular and frees it from any specific rule, from any hierarchy 
of the arts, subject matter, and genres. Yet it does so by destroying the mimetic barrier 
that […] separated its rules from the order of social occupations […] It simultaneously 
establishes the autonomy of art and the identity of its forms with the forms that life uses 
to shape itself.31  
“Art in the singular” is delivered by, or must be understood as identical with, the form of life of 
the modern artist who scrambles the hierarchy of the dominant division (partage) of the sensible, 
as Rancière puts it, disturbing through the inherent autonomous being of aesthetic experience the 
limited access to equal representation, participation, and expression that the (early) administered 
world allows the modern subject. The artist’s occupation, under incipient modernization around 
1800, is to break down the mimentic barriers that have restricted life from unfolding in an 
artwork of freedom, barriers used to delimit and ideologically reconstruct present existence for 
the needs of a given power structure and attendant mode of controlled consciousness. 
Accordingly, for Rancière the artist “establishes the autonomy of art” as identical to the 
autonomous “forms that life uses to shape itself”: the socially productive work of the modern 
artist is to offer the autonomous experience of the artwork as a critical fact in accord with the 
freedom of life itself, or to critically reapply the heterogeneity of imaginative worlds—which 
essentially accord with a free life in opposition to modern forms of alienation and social 
division—back onto the alienated social field.32  
                                                 
31 Rancière, 23. 
 
32 Referring to Rancière’s discussion here, Ken Kuiken writes that “in Rancière’s interpretation, this autonomy [i.e., 
that of the artwork in the modern aesthetic regime] ultimately creates a discourse on the perceptible that is not 






The identity of art and life itself stands over and against the controlled determination of 
political experience at the most basic level.”Schiller’s aesthetic state,” Rancière goes on, “is this 
regime’s first manifesto (and remains, in a sense, unsurpassable).”33 This aesthetic state depends 
on the material/formal interplay of the Spieltrieb to bring into being: “a pure instance of 
suspension,” but more importantly, it is the “moment of the formation and education of a specific 
type of humanity.”34 Again, the “unsurpassable reference point” given in Schiller’s formulation 
of an aesthetic education of humanity introduces “a sort of new region of being—the region of 
free play and appearance—that makes it possible to conceive of the equality whose direct 
materialization, according to Schiller, was shown to be impossible by the French Revolution.”35 
In sum, for Schiller the ultimate free political order, the utopian community to come, emerges 
first and foremost in an imaginative dismantling of the very horizons of possibility of the human 
being, and thus also in a reconstrual of modern humanity’s ideal of political community. Such 
are the rough outlines of the proposed intervention in the letters, culminating in its last pages in 
the vision of the aesthetic state mentioned above.  
So we find in the closing passages the quick conceptual jump from the anthropological 
drive-state (Zustand) of the subject in free play, as discussed throughout the series of letters up to 
that point, to its full politicization in the final postulate of the aesthetic political state (Staat), the 
                                                 
an alternative form of community. As Rancière insists, ‘there never has been any ‘aestheticization’ of politics in the 
modern sense because politics is aesthetic in principle. But the autonomization of aesthetics as a new nexus between 
the order of the logos and the partition of the perceptible is part of the modern configuration of politics’” (Ken 
Kuiken, “’The Power of a Form of Thought that Has Become Foreign to Itself’: Rancière, Romanticism, and the 
partage of the sensible.” SubStance 149, vol. 45, no. 13 [2016]: 13). 
 
33 Rancière, 23. 
 
34 Ibid., 24. 
 






future state, now freed from the limitations of modernity, inhabited by an autonomous collective 
of artistic subject-citizens. Analogous to the effect of the play-drive on the order(s) of the 
embodied mind, the properly aesthetic political state suspends the material state of nature, or 
what he calls the dynamic state (dynamischer Staat)—in which the interaction of individuated 
physical forces alone determines social relations (in correspondence with the Sachtrieb)—just as 
it suspends the ethical state (ethischer Staat)—in which individual subjects freely and rationally 
subordinate themselves to the interests of the whole (the political instantiation of the Formtrieb 
according to the categorical imperative). Both of these basic types of social organization are to 
be inserted into a dynamic relation in the alternative political state of the aesthetic regime, which 
modulates the activities of the drives in triple reciprocality. The play-drive, Schiller insists, will 
reign supreme in an elastic state-formation of its own making, a modern (and proto-Romantic) 
update of the zoophyte character (“Polypennatur”)36 of the ancient Greek polis.37 It will usher in 
the utopian conditions that dominant political structures and their agents have suppressed, 
instead choosing the interests of the few in the name of the status quo. And it will do so not by 
violently supplanting status quo controls, but by re-educating subject-citizens—or calling on 
them to do it themselves—in a manner designed to preempt any violent sociopolitical coercion in 
the first place. 
And yet, in the last instance, Schiller pulls back from the full consequences of his own 
line of reasoning, even if, as Rancière points out, he pursues its course throughout the letters: at 
the end of the text, it is as if the proposed emancipation of modern society must be rechanneled 
                                                 
36 Schiller, 8:319. 
 
37 See Joseph Vogl, “Staatsbegehren: Zur Epoche der Policey,” in Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für 






at all costs, or deferred to the future not as a communal task of modernity, but as the project of an 
educated vanguardist group, a carefully restricted and secretive cell. The final word of the text, 
added in its second version (and thus reflecting perhaps a certain realpolitical resignation in the 
development of Schiller’s political standpoint), is as follows: 
Existiert aber auch ein solcher Staat des schönen Scheins? Und wo ist er zu finden? Dem 
Bedürfnis nach existiert er in jeder fein gestimmten Seele; der Tat nach möchte man ihn 
wohl nur, wie die reine Kirche und die reine Republik, in einigen wenigen auserlesenen 
Zirkeln finden, wo nicht die geistlose Nachahmung fremder Sitten, sondern eigene 
schöne Natur das Betragen lenkt, wo der Mensch durch die verwickeltsten Verhältnisse 
mit kühner Einfalt und ruhiger Unschuld geht und weder nötig hat, fremde Freiheit zu 
kränken, um die seinige zu behaupten, noch seine Würde wegzuwerfen, um Anmut zu 
zeigen.38 
But even beyond this invocation of a select group of initiated souls, in a pure church or republic 
able to convert the Kunst des Ideals into the ideal artistic act (Tat)—which clearly deflects earlier 
moments in the letters, as noted above, that point towards a decidedly collective scale for artistic 
intervention—Schiller’s aesthetic state is already predicated on a rigorous normative framework 
at a more fundamental level.39 Even while the possible politicization of the aesthetic, and vice-
versa, is continuously questioned and reformulated in different terms in Schiller’s text, it 
nevertheless does find a clear answer in the analysis/synthesis of the tripartite anthropological 
drive-structure, and in the resulting notion of a practical freedom revealed in aesthetic 
experience. Its whole operation is to rebuild together savage sensuousness and barbaric 
                                                 
38 Schiller, 8:408. 
 
39 The initial programmatic statement of Schiller’s journal Horen, in which the second version of the letters was first 
published, also focuses on this figure of a select vanguard circle as the key to ideal political transformation. In the 
Vorrede to the journal, Schiller writes: “Mitten in diesem politischen Tumult soll sie für Musen und Charitinnen 
einen engen vertraulichen Zirkel schliessen, aus welchem alles verbannt sein wird, was mit einem unreinen 
Parteigeist gestempelt ist. Aber indem sie sich alle Beziehungen auf den jetzigen Weltlauf und auf die nächsten 
Erwartungen der Menschheit verbietet, wird sie über die vergangene Welt die Geschichte, und über die kommende 
die Philosophie befragen, wird sie zu dem Ideale veredelter Menschheit, welches durch die Vernunft aufgegeben, in 
der Erfahrung aber so leicht aus den Augen gerückt wird, einzelne Züge sammeln, und an dem stillen Bau besserer 
Begriffe, reinerer Grundsätze und edlerer Sitten, von dem zuletzt alle wahre Verbesserung des gesellschaftlichen 






intellectualism, containing them in a transcending third concept-practice and universalizing it as 
a general social process, but all this, in the last turn of the text, explicitly relegated to the level of 
ideal, future relations within a specific domain of reality: aesthetic alter-reality. Schiller ends 
precisely in an overdetermined movement of containment: first, the aesthetic state can only be 
populated with a circumscribed concept of the subject of play and its proper localization in 
artistic experience (play as the circumscription of the violent excesses of the drives within the 
space of aesthetic experience), and second, its practical actualization is only possible as the 
prospective task of a pure elite.40  
It is in light of this that the difference between Schiller’s plan and that of the Romantics 
emerges most clearly. They begin to offer alternatives to his alternative in a more dedicated 
experimental mode, proceeding far beyond the opening he provides by first allocating 
ontological efficacy to the imagination—as Schiller does, asserting that the species-being of 
humanity achieves a fundamentally new state by following the way of art—but then locating this 
transcendent force not merely in aesthetic transformations, but in all fields of life, in all pursuits 
of knowledge and practice. Indeed, this dimension is understood as basic to life itself, the 
expression of a constant state of transitional becoming, an imaginary of/in nature as much as 
                                                 
40 For a discussion of the last letter’s (Kantian) restriction on what otherwise appears as an all-inclusive or 
democratic actualization of aesthetic play, and as the purview of all subject-citizens and social groups under 
modernity, see Matuschek, 219-222. The apparently reactionary, anti-democratic aspect of the concluding image of 
the aesthetic state in the last letter has resulted, as Tribe puts it, in the confused political assessment of Schiller’s 
text: “The intention of Schiller’s argument [in the letters] has been a perennial bone of contention. Was the idea of 
aesthetic education a mere flight from a political revolution gone wrong into an elitist aesthetic utopia? Or, rather, 
was it an essay in political anthropology, treating political ills at their roots in human nature? Is aesthetic education 
the means or the ends of the process described by Schiller?” (Tribe, vii). One way to approach the question is to 
point to how the constitutive ambiguity—and final attenuation—involved in Schiller’s attempt to provide a 
totalizing concept of the aesthetic state (as Zustand and Staat), makes its answer impossible and perhaps 
unnecessary. Within its inchoate outline, a number of opposing political messages can be drawn from the potential it 
opens; in terms of its foundational influence on later political aesthetics, it is exactly its exemplary ability to effect 
an imaginative opening in the real as such—thus allowing the thinking of radical alternatives—that has proven most 







human experience. Romantic forms of thought thus assert the nature of the world as constitutive 
with the powers of the imagination, approaching the surrounding environment as an immanent 
zone of existential change, needing merely to observe and record its individuated processes and 
general patterns. But they also call for the intensification of the world, the reconfiguration of 
human experience (and human understanding of nature) in all its standard forms, through 
operations of the imagination. Utilizing speculative thinking for the reconstitution of the private 
and public sphere of life, by and for every member of modern society, in all domains of human 
investigation and creativity, Romanticism thrives off of this tension between ontological insight 
and political imperative. Reality, seen properly, is itself revolutionary, and yet not enough: it 
must itself be transformed and pushed further along the revolutionary lines of flight it already 
offers in secret or esoteric indications. Every aspect of an already infinitely mysterious lived 
experience must be opened up to its most imaginative possibilities. 
So whereas Schiller describes a kind of via negativa for the quasi-Kantian individual 
subject that only suspends the already present action of the opposed drives for a select few (even 
in its vision of synthesis, in the characteristic operations of a future mode of civilization), in the 
Romantic system of thought the drives, and the experimental activities that impinge upon them 
(not just art, but also philosophy, psychology, natural science, religion, etc.) are made to escape 
and become wildly productive, proliferating into a number of inventive disciplines and 
imaginative forms of individual and collective life. The kind of avant-garde circle the Romantics 
develop, in other words, will only define its unique mode of being and thought insofar as it 
admits to universal extension, capable of expanding its own discursive and practical boundaries, 






In this sense, Schiller provides a start for a political Romanticism that takes up modern 
aesthetics as a task of total existential transformation, but thereafter exceeds the purview of any 
normative definition of the proper function of politics and aesthetics vis-à-vis life as a totality 
(Schiller’s included). It pursues its absolute demands in diverse areas of applied theory, 
attempting to fill in the actual content, or at least indicate the necessary contours, of the kind of 
culturally revolutionary work Schiller proposes and defers. Accordingly, versions of the ideal 
church and republic foreseen at the end of the letters will indeed appear in a few chosen circles 
(“auserlesene Zirkel”)—in the avant-garde group of the Romantics themselves—but their 
romanticized concepts of the same will be anything but strictly delineated, pure, or anti-popular 
in Schiller’s sense. They will strive, at all points, to recognize and increase the utopian imaginary 
already inherent in the real, in present society and its ways of being, its plural offering of 
different knowledge practices and activities. And they will do so through a kind of dispersion of 
disruptive functions of thought applied to all different conventional social roles and identities, or 
a liberation of the traditional occupations and learned subjectivities that each in their own way 
establish the distribution of the sensible in the modern environment of control.  
Rancière offers an idiosyncratic reading of Schiller’s letters, understanding it as a 
manifesto of the prefigurative revolutionary imaginary—and of its mode of social being and 
labor—that modern aesthetic experience generates in forceful, albeit often ignored, ways. As we 
will see in the following chapters, it would be the Romantics who articulate further possibilities 
for this kind of existential shift through the imagination, and pursue its course into regimes of 
being often far removed from conventional understandings of the aesthetic or the political, even 
while binding them all more tightly together as part of one ultimate trigger-event on a collective 






present study begins from the position that the Romantics do qualitatively surpass Schiller’s 
ground-breaking intervention here. The content and detail of political Romanticism in this sense 
constitutes the main focus in what follows. 
III. Romantic Political Imagination 
Thinkers like Schiller, and the Romantics after him, use their literary practice to 
introduce programmatic dissent into the well-ordered arrangement of entrenched custom, 
whether philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, religious, or political in nature.41 With exactly the 
sense of possibility or Möglichkeitssinn called for in the letters, the Romantics produce counter-
images of past, present, and future society in written form, convinced as they were—like 
Schiller—that just here lay the only revolutionary path with real hopes for not devolving into 
anarchic violence. As a progressive project of individual and collective re-education, they 
envision political change as a totalizing existential becoming, a universal process of cultural 
Bildung that cuts across the entire sociopolitical field. Rancière also draws attention to this 
aspect in Schiller’s work, and to its later Romantic adaptation, where it takes on explicitly 
material terms: 
The ‘aesthetic revolution’ produced a new idea of political revolution: the material 
realization of a common humanity still only existing as an idea. This is how Schiller’s 
‘aesthetic state’ became the ‘aesthetic programme’ of German Romanticism, the 
programme summarized in the rough draft written together by Hegel, Hölderlin, and 
Schelling [Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus]: the material 
realization of unconditional freedom and pure thought in common forms of life and 
belief.42 
                                                 
41 See Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative (Cambridge: Harvard, 2003), 41. Beiser refers to the early 
Romantics in this sense as “disciples of Schiller” (50). 
 






Schiller’s plan for an aesthetic liberation of modern humanity (“the material realization of a 
common humanity only existing as an idea”) supplies a departure point, but not an exhaustive one, 
for understanding the ways in which the discourse of politics in its wide range across Romantic 
literary practice depends on the valorization of an unbounded imaginative capacity. Covering a 
variety of heterogenous theoretical systems, cultural discourses, and forms of practical activity, 
the fluid doctrine of the Romantic system of thought, itself based on a series of fluid operations of 
the poetic imagination, can in no way be detached—whether at its ideological surface or in its 
systematic presuppositions—from a will to break down and rebuild the very foundations of modern 
political society: first in the realm of the speculative critique, and thereafter as revolutionary praxis, 
both appearing as essentially intertwined in the texts themselves.43  
The wild politics essential to this gesture consists in the refusal of the pragmatic or 
ostensibly realistic—refusing the preeminence of the reality principles that confront and contour 
the status quo horizons of experience of the observer-participant around 1800 (or what Rancière, 
in an proprietary term, calls the “police”44)—in favor of an experimental reconfiguration of the a 
priori of the given materials at hand. In Romantic wild politics, the main object is to locate, 
describe, or sheerly invent the basic concepts and frameworks of knowledge informing the actual 
needed changes that bring about the ideal future community, and the fields in which these 
changes are best pursued. And while it is precisely this evident protean, idealist, or anti-realistic 
element that is most often claimed as the critical failure of Romanticism when it appears 
immediately political, nevertheless, the Romantics themselves—again, following and exceeding 
                                                 
43  I follow Beiser in this claim: see Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism (Cambridge: 
Harvard, 1992), vii. 
 






Schiller’s initial impetus—fully assert the ungovernable potential of sociopolitical force in the 
imagination, and dramatize it in so many applied interventions into their historical moment. 
Rancière’s own work is positioned downstream from what he calls the “aesthetic 
anticipation of the future”45 first evident in modern form in Schiller’s letters, a leitmotif 
sustained throughout the immediate postrevolutionary era in Romantic texts (and beyond, as 
evident in the later historical avant-garde as well). One way to condense the influential impact of 
the Schillerian-Romantic transition—which is also the main focus of Rancière’s discussion—is 
to emphasize its notion of revolutionary engagement at the primary aesthetic level, beneath, so to 
speak, conventional political strategy and pragmatic forms of implementing social change.46 For 
Schiller and the Romantics (and for Rancière as well), real artistic, philosophical, or scientific 
work entails first and foremost presupposing a model of human life in its fundamental potential, 
a sense of the open possibility or Möglichkeitssinn of the human being in its on-going struggle to 
assert itself against the dominant controls on its own historical evolution. Only an alternative 
anthropology that sees this politicized operation of the imagination as a critical and therefore 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 29. 
 
46 Here and in the following I use the term “aesthetic” to denote both artworks and their discussion in the general or 
commonplace sense, but also to indicate the function of artworks—literature—to impinge upon, manipulate, and 
expand the individual and collective sensorium, this latter definition being key to this study’s notion of political 
aesthetics. (Marcuse treats the eighteenth century shift from aesthetics as the science of the senses—in 
Baumgarten’s and then Kant’s theories—to a terminological definition of aesthetics as the investigation of beautiful 
artworks [see Marcuse, 156-160]). Rancière’s formulations of political aesthetics become important in this respect. 
For him, politics and aesthetics combine at the so-called primary level in what he calls the historically, i.e., 
politically determined “distribution of the sensible”: “the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that 
simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts 
and positions within it” (Rancière, 12). “Aesthetic acts” appear in this framework as “configurations of experience 
that create new modes of sense perception and induce novel forms of political subjectivity,” while politics, in 
necessary connection, “revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see 
and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Ibid., 9, 13). “The important 
thing,” Rancière concludes, “is that the question of the relationship between aesthetics and politics be raised at this 
level, the level of the sensible delimitation of what is common to the community, the forms of its visibility and its 






salutary expansion of the given real, as a reconfiguration of the natural and sociohistorically built 
environment (Rancière’s distribution of the sensible, or what Marcuse specifies in more detail as 
a capitalist “Leistungsprinzip”)47 could offer the sense of revolutionary activism called for in the 
texts of political Romanticism, deemed capable of changing the course of modern historical 
progression. For Schiller in attenuated form, and for the Romantics in full force, it would take a 
prefigurative image of humanity as a political aesthetic project without boundaries, a 
reevaluation of the open-ended imaginative powers of the human subject and collective, to show 
the way (Weg), as Schiller puts it, to move towards freedom (“durch welche man zu der Freiheit 
wandert.”)  
Forms of Realpolitik that neutralize imaginative excess and speculative experimentation, 
in other words, become the primary critical target of Romantic political aesthetics. In a gesture 
that immediately departs from or simply abandons altogether the very determined distribution of 
the anthropologically—and thus politically—sensible (or to speak with Marcuse: in a gesture of 
the “Große Weigerung” of modern political aesthetics),48 Romantic texts dramatize a kind of 
Möglichkeitspolitik applied to the contemporary social moment in full consciousness of the ideal, 
prefigurative, or counter-factual impetus of its form and content: this is in fact what they 
understand as the critical feature of the visionary solutions they posit in response. And this 
sustained position and method, that of the Schillerian Kunst des Ideals in its extended or 
romanticized version is, moreover, what makes it appear as a coherent political problematic at 
the core of the movement from its early to late phases. The Romantics are thus committed, to 
speak with Etienne Balibar, to the “the task of aesthetics [or political aesthetics], not in the sense 
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of institutionalized art but in a somewhat wilder or less controllable way […] to constantly offer 
individuals new manners of imagining how they might live.”49 
Such a wild political paradigm arising throughout Romantic works from around 1800 to 
around 1830—developing into the most speculative sense of political Einbildungskraft to emerge 
in this period—constitutes the main focus of this dissertation, and it interrelates the following 
explorations of political Romanticism in a selection of texts from Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, 
Friedrich Schelling, Johann Wilhelm Ritter, and August Klingemann (the latter more exactly a 
kind of para-Romantic figure),50 among others. My main intention with relying on the 
framework of wild politics is to show how such thinkers formulate a political aesthetics that de-
normalizes modern existence as a whole, coming to function as a sustained conceptual 
destabilization of entrenched contemporary life, at all points in the development of the Romantic 
movement, across all its major fields of investment. Just for this reason, the wild political 
framework also focuses on the Romantics’ speculative reconstruction of contemporary social 
existence—their positive alternative—in philosophical, literary, scientific, religious, and above 
all imaginative political projects that quickly outstrip Schiller’s initial forays into the future 
aesthetic state.  
This notion of a social efficacy, expressed where the imagination introduces an element 
of chaos into everyday life—or is propelled through literary work to do so—is in fact what 
Schlegel identifies as the most extreme kind of productive incomprehensibility, the becoming-
wild of irony that creatively destroys everything that governs it: “wenn die Ironie wild wird, und 
                                                 
49 Cited in Brian Holmes, Quixotic Autonomy: Social Self-Consciousness in the Novels of Flaubert and Cervantes. 
Dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1996), 1. 
50 In the following, Klingemann’s 1804 novel Nachtwachen forms the object of an excursus into wild politics that 






sich nicht mehr regieren läßt […]”51 Schlegel refers here to the radical variant of irony that can 
no longer be controlled or made comprehensible within a discursive system of text or speech, 
and because of this points to a basic faculty of the thinking subject to release itself, under certain 
(ironic, i.e., aestheticized) conditions, from the restrictions imposed upon it. 52 But this reference 
also contains a trace of the Regierung, which, as he suggests more forcefully elsewhere, is in 
large part responsible for such impositions. The government, and the bourgeois social organism 
that supports it, makes the social environment comprehensible only at a cost, namely: by 
subduing the productive ground of chaos out of which natural and social life communicates 
itself, reformulating it as an object of linguistic and social control, making it into a productive 
instrument of knowledge and power.  
But the general hallmark of Schlegel’s own intellectual practice can also be understood in 
light of this statement, that is, as a kind of constant ironization of the material it treats precisely 
inasmuch as it dissolves the molds of the discourses in question, liberating the desired 
(Romantic) form of knowledge or practical life from its previous historical emplacements and 
increasing its quotient of ungovernability or wildness. Like all the authors examined in the 
following chapters, throughout his works Schlegel attempts to enlarge the given horizons of a 
life practice (philosophy, literature, politics, science, spirituality, social relations) through 
                                                 
51 Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe. Ed. Ernst Behler. vol. 11 (Munich: Schöningh, 1958), 
393. Unless otherwise noted, all citations from Schlegel will be drawn from this edition, or from editions that follow 
it, in the format: Volume:Page Number. 
 
52 Manfred Frank defines Schlegel’s concept of irony as a productive tension between a thinking of infinite, 
absolute, and pure activity, and a finite, determined, and limited one: “In order to become comprehensible, that 
which is pure must limit itself; any border contradicts the essential infinity of that which is pure, however; therefore 
it must always overstep the limits which it sets to itself, and then limit itself again, and then overstep these limits, 
and so on and on. This is Schlegel’s model of irony […] Precisely this surpassing of all self-imposed limits is what 
Schlegel calls irony” (Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism [New York: State 
University, 2004], 215). On Schlegel’s concept of irony, see also Ernst Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory 






introducing the imaginative element of a heterogenous other, an incomprehensible alterity or 
object with an attendant potential for profound existential change. But also in the 
symphilosophical work of the wider Romantic movement, a variety of previously constrained 
and circumscribed fields of modern experience attach to a vision of a politically transformed, or 
de-regulated, subject-citizen and community. Pushing their former bounded domains of activity, 
or collapsing them altogether, their respective tasks are redefined as part of a shared collective 
mission of social metamorphosis. The Romantics articulate a coherent political perspective 
insofar as they criticize and rethink the status of contemporary life through the means of the 
imagination, and value the imaginative faculty above all as part of the critical human capacity to 
emancipate itself collectively. 
IV. Wild Politics as a Paradigm 
The present study argues that the Romantic system of thought relies on a specifically wild 
sense of the political imagination applied to three major scenes of intervention: affect, nature, 
and religion.53 The following chapters delve into the specifics of each.  
Chapter 1: at the beginning of the Romantic movement’s political coming-into-
consciousness, around 1800 Novalis proposes a poetics of love in which a revision of the 
Schillerian operations of aesthetic play includes the potentialization of affect to politics. To 
effectively reconstitute the current Prussian state from the perspective of the monarch and the 
common citizen, Novalis draws on a unique framework of the fairy tale (or Märchenpolitik) to 
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systematize the estranging effects of rethinking postrevolutionary society as a messianic task of 
proliferating love.  
Chapter 2: the anonymous author(s) of Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen 
Idealismus (most likely Schelling), Schlegel, and Johann Wilhelm Ritter all share the demand for 
the so-called new mythology that would revolutionize modernity through the transformation of 
the human’s relationship to nature: together they articulate a kind of doctrine of Naturpolitik. 
Located primarily in the politicization of nature, the existential effect of change ascribed to the 
Romantic physics of organicism and dynamism in new mythological texts draws its source 
material directly from an imaginative figure of cosmological science.  
Chapter 3: Excursus: in a brief departure from these central figures, the much neglected 
novel Nachtwachen by August Klingemann stages a materialist—and openly nihilistic—
confrontation with the idealist core of political Romanticism. Nachtwachen’s protagonist, the 
nightwatchman Kreuzgang, comes to police Romantic poetics even as he simultaneously 
subverts the Polizei-function of the state apparatus he is sworn to protect, spreading chaos 
throughout his community in an effort to invert its dominant hierarchies and normative social 
structures. Here Romanticism, in danger of losing itself in an Icarian pursuit of the Absolute, is 
brought back down to earth by the Nachtpolitik of the nightwatchman and reintroduced to the 
sociopolitical realities of the everyday environment around 1800. Even so—or precisely because 
of this conceptual-practical descent—the novel offers some of the most transgressive 
revolutionary depictions of wild political imagination within the Romantic discourse network. 
Chapter 4: culminating some two decades after these two initial moments of Romantic 
wild politics, the late Schlegel begins to intensify his engagement with religious speculation, 






such as in mesmeric medical practices and spiritist phenomena. These occult scientific 
phenomena, and the kind of esoteric Christian science Schlegel invents to explore them, reveal 
the physiological body around 1820 as the combined site of sociohistorical and eschatological 
crisis. Schlegel’s efforts along these lines constitute the last major scene of intervention for wild 
political Romanticism in which the affective, natural scientific, and religious drives of a 
proposed future community all coalesce into a practice of Religionspolitik.  
In each of the chapters, a different structural facet of the imaginative application of 
politics becomes evident in Romantic texts, and together their case study outlines the formal 
features of the movement’s wild political approach. These facets, or paradigmatic methods and 
approaches in the Romantic system of thought, can be summarized in terms of the characteristic 
field, activity, temporality, and sociopolitical expression for which they are designed: their 
combination informs the general refunctionalization of affect, nature, and religion in the political 
imaginary of Romanticism.  
1) Field: the theoretical and practical scope of wild politics is metadisciplinary. In a set of 
variations on a theme, a cohesive body of Romantic texts articulate a kind of super-discourse that 
recombines, as noted above, the dispersion of modern knowledge practices into a form of 
universal identity, the key to recognizing the necessary global alterations to life as such. This 
amounts to an essentially speculative figure, a meta-analogy that makes clear the basic 
correspondence of all micro- and macrological experience, microcosm and macrocosm. Relating 
environmental process and individuated anthropological becoming, ideal human capacity and its 
concretization in the sociopolitical environment, Romantic metadisciplinarity reads them 
together and ultimately points to the confluence of all attempts to critically analyse, and 






For example: Novalis’ poetic and scientific fragments in Das allgemeine Brouillon, 
Freiberger Studien, and Glauben und Liebe elaborate a framework of the Romantic fairy tale in 
terms of its operations of aesthetic-affective metamorphosis (Liebe), connecting it to the 
contemporary mobilization of political emotions around 1800 and using it for a radical critique 
of postrevolutionary Prussian society. The metadisciplinary constellation of Märchenpolitik thus 
appears in the specific conceptual imbrication of love, fairy tale, and politics. 
In Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus, Schlegel’s Gespräch über die 
Poesie, and Ritter’s Versuch über den Galvanismus, Physik als Kunst, and Fragmente aus dem 
Nachlasse eines jungen Physikers, speculative natural science— contemporary Naturphilosophie 
or the Romantic physics of organicism and dynamism—is given a revolutionary, and indeed 
cosmopolitical agenda. It is to discover and make practicable a transformative relationship 
between modern humanity and nature itself in the institution of an alternative society, a utopia 
based in the scientific revelation of the cosmic manifold of force. This constitutes a Naturpolitik 
at the metadisciplinary conjuncture of new mythology, physics, and politics. 
Schlegel’s late manifesto Signatur des Zeitalters and the associated notebooks entitled 
Zur Geschichte und Politik, recast the early Romantic physiological hermeneutic (as exemplified 
in Wilhelm Wackenroder and Ludwig Tieck’s Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden 
Klosterbruders) within the developing discourse of mesmerism and religious spiritualism. 
Schlegel interprets the pathological crisis of the revolutionary epoch around 1820, expressive at 
the site of the spiritist body and body politic, as part of a more comprehensive exegesis of the 
apocalyptic signature of world history accelerating towards its final end. His Religionspolitik at 
the end of the movement consists in a metadisciplinary doctrine that binds together 






As a general schema in the Romantic system of thought, the metadisciplinary figures of 
Märchenpolitik, Naturpolitik, and Religionspolitik all represent couplets (or thrupples) in mutual 
reciprocation, each made more effective through erasing the mimetic barriers, theoretical and 
practical, that historically divide them. They all draw attention to a performed synthesis of 
disparate realms of being and thinking, an activity that resolves them into their possibilities for 
collective social transformation, in the present and future. 
2) Activity: the general operation foregrounded in the above texts constitutes a kind of 
elastic activity proper to Romantic metadisciplinarity. The characteristic nature of the subjects 
and collectives who arise out of the Romantic wild political imaginary is to be always occupied 
with a transitional process of inner and outer becoming, suspending themselves, or residing in 
the productive tension, between everyday realities and the imaginative impulse towards a utopian 
alternative. This is a shared plan for a kind of existential Bildung or Erziehung that succeeds only 
when the manifold of experience, including all its constitutive oppositions in thought and 
practice—in the individual’s subjectivity, interpersonal relations, and in the public sphere—is 
understood as a malleable object, the object of humanity’s unfolding capacity to transcend its 
current fallen status and realize the ideal future state in current activity. 
Thus Novalis will describe the essentially Romantic activity of romanticization 
(romantisieren) as an ordo inversus of phenomenal experience that simultaneously raises the 
mundane to the level of the sacred, and reduces the transcendent into earthly imperfection. The 
activity of romanticization is identified as a restorative procedure of Romantic love and ascribed 
to an elastic model of the subject-collective. The resulting formulation of the so-called 
transmundane agent (Transmundaner) who moves between different worlds, potentializing the 






reconstruct the possible horizons of postrevolutionary society, and this through faith and love 
alone. In the Novalisian political fairy tale, the occupation of the monarch, as well as the average 
citizen—both reconceived as transmundane agents—is to stimulate the (currently weak) affective 
bonds that connect them in the only true political relations: emotions. The monarch is to become 
lovable to the citizen, and citizens begin to love their own sovereign nature, long since obscured 
under modern conditions. Both of them, all segments of modern political society, must be 
rendered constitutively flexible. 
In the complex literary corpus of new mythology, Schelling, Schlegel, and Ritter together 
envision a figure of the Romantic physicist whose activity transgresses the boundaries of 
empirical science, bending the experimental approach towards the full extent of its metaphysical 
consequences. Where Schiller imagines a Kunst des Ideals, the new mythologists will speak of a 
Kunst des Lebens (Ritter) that rethinks scientific practice as a task of messianic reunification 
with nature. They call for a speculative science of the cosmos—a new mythology (Neue 
Mythologie)—that is elastic insofar as it constantly strives to become practical, utilizable for the 
demands of a totalizing existential transformation. Here a certain Romantic metadisciplinarity is 
evident as the occupation of the new scientific generation, its signal activity: the coming 
naturephilosophical physicists will not only reveal the discovery of organic, and then dynamic 
(electromagnetic) nature, they will also contribute to the attempt to reconstruct modern society in 
accord with the surrounding cosmos of force, mobilizing the insights of Romantic science for a 
utopian system of sociopolitical relationships. 
The late Schlegel turns to an idiosyncratic notion of (Catholic) religiosity that constantly 
rebounds between pious resignation and the desire to actualize apocalyptic change in the here 






religare, a binding in thought and practice of different elements and energies, or, as he puts it, an 
unbounded or wild realism (grenzenloser Realismus). For him, the activity of the spiritist healer-
analyst toggles between clinical and world historical prognosis, charting, through painstaking 
observation and speculation, the evolution of eschatological change at the basis of the organic 
body-in-crisis. When the tranced mesmeric body expresses apocalyptic prophecies, Schlegel 
applies this new communicative vessel as part of a program of contemporary metapolitical 
rejuvenation.  
3) Temporality: wild politics, characteristic as a kind of metadiscipline and elastic 
activity of the Romantic literary imagination, interprets history and human evolution over time as 
essentially provisional. Messianic narratives of teleological progress abound in Romantic texts, 
and insofar as they index a certain futural capacity denied to modern humanity—at least for the 
moment—they function as utopianist critiques that relativize the status quo of postrevolutionary 
social organization. In light of such an absolute historical idealization—whether located in pre-
historical Edenic origins, somewhere obscurely embedded in the post-lapsarian modern present, 
or in the promised golden age of the future—contemporary experience, all of previous history, 
can only appear as under erasure, an incomplete symbol or fragment waiting for the ultimate 
crisis-event to render it finally legible. 
Provisionality is necessary in the Romantic philosophy of history because the nascent 
revolutionary energetics, unleashed in contemporary philosophy and statecraft alike—as Schiller 
points out—demands it: in order to attack and then reformulate the modern distribution of the 
sensible on a novel basis, political Romanticism introduces a metahistorical bracketing of the 
current moment, replacing it with a poetic construction that no longer separates the here and now 






explicit in this futurological intention, untethered from historical determination, as is the text of 
Das älteste Systemprogramm, the early Schelling, Schlegel, and Ritter, each in their own ways. 
4) Sociopolitical expression: the typical field, activity, and temporality of the Romantic 
political imaginary eventually expresses itself in the form of a dynamic system, or a framework 
of thought that emphasizes both the productive stimulus of oppositional relations (theoretical-
metaphorical, but also physical), and the need to stabilize sociopolitical forces in a natural state 
of transcending equilibrium. Mereological schemas between part and whole, mechanistic versus 
organicist doctrines of social organization, practical solutions to balance individual freedoms 
against the needs of the greater body politic, problems of constitutionality and lasting peaceful, 
non-alienating and mutually affirmative relationships at the interpersonal, domestic, 
international, and cosmopolitical level: these issues are all translated in Romantic texts into a 
vocabulary of existential becoming, appearing again and again as functionally expanded 
technologies for the coming utopian reorganization of modern life. They are constantly 
reformulated as questions of increasing human power with the resources of its own 
contemporary epoch—whether imaginatively (as Einbildungskraft) or in physiological capacity 
(as Ritter puts it: when modern society becomes electromagnetic). In the fairy tale, new 
mythology, and late religious turn of political Romanticism, a discourse of dynamism 
everywhere seeks and activates material and immaterial forces in the basic drive to collective 
existential transformation.  
Novalis will work out a kind of proto-anarchism based on voiding the conventional 
nature of monarchy as political structure and representative body—as well as any other social 
order that openly dominates its populace. But this will be an elastic, and more exactly chiastic, 






modern political subjects, a new centerpoint for the coming community. He wants the dynamic 
energy released in this imaginative “regicide”—and simultaneous becoming-popular of the 
King—to accrue to all citizens. The people are to recognize that only an egalitarian republic, 
filled with individual citizen-monarchs, could found the so-called new Prussian state through a 
magical-affective (rather than rationalistic-contractual) constitution.  
The early naturephilosophical Schelling, Schlegel, and Ritter offer the clearest variant of 
wild political Romanticism as a “dynamisch Denken” (Schlegel). In their reflections on the 
mysteries of natural dynamic forces, they include a dedicated political physics that recognizes no 
boundaries between, on the one hand, the scientific revelation of the organism and the 
environmental force-field of electromagnetism (beginning in nuce in their own period) and, on 
the other, the postrevolutionary demand to reimagine modern society without alienation and 
mechanistic exploitation. Throughout new mythological discourse, a radical anti-state program is 
called for in the name of an alternative political subject and community based in the speculative 
science of the dynamic cosmos.  
Finally, Schlegel, drawing on and departing from his earlier work on new mythology and 
the dynamics of Romantic Poesie, understands world history in his last phase of work as the 
progressive attempt to identify but also suppress the energies of eschatological change. 
Throughout the 1820s, he develops a hermeneutic framework—a reading practice focused on 
metaphysical, historical, and physiological “signatures”—as a hybrid between the language of 
the physical body in extreme, ecstatic states and the breakthrough of apocalyptic revolution into 
the contemporary epoch. In his late Religionspolitik, Schlegel thus foregrounds the provisionality 
of the present moment by looking to a variety of philosophical and physical indices of the post-






reconfigures contemporary political activity in light of its ultimate transformation, sometime 
after the divine revolution (Gottes-revolution). He will call for the palingenesis, “durch die 
Fantasie bestimmt,”54 of an estranged version of the Catholic church that will serve as the 
transcendental signifier for a global political System des Gleichgewichts or Gegengewichts, the 
dynamic mediator of all spheres of material and spiritual energy in the rebirth of the coming 
religious epoch. 
Metadisciplinary field, elastic activity, provisional temporality, and dynamic 
sociopolitical expression are used in the following only as organizing terms with which to 
approach the diverse register of wild political Romanticism. They are themselves all provisional 
within the scope of this study insofar as the texts of Märchenpolitik, Naturpolitik, and 
Religionspolitik offer such a wide range of alternative designations, as we will see. The political 
valence of their different conceptual operations and modes of being, their whole profusive 
grammar of Romantic self-definition, remains to be explored in detail.  
V. Reception, Approach, Method  
The framework of wild politics so understood takes up a more expansive conceptual 
scope and material domain of political Romanticism than has traditionally been treated in the 
critical scholarship.55 The sustained body of politically engaged literary works and the rich field 
of political concepts arising across the span of the Romantic movement is itself the most 
                                                 
54 Schlegel, 22:47. 
 
55 Carl Schmitt introduced the term “politische Romantik,” but used it ironically in a critique of what he understood 
to be Romanticism’s essentially apolitical aesthetic nature (see Carl Schmitt, Politische Romantik [Munich: Duncker 
and Humblot, 1919]). Another irony associated with Schmitt’s influential reading of political Romanticism is that 
his study’s unmatched polemical enmity towards the movement, excepting perhaps Heinrich Heine’s, contains some 







restricted and least explored domain of Romantikforschung. But undoubtedly here, in renewed 
attention to its political valence, lies the greatest untapped resource for Romanticism’s 
contemporary appraisal, especially given its relatively sparse discussion.56 As we will see in 
more detail in the assessment of Romantic Märchenpolitik, Naturpolitik, and Religionspolitik, the 
predominant feature of this area of research has been, from its inception around 1800 (and 
continues to be today), a kind of interpretive strategy of ideological emplotment.  
According to this standard critical reading practice, instances in the development of the 
early to late Romantic system of thought (particularly in the latter) are isolated—as singular 
works, single authors, or a singular moment in the movement—and either reductively designated 
a position on the postrevolutionary political spectrum, or rejected outright as politically 
incoherent, irreal, or even dangerously transgressive to basic norms of political realism and 
common sense sociability. In either case, Romanticism, now generalized for each major site of 
its literary-historical periodization, and in contradistinction to its own (often published) self-
conceptions, appears as an either exclusively revolutionary-progressive or reactionary-
conservative doctrine, expressive on a schematic level of the narrative—and dead-ends—of the 
wider sociopolitical events of the current era, but not interestingly different in its own terms.  
Indeed, such obvious ideological emplotment is often suggested by, when not explicitly 
admitted in, the texts themselves. And, as will become clear in the following discussions, many 
of the Romantics’ individual works and shared projects are readily graphable onto the 
contemporary instance of the left-right political continuum, depending on their context-specific 
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moment within the evolution of the movement, as well as within the greater unfolding of the 
historical present at the turn of the eighteenth century (i.e., whether the work or project in 
question can be understood as an early-revolutionary or late-conservative expression). This is all 
the more the case when many Romantic authors, Schlegel being perhaps the most (in)famous 
one, served throughout their careers in various official and unofficial positions in the political 
regimes of their time.  
 Such an evaluation of political Romanticism at its admittedly significant ideological 
surface sometimes resolves into a judgment following mainly from the reader-critic’s own 
political values, from his or her own sociopolitical perspective removed in time and material 
concern from that of the Romantics themselves. But the obvious political charge of so many 
Romantic texts, and the on-going relevance of their concerns, encourages just such a judgement; 
indeed it seeks to stimulate it. To be sure, this is a natural approach to assessing the political 
value of those identifiable, grounded tropes, placed securely along the axis of modern 
sociopolitical conceptuality and praxis, which Romantic texts often deploy. And so when they 
suggest their different ideological allegiances, it may become necessary and right to claim—or 
forcefully arrogate—the history of literary imagination for the problems and aims of current 
political debates and struggles. This is even more true given that Romanticism inaugurates, to no 
small extent, the tradition of avant-garde political aesthetics at the inception of our modern era, 
situated at the origin-point of the current sociopolitical conjuncture, and at the beginning of the 
oppositional artistic response to it.57 Of course, this too is a kind of figural emplotment that reads 
Romantic practice for the trace of what will later fulfill it, so to speak, in the avant-garde. But the 
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functional use of this reading is that it destabilizes precisely the conventional literary-political 
placement of the Romantic text along a controlled range of positions. 
While the present study will often foreground this mode of evaluation, that of ideological 
emplotment, it does so only in order to problematize the critical historiography that has so far 
securely placed Romanticism on this polemically-determined spectrum, only in order to suggest 
a number of speculative political orientations situated outside it. For political Romanticism is not 
contained exhaustively in such static placements: by contrast, its very operations of thought 
proceed first and foremost by dissolving and pushing them into heterogenous territories of the 
imagination. Romanticism necessarily appears politically protean, and foregrounds precisely this 
facet in the exposition of its own system(s).  
I thus largely bypass the question of various particular allegiances in the following 
treatment of political Romanticism, or rather, answering this question never serves as the final 
aim of the texts in question here, or of my approach to them. By contrast, I am interested in the 
constitutive movement of thought subtending all political Romantic discourse, namely: in the 
primary or political anthropological tendency (Tendenz), to use Schlegel’s concept, that 
motivates Romanticism’s diverse set of wild political imaginaries. The Schillerian attempt to re-
adjudicate the political use-value of aesthetic experience in terms of its original historical context 






Romanticism to do so,58 is in every case frustrated if the actual programmatic content of a wild 
politics is not first uncovered at this primary level.59  
Frederick Beiser has shown in-depth how the status of contemporary scholarship on 
Romanticism, and on German intellectual discourses at the end of the eighteenth century more 
generally, has remained largely unattentive to the dedicated politicization of thought that marked 
the immediate postrevolutionary period. Beiser’s contention is that against its traditionally 
perceived apoliticality, Romanticism establishes a contested, but nevertheless coherent paradigm 
of modern political thinking: it represents another alternative to a nascent liberalism and 
conservatism concurrently responding to the consequences of the French Revolution. Of 
particular interest here, however, is how Beiser still relies on a conventional or “normal” 
understanding of the political—indeed explicitly so—in order to address its clear evidence at the 
basis of the Romantic system, whether in its first “republican” iteration around 1800, or later in 
“conservative” form in its Restoration turn in the 1820s.60 And yet it is just this identification of 
                                                 
58 Although its discussion falls outside of the scope of this study, it should be noted that one of the most forceful 
attempts to repoliticize Romanticism for the needs of a given political aesthetic strategy is found in National 
Socialism (see Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism, 225-227). For the Nazi ideologues, the 
appropriation of Romantic tropes depended above all on a reduction of its actual content to a series of stable, or 
rigorously circumscribed, political (fascist) ideals, missing the constitutive ungovernability of political Romanticism 
from its beginning to end. 
 
59 Schmitt’s study of political Romanticism also points to the need for a primary reading: in the second version of 
Politische Romantik (1925), he includes the following in a new preface: “There is a romanticism of energy and a 
romanticism of decadence, romanticism as the immediacy and actuality of life and romanticism as flight into the 
past and tradition. Knowledge of what is essential to the romantic cannot proceed from positive or negative 
hygienic-moralistic or polemical-political assessments of this sort. It may lead to these assessments as a practical 
application. As long as no clear knowledge is established, however, it remains basically arbitrary how the predicates 
are combined and allotted here and what is singled out from this extremely complex movement as the truly 
“romantic” in order to praise or damn it” (cited in Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism. Translated by Guy Oakes 
[Cambridge: MIT, 1991], 4). Schmitt’s attempt to reconstruct the ground or structure of presupposition on which 
political Romanticism rests is taken up in this study, even while his particular evaluation of the same is 
problematized throughout. 
 
60 “The central thesis of this work is that German philosophy in this period—whether it concerns epistemology, 
metaphysics, ethics, or aesthetics—was dominated and motivated by political ends. Here I use the word “political” 
in its normal sense of anything concerned with the government of human beings” (Beiser, Enlightenment, 






the evident political-theoretical register of Romanticism that leads Beiser to an ideological 
emplotment that stops short of a more sustained engagement with its full scope, bringing him to 
characterize late Romanticism as the conceptual break that forever reorients the movement’s 
combined programmatic intentions, effectively ending the signal revolutionary content with 
which it began.61 
Even while recognizing a certain layer of wild political imagination at the core of early 
Romantic discourse, Maurice Blanchot also stops short of a dedicated approach to the late 
system(s) of thought: the texts themselves, in any case, are not drawn on in his considerations on 
the subject. He asks: “Which is the real one? true Schlegel? Is the later Schlegel the truth of the 
first? […] Where is romanticism? In Jena or in Vienna? Where it manifests itself rich in projects, 
or where it dies out, poor in works?”62 Romanticism, Blanchot adds, had to end with “suicide, 
madness, loss, forgetting.”63 These are not the operative concepts for the late Schlegel. But, to be 
sure, he was never more eclectic, obscure, and obsessively apocalyptic than in his later writings. 
Beiser’s and Blanchot’s positions have become representative of contemporary 
scholarship on political Romanticism in different, and in some respects parallel ways, but 
together they indicate a general pattern in the reception. On the one hand, as with Beiser, the 
political content of the Romantic system is often affirmed, but also to a certain extent obscured 
in its properly imaginative dimension. Its stated pretensions to apply a speculative practice of 
(philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, religious, etc.) transformation in the political arena to real 
effect thus appears more important in terms of its poetic excess than as a relevant attempt to 
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think an alternative form of political engagement. Beneath its ecstatic manifestos—its attempt to 
criss-cross and reconnect the different domains of modern life in a new metadisciplinary figure, 
exploding surrounding conventional frameworks of social and political understanding, rebuilding 
them in turn—the actual content lies instead in Romanticism’s record of normal political 
statements and activities. And when these become openly Catholic, conservative, or reactionary 
in nature in the later stages of the movement, so it is argued, the qualitative shift must be 
recognized as such.  
On the other hand, as with Blanchot’s influential reading, Romanticism is recognized as 
the literary assertion of a revolutionary freedom that can only obtain in the sheerly possible 
worlds of the imagination. And yet again here: when its overt ideological platform shifts away 
from its initial republican commitment, as perceived in the late movement, it is judged to have 
entirely abandoned its early investments in an aesthetic doctrine of autonomous existential 
transformation. Succumbing at the end to the hegemonic domination of Catholicism and 
Restoration, Romanticism exhausts its drive towards human collective emancipation by 
accepting the altogether regressive ideological format of a new status quo, allowing itself to be 
reterritorialized into a static concept of retrenched social control. 
In distinction to the above pattern of critical reception, the paradigm of wild politics in 
question in the following identifies an anti-normative or heterodox imaginative impulse that is 
constitutive to both the early and late body of Romantic thought. For example, it is exactly in 
Schlegel’s late works that the Christian eschatological tradition undergoes a profound shift in 
meaning and application, translated through an analysis that turns to the revolutionary 
developments of the age as much as to the current psychological and physiological constitution, 






early Romantic manifesto for a utopian task of community-building, understood as a system of 
emancipated social relationships grounded in affect and/or nature, that informs Schlegel’s late 
religious political doctrine of esoteric spiritual-bodily relations. For him, the association—or 
communicative connection—of spiritist bodies with a perceived acceleration in revolutionary 
change signifies the appearance of the ultimate apocalyptic event, and the resulting 
postapocalyptic Golden Age to follow. Contemporary analysis of the revolutionary tendencies of 
the age appears in this light as an investigation of a novel breathrough in world historical 
consciousness, a series of new chaotic becomings that disfigure the traditional frameworks of 
thought and practice in place. 
This study uses a more capacious (and text-immanent) framework for approaching the 
wild political valence of Romanticism. Exemplary in this respect is Patrick Eiden-Offe’s 
polemical notion of a “Romantischer Antikapitalismus”64 evident even in the movement’s 
orientiation towards a fully idealized past social order, in the very moments when it appears most 
detached from processes of modernization and economic exploitation. Such an orientation is on 
full display particularly in Schlegel’s late religious political works, but also in all the authors in 
question in the following. Even while emphasizing the backwards facing orientation of the 
movement, Eiden-Offe still rescues a certain critical impulse that sets Romanticism entirely at 
odds with the simplistic conservative stance often attributed to the (late but also early) 
movement. By way of repudiating Georg Lukacs’ foundational critique of Romanticism as 
unable or unwilling to recognize its own contradictory position in an emergent bourgeois society, 
Eiden-Offe (drawing on the work of Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre) speaks of a profound 
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“Protest gegen die kapitalistische Zivilisation der Moderne im Namen der sozialen und 
kulturellen Werte der Vergangenheit,” identifying it as the motive force of political 
Romanticism.65 While this aspect of anticapitalism vis-à-vis the Romantic philosophy of history 
only briefly arises within the purview of the following study (its full account would have to 
include its futural-utopian thrust as well),66 I do take Eiden-Offe’s contribution to be exemplary 
of a new interpretive approach to a far more eclectic and experimental political Romanticism 
than has yet been recognized: “wenn der romantische Antikapitalismus immer mit imaginierten 
Vergangenheiten operiert,” he writes, “dann muss eine Geschichte des romantischen 
Antikapitalismus zugleich eine Geschichte (zumeist) kontrafaktischer, aber politisch wirksamer 
Imaginationen sein. Was aussteht—und wozu im Folgenden der Versuch unternommen werden 
soll—ist eine Sozialgeschichte mit Möglichkeitssinn.”67  
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66 There is also reason to consider Romantic economic discourse between 1800 and roughly 1830 not so much as the 
elaboration of an anti-capitalist polemic (although this aspect is indeed evident in many texts) as much as a 
speculative liberation of nascent capitalist forces themselves, using their universalizing network-functions as the 
model for a utopian reorganization of modern society. Joseph Vogl has addressed this feature under the rubric of 
“Romantische Ökonomie” in reference to the works of Hölderlin and Novalis in particular: “Die Analogie von Geld 
und Sprache,” Vogl writes, “liegt nicht mehr in einer repräsentativen Kraft, sondern in der Fähigkeit, Fernwirkungen 
herzustellen, Übertragungen zu leisten und so eine universale Vermittlungsfunktion zu garantieren. Geld ist—so 
könnte man folgern—nicht länger Zeichen oder Maß, es ist vielmehr zu einem Organ bzw. zu einem Medium 
geworden, zu einem Medium nämlich im engeren—systemtheoretischen—Sinn: Träger von feedback-Schleifen und 
rekursiven Effekten” (Joseph Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft [Zurich: Diaphanes, 2002], 264). Such an argument 
links to the late Schlegel’s work, where a decidedly ambiguous appraisal of monetary circulation systems arises 
repeatedly. On the one hand, money economies threaten to upend everything, the structure of traditional life, 
deterritorializing extant social systems which still remain intact at the beginning of the modern era (thus forecasting 
Marx’s analysis beginning in the 1840s). But for Schlegel, the socioeconomic significance of money is also a 
utopian one, potentially capable of becoming the site of a new political order whose Fernwirkungen and medial 
functions bind and connect everyone (as evident in Hölderlin’s poem Brot und Wein, discussed below in Chapter 3). 
67 Eiden-Offe, 33. Eiden-Offe thus contributes to the current rehabilitation of the political imagination in Romantic 
texts around 1800 and afterwards, representing a new engagement in the scholarly literature with which this 
dissertation aligns itself. The work of Ethel Matala de Mazza is also of importance for the present study, above all 
when de Mazza reconstrues the body—both physical and political—as a so-called “imaginäre Institution des 







Focusing on three paradigmatic moments in the development of Romantic political 
Möglichkeitssinn—affective aesthetics, new mythological nature, and physiological 
apocalypticism—each of the following chapters can be approached as an individual study in the 
history of a counterfactual, and precisely because of this, politically-effective literary 
imagination. Eiden-Offe’s own methodology again proves exemplary for this approach: referring 
to the wild discourse network of Vormärz in terms just as easily applied to the Romantic context, 
he writes: “Dieser wilden Schreibszene begegne ich mit einer ausgewilderten, selbst 
undisziplinierten Lesehaltung: Ich lese Literatur wie Theorie und Theorie wie Literatur, keins 
von beidem soll dabei einen epistemologischen Vorrang genießen.”68 Das älteste 
Systemprogramm and the works of Novalis, Schelling, Schlegel, and Ritter all call for their own 
form of reading as an undisciplined, or metadisciplinary, process of imaginative speculation, 
itself unbounded (at least in explicit intention) but everwhere designed as so many binding 
operations in reflective thought and practical activity. This is the means and intentional end of 
the Romantics’ critical and positive interventions (and here again a certain contrast to, but also 
affinity with, Schiller’s doctrine). When applied as a political program, when Romanticism 
politicizes its various projects and experiments, we therefore have to refer to a certain wild 
politics driving its demand for total existential transformation. What follows is an attempt to do 









                                                 






CHAPTER 1. MÄRCHENPOLITIK 
     Haben die Nationen alles vom Menschen—nur nicht sein Herz?—sein heiliges Organ? 
- Novalis, Europa69 
 
  Die Liebe herrscht nicht, aber sie bildet, und das ist mehr. 
- Goethe, Das Märchen70 
Introduction: Robespierre and Political Affect 
The eloquent hate with which Maximilien Robespierre denounced the enemies of the 
Revolution is well known. What is perhaps more remarkable, however, is that precisely when 
Robespierre’s polemics turn towards a rhetoric of hate and other negative emotions they often 
also invoke love. Many of his oratorical masterstrokes arise when he renders negative and 
positive affects reciprocally confluent, allowing the one emotion to supplement or intensify what 
otherwise usually appears as its polar opposite. Nowhere is this, one of the unique signatures of 
Robespierre’s public discourse, more evident than in the Janus face of virtue and terror he evokes 
in a famous formulation: “If the mainspring of popular government in peacetime is virtue,” he 
declares, “the mainspring of popular government in revolution is both virtue and terror: virtue, 
without which terror is disastrous; terror, without which virtue is powerless.”71 The brevity of 
this statement is belied by its complexity: virtue and terror are here refigured as complementary, 
their seeming opposition recast as obverse sides of the same logic, namely that logic that presses 
                                                 
69 Novalis, Schriften. Die Werke Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Eds. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel. Vol. 3, 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), 523. All citations from Novalis are taken from this edition and follow the format: 
Volume Number:Page Number. 
 
70 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Sämtliche Werke: Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche. Vol. 9 (Frankfurt: Deutscher 
Klassiker, 1985). 
 






itself on a government currently under revolutionary conditions. Thus virtue and terror become 
mutually necessary elements not only of the same rational political “maxim” but also, and more 
importantly, of the same emotional “mainspring” of insurrectionary transformation, the double 
source, so to speak, of committed political action within a revolutionary situation.72  
While aiming to deter the Revolution’s enemies with the prospect of opposing such 
violent love (“intimidate by terror the enemies of liberty,” Robespierre instructs his fellow 
Jacobins),73 such a rhetorical dialectic transforms negative emotions—feelings of resentment, 
outrage, revenge, hate—by opening them up to their opposite, using them as instruments of the 
defense of the republican cause whose ultimate source is love of the Revolution itself.74 He even 
justifies the most violently excessive phase of the Terror, right at the moment of its height, by 
offering a logical deduction of republican virtue to a politicized sense of love—to patriotism—
arriving at a kind of deontological morality proper to the revolutionary’s strict code. This love 
brooks no exceptions, allows no deviations, it is the absolute “love of homeland” with all the 
attendant individual duties and collective responsibilities connected with it.75 According to this 
Robespierrean logic, all republican virtue proceeds inexorably from “sacred” patriotic love, and, 
to no less extent, all republican strategies and policies of terror follow out of this “holy” affective 
attachment as well.76 To love one’s homeland sufficiently to reinvent it in the name of a higher 
justice—so runs the dynamic of terror and virtue as reciprocal “emanations” of the same singular 
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political drive—such a love of the homeland also demands that one has the sufficient 
ruthlessness to purge it of every last one of its enemies.77 Virtue and terror become ideological 
weapons with a shared basis in the deployment of a totalizing emotional state, in the last instance 
through mobilizing love, that must be publicly performed and inflamed in the hearts of every 
citizen. The revolutionary cause depends on such affective mobilization, or so Robespierre 
argues.78 
But the theorist of the Revolution would also employ the shades, gradients, or lesser 
quanta of political emotion with no less force. For example, Robespierre also exhorts his fellow 
citizens to a form of contempt for the monarchy (and now precisely not hate), linking contempt 
to the revolutionary virtues he bases in love of homeland. One can hear this second, minor 
dialectic between contempt and patriotic love in his contribution to the debate as to whether King 
Louis XVI should be put on trial. Addressing the National Convention in December of 1792, 
Robespierre calls for a policy of contempt towards royalists:  
                                                 
77 Ibid., 115. 
 
78 Robespierre returns to this point repeatedly, indeed, it is the foundation of what he calls the new Republic’s 
principles of political morality: “anything that tends to arouse love of the homeland, to purify morals, to elevate 
souls, to direct the passions of the human heart towards the public interest, should be adopted or established by you. 
Anything that tends to concentrate them on the abjectness of the personal self, to arouse crazes for small things and 
contempt for great ones, should be rejected or repressed by you. In the French Revolution's system, that which is 
immoral is impolitic, that which is corrupting is counter-revolutionary” (Ibid., 112). Martha Nussbaum, without 
reference to Robespierre or the French Revolution, simply generalizes the idea here, claiming that the sustainability 
of all political systems ultimately depends on their ability to modify and sustain certain forms of public and personal 
emotion: “All political principles,” Nussbaum argues, “the good as well as the bad, need emotional support to ensure 
their stability over time, and all decent societies need to guard against division and hierarchy by cultivating 
appropriate sentiments of sympathy and love” (Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions [Cambridge: Belknap, 2013], 
3). For Carlo Ginsburg, by contrast, “the bond of shame” is what constitutes the reality of the modern polis: “A long 
time ago I suddenly realized that the country one belongs to is not, as the usual rhetoric goes, the one you love but 
the one you are ashamed of. Shame can be a stronger bond than love […] Shame is definitely not a matter of choice: 
if falls upon us, invading us—our bodies, our feelings, our thoughts—as a sudden illness. It is a passion placed at the 
intersection between biology and history” (Carlo Ginsburg, “The Bond of Shame.” New Left Review 120 [2019]: 
35). Despite obvious differences here, Nussbaum and Ginsburg share an understanding of affect that emphasizes its 
non-cognitive, extra-discursive power in constituting political communities. Precisely this understanding, as we will 






What is the decision that sound policy prescribes to consolidate the nascent Republic? It 
is to engrave contempt for royalty deeply on people's hearts and dumbfound all the king’s 
supporters. Thus, to present his crime to the universe as a problem, to treat his cause as an 
object of the most imposing, the most religious, the most difficult discussion that could 
occupy the representatives of the French people; to establish an immeasurable distance 
between the mere memory of what he was and the dignity of a citizen, amounts precisely 
to having found the secret of keeping him dangerous to liberty.79 
Again, Robespierre’s formulations reveal an underlying complexity. Insisting that the most 
pressing need of the nascent Republic is simply to spread contempt for the King, the royal 
family, and his supporters, Robespierre goes on to observe that: “for Louis I feel neither love nor 
hate; I just hate his crimes.”80 He is not merely demeaning the King himself; he is strategically 
maneuvering mass emotion to bolster the revolutionary platform at a crucial moment of political 
crisis, namely: the citizens’ decision to legally prosecute the King.  
 As opposed to blinding hate, contempt fosters a cool-headed detachment, a kind of 
Brechtian critical clarity avant la lettre that defangs the aura of “immeasurable distance” and 
invincibility embodied in Louis’ sovereign person. Robespierre wants to avoid making the 
deposed monarch into a juridical object of the highest revolutionary authority, thereby restoring 
him with that most serious and spiritual of powers which had only just recently been stripped 
from him. He should be considered as an individual, like any other, capable of being loved or 
hated, able to inspire deference or indifference in the hearts and minds of those who think of 
him. The King does not even deserve the consideration of the revolutionary court; he is below its 
new laws. Yes, “Louis must die, because the homeland has to live,” Robespierre declares, but the 
pragmatic point is that elevating him to the status of a legitimate legal dispute only reinforces his 
quasi-metaphysical personal presence. The Republic, in which the “dignity of the citizen” is first 
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fully realized, exists only insofar as it has granted itself authority by deposing the King (not just 
as sovereign-divine individual, but as real political structure), making practically clear the 
monarch’s symbolic and now de facto impotence. To be merely contemptuous of the King and 
not more—or rather, out of absolute patriotism for the revolutionary homeland, not to hate him 
but to hate his crime—is at the same time to love the Republic. This upholds the strongest 
version of the new revolutionary code without wasting valuable time and effort on a counter-
productive pseudo-problem. Kill the king, but do not overly burden the citizen body with the 
matter. Anything else is to make oneself into an enemy of the Revolution’s radical course 
forward into the future. In this sense, the juridical issue calls, in Robespierre’s opinion, for a new 
kind of emotional strategizing. Intervening in the economy of political affect at play, Robespierre 
attempts to select out its most important elements and reorganize their effects in the singular 
moment of rhetorical address. 
Contemporary commentators outside of France could not fail to notice the qualitative 
shift in the strategic sophistication and brute efficacy of the politicization of affect during the 
French Revolution. Edmund Burke refers to precisely this when he calls the first stages of 
revolutionary activity a kind of “wild gas” of emotion, one whose lasting impact could only be 
assessed retrospectively when it subsided and settled into a more stable, structured event, with a 
set of identifiable goals and a clear course of development.81 Already in 1790, before the 
execution of the King, Burke observes that the “French Revolution is the most astonishing 
[event] that has hitherto happened in the world,” noting that its unprecedented status is found not 
least in its “strange chaos of levity and ferocity.”82 “The most opposite passions necessarily 
                                                 








succeed,” Burke continues, “and sometimes mix with each other in the mind: alternate contempt 
and indignation; alternate laughter and tears; alternate scorn and horror.”83 There is a certain 
obscurity and volatility, an inconsistency or “strange chaos” that follows from instrumentalizing 
the excesses of mass affect,84 and its observation from a distance is just as much marked by this 
ambiguity. Here we find an indication of the disruptive emotional turn in revolutionary politics 
                                                 
83 Ibid., 9. The target of Burke’s Reflections is a figure of French revolutionary spirit that contaminates popular 
sentiment, coming to threaten monarchy and Church, if not to cause a fall into total social anarchy. Unsurprisingly, 
Burke’s own alarmist criticism of the Revolution appears as much an emotional as rational engagement. An 
important originary thinker of modern conservatism (but also the Irish subject who championed colonial and 
Catholic emancipation), on personal and philosophical grounds Burke refused atheism in its revolutionary political 
form, as evident in his opposition to the reformulation of anti-papist sentiments in English apologies of the French 
Revolution. See Conor Cruise O’Brian in Burke, Reflections, 213-216.  
 
84 A note regarding my use of affect as a term in the present chapter and others: Brian Massumi defines affect not as 
a personal feeling but as a “prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the 
body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body's capacity to act […] (with body taken in 
its broadest possible sense to include "mental" or ideal bodies)” (Brian Massumi, “Translator’s Foreword: Pleasures 
of Philosophy.” In Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Thousand Plateaus [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 
1987], xvi). For Spinoza, Deleuze, and Guattari—the main thinkers of the tradition of affect Massumi draws on, 
representative for contemporary affect theory as well—the distinction on which affect rests is not so much between 
body and mind (which already in Spinoza’s Ethics are conceived as parallel structures of experience), but between 
the articulated consciousness, on the one hand, which includes language, identity, and biography and, on the other, 
the preconscious (Massumi’s “prepersonal”), the motive forces and instinctual drives that lend intensity to everyday 
life, this being the proper sense of affect. I consider Massumi’s definition to be a working or provisional one, as the 
relations of emotion or feeling to affect are by no means unequivocal. And indeed perhaps these terms do not 
indicate categorical differences at all but simply different degrees of the same phenomenon, which Massumi also in 
part acknowledges (Brian Massumi, Politics of Affect [Cambridge: Polity, 2015], 5). Emotions like love or hate 
intensify social and political life in a way that is imaginative and somatic, conceptual-reflective and instinctual or 
drive-like in character, activating the ability of physical and mental bodies to move and be moved, “to affect and be 
affected,” as Spinoza puts it (Deleuze and Guattari, xvi.). In the following, as already above, the terms affect and 
emotion are used interchangeably to describe the social, political, or mass production of intensities in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s sense. Contemporary definitions of affect around 1800 reflect this usage as well, if only to a certain extent 
and with a slightly different emphasis. Kant, for example, drew attention to affect (Affekt) and opposed it to passion 
(Leidenschaft) in his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798): for him, affect is a non-reflective, irrational 
mode of emotional/sensuous experience, a variable state of pleasure or displeasure blocked from the systematic 
insights of Vernunft (in passion, by contrast, this is not the case, or rather passion is not entirely blocked from 
reason): “das Gefühl einer Lust oder Unlust im gegenwärtigen Zustande, welches im Subject die Überlegung (die 
Vernunftvorstellung, ob man sich ihm überlassen oder weigern solle) nicht aufkommen läßt, [ist] der Affect” 
(Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften [Akademie-Ausgabe]. Vol. 7 [Berlin: Karsten Worm, 1998], 251. All 
citations from Kant from this edition in the format Title of Work:Page Number). Kant’s image of uncontrollable 
affect, in contradistinction to a passion that can be worked over and grounded by reason, is also given in a similie: 
“Der Affect wirkt wie ein Wasser, was den Damm durchbricht; die Leidenschaft wie ein Strom, der sich in seinem 






in this period, exemplified in Robespierre’s rhetoric and perceivable, or so Burke argues, by 
anyone considering current events at the time.85 
If the very system of the Revolution, including both the terroristic polices of its leaders 
and the ecstatic self-affirmations of its citizen-collective, accompanied by a chaotic admixture of 
levity, ferocity, and other mass emotional phenomena—if this system can be linked to a kind of 
chaotic affective mainspring, then the contemporary investment in the term fraternité makes this 
connection more evident, even while fraternity poses its own uncertain problematic in this 
period. Fraternity, brotherhood, is the affective manifesto-call of the Revolution. And it seems all 
the more significant insofar as it appears as the most enigmatic term of the tripartite 
revolutionary slogan.86  
Freedom and equality can be clearly articulated as juridical concepts, as the rational basis 
on which the rights of the individual citizen can be rigorously defined in a law-bound normative 
system. Fraternity, by contrast, is the sentimental-moral, but also pre-discursive motive force, the 
emotional dynamic of revolutionary theory and praxis around 1800. In this sense it does not so 
much establish a juridical concept or entity, as much as propel separated individuals into 
movement towards each other, even while holding them together through pre-existing, extra-
legal relationships of intimacy, familiarity, mutual respect, and dependence. The appeal to 
fraternity, last but not least in the Revolution’s guiding motto, leads not so much to legible 
                                                 
85 Timothy Tackett provides more historical evidence of this: “This complex mixture of contradictory emotions, the 
feelings of both fervor and fear, optimism and pessimism was much in evidence in the correspondence of the period. 
‘You have seen,’ wrote the Breton lawyer Jean- Pierre Boullé, ‘how tormented I am by doubt. I am devoured by 
anxiety, […] between hope and fear.’ The small- town barrister from central France, Antoine Durand, described 
many of the same feelings: the ‘striking contrast between good and evil, anguish and hope, joy and sadness, which 
so rapidly follow upon one another’” (Timothy Tackett, The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution 
[Cambridge: Harvard University, 2015], 122. 
 
86 See Stefani Engelstein, Sibling Action (New York: Columbia University, 2017), 4. Engelstein notes that: 
“fraternity structured thinking about the problematic overlap of politics and affect throughout Europe in the late 






definitions of the specific and local, to the individuated or differentiated case (of rights or laws), 
but to the unsharp and open-ended problems of collective formation, to networks of mutual 
relations that scale from everyday interpersonal interactions up to global unities. Rather than 
articulating a clear boundary of difference (as for example when the right to freedom and 
equality before the law has been irrevocably transgressed and the figure of the personal or 
national enemy emerges in full clarity), fraternity initiates a centripetal force that binds 
differences, drawing heterogenous elements into affinity in a movement of disarticulation and 
amalgamation.  
The invention of a more expansive, politicized sense of fraternity (albeit one that seems 
to frustrate discursive conceptualization in favor of embodied affective relations between 
people)—lifted out of its traditional historical role in the limited communal spheres of the 
familial and religious (agape, caritas), repositioned in the domain of a secularized politics—this 
reconstrual of affect first lends such a collectivizing function of fraternity possible within a 
modern revolutionary framework. On this basis, as a kind of micropolitical group force, 
fraternity can (if not entirely on its own) found a new state and society. 
In a section entitled “Love and Politics,” Alain Badiou declares fraternity to be “the most 
opaque of the three terms in the Republican motto.” Badiou continues:  
We can argue about “freedom,” but we know what that’s about. We can provide a fairly 
accurate definition of what “equality” involves. But what on earth is “fraternity”? No 
doubt it is related to the issue of differences, of their friendly co-presence within the 
political process, the essential boundary being the confrontation with the enemy. And that 
is a notion that can be covered by internationalism, because, if the collective can really 
take equality on board, that means it can also integrate the most extensive divergences 
and greatly limit the power of identity.87 
 
                                                 






Badiou is right to draw attention to the third term as a problematic of modern revolutionary 
consciousness, if only to emphasize its ambiguity: he grants a certain opacity to fraternity even 
while assigning it a clear position in the coming nineteenth-century genealogy of internationalist 
(anti-capitalist) opposition. This is because fraternity—and also other concurrent political 
figurations of affect like love—is still in a process of conceptual and practical emergence in this 
period. But this process of emergence, contestation, and formation of political affect (in 
Robespierre’s rhetoric and elsewhere, as we will see) only retrospectively admits to such secure 
historiographical placement, already located within the later radical-left tradition Badiou 
invokes. 
 Modifying Badiou’s observations, one wants to reserve an even more labile nature for 
political fraternity and affect more generally in this period before one subordinates it, as he 
suggests, to the specific “issues of difference” and internationalist identity that would only prove 
decisive in the pan-European and globalized contexts of later revolutionary movements.88 For the 
recognition of a potential use-value of fraternity and other political affects in the immediate 
postrevolutionary environment—a situation confronted with the consequences of recent or 
imminent sociopolitical transformation, in a volatile oscillation between the binary poles of 
monarchical and popular sovereignty, between traditional absolutism and the novum of 
republican democracy—this translation of affect into politics is decidedly experimental around 
                                                 
88 During the French Revolution the concept of fraternité was actually only rarely articulated as internationalist, 
even if it was taken up as an essential part of the international socialist, communist, and anarchist repertoire of 
political affect in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Badious also notes. The Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen, however, does state that: “Men of all countries are brothers, and the different peoples 
should help one another to the best of their ability, like citizens of the same state […] He who oppresses a single 
nation declares himself the enemy of all” (Žižek, 71). But revolutionary fraternity was far more the emotional core 
of French nationalist isolationism. By contrast, more decidedly internationalist appear to be the various European 
monarchical regimes that opposed the Revolution and came to the aid of Louis XVI and his supporters, not to 
mention such Restoration bodies as the Holy Alliance during the reign of Napoleon. For his part, Napoleon 







1800. Fraternity as a revolutionary emotion, in other words, remained an open-ended attempt 
before subsequent traditions (mid-nineteenth century Marxism and Anarchism, in the main) 
recoded the conditions of possibility of critical political theory and practice, setting a scientific-
materialist standard for future radical oppositional movements. In this later development, 
political affect, any theory of public sentiments and mass emotional mobilization, was to no 
small extent relegated—and thus denigrated—to the sphere of the utopian or merely literary 
imagination. 
More generally, any affect appears dynamic and subject to a range of different 
potentializations, just like the imaginative attempts of the mind to capture, distill, and 
communicate emotional experience; ambiguity is obviously a central aspect of the sheer diversity 
of both exceptional and quotidien emotional experience. Everyday life, whether understood in its 
political dimensions or not, is often experienced through a complex field of conflicting, confused 
affects: “emotions or feelings,” Fredric Jameson notes, “would seem to stream along in an 
indiscriminate succession in which, like flowing water, they sometimes froth and sometimes 
stagnate, they overflow but also sink into the ground and dry up.”89 But when mobilized to 
specific ends, deliberately instrumentalized, emotions become events (or what Jameson calls an 
“emotion-event”).90 They may take the form of an absolute that, paradoxically, only increases in 
magnitude, such as in Robespierre’s invocation of a pure and uncontestable hate for the enemy 
(i.e., love for the fatherland) that must be carefully maintained and expanded. Or emotions can 
become attenuated, as in Robespierre’s sense of a tuned-down contempt, subject to movements 
of erosion and diminution, changing and evolving over time until they lose their existential force 
                                                 








altogether, no longer being felt. The politicization of an inherently dynamic affect could only be 
more ambiguous still. Rhetorical strategies that invoke political affect nevertheless most often 
consist in the attempt to regulate the waxing and waning of mass emotions, and to do so for a 
situationally embedded political program. And yet in such attempts a certain excess is often 
impossible to circumscribe or control: the politicization of emotions produces a surplus, an 
excessive event, that escapes even the most rigorous or strictly principled attention to realistic, 
pragmatic method and practice, often breaking the expressive controls of language as well. 
Along these lines, one can say with Carlo Ginsburg that the “relationship between the continuous 
flow of sentiments and emotions and the discrete taxonomy created by words still baffles us.”91 
This is to say that when it comes to its politicization, affect tends to produce a form of politics 
that tests our communicative abilities, but this does not take away from its transformative social 
efficacy: what cannot be rigorously named and identified is not devoid of existential impact: 
quite the opposite. Burke’s image of the wild gas of revolutionary emotion marks precisely this. 
In the actual event, after Robespierre was himself judged counterrevolutionary, there 
arises an illuminating moment in this early history of modern political affect. Robespierre’s own 
fate and that of the theories and practices of both terror and fraternity became inseparable. Only 
after his execution in the Thermidorean reaction (and on the eve of the Terror) was the third term 
of “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” removed from the official slogan of the Revolution.92 Perhaps 
this is a coincidence, but it seems to be one of consequence. Robespierre, terror, and the 
programmatic affirmation of fraternité are historically linked, at least contingently, in their 
ascendancy and downfall. The suggestion here is that it was only the physical presence of the 
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“mystic of the Revolution,” as Schlegel called Robespierre, that sufficed to sustain the wild gas 
of revolutionary emotion that had, up to that point, inspired the Revolution and would prove, in 
retrospect, to inaugurate modernity as an emotionally ecstatic event of political rupture. As first 
indicated in the not insignificant success of Robespierre’s party, and then in the subtraction of 
fraternity from the revolutionary slogan after his death, the political mobilization of affect, and 
what transformations it actually did or was perceived to effect in the status quo body politic, 
appears inchoate and merely nascent in the vicissitudes of its own historical emergence. At this 
early stage it is capable of inciting real political change as much as impeding revolutionary 
progress to the extent that it must be officially discarded. The question Badiou poses—“what on 
Earth is ‘fraternity’”—identifies the general ambiguity of political affect as a major problematic 
for modern revolutionary thought, but it can also be understood as a characterization of the 
variable nature of the politicization of emotion specifically around 1800. Of significance here is 
the model of affective politics that emerges throughout the connections outlined above. At the 
basis of Robespierre’s strategy we find a logical procedure, a rhetorical method or style that 
recognizes this mutability and draws on its resources: it sometimes intensifies emotion towards 
absolute states with immediate political consequence (again, as when virtue and terror, as 
emanations or subordinate functions of the same absolute revolutionary love, are put into 
practice), while at other times tempering and attenuating emotion, readjusting it for the 
individual circumstance (as in the call for a critical contempt towards royalists instead of hate).  
To no small extent, the French Revolution, and not least through Robespierre’s own 
efforts, made dramatically clear one of the main friend/enemy distinctions around 1800, and 
subsequently in the Restoration period as well, namely: the antagonistic divide between 






ancien régime power, with its alliances of elite propertied aristocrats, and the ad hoc tactics and 
limited means of the revolutionary cell, speaking and acting in the name of the subaltern masses. 
And yet, as we have seen, the concept of the political in this period is no less a matter of the way 
in which such friend/enemy distinctions are immediately linked to their figuration as political 
affects, the way emotions are methodically crafted, increased, dissipated, and otherwise 
variously modulated according to the needs of a political decision, in line with a desired response 
to a given social crisis. In this way, the rhetorical techniques the French revolutionaries 
consciously recited from classical Roman and Greek political oratory—with the statesman 
Robespierre recycling the statecraft of a Cicero, for example—are updated for the problems of a 
modern revolutionary theory and praxis with an increasingly sophisticated sense for the 
manipulation of emotional energies. The operationalization of affect in the public sphere, the 
strategic technique in which the spectrum between cathartic passion and disciplined sobriety is 
retooled in a fine-tuned (or crude) agitprop, has never been the same after such figures as 
Robespierre took the floor and appealed to, or better, reinvented a discourse of political emotions 
that is still with us today.93 Accordingly, one should perhaps speak not of a contemporary 
“affective turn”94 in scholarly reflection, but of a return to a tradition of political affect around 
                                                 
93 Peter Sloterdijk, for example, characterizes what he takes to be the entire experiment of modernity as a 
psychopolitical translation of mass affect—revolutionary emotions—into productive and controllable forms. For 
Sloterdijk, this essentially modern experiment has failed, or fallen prey to an overwhelming negativity, having 
proven only able “to open up untraveled paths for collective rage, paths that were supposed to lead to satisfaction. 
Leaving modern institutions such as parliaments, courts, and public debates by the wayside, and in contempt of 
small escapes, these pathways resulted in huge releases of rage, resentment, and fantasies of extermination” (Peter 
Sloterdijk, Rage and Time. Translated by Mario Wenning [New York: Columbia, 2010], 25). With Sloterdijk, we 
can say that the Terror, at least in one of its elements, becomes a prototypical model for later revolutionary 
outpourings up to the present in a purely destructive sense. 
 
94 Nicholas Kompridis, “Introduction: Turning and returning: The aesthetic turn in political thought.” In The 
Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought, edited by Nicholas Kompridis (New York: Bloomsbury, Year), 12. Here I am 
drawing on Nikolas Kompridis’ suggestion that instead of a “turn,” it would be more appropriate to identify an 
aesthetic “return” in contemporary scholarship. The connections between the affective and the aesthetic is always at 






1800, although this tradition itself appears as an open-ended, ambiguous project at the origin-
point of modern political consciousness. 
1.1 Novalis and the Politicization of Love 
As in France and England, German observers of contemporary events around 1800 would 
also explore the potential of emotional experience as a galvanizing political force. The early 
German Romantics seize on the experimental possibility of their historical moment, and as part 
of a sweeping reformulation of the means and ends of revolutionary commitment, they 
immediately begin to translate French models, among others, into more speculative (aesthetic, 
philosophical, scientific, and political) interventions into the specifically German cultural 
situation. The “Vorerinnerung” or introductory notice of the first issue of the Athenäum journal, 
and thus the first published statement of the collective program of early Romanticism, draws 
directly on tropes of fraternité to do so. Beginning the decades-long development of a 
revolutionary model of the imagination critically reapplied onto the sociopolitical sphere—what 
this study understands as a figure of wild politics—the brothers Schlegel evoke a kind of 
fraternal community of knowledge, bodies of knowledge and practice melding into each other, 
and this from the very outset of the Athenäum. In the Vorerinnerung, they write: 
In Ansehung der Gegenstände, streben wir nach möglichster Allgemeinheit in dem, was 
unmittelbar auf  Bildung abzielt; im Vortrage nach der freyesten Mittheilung. Um uns 
jener näher zu bringen, hielten wir eine Verbrüderung der Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten, 
                                                 
affective return as much as an aesthetic one. “Aesthetics [and here one could just as well substitute affects] and 
politics,” Kompridis writes, “have been overtly implicated and entangled with each other since the late eighteenth 
century, when one could already speak of an aesthetic [or affective] turn in political thought, retrospectively, in the 
writings of European romanticism from Rousseau to Schiller and the Jena romantics, and in the framing of the 
debates about the meaning of the French Revolution. So what we may be speaking of is a return rather than a turn, 
or of a turn delayed and resisted until the emergence of more propitious conditions” (Ibid.). As addressed in more 
detail in the following, Frühromantik reframes the debate about the meaning and use-value of the French Revolution 
in terms of affect; as such, the contemporary interest in political affect could profit from a return to some of its 
historical contexts around 1800. The present chapter attempts to do just this. One example of this can be found again 
in Sloterdijk’s work, who, for his part, has returned all the way back to ancient Greece, attempting to extract a 







um welches sich ein jeder von uns an seinem Theile bewirbt, nicht für unnütz. Bey dieser 
leitet uns der gemeinschaftliche Grundsatz, was uns für Wahrheit gilt, niemals aus 
Rücksichten nur halb zu sagen.95  
 
But it will not only be in terms of form and method through which such centripetal affective 
force is taken up by the Romantic system of thought, but in content as well. Similar to the French 
revolutionaries with whom they ambiguously identify, but also critically distance themselves 
from (Robespierre particularly), the Frühromantiker place an exploration of “protopolitical” 
figures and effects—e.g. fraternization, but above all love, as we will see—at the center of a 
major strand of their political theory. In the attempt to articulate the doctrine of total existential 
transformation, early Romantic thinkers such as Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis focus on 
stimulating and enlarging certain moods, feelings, and emotions as essential to the possibility of 
real sociopolitical change.  
 But while French revolutionary rhetoric aims to produce realpolitisch emotional 
effects—and was able in actual practice to do so, however provisional or contested this proved to 
be in Robespierre’s own specific case—early Romantic discourse captures the protean, 
                                                 
95 August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel, Athenäum (Berlin: Meyer and Jessen, 1798), iii. My emphasis. In an 
interpretive gesture that is essential to the concerns of this dissertation as a whole, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy draw 
attention to this notion of a literary-philosophical fraternization (Verbrüderung) as the initial impetus for the later 
so-called historical avant-garde (“without any exaggeration, [Romanticism] is the first ‘avant-garde’ group in 
history”) (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 8). In general, I follow their analysis by understanding Romanticism (but 
here I depart by also considering Spätromantik) as the imaginative production of essentially political moments, or as 
a series of speculative literary images with direct sociopolitical significance. Referring to the above sense of a 
fraternization of knowledge and talents at the heart of the Athenäum project—and this first journal constitutes 
Frühromantik in its totality from the perspective of the authors of The Literary Absolute—they write: “Already we 
can see the well-known ‘papal’ phenomenon [e.g. André Breton vis-à-vis Surrealism] developing, and before long, 
the soon-to-be ‘classic’ (so to speak) scenario will be in place, with its annexations, its sensational ruptures, its 
exclusions and excommunications, its quarrels and spectacular reconciliations, etc.; everything, in sum, that on a 
small scale constitutes the politics (for it is clearly a politics and very precise one) of this sort of organism. 
Including, moreover, its intrinsic weakness: recantations and an undeniably ‘arriviste’ mentality. It will take only six 
years to convert to Catholicism; a little more than ten to dine with Metternich [i.e., Friedrich Schlegel]. But in point 
of fact, things are not this simple” (Ibid., 9). The point of departure of the following chapters is to examine the 
complex political dimensions of the Romantic movement precisely as it evolves over time into its later forms. In this 
sense, the insight that “things are not this simple” when referring to political Romanticism can be understood as a 
kind of leitmotif of the dissertation, an insight, moreover, that is most often lacking in contemporary critical 






ambivalent, or ambiguous aspect of political affect, precisely that which often renders it useless 
from the perspective of a Realpolitik.96 The Frühromantiker approach emotions as the kind of 
excessive surplus of meaningful experience noted above, as a reserve of unruly energy with 
practical (and metaphysical) implications for change. Just for this reason, for them emotions can 
also be channeled into a kind of Möglichkeitssinn for the revolutionary imagination: a sense of 
possibility emerging in the transformative potential of affective experience, a new approach to 
political speculation that thinks emotions as so many modifiable drives, transfiguring them into 
the constitutive power and social-binder of a utopian community in the future.97 In this sense, 
                                                 
96 A clear pragmatic and result-oriented outcome of the political use of affect can surely be attributed to the actors 
and acts of the French Revolution. At play here is, in other words, also a certain Realpolitik of affect that 
characterizes French revolutionary method and orientation. To recapitulate this point: as we have seen with 
Robespierre above, bringing positive and negative emotions into rhetorical confluence was supposed to consolidate 
popular passions into a revolutionary will that could appear sometimes virtuous and terrifying, or other times loving 
and contemptible. This strategic activation of mass affect was supposed to help identify and ensure clear ideological 
boundaries between enmity and fraternity within an on-going transformation of the political sphere. Thus what 
Robespierre called virtue as love of homeland automatically entails the policy of terror directed against the 
homeland’s enemies, a policy that must be immediately put into practice and maintained. For its part, the policy of 
contempt shores up the self-confidence and solidarity of the republic confronted with a crucial moment of decision 
(determining the legal status of Louis’ fate). What the Committee of Public Safety was able to accomplish—not only 
in sheer violent coercion but also in securing support for the Jacobin cause—testifies to the practical efficacy of 
emotion as an influential force under those historical circumstances. Such was the political “technology” of the 
French revolutionaries that strategically modulated and steered affect for world-transformative change. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen above, there is also an interesting ambiguity to this realpolitical deployment of 
political affect (as is also evident in Robespierre’s case), even while the use-value of such emotional paradigms as 
fraternity proved, at least under certain conditions, to be very powerful as a resource for revolutionary agitation. But 
it is precisely this ambivalence or instability in the deployment of political affect around 1800—its contested or 
unreliable point of theoretical and practical orientation—that establishes the potential of emotional paradigms in this 
period to serve as material for the political imaginary. 
 
97 It should be noted that Robespierrean terror also shares, to a certain extent, this departure from pragmatic reality-
principles. Like Romantic figurations of political love, it also arrives at a deeply imaginative and indeed 
transcendent sense of the significance of political activism (albeit an abyssal or terrifying one in the case of 
Robespierre). That being said, Novalis’ reception of Robespierre, and specifically of the Terror, differs from that of 
the rest of the early Romantic circle, perhaps only for the reason that Novalis died before he had the chance to 
change some of his initial opinions (see William Arctander O’Brien, Novalis. Signs of Revolution [Durham: Duke 
University, 1995], 123). Novalis, as opposed to Schlegel and many others, never lost his enthusiasm for the 
Revolution, even if he maintains it throughout his works as an object in need of critical interrogation. In Europa, for 
example, Novalis praises Robespierre’s Cult of the Supreme Being but questions its lasting impact: “Historisch 
merkwürdig bleibt der Versuch jener großen eisernen Maske, die unter dem Namen Robespierre in der Religion den 
Mittelpunkt und die Kraft der Republik suchte” (Novalis, 2:744). Novalis appears to have held Robespierre in a kind 
of dubious awe, and his reflections on the Revolution and particularly Robespierre’s role within it always revolve 
around utilizing affective (or here mystic-religious forces) for political change. Frederick Beiser, for example, 






one of early Romanticism’s main responses to the revolutionary novelty of their historical 
moment is to activate emotional resources for the imaginative construction of Utopia, and to 
apply this image for a critical analysis of modern life. With Rancière, we can say that the general 
Romantic attempt to articulate “figures of community,” to envision and narrate the “formation 
and education of a specific type of humanity” to come, is given specific form in the early 
Romantic discourse of political emotion. 
For the Romantics, a particular deployment of love, similar to Robespierre’s invocation 
of an absolute patriotic love, represents the royal road to knowledge of the ideal political system, 
the key to a radical alteration of status quo experience. When turned into an instrument of an 
alternative sociopolitical imaginary, love constitutes a kind of absolute horizon for political 
Romanticism in its initial phase, the means and end of the early movement’s aspiration to 
romanticize the world, as Novalis puts it. And it is in Novalis’ political writings that this 
problematic is most sustained, for no one in the Athenäum’s immediate symphilosophical circle 
addressed the possibilities of affect for political thinking in more depth and breadth than Novalis. 
Within a programmatic vision of a future utopian society—what he and Schlegel both explore 
under their futurological image of the “golden Age”98—Novalis offers a model of 
Möglichkeitsaffekt by politicizing a whole array of “procedures of love.”99  
This first chapter concentrates on Novalis’ political system of thought through his 
identification of Liebe as the foundation of the ideal future community. By way of examining the 
                                                 
delivered ‘a panegyric on Robespierre's Reign of Terror,’ because he was so impressed by Robespierre's consistency 
in the service of the ideal. Indeed, Novalis was always fascinated by the figure of Robespierre; as late as 1799 [and 
thus in the period of the texts considered below], he saw Robespierre's religion of reason as grounds for hope for the 
revival of spirituality in France” (Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism, 265). 
 
98 See Hans-Joachim Mähl, Die Idee des goldenen Zeitalters im Werk des Novalis (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1965). 
 






various imaginative-aesthetic or, to use Novalis’ own term again, so-called romanticized 
functions attributed to the Romantic notion of love, the following sections treat this intersection 
of politics and affect by way of its central presence in the body of texts beginning with Novalis’ 
poems Blumen (Schlegel’s and not Novalis’ title) and ending with the unpublished Politische 
Aphorismen, with the fragment collection Glauben und Liebe oder der König und die Königin at 
its center (all written together in 1798). Alongside the Glauben und Liebe corpus, I also turn to 
the concurrent Das allgemeine Brouillon encyclopedia project (1798/1799), in which Novalis’ 
proposed connections between romanticized love and the ideal utopian polity find their 
theoretical adumbration in the paradigm of the fairy tale (Märchen). Throughout the following, I 
argue that the Brouillon’s articulation of the fairy tale can be understood as the basic framework 
for the affective political turn of Glauben und Liebe, and thus comes to inform the essential 
gesture of Novalis’ system of political aesthetics. On this reading, the Novalisian Märchen is a 
directly political genre, as well as a generic political operation. It should be noted from the outset 
that such an interpretation does not proceed by interrogating the political imaginary included in 
the various fairy tales offered in his works (such as in the so-called “Klingsohrs Märchen” or 
“Atlantis” episode in Heinrich von Ofterdingen), but rather approaches the theory of the fairy 
tale as a new paradigm of the Romantic political imagination, and one that is then reasserted in 
full form in Glauben und Liebe. It is through an expansive and highly idiosyncratic theory of the 
Märchen within his literary-historical context that the systematic conception unifying Novalis’ 
political reflections is prepared, where the interface between love and the utopian image of the 
ideal future community is worked out and applied to the present sociopolitical situation around 
1800. The fairy tale constitutes one of the major test-sites, so to speak, within the greater 






the postrevolutionary moment. Through the corrective vision of a political organization based in 
love, the signature cognitive movements of the Novalisian fairy tale stimulate the collective 
imagination, helping to generate an image of a novel body politic, self-emancipated through the 
transformative effects of aestheticized love.100  
More specifically, what is at issue for Novalis is the way in which the political 
investments of Märchen theory—of the fairy tale as the place for the imaginative literary 
generation of an alternative, future sociopolitical order—coincide with a proposal for modern 
Prussian society to reground itself through affective bonds, in politicized love as the basis of 
communal organization and expression. The modern world, so Novalis insists throughout his 
political fragments, is to be pushed towards the same paradigmatic transformations dramatized in 
the magical affect-effect of fairy tales: the citizen, polity, and world-community must learn to 
carry out Märchen operations on itself. It must collectively learn, through a kind of elastic or 
romanticized Bildung (terms we will return to below) to project binding forms of love through 
every domain of everyday life, to fashion itself as an ideal society that knows itself to be 
consciously embedded in the messianic progression of history.  
When brought into the more concrete-historical context of Glauben und Liebe (whose 
ostensible occasion is to reflect on the recent rise of King Friedrich Wilhelm III and Queen Luise 
von Mecklenburg-Strelitz to the throne of Prussia), what I refer to as Märchenpolitik in the 
following sketches out a design for love as a tool to build new worlds in the imagination, as a 
preparatory exercise for the manifestation of a different world in the here and now. 
                                                 
100 Novalis returns repeatedly to the immense sense of possibility he finds in the estrangement effects of combining a 
certain sense of the fairy tale, love, and speculative political imagination. And this not just in his own contributions 
to the Kunstmärchen tradition (perhaps most well-known in the fragment-novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen and Die 
Lehrlinge zu Sais), but also when he offers direct programmatic proposals for a radical transformation of modern 






Märchenpolitik, and the figure of romanticized love that informs it, is to empower the 
imagination to think, but also the individual body and the collective body politic to act out, 
alternatives to the historical real, to offer direct negations and/or permutations of entrenched, 
conventional sociopolitical norms and values—whether revolutionary or conservative in nature. 
Or, as we will see, the politics of the fairy tale simply departs from such frameworks in a radical 
break, taking up the task of constructing the future utopian society on the basis of an entirely new 
figure of mass affect.  
Such is the notion of the fairy tale as it resurfaces in Glauben und Liebe with a specific 
political effect: love, as an injection of speculative imagination into everyday social practices, 
provides the preconditions, the necessary framework of reflection, to overcome what Novalis 
takes to be the central issue of modern politics: love reconciles the antinomy of monarchism and 
republicanism, collapsing the bipolar opposition determining the field of postrevolutionary 
political theory and practice around 1800. It will only be a specifically Romantic idea of Liebe 
that could serve as the “constitution” of a future state, one that has inherited the best from both 
republican and monarchical forms, resulting in a kind of Staatsmärchen that “transfigures” 
(verklärt) as Novalis puts it, the modern German polity into utopian form.101 Again, as he 
                                                 
101 To anticipate the movement of the following sections: Märchen theory informs Novalis’ main statement on 
politicized love—and affect more generally—in Glauben und Liebe. Within the fairy tale paradigm, the constitutive 
moment of all politics, the emotional a priori of politics as such, is defined as love.  Locating the conjuncture 
between, on the one hand, the affective, historical, and cognitive operations associated with the framework of 
Märchen, and, on the other hand, the dramatization of love in the political fragments, I first treat the Brouillon’s 
theory of the fairy tale and then turn to its concretization in Glauben und Liebe. I show how the postulate of a new 
political community sketched in this latter text—a community of the future that first has to be speculative 
constructed in the here and now—constitutes what we can call, using Novalis’ terms, a Staatsmärchen. The 
projected image of the state that emerges from such a Märchenpolitik is reducible neither to an apology of 
monarchical paternalism (as Glauben und Liebe has often been understood), nor to a valorization of republican 
fraternité, but to a kind of Romantic anarchism whose legitimacy is drawn directly from love’s unique definition 
and application within its system: as a model of emotional or affective intensity for new forms of 
individual/collective binding, producing alternative forms of political identity that directly impact the grounds of 
legitimacy and constitution of the Prussian state. Accordingly, the following sections locate and treat a revolutionary 






understands it, the mobilization of love to rejuvenate modern political experience does not so 
much entail a practically-oriented and actualizable Realpolitik (although Novalis does not deny 
the pragmatic potential of his proposals to bring about actual shifts in the power imbalance of 
modern German society). It entails far more a politics of Möglichkeitssinn, a wild politics—or 
Märchenpolitik—that departs from sociopolitical reality-principles, frees itself from the 
constrictions of historicization and pragmatic practice, recasting the emotion-event of love as a 
tool of future existential transfiguration. 
Novalis is clear about the experimental dimensions of this approach, and thus about the 
need, when engaging with his work, for an imaginative notion of political theory and praxis, a 
sense of the sheer possibility for radical social change brought about through the prefigurative 
exercise of the imagination. This is evident in the opening fragments of Glauben und Liebe in 
which a division appears between the ideal reader (the “Eingeweihter”) and those unreceptive to 
the stimulations of speculative thought (the “Profanen”). The latter reader-thinkers cannot free 
themselves from the limitations of conventional or historical knowledge practices, from the 
standard ideological narratives that confront the material realities of the contemporary world by 
steering the modern subject away from imagining an alternative to the material realities of their 
sociopolitical environment, deleting possibility and chance in favor of a scientific reductive 
administration of life. For Novalis, such philistines are incapable of the transcendent poetic act 
that gestures towards a different world, a vision liberated from the predetermined horizons of 
possibility of the present moment. Novalis writes: “Wer hier mit seinen historischen Erfahrungen 
angezogen kömmt, weiß gar nicht, wovon ich rede.”102 Throughout the following sections, the 
attempt will be made to trace the implications of Novalis’ phrase here through its relation to 
                                                 






romanticized love, the aesthetic and historical system of Märchen, and the imagination of a 
political utopia in Prussia. 
1.2 Love and Political Romantisieren 
In early Romantic discourse, love functions analogously, indeed identically, to the free 
productivity of the aesthetic imagination. Conceived in relation to the faculties and effects of 
poetic creativity, and more specifically to the Schillerian model of the human play drive and 
aesthetic “state” (Zustand and Staat), freely constructing potential worlds in the space of the 
aesthetic imagination, the Romantic notion of love instantiates that Möglichkeitssinn the early 
movement placed at the center of its experimental literary practice, an integral part of their 
program of transformative artistic life. For Novalis, both love and the imagination offer an 
experience that functions as a medium, as a kind of immaterial organ for the human being to 
relate, analogize, and diversify its phenomenal experience of the world, triggering existential 
shifts and crises, pushing towards more complex, variegated, and intense life experiences. As 
with the revolutionary affect-effects of republican fraternité, the functionality of love in Novalis’ 
sense is to draw different elements of individual and collective existence, different signs, systems 
of signification, and forms of practical life, into ever-more complex matrices of communicative 
correspondence. Romantic love/imagination works on the very interface between self and other, 
individual and collective, subjective feeling and objective world, by collapsing such distinctions 
and reorganizing them in different networks of relationality and interconnection—what Niklaus 
Luhmann calls the “Steigerung des Weltgefühls”103 characteristic of Romantic love.  
                                                 
103 Niklas Luhmann, Liebe als Passion: Zur Codierung von Intimität (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003), 180: “die 
selbstreferentielle Konstitution des [romantischen] Liebens [hebt] die Imagination der Liebenden in sich auf. Daß 
der Liebende das Lächeln sieht und nicht die Zahnlücken, war immer schon beobachtet und zur Charakterisierung 
seiner Passion herangezogen worden. Jetzt geht es nicht mehr nur um Selektion und um imaginäre Ergänzung seiner 






Love as Einbildungskraft thus raises the quotidian or normal to a sublime experience of 
beauty, as much as it concentrates the fullness of experience, the epiphanic insight into the entire 
cosmos, into the particular image or individuated moment of libidinal desire. The ideal and task 
of love—its Aufgabe to provide what Novalis terms the end of discord (Ende des Haders)—is to 
simultaneously suture together and separate the diverse elements, whether ordinary or 
exceptional, that constitute a given life. It is to prove capable of re-orientating existence in its all 
its present forms by acknowledging the field of reciprocal association, the perspective that sees 
the web of indexical significance binding the world together, rendering the macrocosm and 
microcosm, and the human being with them, first truly intelligible in their communication and 
identity.  
Novalis addresses this desired imbrication of imagination, love, and the possibility of 
generating a different sense of world: “Was man liebt, findet man überall, und sieht überall 
Ähnlichkeiten. Je größer die Liebe, desto weiter und mannichfaltiger diese ähnliche Welt. Meine 
Geliebte ist die Abbreviatur des Universums, das Universum die Elongatur meiner Geliebten.”104 
Here at the beginning of Glauben und Liebe, the function of love is defined as an abbreviation of 
the universe, distilling the whole of experience into the microcosm of erotic cathexis, but also 
elongating the specific object of love to its macrocosmic limits. Bringing about chiastic 
transfigurations in the fabric of the everyday experience, love takes on the form of the 
Möglichkeitsaffekt, an event and procedure of the mind that all at once reconfigures the potential 
powers of the human sensorium. This is a form of love that opens up an alternative distribution 
of the real and irreal. Through the expansion of perception to include the free constructive 
capacity of the imagination, love presents the subject with a constant juxtaposition and inversion 
                                                 






of the normal and the transcendent. It recasts phenomenal experience, or rather produces it anew, 
creating more multi-various modes of interacting with the mundane and cosmic surround. With 
love so understood as an essentially imaginative-aesthetic capacity, the world is estranged in 
order to become richer, more intense. In the technical sense Novalis gives love, the world 
becomes romantischer, the enlarged effect of an operation of romanticization. 
This exposition of the function of love in Glauben und Liebe is perhaps the best example 
of the locus classicus of early Romantic self-definition: Novalis understands romantisieren as the 
name of the twofold paradigm of the ideal imaginative procedure, as the active process or proper 
activity that characterizes the aesthetic goal of the Romantic subject, whether as poet or lover. In 
a well-known fragment elsewhere, Novalis defines romantisieren as an exercise in semantic 
expansion and contraction, a dual or dialectical re-signification of things that results in a 
qualitatively different form of life, in the production of an otherness or heterogeneity that 
rebounds back on the thinking subject, effectively shifting the experience of the world towards 
experiences of alterity and novelty. The first part in the schema of romanticization is called 
exponentialization or Potenzierung, the other is reduction or Logorithmisierung—and here we 
find a variation, an adjusted conceptual substitution, for the elongation and abbreviation 
functions we have already seen ascribed to love in Glauben und Liebe. “Romantisieren,” Novalis 
writes, “ist nichts als eine qualitative Potenzierung”: 
Indem ich dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem Gewöhnlichen ein geheimnisvolles 
Ansehn, dem Bekannten die Würde des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einen unendlichen 
Schein gebe, so romantisiere ich es.—Umgekehrt ist die Operation für das Höhere, 
Unbekannte, Mystische, Unendliche—dies wird durch diese Verknüpfung 
logarithmisiert—es bekommt einen geläufigen Ausdruck.105 
 
                                                 
105 Novalis, 2:545. This notion of romantisieren can also be found in that other locus classicus of Romantic self-
definition: Schlegel’s Athenäum fragment 116 on “progressive Universalpoesie.” For Schlegel, love is analogous to 
Poesie, it allows reflection on a given object to “immer wieder potenzieren und wie in einer endlosen Reihe von 






Romanticization, and the Romantic movement that represents its procedures and effects in 
literary texts, deploys a variable technique of what Novalis will also call transfiguration 
(Verklärung), a concept explored in more detail below. This is a constant (re)production of so 
many movements of potentialization, a series of “Wechselerhöhung und Erniedrigung”106 of the 
given material—whatever the poet, lover, or Romantic subject seizes on in the moment of 
intensity—to either macrological or micrological scales, and both simultaneously. This dual 
movement in semantic and phenomenal experience lies at the heart of romantisieren, and, as we 
will see, of Novalis’ concept and practice of the fairy tale as well. 
Romantic Liebe thus both individuates and universalizes perceptual processes of 
abbreviation and elongation: on the one hand, it finds the object of love in the particularity of 
embodied life, in all the various entities and objects that constitute a real lived environment, and, 
on the other, it raises the subject through a recognition of love’s unlimited scope and scale, 
revealing the object of love inherent in the absolute structure of the world itself (Luhmann’s 
Steigerung des Weltgefühls). This complex notion of love consistently appears in Novalis’ body 
of work according to the conceptual pattern of romantisieren. What Luhmann also calls a 
“Verzauberung der Objekte”107 in Romantic love, the drive to enchant the average subject’s 
engagement with modern experience, can in this sense be considered one of Novalis’ major 
concerns in his overall experiment on the contemporary moment. When Novalis categorically 
                                                 
106 Novalis, 2:545. 
 






states that “die Welt muß romantisiert werden,”108 love always appears as the privileged 
representative of this general programmatic demand.109 
Luhmann follows the discursive shift at the end of the eighteenth century, exemplified in 
the Romantic literary imaginary, that increasingly finds in love exactly what Novalis calls 
Potenzierung: a potentialization of the world itself through the existential reterritorialization of 
“falling in love” and “love for love’s sake,” or the adaptation of passionate love as a socially 
functional marker of the modern subject. In the wake of the influential trope of Romantic love, 
Luhmann argues, love in general is thereafter commonly understood as world-shaking, as a 
personal emotion-event that gives an intensified affective resonance to the world: “die Welt der 
Objekte, die Natur, wird Resonanzboden der Liebe.”110 Such is the equation of love and 
romantisieren outlined above, the universalizing/particularizing drive towards an ever more 
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109 But this is not to say that the thesis equating Romanticism in its general character with its specific figure(s) of 
romanticized love can itself be equated with the reductive popular or kitsch reception of Romanticism, which 
involves a basic reduction of the romantic in general to an occasional poem on love and nature. In Notes on the 
Problem of Kitsch, Hermann Broch argues that it is often the poet’s own aesthetic failure that leads to the 
“disastrous fall from the cosmic heights to kitsch,” a risk that applies to “introverted” German Romanticism in 
particular. Romanticism, Broch continues, always moves “along a razor’s edge, continually running the risk of 
falling into kitsch” (Hermann Broch, Notes on the Problem of Kitsch in Gillo Dorfles, Kitsch: The World of Bad 
Taste [New York: Universe Books, 1969], 52). To be sure, this edge is particularly sharp in the Romantic discourse 
of love. But I would add to Broch’s observations the obvious point that besides the given poet’s own aesthetic 
shortcomings and failures, it is just as often the historical reception of a work or movement—not to speak of the 
needs of a culture industry—that effects the reduction to kitsch. On the other hand, however, the “fall” into kitsch 
can also be an intentional gesture of the Romantic text. Pace Broch, certainly Heinrich Heine’s treatment of 
Romanticism sometimes accomplishes just this. More exemplary in this respect is Klingemann’s obscure 
Nachtwachen, whose narrative depends self-consciously on a poetics of bathos that Broch critiques precisely as 
kitsch here. Nachtwachen’s protagonist Kreuzgang satirically inverts the heights of Novalisian love in pursuit of his 
nihilistic program, one that erratically shifts between a will to transcendence and the depths of despair, even while 
productively ironizing both: he shows Romanticism in its kitsch elements, and thus ambiguously tries to rescue the 
movement. As we will see, the novel’s form and content dramatizes an oscillation between pathos and bathos, 
constantly juxtaposing and contrasting ideal figures (such as those of poetic love) with their kitsch reductions. In 
light of this, Broch’s schematic definition of the “Romantic mind” as a “mixture of exaltation and terror” appears 
entirely fitting (especially when applied to Nachtwachen), even if his argument that kitsch “is a specific product of 
Romanticism [i.e., the romantic nineteenth century and not just German Romanticism]” is far more problematic 
(Ibid., 56, 61). 
 






intense synthesis of all aspects of being, the aspiration to incorporate all sensation and 
knowledge into the cosmic manifold (and then to incorporate this entire system of relations once 
again into the crucible experience of individual desire). Romantic love, in Novalis’ ideal 
conception, renders life as a whole more effective or potent, actualizes it at a higher-order level 
of perception and everyday social interaction.  
But Luhmann stops short before attributing a directly political valence to this world-
generative concept of Romantic love: “Wenn Liebe derart von ihrem eigenen Erfahrungsraum 
lebt, dem die Liebenden—und das eben ist Liebe—sich ausliefern, wird es dann kaum mehr 
möglich sein, hier eine Theorie des Staates oder eine Theorie der Wirtschaft anzuschließen.”111 
In Luhmann’s analysis, Romantic love produces an exhaustively self-referential relation to 
phenomenal environment—in which the maximized Weltgefühl of love paradoxically shrinks the 
dimensions of the world, just as the individual’s object of love overwhelms everything else, 
including, at its other extreme, the cosmos itself. So for him it also follows that love cannot be 
connected, reduced, or subsumed to any regime of communal experience such as the state or 
economy (as had long been the case with traditional patriarchalism, according to which the 
familial economy of love, the well-ordered affect of the family unit, serves as the structural 
analog for the nature of the state “family” as well). Novalis’ specific case both affirms 
Luhmann’s claim here and qualifies it. Novalis’ sense of love as a unique realm of experience is 
based precisely on connecting the sphere of the state, that of the political world which appears so 
limited and constricted from the revolutionary’s perspective, to precisely that enhanced 
Weltgefühl of love Luhmann describes above. Pace Luhmann, the explicit intention for Novalis 
is to establish a continuum between different scales and applications of love that informs all 
                                                 






spheres of modern life, that rethinks the postrevolutionary process of sociopolitical constitution 
as a matter of variable operations of romanticized love.  
From Novalis’ perspective collective life appears so alienating just because it lacks a self-
conscious link with the “community” of the couple in love, in particular insofar as it has largely 
relinquished the transcendent significance of the institution of marriage, as he sees it, the most 
profound union. The political is to be modelled on intimate and interpersonal relations based in 
the familial and, to a lesser extent, in the erotic love of the couple. As Novalis describes it, the 
citizen must be connected with the König—or the sense of sovereign self-worth idealized in 
monarchs but not exclusively contained in them—inherent in every autonomous subject, every 
family unit and married pair, through a saturating affect, spread throughout all social formations. 
The program of proliferating love becomes in this way the foundation of all political theorization 
and community-building efforts.112 For Novalis, what is missing, everywhere, is simply love, and 
that is why the postrevolutionary (Prussian, but also “New Prussian”) nation finds itself adrift, 
unsure of how to constitute itself, questioning its very grounds of legitimacy in the face of the 
new revolutionary exigency. Hence the need to encourage those forms of politicized love, those 
operations or practices of self-, group-, and mass-affective force that potentialize the Other, the 
fellow citizen in relations to the individual self and greater social unit. In this way, new bonds 
between disparate subjects and communities can be built all the way up to the state and the royal 
couple, the latter themselves bound through love to each other and, more importantly in Novalis’ 
view, bound to each citizen-subject as well.  
                                                 
112 One could therefore say that Novalis’ theory of love is one that in Luhmann’s terms directly contravenes in the 
on-going functional differentiation of modern society, and by doing so proposes a kind of alternative modernization 







Integrating an older tradition of paternal-monarchical love into the above sense of 
Romantic love as world-transformation or “Weltaufbau,”113 as Luhmann puts it, the assemblage 
love/imagination/romanticization, as we have already seen, has an analogical function: it brings 
different objects and scales of experience, the entire world, into a manifold of relationality (and 
thus also into political relations). Luhmann’s reading sometimes obscures this aspect within 
Romantic discourse, tending instead to emphasize the closed autopoetic system of the lovers’ 
world, circumscribed by only two people.114 Novalis, by contrast, focuses on a socialization of 
love as a performative act of political union, one that breaks with such models of love as 
Luhmann describes them vis-à-vis Romanticism. In regards to present-day contexts, and without 
any reference to romantic traditions, Michael Hardt outlines Novalis’ stance along these lines, 
focusing on exactly that which is at stake already around 1800. “In the past,” Hardt writes, “love 
has sometimes been conceived of as a political force, but today it is almost completely isolated 
within the private and intimate sphere. In order to create a political concept and practice of love 
today, one must extend it beyond the couple and the family to the entire social field.”115 Hardt’s 
comment here can be immediately applied to an explication of Novalis’ politics of love. It is a 
perhaps obvious point, but one that should be emphasized in any study on Romantic political 
affect: when love is politicized, it necessarily refuses Luhmann’s definition of the monological 
inwardness of love, or the limited “love for love’s sake” of the intimate couple, in favor of 
transfigurative relations to the broader social environment in which it is embedded. As we will 
see in the next sections, this expansion of love as a political instrument, as a generator of 
                                                 
113 Luhmann, 167. 
  
114 Ibid., 168. 
 






revolutionary change within the social body, becomes the core of Novalis’ notion of the fairy tale 
as well. 
1.3 The End of Discord 
“Das Ende des Haders,” one of the poems published under the title Blumen in 1798, 
forms a kind of prologue to Glauben und Liebe.116 It exemplifies not only the general poetics of 
romantisieren as already described—the characteristic cognitive, aesthetic, phenomenal, and 
world-generative effects of romanticization—but also its specifically political application as a 
form of Möglichkeitsaffekt based in love.117 In this sense, the poem can serve as a useful point of 
departure into the main concerns of the following discussion of Märchenpolitik. “Das Ende des 
Haders,” in its entirety, reads as follows: 
Lange währte der Zwist, es konnte keiner ihn schlichten;  
Mancher schöne Krystall brach in dem feindlichen Stoß.  
Nur die Liebe besitzt den Talismann ewigen Friedens –  
Da nur, wo sie erscheint, fließen die Massen in Eins.118  
Here we find the staging of a conflict, a primordial struggle situated, on the one hand, in a 
timeless, mythic narrative that, on the other, also echoes with the story of the contemporary 
situation, with clear references to current sociopolitical theory and revolutionary developments 
                                                 
116 Blumen appeared at the end of the June 1798 issue of the Jahrbücher der preußischen Monarchie unter der 
Regierung des Friedrich Wilhelms des Dritten. The July issue saw the publishing of Novalis’ most extensive set of 
political fragments Glauben und Liebe, arguably his most famous political statement next to the long-unpublished 
Europa. In August 1798, the Politische Aphorismen were scheduled to appear in the Jahrbücher, but due to the 
scandalous impact of Glauben und Liebe they were withdrawn before publication. Each of the above contributions 
to the Jahrbücher takes a slightly different approach while remaining intimately related. All three texts—and the 
work-cycle as a whole—will be the object of the following analysis in more detail. On their editorial and publishing 
history, both in terms of King Friedrich Wilhelm’s reception, to whom Glauben und Liebe is explicitly, albeit 
ironically addressed, and in terms of Novalis’ fellow Romantics and the larger contemporary readership, see 
O’Brien, 161-168. 
  
117 See Matthias Löwe, Idealstaat und Anthropologie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 272: “Offenbar wird in Glauben 
und Liebe am Beispiel der preußischen Monarchie also die ästhetische Operation des Romantisierens vollzogen, was 
bei Hardenberg bedeutet, die vorfindliche Wirklichkeit augenzwinkernd in ein anderes Licht zu rücken.”  
 






around 1800 (the discourse of perpetual peace, the activation of the masses). Confusing two 
orders of time—the one mythological or perennial, the other actual or conventionally historical 
(albeit only implicitly given, indicated, or suggested)—a complex superposed or overlapping 
temporal structure arises at the level of the poem’s content and formal organization. This 
structure in the poem constitutes the main facet of the temporality of the Novalisian Märchen as 
well. 
 The advent of discord (or dispute, Zwist) with which the enemy has violently separated 
what was before unified (with a feindlichen Stoß) does indeed have an end, whether in the here 
and now of 1798 or in an unidentified messianic event to come—the Ende of the title perhaps 
indexes both the historical present and the utopian future. But this end is not so much enunciated 
as implied in the temporal movement ordering the poem. The long discord is figured as an 
already accomplished event, a static part of the primal scene or Vorwelt119 narrated in the past 
tense. And yet it also seems to continue, unceasing, because no one could settle it (es konnte 
keiner ihn schlichten). Still, the poem does offer a hope for future peace: the emergence of a 
unified order is signaled in the shift from the past tense of the first two lines to the present/future 
tenses of the fourth and fifth lines (from brach to besitzt), as if the presence of originary mythic 
trauma could indeed be left behind in the image of a restored epoch, healed of the historical 
violence of human strife. But, then again, this shift at the level of poetic temporality is not 
articulated as an indicative speech-act, for everything depends on the appearance of a singular 
future event—love, the Talismann ewigen Friedens—that has apparently not arrived, for the 
                                                 
119 As we will see below in more detail, this sense of an Edenic pre-world plays an important role in all of Novalis’ 
political reflections. Mircea Eliade describes this figure of primordial history, the so-called illud tempus, as a 
universal trait of Western mythic consciousness (see Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal 






people are not yet unified in identity, having not yet passed from an atomized accumulation 
(Massen) to a homogenous unity (Eins). 
The end of discord hinges around this fact, and is thus itself strictly conditional: the mass 
emergence of love as a singular event of collective identification remains to be realized in the 
future. Or rather, it is at least not fully evident that this unity is already present, as it is not part of 
the poem’s content, but rather appears as an implicit movement in possible time, a shift to a 
qualitatively potential temporal order, but only as a potentiality. It is not actually given at the 
level of mythic or historical time that love has appeared, nor is its consequence, namely the 
masses flowing into One, given directly in poetic speech—the end of discord itself is not named, 
nor perhaps, can it be so in any proper sense. This event remains subjunctive and provisional, a 
mode and mood of possibility that may prove ultimately apophatic. The Ende des Haders will 
happen only where and when such a transformative love appears (Da nur, wo sie erscheint). 
Creating this heterotopic place of unity—a place that is both somehow within reach of political 
reality in the present moment but, at the same time, impossibly utopian in scope, a program in 
nowhere, for a world that only exists in the form of a future promise—this nevertheless 
constitutes the poem’s performative impact, the change or stimulation its images are designed to 
incite in its contemporary readers, or at least in the select initiates of Romantic reading. 
The poem’s reference to Kant’s 1795 treatise Zum ewigen Frieden, one of the seminal 
attempts of the contemporary German intellectual sphere to draft a programmatic framework for 
a future of lasting political concord, is unmistakable in the third line.120 As mentioned already, 
                                                 
120 Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden, like “Das Ende des Haders,” also provides a speculative image of the total end of 
political strife. It envisions a kind of evolutionary passage from a Hobbesian state of nature—a “Zustand des 
Krieges” (Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden:348)—to what Michael W. Doyle calls an “ever-widening pacification of a 
liberal pacific union” (Kant, Political Writings, 202). To bring this ideal political organization into being, Kant goes 
on to stipulate the primary conditions (the set of various prohibitive laws and definite articles) that must be 






the reality-effect of this reference signals, alongside the word Massen in the fourth line, the 
poem’s conflation of the mythic time of Vorwelt with present revolutionary development: both 
temporal orders echo each other, mirroring an incomplete striving whose end in unity is reserved 
as the event of a Nachwelt of perpetual peace, a time and space yet to come.121 Here love 
becomes a Möglichkeitsaffekt that is only partly virtual: it does not address the real historical 
environment or embody an actual fraternity that holds the masses together, such as Robespierre, 
for example, called for. But it does address the real possibility of such unification, and the 
necessity of its realization for the very fate of humanity. In this sense, the Ende des Haders—the 
binding of political community in such a way as to be capable of forever suturing what had been 
violently broken apart—recedes into the future. It still remains ahead of a modernity situated in 
the aftermath of a traumatic revolution, left to fill a void that political tumult has produced in the 
cosmic order. Or, as Novalis will put it in Glauben und Liebe: the end of discord still remains 
ahead of a modern age struggling to bring the Interregnum to an end and the utopian post-
historical regime or “goldenes Zeitalter” into actuality.122 This space-between or caesura where 
the historical present finds itself, after past rupture but before future redemption, perhaps finds its 
best symbol in the poem’s dash, the Bindestrich between perpetual peace and its conditional 
appearance (Friedens—/da nur), a graphic line that signifies little, or only deferral, but one that 
still performs a version of the connection (bindet) that Novalis deems essential to the emergence 
of concord. 
                                                 
121 In Glauben und Liebe Novalis writes: “Wer den ewigen Frieden jetzt sehn und lieb gewinnen will, der reise nach 
Berlin und sehe die Königin” (Novalis, 2:498), a phrase that comes, paradoxically, only after a sustained attempt to 
construct an ideal—and precisely not realistic—image of royal femininity next to an idealized King (to be discussed 
below in more detail). For Novalis, the actual Queen of Prussia, Luise, appears as a still-incomplete and not yet fully 
educated (gebildet) half of an ideal monarchical pair. In reading this fragment, one should also not forget that irony 
plays an important role in Glauben und Liebe, even if a long tradition of scholarly reception has ignored this feature 
of the text (see O’Brien, 148). 
 






Only love as a magical instrument, a talisman—as a magical technology or tool—could 
fill this void, end the provisional order of the contemporary historical moment, and connect the 
masses to each other in the final event of peace. Here political love is left fully undetermined, but 
it is still figured as a future task to end all historical strife; its investigation, and eventual 
manifestation, must therefore become the matter of a futurological imagination of politics. The 
last lines of Kant’s essay express a similar thought, where he concludes that thinking the end of 
discord is no “leere Idee, sondern eine Aufgabe, die, nach und nach aufgelöst, ihrem Ziele (weil 
die Zeiten, in denen gleiche Fortschritte geschehen) hoffentlich immer kürzer werden, beständig 
näher kommt.”123 As with Kant, for Novalis too, the regulative idea of an absolute political unity 
(or love) is definitely not empty, even in its asymptotic unreachability. But it must still be 
understood as an imaginative Aufgabe whose realization lies ahead.124 The “reality” so to speak, 
of this ideal of perpetual peace is just that sense of possibility it stimulates in the political 
imagination, pushing it to change the status of contemporary life. 
Crisis, discord, and its possible end sometime in the future, are here properly 
romanticized. The four lines of Novalis’ poem narrate a world marked by the problems and 
potential solutions of the situation around 1800—the problematic of mass democratic 
movements disrupting the old establishment order—but the poem also presents this situation as 
part of a metahistorical order encompassing the present, as an indication that transcending the 
                                                 
123 On Novalis’ relation to Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden, see O’Brien, 124.  
  
124 Some commentators, pointing to Kant’s adherence to his own definition of the “regulative Idee” in this text, 
emphasize that perpetual peace, as such an idea or principle, is strictly unobtainable from his point of view, 
something Kant will also claim of his oft-evoked ideal of a “weltbürgerliche Gesellschaft” or global 
cosmopolitanism (see Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht:329). In a note to his English translation, 
David L. Colclasure remarks that the zu in the title Zum ewigen Frieden can be read as both “to” (in the sense of the 
name of an inn, an image Kant draws attention to at the beginning of the essay) and—more accurately—also 
“toward” since, Colclasure notes, “Kant sees perpetual peace as a state that should be approached, but not as one 






historically determined condition is possible, and that establishing lasting peace necessarily 
orients the messianic progression of humanity. The recent history of political turmoil is refigured 
as a kind of transhistorical Olympian episode, another instance in the perennial record of human 
strife that must be arrested through the radical impact of massified love, bringing the masses 
together into a unified affective body. In a concentrated narrative that reimagines the 
contemporary moment as a sequence within a greater continuum, connected to its prehistory and 
afterlife, to the Vorwelt and Nachwelt, the poem submits the conventional image of history to the 
estranging functions of romanticization, giving primal, present, and future worlds “einen hohen 
Sinn [...] ein geheimnisvolles Ansehn […] einen unendlichen Schein,” reducing the revolutionary 
movement of modern history to so many scattered articulations of a universal love evolving 
through world history. But again, within the temporal movement of the poem, this affective 
Utopia, the ideal end-result of the transfer from scission to unity through the event of love, 
appears far more as a mere possibility or promise. Like the experimental operations of 
romantisieren, the success of love as a transformative technology of political affect—the magical 
talisman that will be re-invoked again and again in the same formulations throughout Novalis’ 
works—is not unequivocally given. It is first and foremost a problem or risk, an assay or Versuch 
that must be carried out in the here and now so as to construct a fundamentally different world in 
the future. Novalis’ reflections on Märchen represent a sustained attempt to do just this. 
1.4 Märchenpolitik  
As Jane K. Brown has shown, the Kunstmärchen around 1800 often comprises an 
allegorical medium in which concerns associated with the French Revolution, “the central 
political event for the Romantic generation,” as Brown puts it, can be dramatized and contested 






revolutionariness” of its content; a view Brown shares in part with Jack Zipes’ seminal work on 
fairy tales, Breaking the Magic Spell).125 In a study on Goethe’s 1795 Märchen—the conclusion 
to the Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderter, and to no small extent also the beginning of 
the generic Kunstmärchen tradition so important to his Romantic contemporaries—Brown notes 
that Goethe’s Märchen is now generally accepted as one of his many literary responses to the 
contemporary crisis of revolution. This response, more specifically, is understood as aligning 
with his concurrent morphological interests: the text’s spatial and generative semantics, Brown 
claims, provide an implicit description of “how to purify monarchy rather than abolish it and 
how to control the mayhem of the Revolution.”126 In Goethe’s fairy tale, the primal event of 
revolution appears in a greater process of emergent change that ultimately recycles back to 
stability. The text charts a path away from a state of anarchic chaos and towards the 
reestablishment of order, an evolution that is formally reflected in different representative 
movements—above all through the central image of the bridge—that structure the text’s 
narrative territory. Marked by a series of metaphorical and literal synapses, for Brown this 
territory is mapped out along the lines of attraction and repulsion that characters follow within 
the diegetic and conceptual bridge spaces of Goethe’s Märchen.  
More significant for the present concerns, Zipes describes the progressive political import 
of the contemporary Kunstmärchen genre in closer reference to Romanticism. He takes note of 
the general revolutionary character of Frühromantik: the early movement is “Revolutionary in 
form, revolutionary in content,” which immediately allows the following premise: 
Here we have the basis for comprehending the rise of the romantic fairy tale in Germany. 
This does not mean that all fairy tales preached revolution, nor that the romantics were 
political revolutionaries in disguise. However, this premise does assume that the 
                                                 
125 Jane K. Brown, “Building Bridges: Goethe’s Fairy-Tale Aesthetics.” Goethe Yearbook, vol. 23 (2016): 16. 
 






romantics were consciously aware of revolutionizing an older form of art under new 
socio-economic conditions which they perceived to be problematic.127 
 
Thus for Zipes, as well as for Brown, the Kunstmärchen genre—in both form and content—
contains clear layers that reflect the problematics of the sociopolitical environment, and can do 
so in different ways, serving the ends of divergent political ideologies according to the given text 
in question. The fairy tale can be conceived either as a drama of the revolutionary overturning of 
order (something, as we will see below, that Novalis emphasizes), or as a reterritorialization of 
chaos into a higher-order potentialization, into the monarchical form promising perpetual peace 
that Goethe suggests at the end of his own fairy tale (which will also inform the discussion of 
monarchy in Glauben und Liebe to a certain extent as well).128 In this sense, the Märchen 
constitutes an aesthetic genre for a new kind of political thinking in its own right perhaps above 
all because its protean nature renders it supple enough for activation across the political 
spectrum, for a variety of positions. It is precisely here that the ambiguity of political affect 
arises as an important element within the Romantic discourse of the fairy tale. What is at stake is 
not just the revolutionizing of a literary genre within a generally problematic political situation, 
as Zipes points out, but the application of the fairy tale’s transformative model of emotion for 
revolutionizing the social situation at hand.  
                                                 
127 Jack Zipes, Breaking the Magic Spell (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979), 48. 
 
128 One way to make sense of such differences in the political evaluation of fairy tale is through attention to the well-
known terminological shift in the concept of revolution between the premodern and modern eras. In the former, 
“revolution” (revolutio) is understood as a return to an earlier state, as in the orbital cycles of celestial bodies 
moving along the preordained circuits described in Ptolemaic astronomy. In the latter, by contrast, the modern 
concept of revolution becomes a fundamental break in the determined course of all orders of life—not just of the 
political status quo—that departs from the “Wiederholungsstruktur” of premodern revolutio, as Jörn Leonhard puts 
it, by introducing a “linearen oder teleologischen Geschichtsvorstellungen” in which revolution is now “mit einer bis 
dahin unabsehbaren, verdichteten und beschleunigten Ereignisfolge identifiziert, zu der die Gewalterfahrung und die 
kurzfristige Erosion von ehemals legitimen Herrschaftsstrukturen gehörte.” This conceptual development, Leonhard 
continues, “imprägnierte weit über Frankreich hinaus das Verständnis und die Kontur von Revolutionskonzepten im 






 The fairy tale is an under-appreciated and fascinating literary form for Novalis, and even 
in its conventional appearances it already provides a sense of imaginative experimentation with 
sociopolitical reality. Inasmuch as it encourages such imaginative energy in Novalis’ view, it 
also comes to represent the transformative aesthetic activity par excellence, the most 
existentially productive of artistic pursuits (what Schlegel terms Poesie in this same period).129 It 
is thus intimately related to the above described operations of romanticization; indeed it can be 
understood as the literary medium in which figures of romanticized Liebe are called into being in 
their most expansive, and effective, forms. Novalis uses the Märchen—sometimes only retaining 
the name, entirely evacuating its traditional content—as a framework to foreground such figures 
of order and disorder as they metamorphize and mutate, inciting intense emotions like love and 
hate, desire and envy. The Märchen is the place for reflections on the chaotic, but ultimately 
restorative admixture of individual and mass affects, bridging the gap between them, and for 
their application as interventions into the course of modern life. A major aspect here is also the 
mode of speculative intervention into historical consciousness that is developed in Novalis’ fairy 
tale paradigm. “Das Ende des Haders” performs exactly such an experiment on the modern 
consciousness of historical temporality, and is itself a concentrated Märchen: it injects a 
difference or alterity into the concept and progress of history itself, prefiguring the vision of 
eternal concord through a politics of love. 
In Novalis’ terms, the crucial point is that the emotional, and thus socially effective 
content of the fairy tale is endowed with a force that is neither solely natural nor divine, but 
magical (magisch); for him, this specific aspect constitutes the undeniable impact that alters 
historical consciousness. Furthermore, this evident magical valence of the fairy tale form is 
                                                 






hardly unmistakable in a period in which politics itself seems to appear in a succession of 
“miracles”: “In unsern Zeiten,” Novalis observes, “haben sich wahre Wunder der 
Transsubstantiation ereignet.”130 Perhaps the most surprising revolutionary ordo inversus131—the 
regicide of King Louis and the rise of the French revolutionary state—had already provided a 
Potenzierung of the Third Estate and a Logorithmisierung of the monarch, so to speak, raising 
the former to the sovereign “head” of the nation and negating, denigrating to the point of 
contempt, and ultimately executing the latter (and here perhaps another sense of what Novalis 
calls transubstantiation above). He elaborates the magical paradigm of Märchen as a response to 
this specific turn of events and to the general political instability of the age—similar to but in a 
more radical vein than Goethe’s, for the “order” of the Novalisian fairy tale is far more that of a 
chaos theory, as will become more clear below, even if it ultimately points to the regulative ideal 
of a future performance of perpetual peace. As Zipes points out, Novalis consciously took up the 
attempt to rethink—and revolutionize—the very concept of the fairy tale for a critical-utopian 
engagement with contemporary social, historical, and political change: this, in its broadest of 
terms, constitutes the thematic of Märchenpolitik in its most developed discourse of political 
aesthetics and affect. 
                                                 
130 Novalis, 2:498. Hans Blumenberg’s observation that: “Aus der spekulativen Physik Johann Wilhelm Ritters lernt 
Novalis Transsubstantiation als das natürliche Prinzip, aller physikalischen und chemischen Vorgänge kennen,” can 
be extended to the sociopolitical order of reflection as well: indeed, Novalis’ frequent use of substantives with the 
prefix trans (as we will see with the central terms Transmundaner and Transfiguration below) is by no means 
limited to the domain of the physical sciences (Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1981], 237). Transformation, transfiguration, becoming-in-time through variable forms and figures of active 
metamorphosis—as a key concept not only in Novalis’ own thinking but also in the wider tradition of 
Naturphilosophie in general (see Chapter 2)—such terms should be understood as the natural or operative principles 
of all diachronic phenomena, which is to say, of all things in the world, including political life. 
 
131 Ordo inversus is here meant as an inversion of the historico-political status quo. To be sure, this is not unrelated 
to the philosophical Umkehrung between levels of reflection that Manfred Frank and Gerhard Kurz refer to with this 
term (see Manfred Frank and Gerhard Kurz, “Ordo Inversus. Zu einer Reflexionsfigur bei Novalis, Hölderlin, Kleist 






William Arctander O’Brien identifies two periods roughly separating the major works of 
Novalis’ oeuvre.132 The first period covers his stay in Freiberg from December 1797 to May 
1799, resulting in the unpublished notebooks of the Freiberger Studien, Allgemeines Brouillon, 
and the Politische Aphrorismen, alongside the published fragment collections Blüthenstaub, 
Glauben und Liebe, and Blumen (the latter set of poems including “Das Ende des Haders”). This 
period saw an increasing thematization of the Romantic concept of love described above, and 
unmistakable in this context is also the concurrent emphasis on a discourse of magic at the center 
of the conceptual framework of the fairy tale. The discussion of Romantic love—or now in the 
Brouillon a romanticized love understood as part of a speculative futurology, reconceived in 
what Novalis calls a magical idealism (magischen Idealismus)133—punctuates this phase of his 
literary production. And it always appears in close proximity to his reflections on the sense of 
magical possibility modelled in the fairy tale: “Liebe ist der Grund der Möglichkeit der Magie. 
Die Liebe wirckt magisch.”134 In turn, the effect of such love, and more specifically the kind of 
Verbindung, Union, and Ehe that it ideally produces, constitutes the means and ends of 
Märchenpolitik: “Uneigennützige Liebe135 im Herzen und ihre Maxime im Kopf, das ist die 
alleinige, ewige Basis aller wahrhaften, unzertrennlichen Verbindung, und was ist die 
Staatsverbindung anders, als eine Ehe?”136 To respond to Novalis’ rhetorical question here with 
an answer from an entry in the Brouillon: Staatsverbindung, or the ideal political bond, only 
                                                 
132 O’Brien, 130. 
 
133 On magical idealism, see footnote 539 below. 
 
134 Novalis, 3:257. 
 
135 In his later work, Schlegel will essentially invert Novalis’ concept of “uneigennützige Liebe.” By contrast, 
Schlegel speaks of “uneigennütziges Verbrechen” as precisely the cause of all the political turmoil of the 
revolutionary period (see Chapter 4). 
 






takes on the form and function of marriage when love becomes magical in the sense Novalis 
gives to it: “wo wahre Liebe vorkommt,” he writes there, “sind Mährchen—magische 
Begebenheiten.”137  
But while love and magic represent the synthesizers, binders, and mediators within the 
system of the Novalisian fairy tale “genre,” the acts of unification they produce are not always 
reconciliatory, harmonious, or otherwise designed to pacify the turmoil of the contemporary 
sociopolitical situation. By contrast, the productive effect of applying the signal imaginative 
procedures of the fairy tale to everyday (social, political, and historical) life practices—such as 
by extending the paradigmatic form of the marriage union throughout all fields of present 
existence—these may just as well appear at first as an alienating influence, a widening of 
oppositions and an intensification of the chaos subtending all worlds and all orders, especially 
when fairy tale operations are understood to entail an outright revolutionary aspect. The 
moments of coalescing elements that Novalis desires appear truly unified only when they reflect 
the energetic clash of their parts in juxtaposition, reproduced in an active movement of 
alternation and combination, as opposed to represented in completed or perfected processes. 
Indeed, the theory of the Märchen postulates the break-through or transfiguration into an 
exponentially higher organization that does not come without a significant quotient of violence 
to status quo normative orders, and indeed constantly returns to its potential to disrupt or perturb 
its own evolving organization. In this sense, the critical re-conception of historical order as such, 
or the modern subject’s consciousness of it, propels Novalis’ development of Märchenpolitik. 
We find its beginning in his encyclopedia project. 
 
                                                 






1.5 Märchen Temporality: Poetic Present 
A certain historically-alienating register for the fairy tale stands out among the many 
dispersed investigations of the Brouillon. In a kind of willed—i.e., magical—change in perceived 
reality, Novalis focuses on how the writer and reader of the fairy tale encounter a disruption of 
the linear progressivist historical sense associated with the dominant Enlightenment paradigm of 
thought. The experience of the Märchen reveals a different or alienated sense of time, lifted out 
of prosaic historical temporality. In terms of the kind of temporal consciousness the fairy tale 
aims at producing, it orients itself in relation to a series of possible worlds of the future, but also 
to a mythic reconstruction of the past. As in “Das Ende des Haders,” this is evident insofar as the 
poem’s temporal order oscillates between a displaced Vorwelt with traumatic after-effects, and 
the task of a political love reserved for the elusive but ultimately redemptive Nachwelt. 
In a series of interrelated entries, the Brouillon defines the fairy tale’s historical 
dimension in this sense as a doctrine of the future (Zukunftslehre). The declared aspiration of 
Zukunftslehre is to become a philosophy of history centered around the so-called poetic present 
(geistige Gegenwart), a historical consciousness that grasps itself in the imaginative act, or rather 
creates and puts itself to use in an imaginative historical order brought into being through poetic 
experimentation. And this will not just be a clairvoyant premonition of the future, but also an un-
forgetting of the past, a re-connection with pre-historical originary life. Such is the scope and 
intention of Novalis’ doctrine of the future within the context of Märchen temporality. Where 
other contemporary philosophies of history, namely those of a dominant Enlightenment (or 
bourgeois) optimism,138 depend in part on a kind of passive hermeneutics—in which the 
                                                 
138 Compare Mähl’s discussion of the above triadic structure of Novalis’ philosophy of history, which he contrasts 
with opposing Enlightenment models: “für den Aufklärer—das gilt auch noch für den Chiliasmus Lessings—stellt 
sich die Kontinuität der Geschichte als eine ständige Aufwärtsentwicklung dar, die von der Gegenwart her die 






contemporary is read as only the present moment in the wider teleological evolution of a one-
way historical “progress”—by contrast, Zukunftslehre outlines a shift towards an active historical 
poeisis, a kind of constructivist genesis of history that makes a clear break with conventional 
historical reality-principles, aiming at a disruption and reformation of temporal experience in 
general. It is therefore not so much the content of a retroactive anamnesis of the past nor of a 
future-facing prophetic insight that Novalis is interested in, but rather the formal process of 
intermixing both of these within the associative fields of poetic thought, producing different 
temporal modes through their combination and confusion so as to spark further progression in 
thought and practice. Temporality becomes a fabric that can be woven, folded, and re-stitched at 
will in the imaginative act, the object of a poeticizing consciousness (and of a cycle of poems). 
In this sense, time is rendered magical in Novalis’ terms, rethought and changed through the 
functions of magic described in the doctrine of the future. The entries of the Brouillon circle 
around the possibilities of such an alternative poetic temporality, how it could be best produced 
and what types of model subjects and collectives it presupposes. The recurrent question is: how 
to invent a fundamentally different anthropological mold, an alien human activity and type, one 
that could actually inhabit the world(s) of the poetic present and thereby transfigure the status of 
modern experience. 
The fairy tale thus mobilizes a form of creative belief, an “ächter Glaube” in the 
temporally absent or invisible, in the ideal and virtual, investing in itself a newfound faith that 
human development can indeed proceed towards perpetual peace, but only after a radical 
                                                 
Geschichtsoptimismus lebt in Kant und, durch seinen Einfluß, auch im jungen Fichte fort, obwohl hier bereits die 
progressive Tendenz als Reaktion auf Rousseaus regressive Geschichtsbetrachtung verstanden werden muß. Für 
Novalis dagegen liegt der Prozeß der Geschichte zwischen jenem Urzustand der Menschheit, der durch kindliche 
Unschuld und märchenhaften Einklang der Natur- und Geisterwelt gekennzeichnet ist, und jenem ersehnten 
Endzustand der Menschheit, der diese Unschuld und diesen Einklang auf höherer Stufe wiederherstellen und die 






reorientation of its present course of progress. Such belief can be understood in Ernst Bloch’s 
later formulations of a “Noch-nicht,” the utopian desire invested in a possible and entirely 
contingent future (or for that matter, in an idealized past) that must first be gleaned from the 
perceived inadequacy of the here and now.139 Contrary to Bloch’s sometimes cursory analysis of 
a potential Noch-nicht within Romantic literary traditions, Novalis’ reflections on Märchen (or 
here, more specifically, on Zukunftslehre), not only draw on a reservoir of irredeemable 
historical experience—a facet of his thought that has led to the long reception of the Romantic 
political imagination as solely backwards-facing, when not hopelessly reactionary.140 He also 
emphasizes, seemingly paradoxically, a certain futural orientation towards the past. It is precisely 
an immersion in the past, in other words, that first opens up a novel image of the desired future 
utopia. Indeed, this aspect of Novalis’ thought is decidedly futurological in its attachment to an 
idealized past or mythic Vorwelt.141 For him, there is an imaginative productivity that comes 
                                                 
139 For Novalis, sometimes this entails not so much an optimism or principle of hope otherwise often espoused in 
his works (to speak most generally) as much as a potentially tragic messianism, a will-to-rupture in historico-
political order that is admittedly fueled by hope, but inured by disappointment. Such a stance can also be found in 
Hölderlin’s poetry, for example, and achieves a different sense, as we will see in the excursus in Chapter 3, in 
Nachtwachen, where a dystopian concept of the noch-nicht has been captured by the Polizei-function of the modern 
state.  
 
140 Bloch repeatedly stresses the dark, backwards-facing, or strictly retrospective orientation of Romantic discourse. 
For example: the “Unreife Deutschlands zur bürgerlichen Revolution, die dadurch bedingten unklaren 
Durchkreuzungen der progressiven revolutionären Vernunft haben so das Originalgenie zuletzt doch mehr zu einem 
Boten aus der Urzeit als der Zukunft gemacht. Dergleichen steigerte sich in den erst recht merkwürdigen 
Verwicklungen der Romantik [...] [This tendency] wurde von dem reaktionären, gegen die bürgerliche Revolution 
gerichteten Auftrag geliefert, wie er wachsend die deutsche Romantik bestimmte und trotzdem vorhandene 
unleugbar progressive Züge durchkreuzte. Auf kaum mehr nacherfahrbare Weise war der Romantiker Vergangenem 
verfallen, und das mit einer lex continui, die—dem reaktionären Auftrag gemäß—in der mondbeglänzten 
Zaubernacht vorzugsweise nur Ritterburgen ragen ließ. Das Geschichtliche verband sich noch wachsend mit 
Archaischem und dieses mit Chthonischem, so daß das Geschichts-Innere bald wie Erd-Inneres selber dreinsah” 
(Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1 [Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1976], 153). Bloch reproduces the gesture of many 
commentators on political Romanticism, reducing the movement to an imposed reading of Spätromantik as 
reactionary kitsch political aesthetics (similar here to Broch), projecting its last iterations—and even these in a 
characterization that ignores the importance of the future in Romantic texts—back over its entire trajectory.  
 
141 Or as Mähl puts it: what differentiates the “eigentliches, romantisches Werk”—evident precisely here in the 
Brouillon—from Novalis’ earlier philosophical studies, “ist dieses sehnsüchtige Drängen züruck in die 






about in the space of juxtaposition—the poetic present—between past and future. This parallax 
between different orders of time constitutes Novalis’ basic object of inquiry in his elaboration of 
Märchen. It is expressed throughout his reflections on magic and the doctrine of the future. The 
energy in this montage-effect of historical imagination is exactly what the different operations of 
the fairy tale are designed to release. 
That such a dialectical presentation of Zukunftslehre is not a merely paradoxical or poetic 
conceit must be understood if the scope and intention of Märchenpolitik as a philosophy of 
history is to be grasped. In this respect, what Mähl calls the characteristic “Ineinanderwirken von 
Vergangenheit und Zukunft”142 in Novalis’ philosophy of history becomes central to the theory 
of Märchen in the Brouillon. Overpassing and estranging the contemporary moment, the origin-
source of the fairy tale is the past and its telos or final end the future. But this is not to say that 
there is no place for a “present” in the theory of fairy tale at all. Again, it is just that the 
Märchen’s concept of present is, in Novalis’ terms, an essentially poetic construction—a geistige 
Gegenwart—an interface with temporal consciousness that is elastic enough to bend and 
synthesize different imaginative and real historical experiences, and that must be brought into 
being experimentally, in diverse montages of poetic images. The task of the fairy tale present as 
formulated in the Brouillon is to provide the ultimate act of aesthetic (and therefore also 
sociopolitical) creativity: when fairy tale operations are encountered and intentionally 
(re)produced, they construct an alternative temporal order and world, the poetic Jetztzeit in 
which Utopia takes on speculative contours, gaining in focus and potential. It remains to be seen 
                                                 
Zukunft bestimmt” (Mähl, 305). For his part, Schlegel, who develops an ideal figure of the “rückgekehrter Prophet” 
(in both his early and late phases), will share this alternative philosophy of history with Novalis, and likewise draft it 
into a program for the transformation of the post-revolutionary environment. 
 






in what sense Novalis will invest this utopian time-order with a more political content based in 
affective relations. 
In some of Novalis’ earlier fragments in the Athenäum, romantisieren itself is 
reformulated as a poetics of temporal traversal precisely along the lines that the later doctrine of 
the future explores, and here the concept of the poetic present is made more explicit: “Nichts ist 
poetischer,” Novalis writes in Blütenstaub, “als Erinnerung und Ahndung oder Vorstellung der 
Zukunft.” Expanding on this point, he continues: 
Die gewöhnliche Gegenwart verknüpft Vergangenheit und Zukunft durch Beschränkung. 
Es entsteht Kontiguität, durch Erstarrung Krystallisazion. Es giebt aber eine geistige 
Gegenwart, die beyde durch Auflösung identifizirt, und diese Mischung ist das Element, 
die Atmosphäre des Dichters.143 
The poetic present, as opposed to the common (gewöhnliche) notion of a restricted prosaic 
present, dissolves and mixes elements of the past and future, projecting possible permutations of 
lived experience with the aim of estranging the very reality principles of a polemically-
determined distribution of the sensible. The moment or Augenblick of such permutation in reality 
is proper to the Märchen, whose generic-disciplinary activity, in light of the last passage above, 
now appears as the cultivation of a certain poetic medium: the Atmosphäre des Dichters that 
deconstructs the false contiguities and crystallizations imposed on historical consciousness. 
Mähl, as we have already seen, also summarizes Novalis’ philosophy of history as a 
dialectical constellation of past, present, and future, stressing that the concept of the poetic 
present takes its initial direction by departing from a quotidian or merely historical sense of the 
contemporary moment. Pointing to his eschewal of Enlightenment presentism, Mähl paraphrases 
Novalis’ dissatisfaction with the historical present, or the nature of historical reality as it appears 
                                                 






in everyday form to the late eighteenth-century subject, increasingly secularized and abandoned 
to transcendental homelessness: “In der historischen Gegenwart,” Mähl writes, “vollzieht sich 
[…] jene selbstgewisse Ausklammerung der Vergangenheit und Zukunft, die ‘alle Gegenstände 
des Enthusiasmus’ verketzert, ‘jede Spur des Heiligen’ vertilgt und den ‘alten Aberglauben an 
eine höhere Welt’ verdammt.”144  
Mähl’s schema is useful here because Novalis also indicates an alternative form of 
Ausklammerung. The historical or prosaic present is indeed to be eschewed—bracketed off—but 
the resulting emphasis on an entwined utopian image of past and future (a “geheime Verkettung 
des Ehemaligen und Künftigen”145), is itself the true, properly romanticized, or poetic present: its 
secretive nature, or the revelation of its secrets, confirms this. This experience of romanticized 
temporality arises only in mutual relation to the two polarized ideal historical forms (the past and 
future, Vor- and Nachwelt) which must be combined and reproduced in synthesis, in every 
moment of the poetic present. The doctrine of the future thereby describes a kind of imaginative 
epoché of the temporal sections of the conventional framework of historical ordering. Dwelling 
in the poetic Jetztzeit of this alternative world, practicing the faculty of speculative worlding 
(Luhmann’s Weltaufbau)—creating different orders of time and worlds as an act of the aesthetic 
imagination—is what the fairy tale principally effects: Novalis will even speak of a 
“Regeneration des Paradieses.”146 But then, just the same, he will say (perhaps ironically) that 
paradise is already a reality; the fairy tale political state is already manifest: one only has to go to 
                                                 
144 Mähl, 305.  
 
145 Ibid.  
 






Berlin and see the environment of love surrounding the new King and Queen, binding the citizen 
in affective attachment to the state of New Prussia (Neupreußischen Staat).147  
1.6 Imperfect Present 
In another excursus on the concept of the poetic present, concurrent with the Brouillon’s 
discussion of Märchen, the fragments of the Freiberger Studien reformulate the ideal of the 
poetic present yet again, this time as the imperfect present (unvollkomnes Praesens) exploring it 
within a logic that proceeds towards a kind of transcendental morality.148 Fragment 29 initiates 
the first movement in a longer syllogistic progression in the Freiberger Studien:   
Hauptsatz—Man kann nur werden insofern man schon ist. 
a. Perfectum. 
b. Futurum. 
Praesens = Synthesis von a. und b. 
Absolutes Praesens—unvollkomnes Praesens149 
As already evident in the temporal paradigm of the Märchen, the point is for the past to become 
the future, and the future past, not in absolute, numerical identity1, but as potentialized identity2, 
as a productive synthesis of opposites that generates a continuous series of imaginary or image-
experiences of an alternative temporality. This is what Novalis wants to rescue for the concept of 
the imperfect present as well. To do so, he contrasts it further with the “perfect present.” Both 
                                                 
147 Ibid., 2:494. 
 
148 The Freiberger Studien—and more generally what Siarhei Biareishyk calls the movement of “Freiberg 
Romanticism,” including Franz Baader and Ritter alongside Novalis—has recently become the object of scholarly 
engagement with the natural-scientific basis of Romanticism’s major and minor figures (Siarhei Biareishyk, 
“Rethinking Romanticism with Spinoza: Encounter and Individuation in Novalis, Ritter, and Baader.” The 
Germanic Review, vol. 94 [2019]), 271). 
  






appear as different expressions of, or variables in, a universal dynamic of temporal generation 
and completion: 
Die unvollkomne Gegenwart setzt eine unvollkomne Zukunft und eine unvollkomne 
Vergangenheit voraus—eine Zukunft, der Vergangenheit beygemischt ist, die durch 
Vergangenheit zum Theil gebunden, i.e. modificirt ist—eine Vergangenheit die mit 
Zukunft gemischt und durch dieselbe modificirt ist. Aus beyden besteht die unvollkomne 
Gegegenwart—welches eigentlich ihr Entstehungsprocess ist. 
Die vollkomne Gegenwart producirt eine voll[komne] freye Zukunft—und voll[komne] 
freye Vergangenheit—die beyde zugleich afficirt werden—und beyde zugleich wircken. 
In der voll[komnen] Gegenwart läßt sich keins von beyden unterscheiden.150  
The imperfect past, similar to a grammatical tense in which a past action is on-going or not yet 
completed, is countered with an imperfect future. For its part, the imperfect present combines 
these two opposing forms of temporal capture, modifying the processive or incomplete nature of 
the one in the other. It intermingles the future in the past, and vice-versa, in an imperfect 
expression that just for this reason constitutes generative potential. This is perhaps not so far 
from an everyday understanding of the present moment in which we always find ourselves in 
everyday life: a mode of time in which elements of a not-yet-completed past seamlessly blend 
into an always only partially manifest future, and we ourselves are responsible for articulating—
or not—the boundaries or confluence of both. This would be the everyday time in which human 
processes of generation unfold. According to Novalis, we live bound to past experience, even as 
we modify our lives according to the possible futures we glean from its historical progression. 
As opposed to these modes of the imperfect, Novalis then posits an absolute or perfect 
present—and for this reason a barren and indeed inhuman temporal present—as the collapse of 
past and future into each other without remainder, indistinguishably. Unlike in the imperfect 
present, in the perfect mode no intermixing or modulation between past and future takes place, 
                                                 






no partial or individuated play of opposing forces exert their effects and are in turn transformed 
in mutual reciprocation. And therefore no generative creation either: in the perfect present, the 
image of the past and future in isolation is strictly impossible, as they appear totally identical, 
simultaneous in the immanence of absolute presence. By contrast to the imperfection of an 
everyday human time, the perfect present can be understood as a figure of time-consciousness 
corresponding to a divine or infinite temporality (of relevance here is the theological tradition 
from Augustine to Aquinas that conceived of God’s existence in a state of eternal or atemporal 
now, perceiving the fullness of past, present, and future time without differentiation, perfectly). 
To even speak of divine productivity in temporal order—as, for example, in the biblical narrative 
of Genesis or in the Greek mythological account of Athena’s birth, fully formed, perfect and 
armed, leaping from the forehead of Zeus—already implies an instantaneous completion that 
marks off the fundamental lack and inferiority of mundane temporal experience and productivity. 
The absolute of divinity defines ex negativo the creaturely agents whose version of creative work 
simply cannot reach such perfection.151 
Having set up the opposition of perfect and imperfect present, with their attendant sub-
differentiations and modal oppositions (perfect/imperfect past/future), Novalis then moves to 
their dialectical combination, now referring to the imperfect as the direct, and the perfect as the 
indirect: 
                                                 
151 Manfred Frank, remarking on the above passage on the imperfect present, notes that the perfect present is, strictly 
speaking, atemporal as it elides any and all temporal succession, this latter being, arguably, the very basis of our 
conceptualization of time. Frank also draws attention to the fact that the perfect present cannot exist in any real 
sense for the human subject except as a hypothetical utopia or non-place of absolute simultaneity or presence, at best 
as an image of divine temporality: this concept of the perfect present: “müßte die Sukzession in eine zeitlose, ewige 
Simultaneität von Starre und Flüssigkeit aufheben. Eine solche absolute oder Allgegenwart ist für uns ‚insensibel‘, 
ein leeres Transcendens, dem keine Realität entspricht” (Manfred Frank, Das Problem Zeit in der deutschen 






Synthesis des Mittelbaren und Unmittelbaren—des Vollkomnen und Unvollkomnen—
Gott und Mensch—Natur (Weltall) und Naturwesen (Individuum)—Geist (Zauberer) und 
Seele (Künstler).152 
Reformulating the above assertion that the geistige Gegenwart the fairy tale produces is 
analogous to the imperfect present, it would now be more accurate to say that in the terms of the 
Freiberger Studien as given here, Novalis privileges neither the imperfect nor perfect present 
alone, but is far more interested in their imbrication, in the dissolution, reunification, and 
energetic estrangement released in the juxtaposition—and synthesis—of all their attendant 
modes of experience. To repeat: in the temporal order of the Märchen, time (whether in the mode 
of past, present, or future, perfect or imperfect, direct or indirect) is rendered malleable and 
elastic as a modifiable dimension, a thing to be woven and rewoven according to need. But of 
particular interest in this passage above, as opposed to the level of abstraction that marks the 
Brouillon’s corresponding notes on Zukunftslehre, is that it provides a set of embodied 
instantiations of each respective temporal order in addition to the practical results of their 
interconnection. The perfect temporality has its attendant perfect figures: God, macrological 
nature (universe), and spirit (magician). The imperfect temporality likewise has its embodied 
proxies: man, micrological natural being (individual), and the soul (artist). The former are 
indirect in effect, the latter direct, which only makes sense within the basic attempt to valorize 
imperfect human existence in contradistinction to perfection, and to expand life’s total creative 
power in doing so by constantly pushing against and integrating its difference.  
 All of this has to be collapsed into a poetic assemblage. The needed synthesis, or what 
Novalis will call the transmundaner actus, brings opposing times, worlds, and beings together in 
a higher-order potentialization. This is a sketch for a form of being that immediately departs 
                                                 






from the merely-human, but also draws elements of the transcendent into earthly development, 
into a therefore properly romanticized figure. Continuing this last fragment, he speaks of a 
mystic Verklärung of material human form into pure spirit, and here we find further developed 
avatars of the different temporal modulations gradually sketched out in the Freiberger 
fragments. Moving to a summarization, Novalis concludes the series begun above:   
Der vollkommen Besonnene heißt der Seer. 
Als irrdische Wesen streben wir nach geistiger Ausbildung—nach Geist überhaupt. 
Als außerirrdische, geistige Wesen, nach irrdischer Ausbildung—nach Körper überhaupt. 
Nur durch Sittlichkeit gelangen wir beide zu unseren Zwecken […] Ein Mensch, der 
Geist wird, ist zugleich ein Geist, der Körper wird.  
Diese höhere Art von Tod, wenn ich mich so ausdrücken darf hat mit dem gemeinen Tod 
nichts zu schaffen—es wird etwas sein, was wir Verklärung nennen können.153 
The concept of the perfect present now shifts slightly once again and becomes the endowment of 
a seer with perfect presence of mind. But given what has already been suggested, such a divine 
consciousness would be incommensurable with the transcendental conditions of the human 
limited to an imperfect, never-completed genesis, a circumscribed ability to reach perfection in 
productivity that is reflected in a corresponding circumscription of absolute temporal 
consciousness. The human resides in an always imperfect experience of the world. Such a perfect 
presence of mind, in other words, could not be useful (nüzlich) to the Romantic model of the 
historically-embedded subject striving to overcome the division between mundane and spiritual 
planes of temporality and being, confronted in a world of freedom with the chaotic intermission 
of both, abandoned to the proliferation of this chaotic reciprocal movement. As perfect presence 
of mind, Novalis suggests, is sufficient to itself, undetermined, and absolute, it lacks a relation to 
                                                 






what one could call, by contrast, an imperfect presence of mind. It lacks all relationality by 
definition: it cannot gain traction in the sheer differentiation of phenomenal reality.  
Imperfect consciousness in this sense constitutes the antipode of perfect consciousness, 
the opposite pole that transforms the absolute of perfect consciousness through the introduction 
of chiastic or romanticized relations to its other. The imperfect thus produces an oscillation 
between opposing orders: a person with perfect presence of mind is a seer, but both our earthly 
and spiritual selves strive for their respective opposites, for the ideal spirit and material body. If 
absolute perfection aligns with a certain verticality in Novalis’ system, then with the imperfect, 
perfection is lowered or reduced (logorithmisiert), subject to movements of semantic and 
ontological “descent” through contact with its limiting and limited counter-pole. The progression 
of this fragment, modeled along the lines of a dynamic romantizieren, concludes with a chaotic 
synthesis, or an image that switches—and constantly reproduces movements of alternation—
between opposing conceptual-practical positions, frameworks of reference, and patterns of being. 
In this way, the synthesis modeled in the fragment ends in the sought-after stimulation of thought 
(Gedankenreiz), gesturing towards a specific form of human life based in chaos, in polyvalence 
and stimulation as opposed to stasis, monotony, and tedium.154 Again the ideal of Bildung arises 
as a mutual attraction or movement between opposite poles of time and types of activity 
                                                 
154 Mähl will also draw attention to this and note that Novalis‘ emphasis on existential polyvalence and chaos as 
opposed to transcendent unity differentiates him from earlier traditions of mysticism: “Es ist für das Verständnis der 
mystischen Komponente im Wesen des Novalis sehr aufschlußreich, daß ihm die Betrachtung Gottes ‘zu monoton’ 
erscheinen kann und er sich die bezeichnende Frage notiert: ‘Wie vermeidet man bei Darstellung des 
Vollkommenen die Langeweile?’ Dieses Ungenügen an einer absoluten Vollkommenheit (als indifferenter Einheit, 
wie sie der Mystiker sucht), dieses Empfinden ihrer ‘Eintönigkeit’ entspricht der romantischen Sehnsucht nach einer 
höheren, gebildeten Einheit, die das Mannigfaltige, den Reichtum an Individuellem vereinigt, ohne ihn aufzulösen 
oder zu vernichten—die den Entfaltungsprozeß der Geschichte nicht rückgängig macht. So haben wir jenes 
Blütenstaub-Fragment zu verstehen, das den Triadenschritt in einer letzten schematischen Formel zusammenfaßt: 
‘Vor der Abstraktion ist alles eins, aber eins wie das Chaos; nach der Abstraktion ist wieder alles vereinigt, aber 
diese Vereinigung ist eine freie Verbindung selbständiger, selbstbestimmter Wesen. Aus einem Haufen ist eine 






belonging to different worlds: the earthly plane is drawn into the spiritual, and the spiritual into 
the earthly, just as in the temporal register of the fairy tale the past is submitted to the future, and 
the future found already embedded in elements of the past. The point, for Novalis, is that this 
evolution must remain always potentialized, imperfect, able to self-generate continuously in the 
asymptotic approach to the utopian condition. 
In sum, the imperfect human, but no less the perfect seer, must strive for a chaotic 
version of Bildung capacious enough to experience all the polar positions of a given life. 
Otherwise it risks an equally spiritual as earthly isolation and death. By contrast, Novalis 
suggests that whoever succeeds in achieving such an elastic, bipolar evolution experiences an 
ecstatic breakthrough, a higher type of death or Verklärung. This transfiguration can be 
understood as the most specific image of the ideal productivity and telos of Märchen. Its model, 
in line with the operations of romanticization, is one of progressive imaginative self-fashioning. 
Novalis seeks the limits of phenomenal experience, but also seeks to transgress the horizons of 
the human sensorium and being as such: as an experimental foray, the fairy tale opens up paths 
and procedures of transfiguration for the subject in the process of becoming something else, 
something strange to itself.  
In the Freiberger Studien and elsewhere, transfiguration is also an activity and goal 
applicable to different social-existential scales: thus the kinds of existential changes brought 
about in fairy tale operations are there for the individual subject-reader as much as for the family, 
community, nation, or global polity. Märchen is to help formulate—to conceptually focus, 
rigorously explicate, but also imaginatively reform—the doctrine of any individuality or 
collectivity possessed with the desire to change and the willingness to speculate on its own 






an artwork, to evolve the human sensorium into a more intense aesthetic faculty and then to 
apply it to the collective sphere of modern life. 
Constituting an entire subset of the Brouillon’s encyclopedic project, the reflections on 
Märchen, Zukunftslehre, and geistige Gegenwart have been granted a foundational status in the 
secondary literature: Nicholas Saul even claims this last term as the “central concept” of Novalis’ 
(and Schlegel’s) doctrine of revolutionary poetics. Novalis’ works aim, Saul notes, “to promote 
the state of ‘geistige Gegenwart’ in the reader,” but this state is also coterminous with the 
creation of a new political force (i.e., political love) to transfigure status quo life. As Saul argues, 
such a magical instrument—precisely what Novalis calls, as we have already seen, a Talismann 
ewigen Friedens in “Das Ende des Haders” or, in a similar vein, a “Zauberstab der Analogie”155 
in Europa—is designed to bring about: “asymptotically the ideal realm of fairy-tale or dream, the 
Golden Age or utopian state.”156 Asymptotically, as Mähl also stresses: the real manifestation of 
Märchen, like the epochal task of political love and faith, is infinitely approximate to the future 
utopian state; it is a regulative Aufgabe of the future that incites difference, novelty, and 
alternative forms of experience in the evolution of modern humanity, but cannot arrive at 
perfection, which is in any case precisely what inhibits it.157 Here again we find the Romantic 
                                                 
155 Novalis, 3:518. 
 
156 Nicholas Saul, “Novalis’s ‘geistige Gegenwart’ and his essay ‘Die Christenheit oder Europa.’” The Modern 
Language Review, no. 77, vol. 2 (1982): 362.  
 
157 Another way to approach this point is to emphasize that the Romantic text aims only to provide the formal 
demand to realize the ideal, the motive or affective demand that pushes bodies and minds along new paths of life 
without articulating the exact nature or telos of the ideal end: it must be constructed. In this sense, the Romantics 
produce what Matthias Löwe calls a “Versuch einer Normenvermittlung.” Here one must emphasize Versuch as an 
experimental procedure of Fichtean provenance that stimulates the individual subject-reader’s ability to think, 
imagine, and freely generate the kind of normative reality they desire to inhabit in the future. Citing Ludwig 
Stockinger, Löwe puts it thus: “Ein romantischer Intellektueller kann Normenvermittlung daher nicht in 
begrifflicher Demonstration bewerkstelligen, sondern er muß zusehen, wie er primär die Tätigkeit in den Menschen 






dictum, the world must be romanticized:158 more exactly, it must become a fairy tale in an on-
going transfiguration of self and society. Romantic imagination will only rarely evoke a program 
of such wild political dimensions again.159  
1.7 Märchen Productivity: Transmundane Act 
 If Novalis’ reflections on the characteristic temporality of the doctrine of the future can 
be understood as the historical-philosophical aspect of Märchen—as the structural analysis of the 
form and function of the fairy tale vis-à-vis history, as its poetic bracketing of conventional 
historical consciousness—then the discussion of the prototypical acts or activities, the typical 
forms of imperfect productivity that mark the fairy tale paradigm (as touched on above), 
represents a kind of applied praxis of the same. Along these lines, Novalis more clearly 
approaches the ethical-political or transformative intervention at the core of his Märchenpolitik. 
He points to the unique work, and indeed direct use-value, of fairy tale operations of thought, 
drawing attention to a kind of productive activity in the binding and disassembling of past and 
future in the poetic present (a point Novalis speculates on elsewhere in the Brouillon, again 
emphasizing the potential utility of the fairy tale for present life: “nüzlich könnte vielleicht ein 
Märchen werden.”160). The Brouillon fragments continue to elaborate the Märchen assemblage 
through what is termed the transmundane act (transmundaner Actus), the name for the activity in 
                                                 
158 For a discussion of Novalis’ call for a romanticization of the world, and his understanding of this program as part 
of the constitutively open-ended or creative subject and an array of aesthetic-existential “exercises” that mark poetic 
experience, see Gabriel Trop, Poetry as a Way of Life (Evanston: Northwestern, 2015), 123. Trop’s formulation of 
Romanticism more generally throughout this work and elsewhere is a keystone for the present study. 
 
159 Schlegel’s work in this same period (and later) notwithstanding. The sheer monomaniacal ambition of the 
Romantic redefinition of the human is staggering in Novalis’ account, but Schlegel will match it in similar terms: 
“Durch die Künstler wird die Menschheit ein Individuum, indem sie Vorwelt und Nachwelt in der Gegenwart 
verknüpfen. Sie sind das höhere Seelenorgan, wo die Lebensgeister der ganzen aüßern Menschheit zusammentreffen 
und in welchem die innere zunächst wirkt” (Schlegel 2:262). 






which poetic temporality is produced. The transmundane act designates the historical bracketing 
described in reference to Zukunftslehre, but it also shifts Novalis’ reflections towards a sense of 
ontological bracketing: a movement between different orders of being, different worlds, a 
transversal movement in embodied experience through which heterogenous, heterodox, or alien 
forms of life emerge and begin to assert their transformative effects on the mind, and, as Novalis 
claims, on the wider body politic as well.  
A similar schematic structure based in qualitative movements of the mind and body 
always returns in the context of transmundane activity. When enthused by faith and love—or by 
any individualized instance of primordial Gefühl breaking through into the sphere of everyday 
experience—the passage from one temporal world-order, from that of the conventional or 
historically “real” to another (to that of the golden Age, and thus to its progressively closer 
approximation and real manifestation), is produced. Or alternatively, such a romanticized 
Weltgefühl accompanies every local instance of true faith and love, it is generated constantly in 
every moment rendered dynamic through intense affect. When one is moved to a sufficient 
degree by faith and love, in other words, then the ideal time and space of the poetic present, and 
its attendant unique sphere of experience or world, is performatively created as a transmundane 
act. This is a kind of productivity that can be cultivated and extended in serial reflections, and we 
see it worked out in countless notebook entries, in strings of poetic fragments and speculative 
insights (that were designed to also activate the readership of the Jahrbuch der Preussischen 
Monarchie).  
Not so much an inexplicable and singular act—as a blind “leap of faith” into a new 
synthesized imaginary of past, present, and future worlds—the transmundaner Actus is far more 






necessary, to whatever situation (and thus also to political situations).161 It makes possible a flow 
in mundane historical presence that migrates between different orders of being and time, opening 
up novel relations to the (ir)reality of the contemporary environment. Again, Märchen as an 
activity depends on a theory of possible worlds (such would be the ontological reformulation of 
Zukunftslehre, with the transmundane act being something like the synapse between different 
worlds). The fairy tale is dependent on what Novalis goes on to describe as a kind of magical 
faith or the moment (Augenblick) of world-generative belief (Glauben): 
Wunderkraft des Glaubens—Aller Glauben ist wunderbar und wunderthätig. Gott ist in 
dem Augenblicke, als ich ihn glaube. Glauben ist, indirect wunderthätige Kraft [...] 
Glauben ist hienieden wahrgenommene Wircksamkeit und Sensation in einer andern 
Welt—ein vernommener transmundaner Actus. Der ächte Glaube bezieht sich nur auf 
Dinge einer andern Welt. Glauben ist Empfindung des Erwachens und Wirckens und 
Sinnens in einer andern Welt.162 
This andere Welt is also made accessible through the mechanism of love: Novalis insists that the 
moment when one truly loves the object of desire—which is just as much to say, in that 
Augenblick in which one has true faith—a world is immediately produced that shifts the ground 
of previous existence. In such cases life becomes romanticized in a radical act of love and belief: 
                                                 
161 With Deleuze and Guattari one could speak of love, faith, and magic not only as mechanisms, but as conceptual-
practical machines or “machinic assemblages” that regulate differential relations and relative movements, that 
connect and integrate—like a hinge—various orders of being and regimes of intelligibility; in Novalis’ case, a hinge 
between real and possible orders of time, between past and future, poetic and prosaic present, and so on (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 56, 71). Love, more specifically, can be conceived as a machine that makes possible new relations 
between Novalis’ ideals of “monarchische Form,” state apparatus, and citizen-subject (as discussed in more detail 
below). Deleuze and Guattari treat a context more specific to Glauben und Liebe when they speak of the “whole 
machinic assemblage” of feudalism as incorporating or intermingling different individual machines within it: one 
has “to consider statements, expressions, the juridical regime of heraldry, all of the incorporeal transformations, in 
particular, oaths and their variables (the oath of obedience, but also the oath of love, etc.): the collective assemblage 
of enunciation” that all together constitute the full scope of the feudal assemblage as a kind of historical totality 
(Ibid., 89). In light of this approach, one could say that Novalis’ project (in the Brouillon as much as in Glauben und 
Liebe) is to construct a series of machinic assemblages articulated through their relations to each other and to the 
wider sociopolitical environment—such as in the connections between Liebe, romantisieren, Märchen, Magie, 
Zukunftslehre, the transmundaner actus, etc. Taken as a whole, these different elements constitute Novalis’ 
intervention into the postrevolutionary assemblage of modernity, right as the modern age attempts to pass fully 
beyond the lingering feudal aspects of the ancien régime. 
 






Glauben as well as Liebe can in this sense be understood as existential technologies, tools 
through which the “Empfindung des Erwachens und Wirckens und Sinnens in einer andern 
Welt” is brought into being. 
Elsewhere in the Brouillon, Novalis will describe the efficacy of such Wunderkraft or 
poetic worlding in even more enigmatic reformulations. In a particularly pregnant image, he 
returns to an exposition of the transmundane act but now claims it as a prior occurrence or 
decision, as a primordial origin-event in which we have already bound ourselves to a series of 
transcendent, virtual, or other-worldly beings, even while he suggests that this event could 
indeed be reproduced in the future: “Wir haben uns, um verbunden zu seyn auf unendliche Art, 
auch mit den Transmundanern, zu Menschen bestimmt, und einen Gott, wie einen Monarchen, 
gewählt.”163 A potential reading of this entry could understand the proposed movement between 
worlds (which takes place in the properly poetic atmosphere or medium) as making possible 
contact to Transmundanern, to the agents of transmundane Acti.164 The human, who is to 
become this transmundane being, is to engage in a process of self-alienation and reconstruction, 
and chooses not only its own God, but also its own monarch. Or, in an even more paradoxical 
gloss, this essentially ecstatic subject—constantly stepping outside of itself in order to reground 
itself at a higher-order level—contests and questions, or perhaps augments and potentializes, the 
very sovereignty of God through an electoral process (which, just as strangely, also applies to 
monarchs). Such an alien or alienated subject freely submits itself to both a divine and worldly 
                                                 
163 Ibid., 418. My emphasis. 
 
164 The meaning of this entry in the Brouillon is as unclear as it is suggestive: is the human able to alienate itself 
from its own condition, becoming this alien agent or Transmundaner through imaginative mechanisms, such as love 
and faith? In any case, what is clear is that the attempt to infinitely connect oneself with everything else—which, as 
we have already seen, constitutes the very operation of romantisieren—entails a political decision that is both 






heteronomy that is nevertheless a product of its own determination, in a world order it itself 
creates within the space of imaginary production.165 At the same time, transcendent and mundane 
authority becomes subject to the election of the romanticized individual and collective, the “wir” 
that alienates itself so as to become the transmundane human, an autonomous activity expressed 
in the on-going decisions made by a progressively evolving humanity. Such an originary and 
future choice to become freely creative, the ability of worlding according to will, is at the core of 
the genre of Märchen; its poiesis takes the form of acts of faith, love, and magic, but it also 
strives to retain a certain productive sense of imperfection at its basis. 
Love, as we have already seen, is for Novalis the ground of possibility of magic (Grund 
der Möglichkeit der Magie). Now faith, in light of the above, appears alongside love as the dual 
ground of magic’s Möglichkeitsaffekt. The force of the imagination with which Romantic love is 
coterminous is here refigured as a miraculous power (Einbildungskraft becomes Wunderkraft) 
and equated with the creative existential activity of faith. Faith and love thus create a poetic 
present that allows the transmundane passage between past and future worlds, or rather, 
engenders a multiplex, potentialized, or plural sense of time, world, and their corresponding 
figures or subjects. The matrix of all these speculative operations only gradually emerges in the 
Brouillon, and the exposition of the fairy tale demands a considerable amount of conceptual 
disentanglement. What has to be kept in view is how Novalis chains along new concepts and 
approaches to his main quarry of thought, layering the form and function of the fairy tale with 
                                                 
165 This emphasis on self-determination is taken even further. Elsewhere in the Brouillon, Novalis states that the 
future human being must become its own autopoietic machine, and thus a kind of God in its own eyes: “Alles was 
von Gott praedicirt wird enthält die Menschliche Zukunftslehre. Jede Maschine, die jezt vom Großen Perpetuo 
mobili lebt, soll selbst Perpetuum mobile—jeder Mensch, der jezt von Gott und d[urch] Gott lebt, soll selbst Gott 
werden” (Ibid., 497). The human doctrine of the future will be the process in which humanity—but also machines—






increasingly imaginative conceptions of love, faith, magic, and alternative temporal experience. 
This ultimate aim also has its own name: in Glauben und Liebe, it is sheer imaginative 
stimulation or “Gedankenreiz.”166  
The Brouillon’s most complex definition of Märchenpolitik reads like a precis of this 
entire development in Novalis’ work-cycle, which itself culminates in Glauben und Liebe. This 
definition not only helps connect many of the strands of a sometimes diffuse system of the fairy 
tale, it also shows the conceptual base on which the Glauben und Liebe corpus rests, the manner 
in which in the latter Märchen operations take on political imaginative functions. This is the key 
fragment from the Brouillon: 
In einem ächten Märchen muß alles wunderbar—geheimnißvoll und 
unzusammenhängend seyn—alles belebt [...] Die Zeit der allg[emeinen] Anarchie—
Gesezlosigkeit—Freyheit—der Naturstand der Natur—die Zeit vor der Welt (Staat.) 
Diese Zeit vor der Welt liefert gleichsam die zerstreuten Züge der Zeit nach der Welt [...] 
Die Welt des Märchens ist die durchausentgegengesezte Welt der Welt der Wahrheit 
(Geschichte)—und eben darum ihr so durchaus ähnlich [...] In der künftigen Welt ist 
alles, wie in der ehmaligen Welt—und doch alles ganz Anders. Die künftige Welt ist das 
Vernünftige Chaos—das Chaos, das sich selbst durchdrang [...] Chaos2 oder ∞.  
 
Das ächte Märchen muß zugleich Prophetische Darstellung—idealische Darstell[ung]—
abs[olut] notwendige Darst[ellung] seyn. Der ächte Märchendichter ist ein Seher der 
Zukunft [...] (Mit der Zeit muß d[ie] Gesch[ichte] Märchen werden—sie wird wieder, wie 
sie anfieng.)167 
 
The productivity of the Novalisian Märchen is evaluated most forcefully here. As both 
instrument and ideal image of a consciously initiated evolutionary process, the true fairy tale 
                                                 
166 Novalis, 2:485. Around 1800 the term stimulation (Reiz) also has a physiological register which cannot be 
ignored in the context of Novalis’ political thought. His reception and critique of the Brownian model (from which 
the term comes) could easily form the leitmotif of an entire study of the Romantic political imagination. The 
starting-point for such a study would be in the Brouillon above all, but also in the Politische Aphorismen, both 
places where the explicitly political discourse of stimulation is given a sustained treatment. See David Krell, 
Contagion (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1998). 
 






pushes the dynamic of becoming to a qualitatively new stage in synthesis, transfiguring the 
constitutive chaos that marks the very basis of the order of being by affirming an inherent sense 
or pattern to chaotic development in a higher form, as infinity (“∞”). This passage also points to 
the fairy tale’s status as a kind of movement arrested in the artwork, as the static representational 
Darstellung of active emergence, a frozen image that is just for that reason prophetic. 
As we have already seen in different moments above, here the imaginative experience of 
the “true fairy tale” schematically juxtaposes two opposing orders as they appear across 
temporal, ontological, and political registers. When Novalis speaks of Wunderkraft, he therefore 
points to the process in which these oppositions may be enlivened—stimulated and brought into 
analogical correspondence, introduced into mutual relations of semantic and practical contact, or, 
in short: romantisiert. In this entry, a kind of Rousseauian Vorwelt or Naturstand precedes the 
state and embodies primordial chaos (chaos1). The fairy tale, which in its conventional form 
often provides a fantastical depiction of this Vorwelt in the image of an anti- or alternative-
reality, instead jumps over the present and opens onto the second order in Novalis’ version: the 
Nach- or künftige Welt.168 This future world, like its counterposed pre-world, is just as remote 
from historical presence, present reality (Welt der Wahrheit [Geschichte]). Between these two 
orders is not the prosaic or historical present as the continually progressing holding space of 
time, but the mediation of the Märchen as a connection between the ideal-imaginary past and 
future, the space and time of the geistige Gegenwart as it impacts on conventions of historical 
                                                 
168 Some version of the future value attributed to the fairy tale that Novalis argues for here will also inform, mutatis 
mutandis, the work of Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm in their 1812 Kinder- und Hausmärchen. In a metaphor 
reminiscent of Novalis’ own literary self-characterization as a disseminator of imaginative pollen, the Grimms 
famously reserve for the German fairy tale the status of “Samen für die Zukunft” (Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, 






understanding and experience. This alternative present reforms the modern subject’s experience 
of the status quo world, modern society, reconfiguring the order of history that justifies it. 
The fairy tale connects Vor- and Nachwelt, mythic past and ideal future, through their 
sharp contrast with the present: Märchen is durchausentgegengesetzt to historical reality, but, on 
the other hand, it is precisely this opposition that makes it “eben darum ihr so durchaus ähnlich,” 
for the prophetic faculty of the fairy tale communicates what the historical real is actually 
progressing towards, its actual future, whether near in time or far ahead. Grasping the 
juxtaposition of historical and imaginative temporal order introduces a vibration or destablization 
in thought that estranges quotidien experience: for Novalis, such Gedankenreiz brings with it so 
many automatic procedures of poetic worlding or transfiguration. In a kind of proto-Surrealist 
Denkbild of contrasting elements, this unique sense of poetic power or efficacy is what the 
Märchendichter provides and trains his readers to self-produce. The poet of the fairy tale relates, 
or draws into a new network of correspondences, past and future worlds insofar as they form 
perfect antitheses, each mirroring the other as their opposite. In this very alignment of 
differences they evince their systematic similarity. What they oppose illuminates what they have 
in common. What one finds before informs the hereafter, and what the future brings will 
constitute a recitation of the past; history will become the prophetische Darstellung of the fairy 
tale: “sie wird wieder, wie sie anfieng.”  
As if a certain Platonic myth of love, on the one hand, and the general structure of 
Platonic dialogue, on the other, were combined and transposed to a historical register, the past 
and the future appear as two opposing halves or soulmates torn from each other, struggling for 
reunification but always divided by an aporetic gap. And yet it is this gap of incomprehensibility, 






Novalis entails a kind of a-productivity, is precisely what is to be avoided, or rather 
deconstructed and transfigured as a relation to its other. The borders between different orders of 
being, time, and forms of work function far more as incitements to build bridges between them, 
to begin transmundane acts that bind different everyday and exceptional experiences, but not so 
as to reduce or contain them in a total image or completed state, never in perfection. There is a 
certain surplus value gained in the turn and return between past and future in the imaginative 
movement of Märchen operations, an excess that can be put to use only because it is imperfect, a 
manifestation of the perpetual, open-ended drive towards self-transformation.  
In its juxtaposition to primordial chaos, the ideal future of the fairy tale is potentialized 
and rendered intelligible, hence “Vernünftige Chaos” or “Chaos2,” as Novalis puts it above: the 
imbrication of past and future that the fairy tale provides constitutes an evolution from sheer, 
undifferentiated chaos to productive, organized chaos. However, this is not a smooth absolute in 
which no disharmonious difference is operative, but an infinite Potenzierung of existence that 
raises original anarchy to a qualitatively “higher” level of organized chaos. Thus Märchen, as 
both generic mode of thought and praxis, involves translating chaotic excess into future usable 
forms (nüzlich könnte vielleicht ein Märchen werden) even while increasing its complexity and 
force. Applying this formal procedure to political reality, to political subjects and institutions—
which is just as much a didactic program or practice of Bildung, the call for an elastic form of 
human development at the individual and collective scale—will be the basic impulse that 
Novalis’ extends in the project of Glauben und Liebe. 
1.8 Elastic Bildung 
The subject-model of Novalis’ fairy tale—its poetic sense of time and world, its unique 






balance of opposites. Nor does it emerge in its political figurations as a stable or homogenized 
model of the citizen, as an individual unit functionally integrated into a wider productive society. 
By contrast, Märchen theory offers a kind of elastic subject, one continuously pushed through a 
chaos of potentialization, suspended between moments of transcendence and common everyday 
life, always (ideally infinitely) potentializing itself through spiritual and earthly movements of 
self-raising (potenzieren) and self-lowering (logorithmisieren).169 Such an elastic model is by 
definition complex and dynamic, and it itself results from an education that produces complexes 
and multiplicities. In one of many similar entries that adumbrate the concept of the fairy tale, the 
Brouillon formulates this doctrine of human Bildung with the following:  
MENSCHENBILD[UNGS] L[EHRE]. Um die Stimme zu bilden muß der Mensch 
mehrere Stimmen sich anbilden—dadurch wird sein Organ substantieller. So um seine 
Individualitaet auszubilden muß er immer mehrere Individualitaeten anzunehmen und 
sich zu assimiliren wissen—dadurch wird er z[um] substantiellen Individuum. Genius.170 
 
The ideal subject or genius is an organ of assimilation: it does not progressively unify itself with 
others at an ever-increasing magnitude, becoming a constantly greater monad or totality, but 
rather combines without eliding difference, constituting itself as a growing multiplicity of 
singular individualities (“immer mehrere Individualitaeten”). Menschenbildung in Novalis’ sense 
entails a non-reductive amalgamation of different elements into the individual, a plurality of 
Stimmen as the basis for a singular self. One could say that the subject of the fairy tale is an 
elastic one inasmuch as it incorporates diversity without doing violence to difference, connecting 
                                                 
169 Schlegel, for his part, will call this form of Bildung as a progression through chaos Ironie, as evident in the 
juxtaposition of two well-known fragments from the Athenäum: “Ironie ist klares Bewustsein der ewigen Agilität, 
des unendlich vollen Chaos” and “Bildung ist antithetische Synthesis, und Vollendung bis zur Ironie.—Bei einem 
Menschen, der eine gewisse Höhe und Universalität der Bildung erreicht hat, ist sein Innres eine fortgehende Kette 
der ungeheuresten Revolutionen—” (Schlegel, 18:82). 
 






and correlating opposing historical and existential orders. The process of such Romantic Bildung, 
as we have seen, is aptly described as transfiguration. 
If it seems that we have departed from a certain discourse of affect in the above 
considerations, further attention to the Freiberger Studien will again emphasize it. There Novalis 
brings our attention back to the effective means of such a transfiguration of the anthropological 
subject, as in the above invocation of a kind of transcendental morality founded in faith and love 
(“Nur durch Sittlichkeit” do we achieve “Verklärung”). Faith and love constitute the moral 
apparatus that makes possible a kind of inner sovereignty, a state of being anyone can achieve, 
provided they themselves follow this paradigmatic model of elastic Bildung in the fairy tale. This 
openly esoteric program amounts to a self-romanticization, a potentialization of the self and 
collective-self into a multiplied series, but it is also provides the ability to recognize what is 
already and always transmundane in given sociopolitical reality, an ability to detect inner or 
sovereign forms of becoming wherever they already exist in the given community, above all in 
one’s self. And if it seems that what is missing in the preceding is specifically a discourse of 
political affect, the fragment from the Freiberger Studien above goes on to emphasize precisely 
that: “Jeder Mensch kann seinen Jüngsten Tag durch Sittlichkeit herbeirufen. Unter uns währt 
das tausendjährige Reich beständig.”171   
Novalis expands upon this essential insight in Glauben und Liebe, claiming that anyone 
can become, and in a certain sense everyone, even the poorest of society, is potentially such a 
monarch ruling over their own utopian world. The point is to recognize this—and to make it 
effective in experimental literary production, in exercises of the speculative imagination—and to 
expand oneself through a series of poetic presents, to transform oneself into an existential-
                                                 






temporal sign, into the poetic Friedensschrift (to use Novalis’ term) one should strive to become 
and thus, as he claims, one always already is. That is, one must, in the grammar of Glauben und 
Liebe, have faith in and love oneself enough—and, crucially, the wider collective of one’s 
fellows—to reach the threshold of transfiguration, to expand individual affective energies into 
forms of political identity and association. The self and resulting state formation so understood, 
as the site of combined existential change and future communal association, becomes a singular 
event to love and remain faithful to. But it must also be constantly constructed and experimented 
with, reconstrued within the present historical distribution of the social environment in continual 
processes of Bildung. 
Here we return from the constructivist philosophy of history of the Brouillon to the more 
explicitly political reflections of Glauben und Liebe. For it is at this point that the transition 
between the speculative formulations of Märchenpolitik in the former, on the one hand, and their 
concretization in Novalis’ engagement with the contemporary political situation in the latter, 
becomes most clear. Just like the elastic subject in Märchen theory, the theory of the state in 
Glauben und Liebe will also focus on making the modern Prussian political structure—its 
administrative apparatus, the King and Queen, and above all its citizen body—into the object of 
elastic Bildung. As with the fairy tale’s imperfect genius, capable of living in and through the 
oscillating interaction of opposing planes of being and time, in the political fragments a vision of 
the elastic state (or Genialstaat) constitutes a more substantial organ (substantieller Organ), a 
more productively imperfect state formation. Novalis’ intention along these lines is to think a 
concept and practice of politics, and of political constitutionality, that assimilates the classic 
opposition around 1800 of monarchy and republic into a higher-order hybrid image (and indeed a 






through and combine). And this image does so by stimulating the maximal scale of love in the 
community, a program that is itself based on a revolutionary re-interpretation of the very basis of 
republicanism and monarchism alike.  
The Möglichkeitsaffekt of love becomes both cause and effect of a transmundane act of 
the entire polity, making possible a political world based on romanticized love. Novalis demands 
love for the political environment, that the state itself must become more loveable, calling for 
strengthened affective bonds to be spread across the total field of social life, changing the nature 
of the highest monarchical instance and average Staatsbürger alike. The political fragments 
assign a task of affective transformation to the contemporary Prussian monarch and people: in 
the coming “Neupreußischen Staat,” everything will be suffused with different forms and scales 
of romanticized Liebe.172 In Glauben und Liebe, Novalis’ politics of love appear in this more 
specific sense as the drafting of a new Staatsmärchen. 
The Brouillon addresses this application of Märchenpolitik to the contemporary situation 
(in its most direct allusion to Glauben und Liebe) in a theory of the state as representation: 
Der ganze Staat läuft auf Repraesentation hinaus. Die ganze Repraesentation beruht auf 
einem Gegenwärtig machen—des Nicht Gegenwärtigen und so fort—(Wunderkraft der 
Fiction.) Mein Glauben und Liebe beruht auf Repraesentativen Glauben. So die 
Annahme—der ewige Frieden ist schon da—Gott ist unter uns—hier ist Amerika oder 
Nirgends—das goldne Zeitalter ist hier—wir sind Zauberer—wir sind moralisch und so 
fort.173  
In Glauben und Liebe, the concept of the state will be submitted to the Märchen: that is, the state 
will be transfigured through what is here called the Wunderkraft der Fiction, through a magical 
capacity of fiction and representation, another analog for the Brouillon’s principle of a 
                                                 
172 Ibid., 2:492. 
 






Wunderkraft des Glaubens. The operations of the aesthetic imagination, or of the specific 
Möglichkeitssinn of the fairy tale—Glauben, Liebe, Wunderkraft, transmundaner acti, 
Verklärung, etc.—bring forth, on the one hand, what is invisible or Noch-nicht in the present 
political configuration and, on the other, transform what is already present and given. For 
example: the King and Queen (both as real, biographical figures named Friedrich Wilhelm III 
and Luise but also as mutable significatory vessels of the coming Genialstaat) are to be 
transfigured into representative signs of love, into media of Möglichkeitsaffekt in the on-going 
realization of an alternative modern Prussian community. In Glauben und Liebe the monarchs 
therefore appear ambiguously; they are both “sichtbar-gegenwärtigen Symbols,” as Mähl puts it, 
of a politically-binding sense of love, but also “‘Erziehungsmittel’ zu einem ‘fernen Ziel,’” 
modes of Bildung that cultivate the imaginative ideal of a utopian community to come, the end of 
discord.174  
Political love trains (bildet) through embodied, living signs; what the monarchs’ love will 
do—and also the love of the people for the monarchical union, and more importantly, the love of 
the people for themselves and for the collective community—is show how to make present what 
is lacking in the post-revolutionary context (a “Gegenwärtig machen—des nicht 
Gegenwärtigen”). What is lacking, what is nicht gegenwärtig, more specifically, is a kind of 
                                                 
174 Mähl continues, speaking of the function of the representative symbol or figure of the monarch in Europa and in 
Glauben und Liebe: “Wo sie sich also immer auch in geschichtlichen Gestaltungen oder realpolitischen 
Wirklichkeitsstrukturen inkarnieren mag, da greift sie zugleich über die vorgegebene Unvollkommenheit hinaus und 
weist in eine fernere Zukunft, welche die Schranken der Zeit und Geschichte aufheben soll [...] Innerhalb der 
politischen Ideenwelt des Novalis aber stellt sich das kommende goldene Zeitalter als ‘Verkündigung der höchsten, 
gebildetsten Menschheit’ in monarchischer Staatsform dar, durch welche die Liebe als ‘alleinige, ewige Basis aller 
wahrhaften, unzertrennlichen Verbindung’ geweckt werden und den Geist des ewigen Friedens verbreiten soll, der 
in der preußischen Monarchie des Jahres 1798 ‘in der Nähe oder gar schon da ist’” (Mähl, 327). As we will see in 
what follows, Mähl may overemphasize the importance of a conventional understanding of monarchism for Novalis. 
I would argue that while Novalis does indeed provide a certain apology of the traditional form of monarchy, this 
cannot be separated from his larger experiment that brings it into contact with revolutionary republicanism (as I 






collective Rousseauian amour de soi that could affectively (and not abstractly or 
mechanistically) legitimate political community and ensure its lasting concord. Novalis’ 
Märchenpolitik thereby models a process out of which a different, indeed alien world emerges. 
Glauben und Liebe dramatizes this alternative world: the revolutionary novum appears out of the 
old, or rather, in the political fragments, both the older forms of monarchy and modern forms of 
republicanism already preserve their future synthesis, the Genialstaat—even if only in 
provisional, conditional or regulative instances. The polar forms of reigning political 
consciousness are already combined with their opposites, ineinanderwirkend, effective, and 
always present in each other, just as mythic and historical time can be viewed as inseparably 
intertwined within the paradigm of Märchen (provided of course that the correct hermeneutic is 
applied): “der ewige Frieden ist schon da—Gott ist unter uns—hier ist Amerika oder Nirgends—
das goldne Zeitalter ist hier—wir sind Zauberer.”  
Making these events and places possible in the space of the imagination comprises 
Novalis’ notion of a magische Begebenheit, the proper fairy tale operation in the sense outlined 
in the Brouillon. Glauben und Liebe will continue this outline in more detail.175 As we will see, 
the romanticized concept of love is still essentially at stake here: it is love and faith that brings 
                                                 
175 Beiser notes that it “has been customary to regard Novalis’ political theory as little more than a fantasy, at best as 
‘an experiment in the realm of the spirit.’ Yet this patronizing approach ignores the often powerful arguments 
underlying Glauben und Liebe” (Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism, 269). The following reading of 
Glauben und Liebe assumes that an experimental thinking of the fantastic—such as exemplified forcefully in the 
paradigm of the Novalisian Märchen—is, as Beiser goes on to point out, not the only horizon of meaning within 
which Novalis’ political thought can be situated. And I would also agree that an overemphasis of a decidedly 
fantastic element often leads to a misrecognition of the kind of real or actual contribution to the postrevolutionary 
situation that Novalis’ clearly understood his work to entail. Nevertheless, Beiser does downplay to a certain extent 
the central role of the imagination in Romantic discourse, a position that I believe is simply untenable in any 
commentary on political Romanticism. Indeed, the departure point of the present study on wild politics is precisely 
the inquiry into what might be called a Möglichkeitspolitik of the imagination as opposed to the kind of realpolitical 
logic Beiser in part appeals to. Regarding Glauben und Liebe specifically, there is always the risk of falling into a 
realpolitical misreading if one insists, to a fault, on a strong version of the argument that his political system has 






about “America” in Novalis’ terms—the quintessential heterotopia or land of possibility for 
Europe in the Romantic system of thought—without having to leave Prussia: as he says, one 
merely needs to go to Berlin and see the Queen.176 In Glauben und Liebe the messianic kingdom 
of the future is to be born in the poetic present, and the true communal state will possess 
legitimate power only insofar as it is elastic enough to contain an ever-increasing quotient of 
love. “Jede Verbesserung unvollkommener Constitutionen,” Novalis writes in the Politische 
Aphorismen, providing the most concise summation of Märchenpolitik between the Brouillon 
and Glauben und Liebe, “läuft daraus hinaus, daß man sie der Liebe fähiger macht.”177 
1.9 Staatsmärchen 
For Novalis, the most reductive schema of the postrevolutionary problematic takes the 
form of an either/or: either monarchy or republic. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, this 
decision was often perceived to lead to nothing other than a kind of aporetic double bind. 
                                                 
176 In the penultimate fragment of Glauben und Liebe Novalis writes: “Wer den ewigen Frieden jetzt sehn und lieb 
gewinnen will, der reise nach Berlin und sehe die Königin. Dort kann sich jeder anschaulich überzeugen, daß der 
ewige Friede herzliche Rechtlichkeit über alles liebt, und nur durch diese sich auf ewig fesseln läßt” (Novalis, 
2:498). 
 
177 Ibid., 500. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write that the “primary decision made by the multitude is really the 
decision to create a new race or, rather, a new humanity. When love is conceived politically, then, this creation of a 
new humanity is the ultimate act of love” (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude [New York: Penguin, 2004], 
356). Far from suggesting that Novalis’ project in Glauben und Liebe could somehow be drawn into the orbit of a 
twenty-first century politics of love in any concrete or actionable way, I only cite Hardt and Negri here to show that 
the very status of affect is an abiding problem of the modern political imagination. It is significant that the 
invocation of political love—around 1800 or today—still leads to a certain form of alternative thinking, i.e., to a 
wild politics, as is evident in this passage from Multitudes above. As regards Hardt and Negri’s reflections on 
political love more specifically, they emphatically claim to be not imaginative, but rather part of an explicit program 
of Realpolitik, “grand politics,” or “political Realism” (Ibid). Drawing on these same passages in Multitude, Richard 
Beardsworth offers a plea for political love that, in light of the juxtaposition of Robespierre and Novalis, seems to 
have a not unremarkable (albeit not intentional) echo. Arguing that the contemporary global situation tends towards 
an ever widening set of social, economic, political, and religious “diremptions,” Beardsworth claims that only love 
can provide an act of “political invention” capable of suturing the various divisions of modernity. In terms that could 
as easily be applied to the period immediately following the Terror in which the Frühromantiker invent their own 
politics of love, Beardsworth writes: “Given the end of progressive violent politics, this radical mending of our 
present state of diremption will require all the more the vehicle of secular love” (Richard Beardsworth, “A Note to 






According to this view, the options of the contemporary political situation bifurcate in a 
dichotomous logic. On the one hand, there is the path of monarchical retrenchment or 
restoration. This is a doubling-down against any and all revolutionary elements. But it also 
potentially galvanizes the oppositional democratic ones: what is left of the absolutist state and 
governmental structure—in German-speaking lands around 1800, the patchwork system of the 
Holy Roman Empire—in this case makes itself incapable of reform, much less emancipatory 
structural change (this latter path, it should be noted, will characterize the German situation in 
line with the so-called System Metternichs until the close of the era in the pan-European 
revolutionary crisis of 1848). On the other hand, there is the course of revolution and 
revolutionary commitment, which for its part risks dissolving the traditional power base of the 
eighteenth century aristocratic-clerical regime entirely, sending society into anarchy, breaking 
modern life free from the molds of conventional norms and existing institutions (Burke’s 
concern, as we saw at the outset of this chapter). The danger here is the chaos preceding the 
successful revolutionary reorganization of society. Its new networks of distribution, support, 
laws, rights, taxation, etc.—the whole system of life that the revolution will usher in—can only 
be realized in actual effect after profound material violence has been done to the old world (an 
event that, as opposed to French developments, never occurred in the immediate 
postrevolutionary German context).  
The breakdown of social order was a potential end, and violence a necessary means, in 
either decision, as would become clear to European leaders and power-brokers (however 
revolutionary, reformist, or reactionary) after the example of Robespierre’s Terror, Napoleon’s 
conquests, and the resulting Coalition Wars of the first decade of the nineteenth century. The 






system of international alliances was drawn up to reterritorialize the geopolitical changes brought 
about in the French Revolution and Napoleonic imperium, is official testament to the stakes 
involved in such a black and white decision. In the actual event, the anti-liberal, anti-secular 
Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia did not prove strong enough to survive this double 
bind. And our contemporary concept of Realpolitik would emerge precisely out of this crucible 
of nineteenth century politics, namely: as a by-product of the process whereby the 
insurrectionary aspirations of the French Revolution were recited and reformulated in an 
increasingly anti-idealistic and politically positivist Vormärz.178 
Navigating this decision without recourse to any pragmatic Realpolitik—or rather, 
transgressing the rigid opposition between monarchism and republicanism by rendering it supple 
and elastic, combining and distorting the essence of each political doctrine in turn179—is a major 
                                                 
178 Ludwig von Rochau, erstwhile radical exiled Vormärz journalist, enemy of Otto von Bismarck, and later deputy 
in the 1871 German Reichstag, first coined the term Realpolitik in his popular 1853 Grundsätze der Realpolitik. Like 
Karl Marx’s 1851 18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon, Rochau’s often fascinating Grundsätze is a response to the 
rise of the Second Republic and the election of Napoleon’s nephew Louis in France (albeit one that in comparison to 
Marx’s account is today entirely forgotten). Like Machiavelli or, for that matter, Metternich, Rochau argues for a 
cool-headed analysis of material power forces in the political theater (as opposed to what he calls the 
“Experimentalpolitik” of the earlier revolutionary era, something he would have no doubt recognized and rejected in 
Novalis’ works) (Ludwig von Rochau, Grundsätze der Realpolitik [Stuttgart: Karl Göpel, 1859], 3). After its co-
optation and popularization by Bismarck, an increasingly cynical concept of Realpolitik was taken up by an entire 
tradition of modern political history and science on both sides of the political spectrum, from A.P. Taylor to Henry 
Kissenger. Today it often appears as the hegemonic principle of all rational-pragmatic political considerations, 
although, as Bruno Latour notes, any invocation of reality in contemporary politics cannot avoid coming off as 
“deeply unrealistic” (on the reception of realpolitik, see John Bew, “The Real Origins of Realpolitik.” The National 
Interest [March/April 2014] and Bruno Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public.” 
Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy [Cambridge: MIT, 2005], 4). Interestingly, in the course of his 
exposition of Realpolitik, Rochau himself advocates for a certain “Elasticität der staatlichen Formen” (Rochau, 8). 
The elastic state organically responds—indeed, for him the state is essentially an organism, and one whose 
spätromantisch provenance is impossible to miss—not only to changes in international and domestic political 
conditions, but also to the “schlummernden Anlagen und die unentwickelten Fähighkeiten” of what he calls 
“gesellschaftliche Kräfte” (Ibid., 8, 5). Social power includes collective affect as well as capital, poverty, 
intelligence, uncertainty, prejudice, and “ganz besonders die Dummheit,” as he puts it (Ibid., 9). For Rochau, all of 
this must be drawn into the calculus of realpolitical power in his definition, but these aspects are also the explicit 
purview of Novalis’ Möglichkeitspolitik as well. 
 
179 Novalis attempts to “escape the web of either reformative or revolutionary political discourse in the traditional 
sense” (Elizabeth Mittman and Mary R. Strand, “Representing Self and Other in Early German Romanticism.” 
Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings, ed. Jochen Schulte-Sasse 






concern in Glauben und Liebe. But Novalis is also careful to recognize that this is an immense 
challenge given the contemporary bifurcation of political positions:  
Jetzt scheint die vollkommene Demokratie und die Monarchie in einer unauflöslichen 
Antinomie begriffen zu sein—der Vortheil der Einen durch einen entgegengesetzten 
Vortheil der Andern aufgewogen zu werden. Das junge Volk steht auf der Seite der 
erstern, gesetztere Hausväter auf der Seite der zweiten. Absolute Verschiedenheit der 
Neigungen scheint diese Trennung zu veranlassen. Einer liebt Veränderungen—der 
Andre nicht.180 
It now seems that the resolution of this political antinomy can only result in an aporetic 
confrontation, a continual non-decision or antagonism that motors generational difference 
without fundamentally changing the general situation. The irreconcilable gap between republican 
democracy (the “Fluidum deferens der Jugend”)181 and monarchy, or the doctrine of the Home 
and Father (“gesetztere Hausväter”) appears absolute (“absolute Verschiedenheit”): only a 
stillbirth can be expected from the impossible union of fertile youth and sterile old age. 
The reconciliation of this opposition—and not merely choosing the one position over the 
other—will thus constitute the solution to the crisis of the age, its “hauptpolitisches Problem.”182 
In the Brouillon, Novalis asks: “Ist ein politisches Leben möglich?,” only to immediately 
reformulate his question: “Sind Verbindungen der entgegengesezten politischen Elemente a 
priori möglich?”183 Here we find the discourse of the insufficiency of the perfect (as elaborated 
above vis-à-vis the Freiberger Studien) returned for political application. If such a real political 
                                                 
familialism inherent in both traditions, whether as monarchical paternity or republican fraternity, and as a 
combination of both. And yet it is just as clear that Novalis is interested in a romanticization of the familial political 
imaginary of the period that carries it far beyond its conventional forms. 
 
180 Novalis, 2:503 
 
181 Ibid., 501. 
 








logic of interconnection is indeed possible, then it will not be within the framework of the 
exclusive disjunction, of the either/or: neither the perfectly isolated republican nor monarchical 
system will ultimately prove adequate to the ideal imperfection of the future political utopia. 
Like the desired elastic subject of Märchen, Prussia too must become the representative site not 
in which absolutes are instantiated (not as in the absolutist monarchical authority or the absolute 
revolutionary commitment of a Robespiere), but one in which heterogenous elements—opposite 
temporal orders, opposing existential regimes—are rendered co-present. Märchen theory, put 
differently, can be politicized and used as a model to transfigure the state, and, as we will see, to 
transfigure the monarch and the conventional relationship between King and citizen 
subject/collective as well. Through political Wunderkraft, through the kind of Staatsmärchen 
envisioned in Glauben und Liebe, the seemingly impossible becomes possible: the irreducible 
antinomy between antiquity and juvenility, rigidity and fluidity, stasis and mobility, between a 
monarchy and republic as principles collapsed into each other, the dissolution and recombination 
of all these opposed traits: “Das Karacterisirende lößt sich in jedem.”184 
While the logic of Glauben und Liebe (following the pattern of the fairy tale) is 
synthetic,185 syncretic, or even reconciliatory, it must be emphasized that the targeted a priori 
                                                 
184 Ibid., 261. This fragment emphasizes the need to synthesize these essential poles of the philosophy of history of 
the fairy tale paradigm: “GESCH[ICHTs]LEHRE. Was ist eigentlich Alt? Was Jung? Jung—wo die Zukunft 
vorwaltet. Alt—wo die Vergangenheit die Übermacht hat. Jung und alt—polare Praedicate der historischen Substanz 
[...] Alt entspricht dem Starren. Jung—dem Flüssigen. Das Alte ist das Gebildete—plastisch. Das Junge—das 
Bewegliche—Gemeinsame. Wenn sich Historien berühren, so werden beyde polarisch. Das Karacterisirende lößt 
sich in jedem.” The political Romantic discourse of polarity and the system-figure of the dynamic, which Novalis 
draws on here, is discussed further in Chapter 2. 
 
185 In his discussion of Glauben und Liebe, Peter Coulmas notes that synthesis is a central structural feature of 
Novalis’ political theory. One of the strengths of Coulmas’ reading is that even while Novalis gestures towards the 
form in which such opposing elements are to be sublimated—the Universalstaat or Genialstaat—Coulmas 
emphasizes that this is by no means self-evident in Glauben und Liebe. The fragments, he notes, leave this 
sublimation or ultimate synthesis up in the air, its exact processes and nature remain unclear as dramatized there. As 
we have seen above, this is in line with the kind of empty (content-less) or asymptotic “Normenvermittlung,” as 






“Reunion der Oppositen,” or what Novalis calls elsewhere the “gemischte Regierungsform”186 of 
a monarchy-republic, only occurs after the fields of monarch and republic have both been 
practically and conceptually destituted. He is clear about the significant amount of conceptual 
and practical violence involved in building a future political community on novel foundations; 
traditional concepts do not emerge from such a process—whose symbolic figures appear in 
volcanoes, floods, and landslides in Glauben und Liebe and elsewhere—without first being 
redefined vis-à-vis their conventional meanings (just as we saw in terms of the historical 
estrangement of a Märchenpolitik that eschews the prosaic-historical present for the geistige 
Gegenwart). Novalis’ procedure in this respect can therefore be understood as an initial 
deconstruction of the rigid positions of the postrevolutionary problematic. Like the elastic 
genius-subject of the Brouillon, the point is to reduce (logorithmisieren) or evacuate the 
dominant understanding of the state—whether as enlightened despotism or popular 
republicanism—to make the reigning concepts of the political strange and alien, to perform the 
transmundaner actus on society and rethink it as part of a dynamic of collective becoming, 
opened up to a series of potentializations. Along these lines, Löwe will even speak of the 
“Verfremdungsprogramm” of Glauben und Liebe, an aspect often overlooked in the reception of 
                                                 
‘Universalstaat’ ist ein republikanisches Wesen mit umfassende Monarchie. Bedeutet nun die Vereinigung dieser 
zwei entgegengetzten Regierungsformen in einem Begriff nur einen dichterischen Harmonisierungsversuch zweier 
an sich unvereinbaren Elemente? Soll neben dem um die Wende des 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert modernen 
Republikanismus auch der tradierten Monarchie ihr Recht gelassen werden? Oder geht es hierbei um die 
Neuprägung der beiden Begriffe und ihre Verschmelzung zu einem höheren Dritten, richtiger: zu einer neuen 
Staatsform?” (Peter Coulmas, “Der Monarch bei Novalis.” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft 
und Geistesgeschichte, no. 21 [1943], 326). The present discussion essentially argues, as is evident already, that 
Novalis clearly gestures towards a third or higher state formation, or at least postulates its necessity and speculates 
on its realization.  
 
186 “Das politische Problem,” Novalis writes, “dürfte also wohl Eins der Hauptprobleme, wo nicht gar das höchste 
seyn, und seine wahrhafte Auflösung unermeßliche untergeordnete Auflösungen nach sich ziehn, und den 
wichtigsten Einfluß auf alle Wissenschaften haben. Der Keim d[er] Auflösung liegt in der gemischten 






Novalis’ political thinking.187 Forms of political romantisieren, and not just in the exemplar of 
Glauben und Liebe, begin from the standpoint that understands contemporary reality as 
fundamentally inadequate, as an alienated form of present existence itself in need of critical 
inversion, demanding a critical process of alienation. Hence the programmatic use of 
Möglichkeitssinn in a dedicated negative mode, not just in Romanticism, but, I would argue, as a 
constitutive element in all political avant-gardism.  
For example, one could ask whether Novalis considers the King—or what we should 
rather call the figure of König without article in Glauben und Liebe188—to fulfill a function that 
is even possible for the imperfect, incomplete human subject, given that Novalis’ notion of 
König seems to represent far more an impossible species of the Transmundaner. König is 
transmundane, inasmuch as it appears stretched beyond recognizable symbols of sovereign 
monarchical identity; but in this it also models a perfected form of sovereign selfhood—like a 
                                                 
187 Even though one of Novalis’ poetological self-definitions emphasizes precisely this program of alienation: “Die 
Kunst, auf eine angenehme Art zu befremden, einen Gegenstand fremd zu machen und doch bekannt und anziehend, 
das ist die romantische Poetik” (cited in Herbert Uerlings, “Einbildungskraft und Poesie bei Novalis.” Novalis. 
Poesie und Poetik [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004], 21). 
 
188 I use the term “König” and the personal pronoun “it” instead of “the King” or “he” to emphasize the 
conceptuality, abstraction, and, simply put, strangeness of the figure of the monarch in Glauben und Liebe. I have 
done the same above with Märchen, often omitting its article. König is not exhausted as a historical-biographical 
figure in this text, a point not lost on Friedrich Wilhelm III himself. Schlegel, Novalis’ literary agent at the time, 
reports back on what the editor of the Jahrbuch told him: “Unger writes to me: ‘The king was reputedly annoyed by 
several statements in Faith and Love. He said, ‘More is demanded of a king than he can possibly accomplish. It is 
constantly forgotten that he is a human being. One should take such a man, who prescribes the king his duties from 
the writing desk, and bring him before the throne, where he will finally see the difficulties that surround the king and 
cannot possibly be overcome’” (cited from O’Brien, 167). The King has not somehow missed the point, even if he 
correctly understands Novalis’ fragments for all the wrong reasons. (Glauben und Liebe provides in this sense no 
small criticism of Friedrich Wilhelm III: even he is in need of new Bildung, or rather he must forget that he is 
“merely” a human being if he is to take on his full transcendent power as an exemplary transmundane agent). 
Novalis does indeed demand more than a real king can accomplish. And even then, he claims further that there are 
precious few human beings in the true sense anyways. The point is to first become a human being through 
transfiguration. Interestingly, this far more radical statement is at the basis of his critique of rights-based political 
constitutionalism as well: “Wenig Menschen sind Menschen—daher d[ie] Menschenrechte äußerst unschicklich, als 
wircklich vorhanden, aufgestellt werden. Seyd Menschen, so werden euch die M[enschen] Rechte von selbst 






God— that just as much must be posited as an ideal for the limited human subject (and for the 
real King as well). Accordingly, the transcendent figure of König is useful because it provides 
the attractive force that pulls the collective of imperfect citizen-subjects towards a systematic 
center point, allowing all people to transfigure themselves in reaction to the political absolute; 
everyone becomes a monarch under the true monarchical system: 
Die Monarchie ist [...] ächtes System, weil sie an einen absoluten Mittelpunct geknüpft 
ist; an ein Wesen, was zur Menschheit, aber nicht zum Staate gehört. Der König ist ein 
zum irdischen Fatum erhobener Mensch. Diese Dichtung drängt sich dem Menschen 
nothwendig auf. Sie befriedigt allein eine höhere Sehnsucht seiner Natur. Alle Menschen 
sollen thronfähig werden.189 
As a being that belongs to humanity but not to the state (at least in its present historical forms), 
König appears as a kind of partial or semi-alien figure/object, reducible to neither merely human, 
earthly categories, but also not entirely heterogenous to them. König signals an “absoluter 
Mittelpunct” outside the regime of the mundane, and yet what is perfect about it is precisely that 
it has been raised, in a paradoxical formulation, to an imperfect, mundane destiny (“ein zum 
irdischen Fatum erhobener Mensch”), something one could otherwise expect to constitute a 
lowering or dimunition of transcendence. But here the human is raised to an earthly fate, and in 
this way the fate of the Earth as well. The complex spatial semantics of romantisieren, its two-
way verticality, is again visible in this fragment: upwards-transcending Potenzierung is the same 
as the downwards tendency of Logorithmisierung: König is an “erhobener Mensch” precisely 
insofar as it exists as “irdisch,” and yet its participation in worldly life is what satisfies the 
“höhere Sehnsucht” of imperfect human nature.  
                                                 






“Alle Menschen sollen thronfähig werden” can be understood to mean, in light of the 
above, that the concept of König is part of the transmundane Bildung of all people. König evokes 
a foreign, because forgotten, world. Hence the last sentences of this fragment that Mähl also 
emphasizes: “Das Erziehungsmittel zu diesem fernen Ziel ist ein König,” Novalis writes, “Jeder 
ist entsprossen aus einem uralten Königsstamm. Aber wie wenige tragen noch das Gepräge 
dieser Abkunft?” The “ächtes System” of monarchy takes on proto-anarchistic contours, it shows 
a certain individual sovereignty already inherent in everyone but still needing further 
development, having been lost under present conditions of modernization. The Bildungstrieb of 
true monarchy is thus itself a manifesto. It calls for and forth the revolutionary consciousness 
that is every subject’s heritage: we are originally, at the origin-point of our being, Zauberer, 
Novalis insists, and therefore we are all naturally monarchs, reigning from a position both inside 
and outside the phenomenal order(s) of reality. The “Dichtung” of monarchy, present already but 
also to be produced in the future, stimulates this forgotten “Thronfähigkeit.” The poet of the fairy 
tale exposes what has since become covered up, obfuscated by the conservation of power in a 
rigid state formation. The Staatsmärchen evokes a primal political world (Vorwelt) as the model 
of a future state in which all citizens remember and actualize their own sovereign power in the 
here and now. “Das ist eben das Unterscheidende der Monarchie,” Novalis writes in this same 
fragment, “daß sie auf den Glauben an einen höhergebornen Menschen, auf der freiwilligen 
Annahme eines Idealmenschen, beruht.” The “Idealmenschen” that the monarchical form 
presupposes, however, is to be found in every subject. 
The elastic subject of Märchenpolitik, in other words, has a task, albeit a decidedly 
nebulous and ambiguous one. This task can be summarized as follows: one must love and have 






collectivize this affective belief in the self (i.e., belief in oneself as König), projecting it onto the 
political community as a whole. Here we can see the contours of a program of anarchistic affect 
emerging in Novalis’ account of Märchenpolitik.190 The new constitution of the 
postrevolutionary Prussian state, according to the political application of the fairy tale in 
Glauben und Liebe, will follow automatically from such a collective transmundane act. But this 
only provided every individual citizen understands themselves as König: as agents and not just 
subjects of a political transfiguration through love. 
Conclusion: Anarchistic Affect in New Prussia 
 Robespierre and Novalis are in explicit accord in at least one regard, which provides 
something like the maxim of Romantic political Möglichkeitsaffekt: “anything that tends to 
arouse love of the homeland,” Robespierre says to the National Convention, “to purify morals, to 
elevate souls, to direct the passions of the human heart towards the public interest, should be 
adopted or established by you.”191 Robespierre and Novalis alike argue for a statecraft or 
political technology dedicated to the active production and modulation of affect towards political 
ends. In Glauben und Liebe, this will also be called “natürliche Etiquette,” a system of practical 
conventions and symbolic forms spread throughout society that intensify the “natural” or 
                                                 
190 Mittman and Strand also notice this slippage from the sovereignty of the monarch to a full-blown anarchism of 
the individual sovereign citizen in Glauben und Liebe: “With the power of poesy, the representational power of the 
king and queen in ‘Faith and Love’ is no longer based on a mechanistic relationship between the ruler and the ruled, 
but rather on an exemplary, transformative one: ‘All human beings must become capable of ascending the throne.’ 
By undoing the chimera of referentiality in the structure of representation, and by suggesting that the state (and its 
constituent parts) be taken up into the realm of the imaginary, Novalis challenges the monarchy's existing claim to 
authority. Thus, while ‘Faith and Love’ may, when read most literally, be seen to be a reactionary affirmation of 
monarchist structures, it can just as easily be seen as undermining that structure in a radical, even anarchistic 
gesture” (Mittman and Strand, 66). 
 







physiological expression of the free unfolding of humanity’s “Lebensprinzip.”192 The state, 
according to Novalis (and perhaps it is not incorrect to attribute such a view to Robespierre as 
well), must endeavor to increase every situation in which the citizen can stimulate this life-
principle, in which the citizen perceives the state as the generative process of the wider social 
organism endowed with freedom. For Novalis, this affective life-principle is “Mehr oder weniger 
vererzt […] in jedem Staatsbürger,” exactly as the anarchistic principle of König is: it only 
remains to become effective by steering individual and mass political affect into a practice of 
proper etiquette: 
Der König ist das gediegene Lebensprinzip des Staats [...] Zunächst um das 
Lebensprinzip her, erzeugt sich mithin das höchste Leben im Staate, die Lichtatmosphäre 
[...] Die Äußerungen des Staatsbürgers in der Nähe des Königs werden daher glänzend, 
und so poetisch als möglich, oder Ausdruck der höchsten Belebung seyn [...] Ausdruck 
der höchsten, zurückgehaltenen Kraftfülle, Ausdruck der lebhaftesten Regungen, 
beherrscht durch die achtungsvollste Besonnenheit, ein unter Regeln zu bringendes 
Betragen seyn. Ohne Etiquette kann kein Hof bestehn. Es giebt aber eine natürliche 
Etiquette, die schöne, und eine erkünstelte, modische, die häßliche. Herstellung der 
erstern wird also keine unwichtige Sorge des denkenden Königs seyn, da sie einen 
bedeutenden Einfluß auf den Geschmack und die Liebe für die monarchische Form 
hat.193 
Novalis’ notion of Hof serves as the synecdoche of a general state ecology: the rhetorical 
organization of courtly sociability, according to which politics is a matter of enunciation, tact, 
politeness, of the conventional regulation of behavior vis-à-vis the monarch, stands in for 
Novalis’ ideal doctrine of political sociability on a greater scale. The state—consisting of so 
many micro-monarchs revolving around the central example of König, the poetic 
Lichtatmosphäre of the political field which emanates just as much from each individual 
citizen—should understand its greatest efficacy to consist in the degree to which it can stimulate 
                                                 
192 Novalis, 2:489. 
 






expressions of “höchste Belebung,” “lebhafteste Regungen.” Furthermore, this sort of “court” 
does not encourage, on the one hand, ecstatic, uncontrolled patriotic expression, or, on the other 
hand, fawning or sychophantic attachment to a charismatic Führerkult (this latter being the 
erkünstelte, modische, die häßliche form of political etiquette). Rather, the state apparatus aims 
for a controlled output of affect along certain predetermined channels, constituting itself in a 
sovereign body of citizens itself concerned with the maintenance of appropriate social behavior. 
There must be, Novalis insists, “Ausdruck der höchsten, zurückgehaltenden Kraftfülle […] 
beherrscht durch die achtungsvollste Besonnenheit, ein unter Regeln zu bringendes Betragen.” It 
is precisely this latter form of controlled political affect that König fabricates (literally: 
Herstellung) in both individual and collective form, so as to potentialize the power of the state 
and love for the republican-monarchical system.  
If the above designation of König in each individual citizen-subject is retained (instead of 
reading “denkender König” here as the actual enlightened despot, i.e., Friedrich Wilhelm III), 
then this passage suggests that the citizen-subject is responsible for the modulation of its own 
autonomous affect, its own system of lawful sociability and emotional expression. Again a kind 
of anarchistic element is mobilized in the Staatsmärchen, entailing a horizontal rather than 
vertical production of political power: each and every König must produce and tend to political 
Möglichkeitsaffekt for themselves, for the common interest of their fellows, and for the state as a 
whole. In this strict sense, the monarchical form Novalis has in mind—as opposed to the 
conventional theory of eighteenth-century absolute monarchism—can be understood as a 
regulated output of the everyday behavior of love by every citizen (“ein unter Regeln zu 
bringendes Betragen”), a social code whose law is affective attachment. In turn, as if in a 






Form”: civic love towards the Novalisian monarchical system, which is just as much the love of 
sovereignty dispersed through all beings, begins to love itself more and more, and to expand into 
a new state formation. 
Ultimately it will be such harnessing of the open-ended production of affect that 
constitutes the majority of the prefigurative work in Glauben und Liebe. Again, this is the 
responsibility of the state as much as the individual citizen, or the state as a multiplicity of 
differing individualities; fulfilling this responsibility, furthermore, will necessarily transfigure 
the very nature of the state as well as the individuals who constitute it. To repeat: the 
productivity of political affect becomes the productivity of Märchenpolitik: a kind of progressive 
ordering of the emotions and passions of the citizen-collective is to be carried out freely and not 
coerced. A program of Bildung or education is called for, a progression or “leading-out” 
(educare) from an ultimately destructive form of social organization to one properly structured 
through the regulated proliferation of signs and practices of political love at a higher-order level 
of chaotic synthesis. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the discussion of the contrasts between what Novalis 
views as the famously profligate and immoral regime of Friedrich Wilhelm II (and, by extension, 
the French revolutionary model of political affect with which he associates this regime) and his 
own framework of political principles based on affective connections: 
Das Prinzip des alten berühmten Systems ist jeden durch Eigennutz an den Staat zu 
binden […] so wurde grober Eigennutz zur Leidenschaft, und zugleich seine Maxime 
zum Resultat des höchsten Verstandes; und dies machte die Leidenschaft so gefährlich 
und unüberwindlich.194 







At the end of this fragment comes the dictum already cited above in the form of an explicit 
opposition to mechanistic, proto-capitalist political formation: “Uneigennützige Liebe im Herzen 
und ihre Maxime im Kopf, das ist die alleinige, ewige Basis aller wahrhaften, unzertrennlichen 
Verbindung, und was ist die Staatsverbindung anders, als eine Ehe.” Novalis opposes a negative 
and inhibited form of egotistical etiquette and passion (häßlicher Eigennutz) to its positive other 
(schöne, uneigennützige Liebe). The old system, structured through Eigennutz, leads to a violent 
outburst of the wrong kinds of passion, with a critical echo of modern political economic 
discourse on the salutary effects of the same: this markedly Smithian principle, which guides the 
citizen to pursue only individual, rational self-interest, cannot lead to concord. It must be 
superceded by the individual production of self-effacing collective sentiment, the spread of 
politicized love based on a communal relation between self, other, and state. Furthermore, this 
same proliferation must be an aesthetic one, a transposition of politics towards forms of 
increased beauty. 
But here it should be stressed, against much of what we have already seen Novalis argue, 
that the point is not to synthesize oppositionality without doing violence to respective difference, 
but rather, to provide a clear apology for the one over the other, to negate and supercede one 
category—Eigennutz—entirely. With a logic familiar to later Hegelian dialectics, Novalis 
affirms that the passage through negativity, or through the historical series of discord, is a 
necessary step to arriving at Chaos2 or the productive, organized form-in-chaos first described in 
the Brouillon’s reflections on Märchen. The crisis of the previous Prussian regime of Friedrich 
Wilhelm II—also reflected in French revolutionary forms of governmentality and early capitalist 
economic theory—must be absorbed within the future ideal of the new Prussian state. Ugly self-






provide that which must be transcended by the beautiful, unselfish love of the commons, the 
form of love proper to König. Not only is one articulation of chaotic affect (Leidenschaft1, what 
Novalis indicates as so gefährlich und unüberwindlich) to be transfigured into more controllable 
and productive form (Leidenschaft2, the self and collective love of the proper monarchical form 
embodied in natural political etiquette), the category of the individual subject is itself to be 
subjected to a more fundamental alteration: the individual must achieve an unmediated interface 
with the collective, and not primarily attend to its particular needs and freedoms. But in this, the 
passion, emotion, or affect of the individual subject still remains paramount. It is up to the 
individual citizen—now recast as König in the new Prussian state—to pursue the collectivization 
of its own affect in political form. In the same way that the historical subject is transfigured into 
the elastic subject or Genius in the framework of the fairy tale, in the Staatsmärchen we 
encounter a potentialized citizen/collective in the vision of a Genialstaat, a state populated by 
Idealmenschen conscious of the sovereignty diffused throughout the demos.195  
We find this same attention to the transformative task of the individual citizen once again 
in one of the most important fragments of Glauben und Liebe. Here Novalis both criticizes 
abstract-legalistic constitutionalism, and retains its emphasis on the subject’s acceptance of the 
social contract, in the process reformulating both aspects as essentially aesthetic problems of 
representation:  
Ein wahrhaftes Königspaar ist für den ganzen Menschen, was eine Constitution für den 
bloßen Verstand ist. Man kann sich für eine Constitution nur, wie für einen Buchstaben 
                                                 
195 Leif Weatherby describes the Novalisian subject—or rather, the transformative subject-object nexus theorized in 
Novalis’ work that Weatherby explores under the term “organology”—not as elastic, but as “plastic”: Novalis, 
Weatherby writes, “understood himself as a practitioner of new forms of writing that might generate new forms of 
thought, nature, and government. His program remained fragmentary, but its impulse—the plastic synthesis of 
subjects and objects in historical development at natural, social, and governmental levels—was the most complete 
statement of the organological program” (Leif Weatherby, Transplanting the Metaphysical Organ [NewYork: 






interessiren. Ist das Zeichen nicht ein schönes Bild, oder ein Gesang, so ist 
Anhänglichkeit an Zeichen, die verkehrteste aller Neigungen.—Was ist ein Gesetz, wenn 
es nicht Ausdruck des Willens einer geliebten, achtungswehrten Person ist? Bedarf der 
mystische Souverain nicht, wie jede Idee, eines Symbols, und welches Symbol ist 
würdiger und passender, als ein liebenswürdiger treflicher Mensch?196 
In what will become a central trope of later political Romanticism, the constitutional contract 
appears here as the biblical dead letter; as Novalis explains elsewhere, the political document 
connects citizens to the state when, and only when, their personal interest aligns with its general 
law, but it cannot truly bind them in the only way that counts, i.e., emotionally, magically, 
through exercises of romanticized love and faith whose primary function is to connect the 
dispersed elements of modern life in a communicative network, not a body of rational laws.  
Beyond this, Novalis also rejects outright the notion that sovereign power, of whatever 
form, could otherwise legitimate itself through the brute recourse to physical coercion (whether 
backed by a political contract or not) or divine authority. That power must legitimate itself in 
general only vis-à-vis the people is a distinctly modern political principle, one that, furthermore, 
was reaffirmed nowhere more so than in Robespierre’s notion of the true legitimacy of the 
revolutionary state (i.e., in the dignity and autonomy of the common citizen). Novalis can be 
seen to inherit and modify this democratic precept when he asserts that the state must provide its 
subjects with symbols of respect and love, making itself capable of being respected and loved by 
each individual citizen. Even so, for Novalis it is already a step in the right direction that 
constitutionalism—whatever its demerits might otherwise be—depends on the physical presence 
of a text, the aesthetic embodiment of the social contract between state and citizen, even though, 
as he says, attachment to dead Zeichen runs the risk of devolving into the “verkehrteste aller 
Neigungen.” Where his vision of the new Prussian state becomes most radical, even while still 
                                                 






retaining aspects of a political modernity that increasingly relies on an individualist framework, 
is when Novalis imagines the mystische Souverain, or the figure of König, as itself a kind of 
living constitutional text. This “constitution” must prove worthy of each citizen’s love, and each 
citizen ratifies it to the degree that they are affectively bound to it and each other.197 
To summarize this again as a kind of Romantic anarchism: each citizen-subject must be 
able to personally accept, without coercion, the power of the heteronomous sovereignty to which 
they freely choose to submit.198 Otherwise, dispute and discord will prove interminable. More 
than this: the state—as embodied in living signs of individual and collective love and faith—
must be constituted in such a way that each subject-citizen finds their own natural sovereignty, 
their own law (“Aber fordert nicht die Vernunft,” Novalis asks, “daß Jeder sein eigener 
Gesetzgeber sei? Nur seinen eigenen Gesetzen soll der Mensch gehorchen”),199 aligned with that 
of the common affective constitution of the polity as a whole. In this way, the fundamental 
dilemma of politics as the seemingly impossible alignment of individual freedom with natural 
determination is actualized; the desired “politische Quadratur des Zirkels”200 is put into practice.  
                                                 
197 The constitutional state in Novalis’ sense presupposes an absolute quantity of love. In the Politische Aphorismen, 
he notes: “Die vollkommenste Constitution entsteht durch Incitation und absolute Verbindung mit diesem Reize 
[i.e., the stimulus of the Absolute]. Durch ihn kann sie alle übrige entbehren—denn er wirkt anfänglich stärker im 
Verhältniß, daß die relativen Reize abnehmen, und umgekehrt. Hat er sie aber einmal ganz durchdrungen, so wird 
sie völlig indifferent gegen die relativen Reize. Dieser Reiz ist—absolute Liebe” (Ibid.). In ideal form, then, the 
monarch embodies (symbolically and physically) this point of absolute stimulation or love.  
 
198 Here an interesting question arises: what would Novalis’ position on popular or mass revolt be? What, in other 
words, would he contribute to the Kant-Schlegel debate on justifiable democratic insurrection (as initiated in 
Schlegel’s 1796 Versuch über den Republikanismus)? As we have seen above, in the Novalisian system the 
monarchical subject—the citizen as monarch—grants political legitimacy only to the extent that the state is capable 
of stimulating love. Were the state to fail in this respect, it would seem like the citizen would have the right to revolt, 
a kind of political “divorce” on the grounds of lack of affection. 
 
199 Ibid. See also Beiser’s discussion of the Romantic insistence that all law must be accepted not only by the people 
in common, but also by the individual who self-imposes law, refusing any other form of coercion (Beiser, Romantic 
Imperative, 37). 
 






Precisely here Novalis suggests a program of elastic Bildung: the end of conflict, 
perpetual peace, only occurs when the people learn to determine their own world in the 
integration and critical rejection of certain elements of the old, in a synthesis of both opposed 
poles of the postrevolutionary problematic. On the one hand, the republican demand for a just 
and virtuous social state is expanded to include the state’s capacity to stimulate—and earn and 
deserve—love and faith (as Schlegel puts it in the Gespräch über die Poesie: “Die Liebe bedarf 
die Gegenliebe”201) On the other hand, the monarchical form will not simply be reasserted as the 
more intense charismatic authority of one individual ruler,202 but will be entirely romanticized as 
a charismatic sign-function: the manifestation of the König inherent in every citizen. It will 
become a kind of proto-syndicalist definition, paradoxically enough, of the true monarchical 
form or sovereign worth of each individual in Novalis’ political fragments, one made infinitely 
richer, potentialized or transfigured, and thereby brought into connection with the wider 
community.  
                                                 
201 Friedrich Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1968), 286. 
 
202 “Novalis’ historical significance,” Beiser writes, “lies more in his break with ‘legalism,’ the view that all 
authority in the state should derive from the law. One of Novalis' most striking and characteristic doctrines is that 
political authority should be based not only on the law but also on the personality of the ruler. In this regard, Novalis 
differed from the dominant trend in the political philosophy of the Aufklärung, which usually stressed the authority 
of the law; but he also departed from the historicism of Burke […] To adopt the typology of Max Weber, Novalis 
insisted on the value of not only ‘legal’ and ‘traditional’ but also ‘charismatic’ authority. For the first time in the 
1790s charismatic authority was given an importance equal to rational and traditional” (Beiser, Enlightenment, 
Revolution, Romanticism, 264). Qualifying Beiser, I would argue that it is far more a charismatic state and 
charismatic citizen that Novalis is interested in, and not just its sovereign leader, as Novalis repeatedly insists on the 
need to intensify affective bonds between the individual and state apparatus that instrumentalizes the form and 
function of the monarch. The model of König in Glauben und Liebe is intended above all to maximize the charisma 
of the subject and the wider body politic (as opposed to the real monarch) as citizens come into contact or interact 
with the monarchical state through etiquette. Novalis’ model of charismatic authority thus makes the monarchical 
leader into an absolute point of stimulation of and for the citizen (and thus makes the actually living leader, in a 
certain sense, into a nonhuman entity, as discussed already, a symbol and regulative ideal that only serves as a 
prefigurative image of future collective transformation). Far from offering a cult of the personality dedicated and 
subordinated to a particular leader, in their idealized figures described in Glauben und Liebe, Friedrich Wilhelm III 
and Luise actually only achieve their power as citizen-functions within this narrative. The monarchy has been fully 
transfigured at this point in the political fragments, or introduced into chiastic operations with the beings (the 






Glauben und Liebe thus dramatizes the constant progressive movement of thought, its 
attempt to imaginatively stimulate (Gedankenreiz), at the basis of Novalis’ Märchenpolitik. Such 
thinking of the negative, selfish passions of abstract legalism, as Beiser puts it. It entails a move 
away from the artificial bonds of contractualism and the mere rational letter (“der papierne Kitt”) 
towards consists in tracking—or inciting—evolution from prior negativity to subsequent 
organized form. It appears, more exactly, as the regulated emergence of positive, embodied, 
selfless love out the living constitution of a communal collective in love: 
Meinethalben mag jetzt der Buchstabe an der Zeit seyn. Es ist kein großes Lob für die 
Zeit, daß sie so weit von der Natur entfernt, so sinnlos für Familienleben, so abgeneigt 
der schönsten poetischen Gesellschaftsform ist. Wie würden unsre Kosmopoliten 
erstaunen, wenn ihnen die Zeit des ewigen Friedens erschiene und sie die höchste 
gebildetste Menschheit in monarchischer Form erblickten? Zerstäubt wird dann der 
papierne Kitt seyn, der jetzt die Menschen zusammenkleistert, und der Geist wird die 
Gespenster, die statt seiner in Buchstaben erschienen und von Federn und Pressen 
zerstückelt ausgingen, verscheuchen, und alle Menschen wie ein paar Liebende 
zusammen schmelzen.203 
For Novalis, this proposed revolution out of which the New Prussian state rises—and indeed of 
political modernity writ large at the outset of the new century—will be nothing other than the 
rise of the affectively-charged König, the most beautiful form of society held together through 
love and not paper. It will be, in other words, the production of the ideal sign (Zeichen) of a 
republic filled entirely with citizen-kings. In turn, every individual monarch, through an 
everyday life that has been romanticized, will proliferate the signs of this future world, 
intensifying the charismatic bonds of a possible modern society, a total existential saturation of 
love. It is in this sense that one must read the most condensed formulation of Glauben und Liebe: 
“Der ächte König wird Republik, die ächte Republik König seyn.”204 This yields Novalis’ fullest 
                                                 
203 Novalis, 2:488. 
 






vision of political Möglichkeitsaffekt: the love and belief of each citizen in themselves and in 
their collective self becomes the precondition of an alternative world order in which republic and 
monarchy are transformed, alienated from their previous forms but also reconciled together in 












































CHAPTER 2. NATURPOLITIK 
 
        Der Mensch steht vor der Natur wie ein Fragezeichen, seine Aufgabe ist, den       
        krummen Strich daran gerade, oder ein Ausrufungszeichen daraus, zu    
        machen. 
   - Ritter, Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse eines jungen Physikers205 
 
I sing the body electric. 
  - Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass206 
 
Introduction: Kraft and Transformation 
The discourse of new mythology around 1800 is never given one comprehensive account. 
It remains instead the subject of a relatively sparse set of scattered reflections and short 
manifestos, or buried within larger works in the form of so many excurses. Exemplary in this 
respect are even its two major or “definitive” statements: the fragmentary Das älteste 
Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus (anonymous, circa 1796)207 and Friedrich Schlegel’s 
Rede über die Mythologie, itself a kind of fragment within the larger frame of his Gespräch über 
die Poesie (1800). This seeming lack of an exhaustive or even coherent definition of new 
                                                 
205 Johann Wilhelm Ritter, Key Texts of Johann Wilhelm Ritter (1786-1810) on the Science and Art of Nature. 
Translated by Jocelyn Holland (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 460. Unless noted otherwise, all citations from Ritter are drawn 
from this edition. 
 
206 Walt Whitman, “I Sing the Body Electric.” Leaves of Grass (New York: Viking, 1982), 250. 
  
207 The Systemprogramm is of undetermined authorship, probably written in 1796. Beginning with its publication by 
Franz Rosenzweig in 1917, where Rosenzweig first gave it its present title and claimed Schelling as its author, the 
text has also been attributed to Hölderlin and Hegel (it is most probably written in the latter’s handwriting) (see 
Benjamin Pollack, “Franz Rosenzweig’s ‘Oldest System-Program.’” New German Critique, no. 111 [2010]). For the 
most part, Schelling remains the preferred candidate for authorship today. Daniel Whistler, for example, attributes 
the Systemprogramm to Schelling even while avoiding the entire Verfasserfrage: “Whether or not Schelling had a 
hand in the penning of this document,” Whistler notes, “there is agreement that it is representative of his thought at 
that period” (Daniel Whistler, “Schelling’s Poetry.” Clio, no. 43, vol. 2 [2014], 144). In what follows, I will simply 
refer to the author(s) of the Systemprogramm, but also assume its specific connections with Schelling’s published 






mythology is of a kind with its contemporaneous moment: the rhetorical agility and general 
mood of impatience that marks the new mythological text mirrors the historical situation at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, one characterized by revolutionary developments across the 
board, by a variety of profound practical and conceptual paradigm shifts that quickly left the 
outgoing era behind. For many thinkers in this period—and especially for the early Romantics 
who invent the programmatic ideal of a new mythology, investing it with such intensity—the 
advent of postrevolutionary, postkantian modernity was consciously recognized as the arrival at 
a threshold of change, at that “Sattelzeit” (as Reinhardt Koselleck’s neologism has it) that, in 
retrospect, forcibly initiates the modern historical epoch as a revolutionary break with the past.208 
As we have already seen with Schiller and Novalis, the political aesthetic engagement expressed 
in the literary corpus of new mythology understands itself as a response to the sociopolitical 
crisis, but just as much also as a recognition of the immense sense of possibility offered in the 
on-going rupture of contemporary life. 
What Schlegel would later call the “Signatur des Zeitalters” is also read by his Romantic 
contemporaries around 1800 as a disenchanted and alienating one, as the sign of an age 
embedded within a greater world historical process of accelerating and often terrifying change, 
most evident with the most recent revolutionary outbreak. From their perspective, the 
contemporary age saw its participants increasingly isolated and atomized through the spread of 
an overwhelmingly violent analytic ratiocination: Novalis’ contempt of the “papierne Kitt” 
                                                 
208 Reinhardt Kosseleck, “Einleitung.” Geschichtlich Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), xv. Helmut Schanze notes that “romantischen ‘Lebensläufe’ 
spielen in einer Epoche, die sich, mit Reinhart Kosseleck, sowohl politisch wie literarisch als ‘Sattelzeit’ ausweisen 







tenuously holding modern society together expresses exactly this.209 In ever-more powerful 
systems of ideological and coercive control, in conjunction with perceived oppressive structures 
of sociopolitical and socioeconomic regimentation (whether in the form of an absolutist 
monarchy, an overly-authoritarian republicanism, or a nascent capitalist rationality)—these are 
understood across the development of Romantic political critique to directly oppose the wildness 
of the “allmächtige Fantasie”210 cultivated in their collective literary endeavors. In their group 
projects and individual works, the Frühromantiker focus on a polemic against the machine state, 
the modern machinic society supported only by the dead letter of the law in Novalis’ sense. They 
oppose the on-going entrenchment of this mechanistic status quo, characterizing it as the enemy 
of the vanguard subjects and utopian communities, experimental aesthetic practices, and modes 
of imaginative thinking they claim as the signal operations of the Romantic movement.  
Neue Mythologie—one of the most important names for the Romantics’ on-going attempt 
around 1800 at total existential transformation—arises out of this critical context and proposes 
an alternative path for future society. New mythology is to be the doctrine of a revolutionary age 
opposed to the above problematics of modern historical development, and alongside Novalis’ 
notion of Märchenpolitik, in many ways it would encapsulate the most radical aspirations of the 
early Romantic political imaginary (we will turn to its later iterations in Spätromantik in the 
following chapter). Given new mythology’s totalizing scope and unlimited pretensions to change 
the very course of modernity—what Benjamin Specht calls its status as a desideratum of the 
                                                 
209 Manfred Frank, for example, specifies the new mythological program of Frühromantik as an intervention into a 
hegemonic system dominated by analytic reason. For him the essential agonism marking the age resides between the 
“synthetische Option des Mythos” and the “Aufklärung (des analytischen Geistes)” (Manfred Frank, Der kommende 
Gott [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982], 107). A particularly striking exemplar of this Romantic tendency can be found in 
Novalis’ Europa. 
 







contemporary epoch (Epochendesiderat)211—it is unsurprising that its exact nature and content, 
dramatized in the speculative figures and experimental concepts of new mythological texts, is by 
no means easy to define. 
In the Rede—and this is perhaps its most general formulation for Schlegel—new 
mythology is not so much a body of novel mythological traditions and associated belief 
structures, as much as it is the name for an absolute imperative to mutate on a collective and 
indeed cosmic scale, a demand on contemporary society as a whole that it confront an epochal 
decision between alternatives: either continue on its present course of cultural (political, moral, 
philosophical, aesthetic, etc.) degeneration or, by contrast, re-emerge rejuvenated: “untergehen 
oder sich verjüngen,”212 as Schlegel puts it, echoing Novalis’ generational decision between old 
age and youth. New mythology imagines the revolutionary rebirth of the entire cultural sphere as 
a full liberation of creative forces, a releasing of inhibited energies and powers (Kräfte) that, as 
we will see, are as much natural and material as transcendent and imaginary.213 The Rede poses 
                                                 
211 Spect writes that new mythology as an “Epochendesiderat, bleibt jedoch—entsprechend der pluralen 
Diskurssituation um 1800—ein unscharfer Begriff und bildet kein geschlossenes, klar definiertes Projekt” 
(Benjamin Specht, Physik als Kunst [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010], 105). While such indeterminacy or under-
determination of new mythology as a singular project is certainly the case, certain common investments can indeed 
be identified in new mythological discourse. To anticipate the argument of the present chapter: in what follows I will 
focus on what I take to be one of the most important aspects of new mythology, namely: its articulation of a 
Romantic politics of nature. First, however, a certain amount of theoretical reconstruction needs to be done to arrive 
at a reading of new mythological Naturpolitik, and to situate it in relation to the wider project of Romantic wild 
politics in this period of early Romanticism and afterwards. 
 
212 Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie, 314. 
 
213 Even while Specht remains sensitive to the protean nature of new mythological discourse, he also provides a 
succinct definition of it (relying heavily on Schlegel’s framework to do so): “Die Neue Mythologie lässt sich 
charakterisieren als Forderung nach einem neuartigen symbolischen Weltbild zur Lösung verschiedenster 
Vermittlungsprobleme der Aufklärungsphilosophie, etwa zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, praktischer und 
theoretischer Vernunft, Einzelnem und Ganzem, Staat und Individuum, Religion und Philosophie, System und 
Geschichte, Natur und Subjektivität. Die Rede von der ›Mythologie‹ bezeichnet hierbei den Wunsch nach einer 
neuen Form künstlerischer und kultureller Totalität, das Attribut ›neu‹ das Beharren auf den  Errungenschaften der 
Moderne. Eine Synthese dieser Gegensätze soll dabei mithilfe eines neuen, idealistisch fundierten Poesie- und 






itself as the stimulus or manifesto-call to achieve such a rejuvenation. As part of the set of 
demands for sweeping existential transformation that Romanticism constantly proposes as its 
core doctrine, new mythology in its Schlegelian version constitutes an extension, and perhaps the 
most expansive one, of what Schlegel elsewhere calls the major imperative of his movement, or 
the push to make Romanticism effective, to cast it as a cohesive or singular deed that 
reconfigures status quo modern society at its fundaments.214  
For its part, the Systemprogramm announces its epochal demand in just as direct of terms 
as Schlegel’s: “wir müssen eine neue Mythologie haben.”215 But despite such clear directives, 
this earliest version of new mythology in the Systemprogramm otherwise appears as inchoate as 
it is ambitious, a sketch whose programmatic content, according to its own arguments, must 
await fuller development in a future world, a world which is yet to be constructed. Such is still 
the case four years later when Schlegel claims in the Rede: “Wir haben keine Mythologie” and 
continues: “es wird Zeit, daß wir ernsthaft dazu mitwirken sollen, eine hervorzubringen.”216 But 
what do such invocations of a future mythological state actually contain; how will new 
                                                 
gesamte Kultur, da die Kunst, v. a. aber die ›Poesie‹, als zentrale Vermittlungsinstanz fungiert und letztlich zu einer 
›ästhetischen Revolution‹ der gesamten Kultur überleiten soll” (Specht, 104). 
 
214 Beiser, whose foundational study of early Romanticism takes Schlegel’s “romantisches Imperativ” as its title and 
epigraph, glosses it in terms that also apply to Schlegel’s more specific articulation of the same as a new mythology. 
For Beiser, the romantic imperative represents an “obvious play on Kant’s own categorical imperative. This 
romantic imperative demands that all of nature and science should become art, and that art should become nature 
and science. Furthermore, it demands that poetry should be social as well as society poetic, and that poetry should be 
moral as morality should be poetic. There should be nothing less than a contract between poetry and life, as Schlegel 
later puts it, so that poetry becomes lively and life becomes poetry” (Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, 19). Another 
code for what Novalis terms the romanticization (romantisieren) of the world, the romantic imperative relies on such 
reciprocal conceptual intermixing; this assemblage character is a hallmark of all new mythological self-definition, 
and of all the texts in question in the following. 
 
215 “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus.” Mythologie der Vernunft. Ed. Christoph Jamme and 
Helmut Schneider (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984). All citations of the Systemprogramm drawn from this edition and 
cited as Systemprogramm:Page Number. 
 






mythology go about changing the nature of life around 1800 and beyond? More exactly, will it 
only be through the mediation of aesthetic experience (Poesie), as is often emphasized in this 
context? In the terms of an early revolutionary Romanticism, I argue, this proposed new 
mythological function will in fact constitute a more multi-faceted program of existential 
transformation. In its full scope, it connects a wide variety of modern disciplinary knowledge 
practices and social and natural phenomena all together—from science to religion, from political 
theory to physical matter—and quickly outstrips its own adaptations of a Schillerian doctrine of 
aesthetic autonomy. 
To begin with, for both the author(s) of the Systemprogramm and Schlegel, there is not 
even an old mythology anymore, there is no significant mythological function at work in present 
society that one can employ for the problem at hand. As indicated already, the reduction of a 
chaotic and deeply mysterious lived experience, the sacred element of all life, to abstract 
mechanical and materialistic principles (as Schiller and the Romantics understood the situation, 
the negative inheritance of Enlightenment), is held responsible for this modern deletion of the 
ancient sociocultural work of myth.217 The contemporary moment offers no real socially-binding 
tradition, no source of mythic narrative cohesion, which could be renewed or immediately drawn 
on so as to recuperate an overly atomized, individualistic, and alienating modernity. The old 
mythologies—the stories of ancient Greece and Rome, of Olympus—could not be simply 
reasserted (much less those of contemporary conventional religion). That world, as the 
Romantics well knew, was gone forever. What is lacking must therefore be supplied: because 
there exists as of yet no new compendium of cultural origin-myths, legitimating social narratives, 
                                                 
217 See Michael Löwy, Romanticism against the Tide of Modernity (Durham: Duke, 2001), 30. Also for Specht, as 






no canon of mythic iconography, and no updated “theogony,” so to speak, appropriate to an 
increasingly secular, scientific, and politically revolutionized sensibility—because all this is 
missing, a specifically modern mythology would have to be constructed. In this invention of a 
modernized mythology there will be nothing of the kind of “ideological masquerade” of ancient 
mythology with its traditional devices and strategies either; precisely this is not to be inherited 
and re-functionalized for a modernity struggling to redefine and reorient itself.218 New 
mythology around 1800 will not be, as in Jason Wirth’s formulation, “something otherwise than 
it purports itself to be (the infancy of reason, proto-science, archetypes, the despotic musings of 
power hungry priests […] culturewide delusional thinking, etc).”219 Out of this perceived cultural 
vacuum, the dominant gesture of new mythological discourse becomes, by contrast, the charge 
for modern subjects to self-consciously realize the transformative capabilities made possible 
through the unique developments of their own historical epoch.  
Such developments are expressed in a variety of contemporary manifestations: in German 
Idealism, the French Revolution and Second Scientific Revolution, and not least in the proto-
avant-garde movement of Romanticism itself. All of these were to be taken up as source material 
and insight for the new mythological task, namely: to assemble the disparate elements of modern 
life in a more cohesive whole, into a super-discourse with metadisciplinary coherence, a 
totalizing interventionist program for the present situation. The contemporary age is charged to 
expand such individual, as yet un-connected or non-collective developments as far as possible, to 
thereby achieve a renewed basis of social and intellectual synthesis, a qualitatively new 
                                                 
218Jason M. Wirth, “Foreword” to Schelling: Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. 









grounding and direction along which society could proceed into the future. New mythology 
proposes a series of synthetic operations all geared towards intersectional change.220 Its version 
of the ideal Schillerian Bund is a bond of disparate social and political groups, bringing together 
different knowledge practices and disciplines; it confuses the mimetic barrier, as Rancière puts it, 
between the arts and sciences, but also between the elite educated class and the mass of 
unenlightened poor, bypassing the artificially imposed limitation of status quo social 
organization. New mythology is supposed to manifest—to identify and construct in thought, in 
the space of the imaginative text—a latent unifying power hidden but inherent in contemporary 
forms of life (in this sense it can be understood as an analogous attempt to Novalis’ figure of 
König). The aim is to engender a modern Prometheus, a divine or mythopoetic force or power 
(Kraft) proper to modernity that could bring a different kind of Enlightenment into effect, and its 
“light” will be an electrical one, as we will see. It is supposed to give to humanity precisely that 
which it needs to become great, to actualize the fullest potentials of human social progression, to 
rebuild the world in an image of emancipated human capacity. Its “Agitationsprogram”221 rests 
on an expectation not just of “eine allgemeine Verständigung, sondern auch soziale 
Wirksamkeit”222 to immediately follow in the wake of its intervention. Nothing less is the 
exigency of new mythology in its Romantic formulation. 
                                                 
220 The modern critical reception of new mythology can also be understood as the result of a kind of 
intersectionality, or interdisciplinarity, in literary-critical scholarship. Beginning in the 1980s, new mythology 
becomes an object of sustained attention as Manfred Frank, Karl Heinz Bohrer, and Heinz Gockel begin to detail the 
discourse-network of early German Idealism as it criss-crosses with the concerns of Romantic aesthetic theories and 
literary practices. See in particular their foundational work in Mythos und Moderne: Begriff und Bild einer 
Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983) and Frank’s Der kommende Gott, which offers an indispensable 
resource on the subject. 
 
221 Dieter Henrich, “Hegels Älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus.” Mythologie der Vernunft. Ed. 
Christoph Jamme and Helmut Schneider (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984), 160. 
 
222 Márta Baróti-Gaál, “Die ‘Neue Mythologie’ als Ergründung des ‘unendlichen Gedichts’ der Frühromantik.” 






But this is not so much a condition to be definitively reached as much as it is a 
mobilization of the ideal synthesizing force, the (im)material power that could unify an 
increasingly atomized cultural sphere, reactivating it along the lines that Schiller first imagined. 
New mythology, accordingly, can be understood first and foremost as an on-going process of 
mythologization, as an active verb of human Kraft in its modern forms or patterns, or more 
exactly as a process of triggering individual and collective powers in answer to the Romantic 
imperative. With such a sense of mythologization as a progressive praxis, as a kind of 
potentialization of modern human faculties of becoming, the term Mythologie in Schlegel’s Rede 
serves not so much as a complete doctrine of updated “gods” and their allegorical revelation in 
the present moment (although that is indeed an important aspect of its rhetorical imagery),223 as 
much as a serial intervention into the current development of theoretical and practical activity, 
and a resulting re-construal of dominant forms of life as part of the wider development of 
humanity’s potential to transform. The final new mythological intention is, then, not just to 
construct and dwell in a different modern world—to reach and then reside in the utopian 
situation—but to constantly produce one anew for every moment of historical progression, to 
recognize the very vocation of humanity as an on-going task of self- and world-generation. This 
is its wild political scope. Ernst Behler notes that new mythology “is not a research project to be 
carried out in the near future, but one of those more fundamental tasks that, upon reflection, 
manifest both the impossibility and the necessity of their realization.”224 And yet, if we attend to 
                                                 
223 In the Ideen, Schlegel identifies a new set of (national) divinities for the modern German era: “Nicht Hermann 
und Wodan sind die Nationalgötter der Deutschen, sondern die Kunst und die Wissenschaft. Gedenke noch einmal 
an Kepler, Dürer, Luther, Böhme; und dann an Lessing, Winckelmann, Goethe, Fichte. Nicht auf die Sitten allein ist 
die Tugend anwendbar; sie gilt auch für Kunst und Wissenschaft, die ihre Rechte und Pflichten haben. Und dieser 
Geist, diese Kraft der Tugend unterscheidet eben den Deutschen in der Behandlung der Kunst und der 
Wissenschaft” (Friedrich Schlegel, Fragmente der Frühromantik, eds. Friedrich Strack and Martina Eicheldinger 
[Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011], 94). 
 






the texts themselves—and not avoid their open commitment to an essentially heterotopic vision 
of an alternative world, one which appears both impossibly utopian and as the primary demand 
on the present political conjuncture—we find that it is precisely as a contemporary research 
project that the new mythologists propose a series of “fundamental tasks” for future messianic 
change. 
Because of such a totalizing prospective, in both the Systemprogramm and Rede the 
reader is confronted with a notion of mythologization in a variation on one apodictic demand—
make the world mythological—while the specific content that would fill out or define this shared 
vision of a modern mythology remains ambiguous.225 Indeed, the problem of specifying the 
content of new mythology, of identifying whatever is actually to be collected under its name 
(i.e., what would bring about the radical alterations new mythological discourse calls for, or what 
exactly the nature of such revolutionary Kraft is to be) persists to the end of both texts, openly 
foregrounded in their arguments. After all, the very idea of a mythology for modernity is itself 
supposed to be completely new: “soviel ich weiß,” the Systemprogramm claims, it is “noch in 
keines Menschen Sinn gekommen.”226  
Between the Systemprogramm and the Rede we are constantly led not as much to a 
declarative what, to what new mythology presently contains or will in the future, but rather to a 
                                                 
225 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 28 
 
226 Originality functions as an operative term for new mythology in both the Systemprogramm and Schlegel’s Rede. 
Schelling expands upon this point in his Philosophie der Kunst, echoing Schlegel’s arguments in the latter text 
exactly: “das Grundgesetz der modernen Poesie ist Originalität (in der alten Kunst war dieß keineswegs in dem Sinn 
der Fall). Jedes wahrhaft schöpferische Individuum hat sich selbst seine Mythologie zu schaffen, und es kann dieß, 
aus welchem Stoff es nur immer will, geschehen, also vornehmlich auch aus dem einer höheren Physik [my 
emphasis]. Allein diese Mythologie wird doch durchaus erschaffen, nicht etwa bloß nach Anleitung gewisser Ideen 
der Philosophie entworfen werden dürfen; den in diesem Fall möchte es unmöglich seyn, ihr ein unabhängiges 
poetisches Leben zu geben” (Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke [Berlin: Total, 1997], 446. All Schelling citations drawn 
from this edition). Schlegel provides essentially the same argument in the Rede, and, as we will see, similarly draws 






kind of transcendental condition that, were such a mythology to be produced, it would fulfill the 
ultimate vocation of the human in its last phase of self-completion. As such, the new 
mythological text proposes, adapting Daniel Whistler’s phrase, a “poem-to-come, a messianic 
speculative epic.”227 It points to the end of all human progression, as much as it uses the (quasi-
regulative, because materially possible) image of this end in a critical application on the 
contemporary moment.228 But again, new mythology’s content or material—what Schelling calls 
its Stoff—can just as much be understood as the process of mythologization itself, the on-going 
process through which modernity ascribes mythopoetic powers to itself, pursuing a different 
future. In turn, what is ultimately identified as the privileged source material of 
mythologization—an identification, as we will see, that remains in a cautious, tentative, or 
conditional mode in its two defining moments between the Systemprogramm and Rede—this will 
also have to be submitted to a process of mythologization. 
2.1 New Mythological Nature 
New mythology aims to stimulate the transformative potential of modern life by drawing 
on a variety of resources. Alongside an investment in aesthetic-imaginative experience—in 
Schönheit, Poesie, or Kunst, the terms through which the scholarship has usually approached the 
figure of new mythology—this chapter locates a major source for new mythology in one domain 
above all: in nature and in the scientific exploration of nature’s constitutive dynamic forces. 
Focusing on its natural discourse, on the way a certain figure of Romantic Natur, 
Naturwissenschaft, and Naturphilosophie becomes both means and ends to new mythology’s 
                                                 
227 Whistler, “Schelling’s Poetry,” 144. 
 
228 Ibid. Likewise, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy speak of new mythology, with reference to the Systemprogramm, as 







imperative, also provides a departure point for a study of the political valence of new mythology. 
For when new mythological texts repeatedly open up the natural sciences to speculative 
enlargement, the Romantic model of Naturwissenschaft itself immediately appears in what 
should be called, more exactly, a politics of nature. The process and method of modern natural 
science in its Romantic iterations centers around a politics of mythologization attached to a 
natural basis. If modern society needs to alter its evolutionary course at the risk of its own future 
survival—as the author(s) of the Systemprogramm, Schlegel, and especially, as explored in the 
last sections of the present chapter, as Johann Wilhelm Ritter all insist—then society will only be 
able to do so by drawing on the resources of that most protean and mysterious of forces: nature 
itself.  But nature too will have to be submitted to a process of mythologization, that is to say, 
new mythology submits modernity to a process of mythologization only by way of 
fundamentally altering society’s view of nature and the mode in which natural science is 
pursued. 
As such, new mythology’s investment in nature and natural science constitutes an 
important discursive site for early Romanticism in its wild political form. It is under the sign of 
an expansive formulation of new mythology vis-à-vis a combined notion of nature and politics—
or what I call Naturpolitik in what follows—that another vector of wild political imagination 
emerges around 1800. What is left potential and virtual in new mythological thinking leads to its 
great permeability across a body of disparate texts, traditions, and disciplines. And it is this 
constitutively open-ended feature, the metadisciplinary flexibility and experimentalism of new 
mythological thinking, that generates a variety of political imaginaries in its primary texts. A 
malleable Reflexionsmedium for the imagination, new mythology offers such use-value for 






of collective metamorphosis (just as in Novalisian Märchenpolitik)—and then, more importantly 
for present purposes, because in the pursuit of its goals new mythology looks to nature as the 
place for the most dramatic instances of existential transformation of all.  
This is to say that when new mythology applies itself to the political sphere, when it self-
consciously announces itself as a politics, as an activity and knowledge practice with directly 
political implications, it does so when it draws on a speculative-aesthetic doctrine of nature, and 
above all on physics. In the Systemprogramm, Schlegel’s Rede, and Ritter’s late works, the 
scientific investigation of nature through physics (more exactly: a “higher,” “speculative,” or 
“dynamic” physics) is to fulfill the political—and indeed cosmological—aspirations of new 
mythology.229 Schlegel provides a point of departure for such a reading of new mythological 
physics as wild politics. In the Rede he applies the semantic and conceptual resources of the 
contemporary physicist to expand the domain of the Romantic imperative, collapsing the fields 
of the scientific, aesthetic, and political into each other in the name of a new mythology. When 
he calls on humanity at the conclusion of the Rede to become aware of, practice, and expand its 
own innate revolutionary-divine power (“der Mensch fängt erst eben an, sich seiner 
divinatorischen Kraft bewußt zu werden”),230 he goes on to elaborate his plan with the 
conceptual resources of one of the central paradigms of current Naturphilosophie, namely: 
polarity. In contemporary scientific discourse, polarity presupposes nature as an immanent 
                                                 
229 Specht notes along these lines that: “Einen für die Literarisierung naturwissenschaftlichen Wissens um 1800 
zentralen Kontext bildet das epochale Großprojekt einer Neuen Mythologie. Sowohl Ritters (Die Physik als Kunst) 
als auch Novalis‘ (Klingsohr-Märchen) geschichtsphilosophische und künstlerische Ausdeutungen der Elektrizitäts- 
und Galvanismusforschung sind nur vor diesem gedanklichen Hintergrund adäquat zu verstehen. Und auch für 
andere Mitglieder des Jenaer Kreises, nämlich die Brüder Schlegel, sind die Resultate der zeitgenössischen 
Naturwissenschaft gerade deshalb besonders bedeutsam, weil sie sich als Stoffquelle, Indiz und Instrument für 
dieses Epochenprojekt deuten lassen. Von der Physik der Zeit wird erwartet, das spezifisch Neue dieses genuin 
modernen, integrativen Symbolsystems zu verbürgen” (Specht, 104). 
 






matrix of energetic forces (gravitational, magnetic, electrical, chemical) in reciprocal, 
oppositional movements. What Kant termed “bewegende Kraft,”231 and installed as the basis of 
his doctrine of physical dynamics only a few years before—a doctrine founded on the evident 
presence of polarity in nature—becomes in the Rede the metaphorical and scientific framework 
for the force dynamic of romanticized thinking. Polarity, specifically the structure of the magnet 
and generally the determination of all things through their local-relative position within a 
universal field of opposing energetic-magnetic forces, is for Schlegel the essential natural 
phenomenon with which to grasp the principles (“Prinzipien”) of human nature as well, and 
more exactly the impact of the revolutionary development of contemporary historical events on 
the modern subject and collective. 
According to the constant drive towards synthesis and unification that marks 
mythologization, the dynamics of nature and culture must ultimately be understood as identical 
in Schlegel’s view. “Welche unermeßliche Erweiterungen wird sie [humanity’s divinatory 
powers of thought] noch erfahren; und eben jetzt,” he continues from the above: 
Mich däucht wer das Zeitalter, das heißt jenen großen Prozeß allgemeiner Verjüngung, 
jene Prinzipien der ewigen Revolution verstünde, dem müßte es gelingen können, die 
Pole der Menschheit zu ergreifen und das Tun der ersten Menschen, wie den Charakter 
der goldnen Zeit die noch kommen wird, zu erkennen und zu wissen. Dann würde das 
Geschwätz aufhören, und der Mensch inne werden, was er ist, und würde die Erde 
verstehn und die Sonne. Dieses ist es, was ich mit der neuen Mythologie meine.232 
 
In the terms of the speaker here in the Rede, Ludoviko—whose character within the Gespräch 
has often been read as a proxy for the early Schelling, who in turn represents the most important 
                                                 
231 Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft:494. See footnote 265 below. 
 







interlocutor for Ritter’s own naturephilosophy233—new mythology will be the condition of 
possibility of modern change, one in which the human’s absolute potentialized power is 
recognized as such and thereby fully actualized. The nature of modernity as one of estrangement 
and division will be healed by the emerging knowledge of the true “ewigen Revolution,” recast 
as a collective “Prozeß allgemeiner Verjüngung.” In this vision of a fully mythologized world, 
empty or frivolous communication (“Geschwätz”) will cease; frustrated self-becoming 
(“werden”) will be released, allowing the human to become “was er ist” in essence (“inne”); and, 
crucially, the alienation between human and nature (“Erde,” “Sonne”) will be overcome in an 
understanding (“verstehn”) of their ultimate identity from a higher perspective. New mythology 
will become the consummation of the revolutionary development of the age in its approach to 
nature and its natural self. 
The conclusion in the passage above is that the human achieves full understanding and 
power (discovers “unermeßliche Erweiterungen” of its “divinatorischen Kraft”) only when it also 
realizes itself in a relational condition, embedded in a natural force field structured through the 
Urphänomen of an equally physical-natural and cultural-historical polarity. The formerly 
unconscious subject, a mere human moving blindly between opposing “Pole der Menschheit,” 
this incomplete humanity now grasps itself fully, sees itself disclosed in the total process of its 
(r)evolution within nature. Primordial social activity (the “Tun der ersten Menschen”) is figured 
as part of a continuum that extends to its opposite pole, to utopian or post-historical life (the 
“Charakter der goldnen Zeit die noch kommen wird”). A fully mythologized modernity sees its 
                                                 
233 The Systemprogramm and Rede together form a tight discursive body; as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy observe, 
the Rede, “virtually a pure distillate of Schelling,” can simply be read “as a commentary on the ‘Earliest System-
Programme’” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 93). Reading them together is to encounter a series of intertextual 
connections such that between them a singular doctrine of new mythology emerges. In what follows, however, I 






present moment as situated within the tension of this greater trans-historical system of polarity, 
caught up within the determinative forces of universal magnetic duality. New mythology’s 
demand, for Schlegel, is that the contemporary age recognizes itself as situated in this sense. 
True knowledge, and the ability to change history and to bring about the utopian goldene Zeit, is 
to be found at the point of magnetic indifference234 or equilibrium235 between two opposed 
historical forces, each located at the extreme ends of the historical trajectory of collective human 
life. The result of divinatory thought, or what Schlegel also calls Poesie, is to reveal this polarity 
to the human being, and to stimulate the human’s participation in an essentially dynamic cosmos, 
everywhere permeated by an interactive field of energetic forces: energies that are also inscribed 
onto our consciousness of the world historical process. The image of a dynamic nature is thereby 
mobilized for the demands of existential revolution, in line with Schlegel’s Romantic imperative.  
To recapitulate this point: Schlegel’s closing image of new mythology’s final goal rests 
on the assumption—as do the other new mythological texts to be considered below—that such a 
physics of sociohistorical polarity is no different from the dynamism structuring material nature. 
                                                 
234 As we will see in more detail below, this dynamic concept of nature with an empirical proof in electromagnetism 
would play a determinative role in the form and content of Romantic or new mythological physics. Alberto Toscano 
provides some historical context for the image of the “point of indifference” around 1800 and particularly in 
Schelling’s work. It arises frequently—perhaps more than any other—in new mythological texts as well. “The 
emergence of the concept of indifference as a defining element of Schelling’s thought,” Toscano notes, “was itself a 
result of the intense research undertaken by Schelling into the most recent developments in the natural science. The 
Dutch physicist Anton Brugmans, in the course of experiments on magnetism, whose results were published in 
1765, had observed that a metal rod to which a magnet was applied possessed points of indifference which when 
touched by the magnet would not result in a change of polarity at either end. From these findings Brugmans drew 
the conclusion that mutually implying polarities, manifesting themselves as relationships of force, were constantly at 
work, though prey to a neutralization or suspension in points of indifference” (Alberto Toscano, “Fanaticism and 
Production: On Schelling’s Philosophy of Indifference.” Pli 8 [1999], 56). 
 
235 Jocelyn Holland has drawn attention to the concept of equilibrium around 1800 in precisely the context that 
interests me, namely: through the related terms of polarity, magnetism, and the point of indifferentiation. As a 
mobile figure of thought that transports aspects of the material into the immaterial, the natural into the sociopolitical, 
binding together seemingly mutually-removed philosophical and physical considerations. Holland notes that such 
conceptual-practical mobility is a hallmark of Romanticism, a facet particularly of its early iterations, I would add, 
that has often been overlooked in favor of more explicitly aesthetic concerns in Frühromantik (see Jocelyn Holland, 







All new mythological texts freely traverse semantic and disciplinary divides between social- and 
natural-scientific considerations, and they recognize such divides from the outset only as an 
initial step to reorganizing them. New mythology rests on an identification of the lifeworld of the 
human and nature, of all living (and often inanimate) forms of life. This is to say that points of 
indifference between opposed life forms—as between opposing forms of contemporary 
sociopolitical life—abound in new mythological texts: what has been formerly separate and 
unbridgeable, in other words, is always to be brought back together, synthesized and mediated in 
a point of magnetic indifference. As Ethel Matala de Mazza describes Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie, the essential method is to reconstrue the “organische Totalität” as an 
imaginative process of dynamic integration, an “Integration polar aufeinander bezogener 
Elemente.”236 Mythologization as a revolutionary process does not only affect the human’s 
ability to historicize itself, to understand itself as embedded in and determined by a universal 
historical dynamic; it will also be a revolution of humanity’s understanding of the natural 
surround from which it ultimately cannot differentiate itself. In Schlegel’s definition of new 
mythology here, this constitutes a paradigm-shift made possible only when humanity takes on 
the correct “Naturanschauung” that would recognize this higher-order thinking of a universal-
ontological dynamism, and apply it as a new framework of social activism. Mythologization 
becomes a matter of constructing a “mythologische Ansicht der Natur,”237 as Schlegel puts it, 
one which would (in)form a radically different relationship between the state of the human and 
that of nature.  
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The Systemprogramm also concentrates on a novel relationship to nature through physics, 
finding it to be a promising source for new mythology. This is one of its initial problematics. 
Even before the clarion call to a new mythology is announced near its end (just as in the Rede), 
we find immediately at the beginning of the Systemprogramm that physics must somehow be 
made productive for the task of total existential change: “Ich möchte unserer langsamen, an 
Experimenten mühsam schreitenden Physik einmal wieder Flügel geben.”238 As in Schlegel’s 
vision, for the author(s) of the Systemprogramm, a reworked natural science will give wings to a 
modern age struggling to reinvent itself. Physics, and specifically a physics of dynamism, 
polarity, and magnetism with direct effect on human sociality and political constitution, is no 
longer to be empirically bound as in the present, but speculatively liberated, not plodding, but 
accelerating towards the knowledge-practices of an emancipated future world. Speculative 
movement is what is lacking. Stasis, or so the Systemprogramm claims, is now the enemy of 
every physics—and every cultural sphere—that struggles to liberate itself from its own limits of 
conceptual and practical possibility. 
The material of new mythology is thus to be found, in no small part, in a qualitative 
rethinking of nature and the human’s participation in it through physics—and here we should 
think of the distinctly Spinozan provenance of this image of natura naturans, as well as the 
figure of the scientist intent on isolating its phenomenal forms and forces, but conscious of 
always already being caught up in infinite natural becoming. Elsewhere and repeatedly in this 
period, Schelling—whose presence is easily detected in the Systemprogramm, Rede, and 
especially in Ritter’s works, and whose own doctrine of dynamic polarity proved determinative 
for Romantic science around 1800 in general—Schelling returns to the possibility of infusing 







physics with just such a standpoint, taking up again the extension of physics to meet the needs of 
a new mythology: “Man hat mehrmals in neuerer Zeit den Gedanken gehört, daß es wohl 
möglich wäre, aus der Physik natürlich, sofern sie speculative Physik ist—den Stoff einer neuen 
Mythologie zu nehmen.”239 New mythology thereby opens onto a speculative physics or 
Romantic Naturphilosopie with overt aspirations to radically alter the status of contemporary 
life.240 This naturephilosophical strand focused on dynamic force phenomena—the “intertwining 
histories of nature and human cognition as a single story,” as Weatherby puts it,241 a narrative of 
an energetic system of polarized magnetism (and, with Ritter, also one of electromagnetism) 
connecting all life forms, organic and inorganic—such a Naturphilosophie provides the most 
promising body of material for mythologizing modernity.242 Here we find Romantic science 
directly extrapolating from nature’s dynamic force phenomena, the essentially dynamic structure 
of nature itself, so as to provide a series of speculative visions of the future society.  
The thesis of the present chapter is that this sub-discourse centered on nature in new 
mythological discourse, and specifically the dynamic-physical model of nature that it ultimately 
rests on, expresses its most transformative aspirations in a variety of alternative political 
imaginaries. In the following, I continue from the point of departure above by drawing in more 
                                                 
239 Schelling, 446. My emphasis. 
 
240 Beiser describes the ideal of Naturphilosophie simply as the “poetic exposition of science” (Beiser, Romantic 
Imperative, 14). 
 
241 Weatherby, Transplanting the Metaphysical Organ, 124. 
 
242 Specht summarizes the above understanding of neue Mythologie as the synthesis of mythology and nature, or 
Frühromantik and Naturwissenschaft around 1800: “Die hohe Erwartung an die aktuellen Naturwissenschaften, eine 
neue Etappe des Naturdenkens, ja eine Revolution des Weltbildes einzuleiten, wird auch im sich zeitgleich 
formierenden Jenaer Kreis lebhaft diskutiert und geht in die ästhetisch-geschichtsphilosophische Kulturdiagnostik 
der Frühromantik ein: in die Prognose einer ›Neuen Mythologie‹ im ›Ältesten Systemprogramm des deutschen 
Idealismus‹ und in Friedrich Schlegels ›Gespräch über die Poesie‹, mit deren Hilfe sich »die Kraft aller Künste und 






detail on the Systemprogramm, Rede, and Ritter’s late corpus of works in the Versuch einer 
Geschichte der Schicksale der chemischen Theorie (1808), Physik als Kunst (1806), and 
Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse eines jungen Physikers (1810). I read this group of new 
mythological texts in terms of the following combination: 1) concepts of nature and 
Naturwissenschaft that draw on various physical models (mechanism, organicism) but above all 
on that of dynamism (in the main electromagnetism), and 2) imaginative, i.e., speculative and 
aesthetic accounts of the political that follow from the application of the dynamic concept of 
nature to the organization of a desired future society.  
Between the respective gestures of the above texts, I specify the framework of 
Naturpolitik in new mythological discourse. The following discussion relies on an understanding 
of Naturpolitik as a form of thinking that attempts to refigure the very nature of nature itself—
articulated at the intersection of various mechanistic, organicist, and dynamic versions of 
physics—and in the process invoke novel types of citizens, collectives, and state structures, 
resulting in some of the most imaginative political visions of early Romantic thinking. All of the 
above authors valorize nature and its scientific investigation in their respective forays into the 
imaginary construction of ideal subjects and communities. All of the texts considered here build, 
to different extents and with differing focus, a view onto sociopolitical organization informed by 
their respective views of nature, versions of Schlegel’s “mythologische Ansicht der Natur.” 
In the next section, I focus in more detail on the political physics evident in the 
Systemprogramm. In the first new mythological manifesto, an antimechanist concept of nature is 
politicized in a sweeping critique of the machine state and an implied vision of a positive natural 
society. The Systemprogramm first briefly opens the possibility for a different physics—a 






dynamic nature and applies it in the form of a proto-anarchist critique of the political state. But it 
still defers it to the future: physics as the proper discipline and source-material of new 
mythological Naturpolitik will have to wait for better conditions. The originary text for Romantic 
new mythology leaves the possibility of an ideal future physics (“Physik im Großen”), under 
erasure, open to exploration for later thinkers to develop, even as it provides its most radical 
image as a specifically dynamic one. 
I then turn to the Rede and how it builds on the Systemprogramm’s notion of a higher, 
speculative, or dynamic physics, offering a fuller vision of the mythologized concept of nature 
and Naturwissenschaft emphasized there. But rather than providing a further political extension 
as in the latter text (although we will see exactly this to some extent through the additions and 
corrections of 1822 and onwards), Schlegel’s own new mythological manifesto mobilizes a 
dynamic notion of nature (or a natural system constituted by energetic forces, a magnetic or 
polarized natural force field, as understood above) for a holistic aesthetic reconfiguration of 
everyday life (Poesie). Here the aspirations of new mythology still hinge on a novel relationship 
to the human’s natural surround, to the material-physical other of human subjective experience 
embodied in natural phenomena, and on the relationship of the Romantic concept(s) of nature to 
the problems of political formation and organization. And, significantly for a study of the 
political aspect of Romantic strategies of the imagination in this period, Schlegel recognizes the 
revolutionary potential of present and future life in a vision of collective political Bildung, based 
on a poetic-productive relationship to nature. Schlegel calls for a national aesthetic education by 
and through nature, and specifically for an expanded literary engagement with nature, in a nature 
poetry with political effects. But even here, if new mythology can be conceived as a kind of 






without much of the direct political elaboration of the Systemprogramm. Accordingly, between 
that latter text and the Rede, the philosophical, social, and aesthetic doctrine that new mythology 
proposes appears as a matter of politicizing and poeticizing nature, respectively. 
Finally, in the last sections, Ritter’s late works—whose position within new mythological 
discourse remains to be explored in detail in the secondary literature—are understood to 
represent a concluding variation on this body of naturepolitical reflection, and this especially 
when new mythology centers on dynamic natural forces (as opposed, as is usually noted in 
discussions of new mythology, as a body of thought limited to the concept of an essentially 
organic/organicist nature, as has been particularly the case in reference to the Systemprogramm). 
In Physik als Kunst and the Fragmente, the latter a pseudo-posthumous text published just two 
days before his death, Ritter begins to explore the possibility of an alternative model of political 
organization along the lines of the speculative physics prepared in the Systemprogramm and 
Rede. Ritter’s political reflections on the relationship between individuals, members (Glieder, a 
central term in his thought), and the collective state or political totality—relationships that for 
him must ultimately be understood as dynamic, and indeed literally electromagnetic—follow 
directly from his naturephilosophical doctrine and its application as a speculative and/or aesthetic 
physics, what Ritter alternately calls a science of “Cosmik” or “Kunst des Lebens.”243  
Ritterian science is the metadisciplinary investigation of the dynamism of the natural 
cosmos and the human’s total imbrication with its environmental system of force phenomena. 
But Ritter’s version of science also constitutes a mythic history of humanity up to the modern 
age, drawing his discourse into the orbit of new mythological historical imagination. Higher or 
                                                 







speculative physics, and particularly the ancient revelation of fire and the related modern 
scientific insight into electricity, is for Ritter both material-historical and ideal-futurological, 
retrospective and divinatory, just as it is for Schlegel.244 Ritter argues that physics, properly 
understood as cosmological insight into the infinite complexity of nature, has generated the 
accumulation of human knowledge in the past and represents the most significant hopes for 
furthering the evolution of humanity in the future. Indeed, physics provides an insight into the 
ultimate redemption and self-completion of the human through its historical divergence and 
ultimate reunification with a nature that now appears, in light of recent scientific breakthroughs 
in the science of dynamic forces, more mysterious and powerful than ever before. Physics in all 
its stages of development, for Ritter, has always provided its contemporary epoch, whether 
recognized or not, with its own version of a mythological view of nature in just this sense. 
Physics has already helped humanity critically reassess itself in dialogue with nature. As we 
already saw above for Schlegel and the author(s) of the Systemprogramm, Ritter’s observations 
on nature and natural science as a process in constant becoming is coterminous with an insight 
into the way sociality and political organization can also be disrupted and reformed—with, in 
other words, an emancipatory and culturally-productive insight. He adapts this emerging 
scientific image of nature as the most important resource and inspiration for the Romantic 
imperative, encoding it as part of his own version of new mythology. 
In Ritter’s late works, the ultimate embodiment of this mythological-natural perspective 
is a scientific body or institution—a natural Anstalt or Staat, provided by nature itself—based on 
                                                 
244 In the Versuch Ritter notes: “das ganze Körperreich wird auf diese Weise von der Electricität umfaßt; muß nicht 
vor allen auf sie der Verdacht fallen, sie sey das Feuer, was dem Thon des Prometheus Form, Gliederung, Ordnung 
und Leben giebt? […] Giebt es etwa Entwickelungs-,Verzweigungs-, Gliederungsgesetze bey diesen Electricitäten, 
von deren Ausübung wir wenigstens die Schemen, nach denen jenes System und die von ihm begriffene unendliche 






the above mentioned political concept of the member or Glied. The ideal political world for 
Ritter would be nothing other than the collective body of physics’ highest achievements, 
embodied but also carried further by the state of members. The highest achievement of 
contemporary physics, in turn, is nothing other than the discovery of the dynamic conception of 
nature, the natural force field in which all things—including political subject-citizens—appear as 
members in a cosmic circuit, enchained together and subject to a process of membering 
(Gliederung) in an overall system of variably connected energy flows. Accordingly, in Ritter’s 
late works that social formation or political state that most closely mirrors the dynamic system of 
nature is based on a continuum or connected network of members, all caught up and contained in 
the manifold of the energetic environment. The conclusion of the present chapter takes up such a 
politics of the Glied: it can be understood as Ritter’s image of a successfully achieved new 
mythological standpoint, an image that extends the tradition of political physics inaugurated in 
large part through the Systemprogramm and Rede. 
2.2 Political Physics 
Beginning in media res in a movement beyond the “praktischen Postulaten” of Kantian 
ethics,245 the Systemprogramm’s first assertion is that the individual’s absolute freedom 
effectively renders it divine.246 Appearing again at the end as the Prometheus or “höherer Geist” 
                                                 
245 The Systemprogramm is a fragment of an apparently larger whole; its first line begins in the middle of a sentence 
continued from a now-lost previous page: “– eine Ethik. Da die ganze Metaphysik künftig in die Moral fällt – 
wovon Kant mit seinen beiden praktischen Postulaten nur ein Beispiel gegeben, nichts erschöpft hat –, so wird diese 
Ethik nichts anderes als ein vollständiges System aller Ideen oder, was dasselbe ist, aller praktischen Postulate sein” 
(Systemprogramm:81). Of note here is that the movement beyond Kant amounts to an arrival at a decidedly Fichtean 
metaphysics which will, as we will see below, then depart from this framework to become a naturephilosophical 
physics and politics, a Naturpolitik. On the reconstruction of the text’s provenance and material status, see Henrich, 
“Hegels ‘Ältestes Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus.’”  
 
246 The Systemprogramm’s ambitions are clear in this respect: the select human—the new mythologist or that form 
of humanity that corresponds to new mythology’s projected changes—will itself take on the role of self-sufficient 
God, finding divinity and immortality precisely not in the traditional transcendent concept of a religious God, but in 






who delivers a “neue Religion” to humanity, the text describes a process whereby this inherently 
creative and powerful individual subject becomes collectivized as a “mankind-subject,” as 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy put it.247 Such absolute freedom endows the subject—and, after this 
process of mythologization, the collective as well—with the power to generate worlds like a 
transcendent maker: “Die erste Idee ist natürlich die Vorstellung von mir selbst als einem absolut 
freien Wesen. Mit dem freien, selbstbewußten Wesen tritt zugleich eine ganze Welt—aus dem 
Nichts hervor—die einzig wahre und gedenkbare Schöpfung aus Nichts.”248 The individual 
thinks itself (“die Vorstellung von mir selbst”) as an absolutely free being (“als einem absolut 
freien Wesen”); in turn, “eine ganze Welt” emerges that the subject, enjoying its constitutively 
free productivity, autogenerates. The Systemprogramm affirms from the outset that the world is 
not merely mediately known or transcendentally-limited from the perspective of cognition, but is 
ontologically determined directly by the human, at least when conscious of itself. The need to 
grant a kind of primary metaphysical agency to the human qua individual and collective—the 
ability to fundamentally create and alter the world, as a person and as a species, from the 
combined perspective of the individual part, the global whole, and the desired mediation between 
the two—initiates the discourse of new mythology in the Systemprogramm and, as will become 
more clear with regards to Ritter, can be understood to constitute its final intention as well. 
Following the last sentence above, we find ourselves moving even further beyond the 
limits of (Kantian or Fichtean) transcendental doctrine. The Systemprogramm rises again towards 
a new foundational knowledge-practice (or rather descends), one that discloses the possibility of 
generating a moral world as actually a question of physics: “Hier werde ich auf die Felder der 
                                                 









Physik herabsteigen; die Frage ist diese: Wie muß eine Welt für ein moralisches Wesen 
beschaffen sein.”249 It is, then, from within the field of physics that the moral construction of the 
free world immediately draws its resources. Natural science is no longer to merely identify and 
describe the natural conditions of things, inform us as to the objective material structure or 
system of the natural world, as it had previously been understood in a strict sense. By contrast, 
here there is a reversal: natural science is to be instrumentalized—and, as we will see, also 
politicized—so as to contribute to the attempt to modify the world according to the radical ideal, 
the “erste Idee” of an absolutely free “Menschheit.” Physics is to become a tool of the subject’s 
world-creative power—and not merely a discipline for the scientific observation of, or 
circumscribed experimentation on, the natural world. Such a physics does so, or becomes 
essentially ethical, only when it no longer limits the unfolding of human freedom and creativity. 
The concept of nature itself, and natural science, will have to be understood in a different light to 
be so applied. 
After the rhetorical question above (“wie muß eine Welt für ein moralisches Wesen 
beschaffen sein”) follows the call to then elevate physics, to mythologize it by unlocking its 
generative potential or “schöpferischer Geist”:  
Ich möchte unserer langsamen, an Experimenten mühsam schreitenden Physik einmal 
wieder Flügel geben. So, wenn die Philosophie die Ideen, die Erfahrung die Data angibt, 
können wir endlich die Physik im Großen bekommen, die ich von späteren Zeitaltern 
erwarte. Es scheint nicht, daß die jetzige Physik einen schöpferischen Geist, wie der 
unsrige ist oder sein soll, befriedigen könne.250 
 
Contemporary physics (“jetzige Physik”) is here clearly relegated to a subordinate position in the 
hierarchical couplet philosophy > empirical science, situated below the first philosophy of 









absolute ethics (and later, in turn, everything will be further connected to the universality of 
aesthetic beauty). Physics, as a scientific record of experience, merely provides the empirical 
data of the environment. By contrast, the use-value of a creative (schöpferisch) physics—one in 
accord with mythologization—only obtains insofar as these data deliver a kind of technical best 
practices for the constitutive ideas of human freedom and world-generativity as they unfold 
within their natural environment. Physics, as already noted, is no longer to serve its own former 
disciplinary ends as an investigation into a seemingly autonomous field of material natural forces 
like gravity—where physics appears hindered by its own methods and practices in the first place 
(“an Experimenten mühsam schreitenden Physik”). But rather, through its new mythological 
application, “Physik im Großen” is to inform the submission of nature to the heteronomy of 
absolute freedom. This freedom is one imposed on the world by the human rather than itself 
mediated through seemingly law-bound natural necessities of the exterior environment.  
 The value of higher physics in the Systemprogramm is its ability to further a certain 
inquiry, namely: “how should a natural world be constituted for a moral being,” and not: “how 
does the natural world determine moral constitution?”251 In this reversal of what is often 
understood as the proper determination of lived experience—now the imperatives of the 
emancipated and creative human being become primary as opposed to the necessary laws of 
nature—physics provides the knowledge of nature but only instrumentally so. It is relegated to 
one limited aspect, albeit an essential one, in a higher task that now appears, more precisely, as a 
post-religious anthropogenesis of the world, as the construction of a new mythological world 
inhabited by a different and more powerful kind of human. 
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programming” of the world, whereby the “world itself [is made] into a corollary of the subject” (Lacoue-Labarthe 






New mythology thereby demands a reorientation of the ends of natural scientific 
investigation. Physics, itself transformed, will become the necessary instrument and material of 
new mythology. But this change in physics, or its becoming-creative, so the Systemprogramm 
stipulates, is reserved for a future beyond the present crisis of modernity. Given that the 
historical conjuncture around 1800 appears otherwise bereft of “einen schöpferischen Geist, wie 
der unsrige ist oder sein soll,” the elevation of a world-generative physics tentatively sketched 
above seems improbable to the author(s) of the Systemprogramm. “Physik im Großen […] die 
ich von späteren Zeitaltern erwarte” obviously defers it to the future. For the present, 
contemporary physics exists under erasure, waiting to become the basis of the coming revolution 
of practical consciousness. 
But even while the possibility of a mythologized physics is opened here only briefly and 
then deferred, the Systemprogramm would seem to immediately offer a model situation for its 
application. This occurs precisely when the insights of natural scientific investigation, the 
physics of the naturally free and creative human, are expressed in the domain of the political. 
With this, and in line with the general agility of the text’s development, the question of 
submitting nature to the demands of freedom, or recreating the world according to the first Idee, 
is itself reversed when the question is applied to “Menschenwerk” or politics. The demands of 
freedom are now only intelligible as facts of nature; the very evidence of the natural environment 
informs the true political constitution. Under the right circumstances, the structure of the natural 
world—if it is properly recognized as an infinite evolution of autonomous but interrelated life 
forms—can therefore indeed be used as a basis for a critique of modern sociopolitical control: 
Von der Natur komme ich aufs Menschenwerk. Die Idee der Menschheit voran, will ich 






als es eine Idee von einer Maschine gibt. Nur was Gegenstand der Freiheit ist, heißt 
Idee.252  
 
The nature of a higher physics, the science of free world-generating capacity, becomes clearer, 
and with this the possible material of new mythology as well, when it takes on a political edge. 
And it emerges exactly from a certain notion of nature and human existence, namely: that of 
antimechanism. This sort of physics affirms radical human freedom insofar as its preconception 
of nature is antimechanistic. The “Idee der Menschheit,” whose essence as freedom a priori, we 
now learn, excludes the mechanical or machinic, follows from this sense of living nature. The 
claim is that machines are essentially inhuman and unnatural, dead, and that this insight grounds 
the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of any given political community. Thus the state, being a kind of 
machine itself (“etwas Mechanisches”), cannot even be part of the politics of the coming “Physik 
im Großen.”253 The state as such cannot even be thought from the perspective of nature as 
freedom. 
The next lines extend this concept of antimechanist nature as the opposite of—and as the 
(political) opposition to—“das ganze elende Menschenwerk von Staat, Verfassung, Regierung, 
Gesetzgebung”254: 
Wir müssen also über den Staat hinaus!—Denn jeder Staat muß freie Menschen als 
mechanisches Räderwerk behandeln; und das soll er nicht; also soll er aufhören.255 
 
As the rhetorical movement of the text proceeds towards a fuller understanding of the new 
mythological project, successively elaborated in a series of interconnected domains of theory and 
                                                 
252 Systemprogramm:82. 
 
253 “Die Maschinenmetapher,” Christoph Jamme and Helmut Schneider note, “ist ein Topos der Zeit, [that the 
author(s) of the Systemprogramm] bei Mendelssohn, Schiller, Fichter oder auch Hemsterhuis finden konnte und der 










practice, mechanization arises as the very antithesis of mythologization. From a metaphysics of 
freedom and world-creation, to its application as a physics and resulting antimechanist political 
critique, the Systemprogramm’s vision emerges in sharper outline as the necessary connection 
between the naturally free human being and self-organizing, non-machinic nature. But here what 
Manfred Frank calls the “radikalanarchistische Staatskritik”256 of the last passage above should 
be emphasized in its express negativity, that is, as a radical anarchist critique that proceeds ex 
negativo, delineating everything that is not Idee or one of its objects (“Nur was Gegenstand der 
Freiheit ist, heißt Idee”). For, strictly speaking, up until this point we have the outlines of a 
physics that could claim to be mythologized only insofar as it opposes the state (“Verfassung,” 
“Regierung,” “Gesetzgebung”), the mechanistic (“Mechanisches,” “Maschine,”) and finally, the 
“mechanisches Räderwerk” of all state formations (“jeder Staat”). The political expression of the 
new mythological world, in other words, can only be one definitively opposed to organizing 
“Menschenwerk” as “Räderwerk.” The strong claim of the Systemprogramm in this respect is 
that any knowledge practice unable to transcend the paradigm of the mechanism—whether as a 
metaphysics, physics, or politics—proves just for this reason incapable of mythologization. 
Accordingly, it must be rejected as new mythology’s material; the present situation itself must be 
rejected. 
 So what should be accepted, more specifically, as this material? What would be a 
political organization—but not a state in the negative sense here—that would reject the 
mechanization of modern life in the name of nature and the naturally free mankind-subject? 
Some commentators have identified this explicit antimechanist doctrine as the obverse of a 
positive position given only indirectly in the Systemprogramm. This position is to be found in the 
                                                 






tacit dramatization of a certain organic discourse, or in the text’s foregrounding of the figure of 
the organism both as the structural marker of nature and as a model of sociopolitical 
organization, a dual gesture characteristic of discussions of the organic around 1800 that address 
head-on the problematic of the mechanistic. In its broadest formulation as organicism, a direct 
opposition to the mechanical (and also to the inorganic or inanimate) is often taken as definitive 
in this period in general. As Jennifer Mensch puts it, organicism can be most broadly conceived 
as the “view of nature as something that cannot be reduced to a set of mechanical operations,” 
leaving the concept open to become an influential “response by science and art, in politics and 
literature, when grasping the problems and possibilities of an irreducibly living nature.”257 This 
organicist perspective informs—at least partially, as we will see—the conceptual backdrop for 
the Systemprogramm’s claims. 
Kant again becomes a major point of orientation for the figure of an organic political 
organization opposed to a false and unnatural machine state. He treats the organism in the second 
part of his 1790 Kritik der Urteilskraft in terms of the (critical, reflective, or analogical) 
connection between teleological judgment and nature. In light of the importance of his discussion 
on the (im)possibilities of a science of nature for subsequent Romantics, his well-known 
statements on the subject bear re-emphasizing, but also because they adumbrate the concerns we 
will encounter in Schlegel and Ritter’s new mythologies as well.  
For Kant, schematically put, the opposition between mechanism and organism can be 
thought as the difference between a watch and a tree, or more specifically, in the particular 
organization of cause-effect relationships (efficient and final causes) that obtain differently in 
                                                 







each representative entity. The former—the watch as a product of technology or artifice—cannot 
be said to operate according to a mutually reinforcing causal relationship (“wechselseitig als 
Ursache und Wirkung”258) between its parts and whole. A timing gear in a watch, for example, 
cannot reproduce, conceive of the design, or operate the watch in its entirety, nor can it do so for 
its other functionally-individuated parts. The single gear mechanism cannot serve as final cause 
of the whole watch or of its fellow parts: only the intention and labor of the watchmaker can.  
By contrast, what makes a tree a natural product, and, according to Kant, what constitutes 
the phenomenality of all natural products for the human subject, is that we cannot think their 
parts and wholes as functionally separated: 
In einem solchen Produkte der Natur [e.g., a tree] wird ein jeder ein Teil, so wie er nur 
durch alle übrigen da ist, auch als um der anderen und des Ganzen willen existierend, d.i. 
als Werkzeug (Organ) gedacht: welches aber nicht genug ist [...] sondern [such a natural 
product must simultaneously be thought] als ein die anderen Teile (folglich jeder den 
anderen wechselseitig) hervorbringendes Organ [...] und nur dann und darum wird ein 
solches Produkt als organisiertes und sich selbst organisierendes Wesen ein Naturzweck 
genannt werden können.259 
 
An organism, or a product of nature that can be said from the point of view of transcendental 
reason to behave purposively (i.e., as a “Naturzweck”) has, like a watch, parts that appear as so 
many individual organs or sub-mechanisms subordinated to the purpose of the collective whole 
(“Ganzen”). Crucially, however, and this is what distinguishes the organism from a machine, the 
individual “Teil” as “Werkzeug (Organ)” also appears as that which causes—brings into being, 
conceives, designs—all other individual parts and the whole itself. The seed, for example, is both 
an individual functional part of the tree and expresses the entire species-specific design of its 
organism when it becomes a new tree (or rather expresses this species-being at every moment in 
                                                 
258 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft:372.  
 






its endless morphological development). The organization of the organic is marked both by its 
status as “organisiertes” (as vertically subordinated to the whole) as well as a “selbst 
organisierendes Wesen” (horizontally integrated and independently causal of all other parts and 
the whole). It is the singular nature of the organism that part and whole are always 
simultaneously both means and end. This, broadly understood, constitutes the concept of the 
organic; its influence, as Mensch observes, became such that “one cannot help but reach the 
conclusion that the latter half of the long eighteenth century is a period best defined by its 
organicism.”260  
When applied as a schema for the proper construction and functioning of society—and 
here organicism expresses its contemporary influence perhaps the most—the organic offers a 
counter-model to a political system in which individual parts, citizens, are treated as mere means 
to a heteronomous end (such as in the absolutist state or in the abstract legalism and rights-based 
model of French republicanism, both constituting central targets of Romantic critique).261 
Formulated as a political critique, the organic exposes the machine state, the false organization in 
which members of the polity are determined by an apparatus (be it monarchical, democratic, or 
otherwise) to be mere cogs, exploitable tool-organs in a machine neither of their own making nor 
                                                 
260 Mensch, 1. And not just the long eighteenth century; others have extended this claim to cover all modern 
philosophizing in general: Yuk Hui, for example, writes that “since the publication of Kant’s third Critique in 1790, 
the concept of the organic has been the new condition of philosophizing. It is a reopening of philosophy after the 
epoch of mechanism and is later developed in other directions: vitalism, organicism, systems theory, cybernetics, 
and organology, among others” (Yuk Hui, Recursivity and Contingency [London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019], 
2). For a summary discussion of Kant’s concept of the organism, see Engelstein, “The Allure of Wholeness: The 
Eighteenth-Century Organism and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate” Critical Inquiry, vol.29, no. 4 (2013), 756-757. 
 
261 In the Kritik der Urteilskraft Kant uses the organic as a political metaphor in what appears to be an allusion to the 
American Revolution: “So hat man sich bei einer neuerlich unternommenen gänzlichen Umbildung eines großen 
Volkes zu einem Staat des Worts Organisation häufig für Einrichtungen der Magistraturen usw. und selbst des 
ganzen Staatskörpers sehr schicklich bedient. Denn jedes Glied soll freilich in einem solchen Ganzen nicht bloß 
Mittel, sondern zugleich auch Zweck und, indem es zu der Möglichkeit des Ganzen mitwirkt, durch die Idee des 
Ganzen wiederum seiner Stelle und Funktion nach bestimmt sein” (Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft:376). It should be 
noted that it is precisely this sense of Glied in the above that will become essential to Ritter’s own version of a new 






ultimately of benefit to them, denying them their free teleological development in conjunction 
with the whole of their fellows. Relegated to such a position, the individual becomes the opposite 
of a “sich selbst organisierendes Wesen”; citizens in this artificial or indeed Hobbesian situation 
are emphatically not in a (free) state of nature, so to speak, and that is precisely the problem. 
For Manfred Frank, the Kantian concept of the organism, extrapolated and applied to the 
sociopolitical field as an organic-organizational model more broadly in this period, provides the 
positive framework of the Systemprogramm in its specificity. Frank argues that a politicized 
organicism enables the text’s “Kritik am Staat als Maschine”262 in the above sense, opening an 
avenue for future political speculation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well.263 For 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy as well: the “entire logic of the final development of the System-
Programme,” they write, “refers to the concept of the organism.”264 But I would argue that there 
is an alternative positive image of the higher physics envisioned in the Systemprogramm, 
namely: dynamism. While intricately bound to the trope of an organism around 1800, the 
dynamic model nevertheless represents a certain departure from, and extension of, the paradigm 
of the organic in its political expression. And as deployed in the Systemprogramm, this 
alternative visible in the dynamic appears to more fully express the text’s own conceptual 
movements and practical goals (insofar as it includes its implied organicist framework). It is 
precisely at the point when it arrives at an explicit discussion of new mythology that the 
                                                 
262 Frank, Der kommende Gott, 155. 
 
263 The political critique of the machine state, Frank writes of the Systemprogramm, “appelliert ja—ausgesprochen 
oder unausgesprochenerweise—an den Gegenbegriff des Organismus [...] Das ist eine Idee, die zu den 
wirkungsmächtigsten der Moderne gehört: sie half nicht nur die biologische Struktur organischer Lebewesen 
entdecken, sondern fungiert auch als Metapher im sozio-politischen Diskurs, seit der Romantik vor allem als 
Metapher für eine Staatsutopie gegenbürgerlicher Prägung, und bis hinein in die Schriften sowohl der Sozialisten 
wie der politischen Rechten” (Ibid.). 
 






introduction of the figure of the dynamic combines the various dispersed but interrelated gestures 
of the Systemprogramm, bringing its program to a culmination. 
Before focusing on this moment, it is worth noting that the closest relevant discourse on 
dynamic nature and natural science, as opposed to a mere antimechanist organicism, can be 
found in the concurrent development of Schelling’s early Naturphilosophie.265 Schelling 
elaborates his reflections on speculative natural science in terms that, rather than eliminating the 
concept of mechanism in favor of its antithesis in organicism, enfold both into a higher-order 
thinking of nature as a dynamic system. In the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1798), he 
provides a more detailed framework for this:  
Fassen wir [...] die Natur in Ein Ganzes zusammen, so stehen einander gegenüber 
Mechanismus, d.h. eine abwärts laufende Reihe von Ursachen und Wirkungen, und 
Zweckmäßigkeit, d.h. Unabhängigkeit vom Mechanismus, Gleichzeitigkeit von Ursachen 
und Wirkungen. Indem wir auch diese beiden Extreme noch vereinigen, entsteht in uns 
die Idee von einer Zweckmäßigkeit des Ganzen, die Natur wird eine Kreislinie, die in 
sich selbst zurückläuft, ein in sich selbst beschlossenes System ist.266 
                                                 
265 For a fuller discussion of Schelling’s early Naturphilosophie, and its specifically aesthetic aspects, see Trop, 
“The Aesthetics of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie” in Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 
(2015). Kant also provides an account of physical matter as dynamic in this same period. Kantian dynamics can be 
understood as a paradigmatic theory—as with his treatment of the organism—that helps establish the Romantic or 
naturephilosophical concept of dynamic physics that Schelling, and with him Schlegel and Ritter as well, develop 
much further, and far beyond the limits of transcendental critique. In the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der 
Naturwissenschaft (1786), Kant breaks with traditional atomistic physical theories by postulating movement or 
“bewegende Kraft” as the constitutive phenomenon of the natural world. For him, specific movements in space can 
be analyzed in terms of attractive (anziehend) or repulsive (zurücktreibend, zurückstoßend) forces that, taken 
together and in mutual relation, establish the dynamic concept of matter in its conditions of possibility: “Aus dieser 
ursprünglichen Anziehungskraft, als einer durchdringenden, von aller Materie, mithin in Proportion der Quantität 
derselben, ausgeübten, und auf alle Materie, in alle mögliche Weiten, ihre Wirkung erstreckenden Kraft, müßte nun, 
in Verbindung mit der ihr entgegenwirkenden, nämlich zurücktreibenden Kraft, die Einschränkung der letzteren, 
mithin die Möglichkeit eines in einem bestimmten Grade erfülleten Raumes, abgeleitet werden können, und so 
würde der dynamische Begriff der Materie, als des Beweglichen, das seinen Raum (in bestimmtem Grade) erfüllt, 
konstruiert werden” (Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft:517). Benjamin Specht notes that 
Schelling: “wie viele seiner Zeitgenossen in der Nachfolge von Kants Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der 
Naturwissenschaften versucht, einen stofflichen Natur- und Materienbegriff durch einen kräftedynamischen 
abzulösen, und in der Elektrizitäts- und Galvanismus- Forschung seiner Zeit einen empirischen Anhaltspunkt für 
sein spekulatives Vorgehen gefunden zu haben glaubt” (Specht, 26). 
 
266 Schelling, 339. The scientific disciplines that constitute naturephilosophy, at least for the Schelling of the Ideen, 
are hierarchically organized with dynamics first and foremost. In the first preface to the Ideen, Schelling provides its 
outline: “Der philosophische Theil dieser Schrift betrifft die Dynamik als Grundwissenschaft der Naturlehre, 







So while in further articulations of Schelling’s early naturephilosophical system, he can still say 
“Philosophiren über die Natur heißt, sie aus dem todten Mechanismus, worin sie befangen 
erscheint, herausheben, sie mit Freiheit gleichsam beleben, und in eigne freie Entwicklung 
versetzen,”267 Schelling’s speculative or higher physics constitutes neither a strict antimechanism 
nor an exclusive organicism. It is, rather, an investigation into nature as an “in sich selbst 
beschlossenes System” whose cycle of phase changes (“Kreislinie”) continually passes through 
various mechanical and organic forms of being. Nature becomes intelligible only by postulating 
an autopoietic development or “freie Entwicklung” that at times appears to operate mechanically 
(in which only one-sided cause and effect relations can be said to obtain) and at other times 
organically (where natural products appear as the result of a mutual reciprocability of cause and 
effect relations).268 Everything is then again connected and unified at the cosmic level of 
dynamic force relations, from whose perspective there is no rigid opposition between machine 
(Mechanismus) and organism (Zweckmäßigkeit): both are connected in a circuit of becoming. 
 Such a concept of nature as an energetic system of transformation—drawing on the 
naturephilosophical insight into the systematic unity of nature through dynamic forces, but also 
expanding the Kantian discourse of organicism—supplies the more comprehensive framework 
for the Systemprogramm’s political claims. When the text finally thematizes new mythology 
directly, it provides a symbolic instantiation of just this kind of dynamic relationality, one whose 
                                                 
Naturlehre oder sogenannten Physiologie umfassen” (Ibid., 311). 
  
267 Ibid., 662. 
 
268 See also Schelling’s comments in Weltseele that the “Gegensatz zwischen Mechanismus und Organismus, der die 
Fortschritte der Naturwissenschaften lange genug aufgehalten hat” is to be eliminated in the new 
naturephilosophical science of the “Idee der Natur als eines Ganzen” (Ibid., 512). Also Novalis: “up to now our 
thinking was either purely mechanical—discursive—atomistic—or purely intuitive—dynamic. Perhaps now the time 
for union has come?” (cited in Margaret Mahony Stoljar, Novalis Philosophical Writings [Albany: State University 






gesture everywhere demands a “vereinigen” of “Extremen” such that a new system of social 
relationality—a sociopolitical dynamic—could arise (and it is also here that Schlegel’s 
concluding definition of new mythology in the Rede comes closest to the Systemprogramm). 
This unification of extremes can again be understood as a metaphoric, but also material play of 
attractive or centripetal force applied to what was formerly antipodal, opposite, or mutually 
repulsive. Mythologization, we can now say more specifically with reference to the 
Systemprogramm, involves a becoming-energetic—or indeed a becoming-magnetic, whereby the 
movement of opposites is to be brought together in an Indifferenzpunkt—of the dominant modes 
of being and different social classes forming life under modern conditions: 
wir müssen eine neue Mythologie haben, diese Mythologie aber muß im Dienste der 
Ideen stehen, sie muß eine Mythologie der Vernunft werden. Ehe wir die Ideen 
ästhetisch, d. h. mythologisch machen, haben sie für das Volk kein Interesse; und 
umgekehrt, ehe die Mythologie vernünftig ist, muß sich der Philosoph ihrer schämen. So 
müssen endlich Aufgeklärte und Unaufgeklärte sich die Hand reichen, die Mythologie 
muß philosophisch werden und das Volk vernünftig, und die Philosophie muß 
mythologisch werden, um die Philosophen sinnlich zu machen.269 
 
The term Mythologie serves to expand the cause of the popular Volk to an identification with the 
elite Philosoph, collapsing the domain of the sinnlich and aesthetic into that of the vernünftig and 
rational. Philosophy, the Systemprogramm insists, must become mythopoetic, that is, the idea of 
reason must draw on the aesthetic power of popular origin-narratives to make itself effective, 
legitimate to the sensuous lifeworld of the masses. It must, in a word, become a “sinnliche 
Religion”; it must un-enlighten or mythologize itself. But by the same token, the 
Systemprogramm stipulates here that any modern mythology must remain true to the 
enlightenment of the Idee, to the ideal of a theoretically-grounded freedom. In a kind of 
collective Aufklärungsarbeit, the unenlightened masses find reason only insofar as they 







recognize the affective-sensible image of their absolute freedom and creativity in philosophically 
rigorous form. While mythology entails the affirmation of popular cultural sensibility, it does so 
only by way of dissolving the theoretical elite of modern society (the intelligentsia or avant-
garde of reason that both directs and participates in the development of modern society) into the 
body of the popular-egalitarian demos. This is why new mythology must become a “Mythologie 
der Vernunft” as much as a sensuous religion.270 
 Here the terms Mythologie and mythologisch designate a markedly egalitarian 
realignment of the operative regimes of modernity in accord with the Systemprogramm’s 
normative aims, with its recognition of the “exigency of a sociality grounded in freedom.”271 In 
the above citation mythologisch modulates these regimes (ästhetisch-sinnlich versus vernünftig-
philosophisch, Volk-Unaufgeklärte versus Philosoph-Aufgeklärte) in a future relationship of 
mutual dynamic contact, pushing them to invert and combine their identities: a reciprocal 
“handshake” of opposing social segments, and a self-reinforcing system of relations in which 
antithetical groups (and ideas) are rendered permeable to each other, and thus opened up to 
expanded forms of productive freedom.  
 At least on the evidence of this concluding passage in the Systemprogramm, the model of 
the organism cannot be said to entirely capture the characteristic energy, or more exactly the 
                                                 
270 Ibid. 
 
271 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 34. The authors of The Literary Absolute largely sidestep a discussion of the 
political nature of Romanticism in general, and also here in their treatment of the postkantian context of the 
Systemprogramm in particular. In making some of their strongest claims, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy carefully 
avoid the political: “All of this,” they refer to the general aims of the Systemprogramm, “in which the essential 
elements of the metaphysics of German idealism (politics aside) is sketched out, constitutes by right and in fact the 
impassable horizon of romanticism” (Ibid., 34). A major impetus to this dissertation as a whole is to fill in some of 
the political questions left open in these authors’ account of Frühromantik as the originary avant-garde movement. 








force dynamic, with which new mythology envisions the future society. To be sure, this call to 
democratize or popularize philosophy272—and with it the cultural-political elite whose control is 
in no small part grounded in their status as enlightened—indeed does subvert the dominant 
hierarchy by insisting it become organic. It seeks to restore what the modern apparatus of 
government has since perverted: the original, social organism given in the state of nature in 
which no one part-citizen is entirely subordinated to any other or to the whole. Hierarchy and 
control are figured here mechanistically insofar as the Volk is assumed to have always 
represented the instrumentalized means and never the end of political (or philosophical) life, 
remaining always a tool in a machine state to be exploited and never the final telos of a sovereign 
organic polity. As such, the new mythological political imaginary does indeed draw on the 
conceptual and semantic resources of organicism. But this is a vision of a political organization 
that does not just prescribe an utopian relation between means and ends, part and whole, 
individual organ and total organism. The text also dictates a constant dynamic movement and 
intercompatibility between oppositional poles: the masses are attracted to and connect with the 
elite, and vice versa, to the point of indistinguishability, identity, or indifference, each drawing 
relative power from the opposed presence of the other. This movement, which expresses both a 
kind of attractive and repulsive force—whereby what is divided is brought back together, and 
what is entrenched in itself begins to transgress its own boundaries—is precisely that force that 
needs to be fostered in contemporary society. But it will also lead to the messianic or 
synthesizing last work of humanity as it discovers the dynamic potentials of nature and itself. It 
                                                 
272 See Daniel Whistler, “Schelling’s Politics of Sympathy: Reflections on Clara and Related Texts.” International 






includes the organism as a privileged structure of this epochal development, but not exhaustively 
so. 
2.3 Dynamic Poesie 
 New mythology’s call on the modern world to take on a dynamic form in its self-
organization is developed further in Schlegel’s discussion of a mythological view of nature. But 
Schlegel, for his part, also expands the aesthetic—and ultimately cosmic—dimension of higher 
physics to a greater extent than the Systemprogramm, bringing us closer to the framework that 
informs Ritter’s reflections on dynamic Naturpolitik as well. 
 Schlegel’s Gespräch über die Poesie, and the Rede über die Mythologie in particular, is 
suffused with the images and characteristic operations of thought of contemporary physics 
around 1800.273 In general, the dialogue proceeds by locating points of metaphorical and 
physical indifferentiation and contact—figures of Indifferenz, and to a greater extent Berührung, 
arise frequently at crucial moments. The Rede offers a version of Romantic literary practice 
(pursued through reflections on a new theory of poetry and the novel) that in no small part 
depends on a dynamic formulation of nature and natural science. Metaphorically transcribing 
dynamic force phenomena onto social, aesthetic, and historical contexts (just as we saw with the 
Systemprogramm’s politicization of the mechanics-organics-dynamics assemblage), Schlegel’s 
text summits in the image of the “konzentrierteste Zusammendrängung aller Kraft der Poesie” in 
its concluding section.274 Schlegel’s claim elsewhere during this period that “Dynamik ist die 
                                                 
273 One year before, in one of his 1799 Athenäum fragment collections (Ideen), Schlegel outlines a number of major 
positions that, as we will see in more detail below, would find further articulation in the Gespräch (and that also 
echo Schelling’s concurrent work on naturephilosophy): “Die Natur ist organisch, und die höchste Schönheit daher 
ewig und immer vegetabilisch” (Schlegel, Fragmente der Frühromantik, 90); “Günstiges Zeichen, daß ein Physiker 
sogar—der tiefsinnige [Franz] Baader—aus der Mitte der Physik sich erhoben hat, die Poesie zu ahnden, die 
Elemente als organische Individuen zu verehren, und auf das Göttliche im Zentrum der Materie zu deuten!” (Ibid., 
91); “Willst du ins Innere der Physik dringen, so laß dich einweihen in die Mysterien der Poesie” (Ibid.). 
 






Größenlehre der Energie” finds its fuller elaboration in the Gespräch in what can be called a 
Romantic poetics of energy, or more specifically, a Poesie whose central figure is a kind of 
aestheticized and socially-effective magnetism.275 
 Addressing his friends directly after the last speech on Goethe’s style, and thus at a 
moment of reflection for the interlocutors and the Gespräch as a whole, Antonio276 provides a 
kind of general summary of the dialogue in the proprietary language of the contemporary 
physical and life sciences: 
Wenn Sie in dieser Weise fortfahren, das positive und das negative Ende der gesamten 
Dichtkunst, wie es wohl in physikalischen Versuchen geschieht, in Berührung zu 
bringen; so wird es nicht an einer vortrefflichen Indifferenz fehlen, für Ihre sogenannte 
neue Schule; denn was andres als eine wunderlich gemischte Indifferenz von allen 
möglichen und unmöglichen Kunstversuchen kann wohl entstehen, wenn der einmal 
allseitig erregte Bildungstrieb ohne Unterlaß nach allen Extremen, in leichter Poesie 
abwechselnd hinüberspielt?277  
 
Here at the very end of the Gespräch, the path forward for the Romantic program (“Ihre 
sogenannte neue Schule”) is to push the formative or organic drive (“Bildungstrieb”) towards the 
extreme poles of its scope (“das positive und das negative Ende der gesamten Dichtkunst”), 
dramatizing the oscillation between the sheer drive-character of the human and its mediated 
image in aesthetic experience (“leichter Poesie.”) In doing so, the literary movement would be 
                                                 
 
275 Ibid., 82. In this fragment, Schlegel provides a typically syncretic definition of dynamics. Beginning with the 
standard physical understanding of the term as a calculation of energetic force (prepared in Kant and Schelling’s 
philosophies of science), he immediately broadens the field of its application to astronomy, mathematics, history, 
Romantic Witz, and spiritual or religious inspiration: “Dynamik ist die Größenlehre der Energie, welche in der 
Astronomie auf die Organisation des Universums angewandt wird. Insofern könnte man beide eine historische 
Mathematik nennen. Die Algebra erfordert am meisten Witz und Enthusiasmus, nämlich mathematischen.” 
According to Beiser, Poesie in its fullest Romantic formulation (given precisely in the Gespräch) consists in its 
ability to reach across disparate realms of being and knowledge, thereby expanding beyond the merely aesthetic or 
literary to include, among others fields, nature, Naturphilosophie, and the discourse of dynamism. (Beiser, Romantic 
Imperative, 14). 
 
276 Antonio’s figure in the Gespräch is often identified with Friedrich Schleiermacher (see Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy, 89). 
 






able to synthesize such various experiments—its “physikalischen Versuchen”—in poetic 
mediation, the point of indifferentiation continuously reproduced in Romantic practice. The 
organic and dynamic, the aesthetic and material, Bildung and magnetic polarity, in short: nature 
and culture as such in their real interconnected configuration, are all figured as mutual 
components aligned in the same experimental poiesis, the same evolving body of knowledge and 
practice that Romanticism—as Schlegelian new mythology—is supposed to become.  
As mentioned at the outset of the chapter, the Rede also begins with a discussion of force 
and power that shifts between natural/material and human/social registers, using the one to 
expand the functional potentials of the other, gaining focus for the new mythological aspiration. 
Here Schlegel proceeds from the same initial assumption as the Systemprogramm, but also 
departs from that text when he reformulates the absolutely free creativity of the human as a 
problem of the isolation of the individual subject under modern conditions of life. So while in the 
Systemprogramm the absolute subject is responsible for the “einzig wahre und gedenkbare 
Schöpfung aus Nichts,” for Schlegel this same insight is affirmed but taken as a lamentable 
condition of the lonely poet. Ludoviko, who gives the speech on mythology, addresses the 
audience of friends with an opening question, and again we find the semantics of energy and 
power organizing the poetic act, and the poet’s imperative: “Soll die Kraft der Begeisterung auch 
in der Poesie sich immerfort einzeln versplittern […] Soll das höchste Heilige immer namenlos 
und formlos bleiben, im Dunkel dem Zufall überlassen?”278 Ludoviko continues: 
Ihr vor allen müßt wissen, was ich meine. Ihr habt selbst gedichtet, und Ihr müßt es oft im 
Dichten gefühlt haben, daß es Euch an einem festen Halt für Euer Wirken gebrach, an 
einem mütterlichen Boden, einem Himmel, einer lebendigen Luft. Aus dem Innern 
                                                 
278 The figure of Ludoviko has also been read as a stand-in for a member of the early Romantic circle, namely: as 
Schelling. For the present discussion, such identification—which need not necessarily be taken into account—only 
serves to bring the intertextual encounter between the Systemprogramm and Rede even closer (see Lacoue-Labarthe 







herausarbeiten das alles muß der moderne Dichter, und viele haben es herrlich getan, 
aber bis jetzt nur jeder allein, jedes Werk wie eine neue Schöpfung von vorn an aus 
Nichts.279 
 
The modern poet, like the absolute subject of the Systemprogramm, is capable of bringing forth 
new creation out of nothing (“eine neue Schöpfung von vorn an aus Nichts”), but at least up to 
the present such poetic world generators have been relegated to solitude.280 They lack a “fester 
Halt” that elevates their isolated activity or efficacy to a collective “Wirken.” They are unable to 
contribute to the basis of coming social emancipation and productivity, not only because the 
progression of modern life everywhere preempts this universal cultural shift, but also because 
poets have not yet been intense enough, the requisite enthusiasm (Kraft der Begeisterung) has 
not coalesced, to speak with Rancière, in a fully articulated modern regime of the aesthetic: 
Es fehlt, behaupte ich, unsrer Poesie an einem Mittelpunkt, wie es die Mythologie281 für 
die der Alten war, und alles Wesentliche, worin die moderne Dichtkunst der antiken 
nachsteht, läßt sich in die Worte zusammenfassen: Wir haben keine Mythologie.282 
 
Again the essential issue is that modernity and its characteristic “moderne Dichtkunst” possess 
no mythology like the ancients did, nothing that could bind individuals into a whole, linking 
together a homogenous social and narrative body through a shared set of beliefs and practices. 
This, then, is the initial problematic of the Rede, shared with the Systemprogramm but 
                                                 
279 Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie, 312. My emphasis. 
 
280 Schelling will also recognize this problem. In his System des transzendentalen Idealismus, published in the same 
year as the Gespräch (1800), he questions how “eine neue Mythologie, welche nicht Erfindung des einzelnen 
Dichters, sondern eines neuen, nur einen Dichter gleichkam vorstellenden Geschlechts sein kann, selbst entstehen 
könne, dies ist ein Problem, dessen Auflösung allein von den künftigen Schicksalen der Welt und dem weiteren 
Verlauf der Geschichte zu erwarten ist” (Schelling, 1030). Of note here is that Klingemann’s Nachtwachen also 
begins with precisely this problematic of the isolated modern poet.  
 
281 In the second version of the Gespräch, here “Mythologie” is changed to “fest bestehenden Symbolik der Natur 
und der Kunst” (Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie, 313). We will return to the significance of the second edition 
1822 expansion of the Rede in more detail below. 
 






formulated in a more fleshed-out and engaged poetics. An original, modern, and as Schlegel 
stresses, a completely artificial mythology remains to be produced that would impact not only 
literature and aesthetic discourse but also wider society, the modern Zeitgeist as a totality, whose 
voice the modern (Romantic) poet aspires to be. The Rede sets itself the task of identifying such 
a center point, the Archimedean (or Indifferenz) point that makes possible the only chance for a 
truly utopian development of the future.283 New mythology, for Schlegel, will have to seize on 
whatever material—including but not limited to imaginative aesthetic experience—that offers an 
index (or “Äußerungsart”) of the cosmic centripetal movement, the “Phänomene aller 
Phänomene, daß die Menschheit aus allen Kräften ringt, ihr Zentrum zu finden.”284  
 Elaborating on the conditions of possibility, but also on the potential content of new 
mythology as a Centrierung (Ritter’s term for the same), unfolds throughout the rest of the Rede. 
The text provides a kind of survey of the various philosophical, literary, scientific, and also 
political expressions that indicate the emergence of an orienting “Zentrum” for modernity. Not 
the least of these will be the science of dynamic forces, the physics of electricity and magnetism 
whose metaphorics already organize the rhetorical register of the Rede. New mythology, even in 
its most aestheticized form, will find its inspiration above all in the material of contemporary 
physics. Physics gives evidence of the emancipatory element at the center of both nature and 
humanity, or rather, Romantic science so understood will not only lead to scientific 
                                                 
283 Of course, Schlegel leaves the realization of new mythological utopia entirely open and speculative, a matter of 
“Möglichkeit,” “Vermutungen,” and “Vorschläge zu Versuchen”: “Ich bitte Euch, nur dem Unglauben an die 
Möglichkeit einer neuen Mythologie nicht Raum zu geben. Die Zweifel von allen Seiten und nach allen Richtungen 
sollen mir willkommen sein, damit die Untersuchung desto freier und reicher werde. Und nun schenkt meinen 
Vermutungen ein aufmerksames Gehör! Mehr als Vermutungen kann ich Euch nach der Lage der Sache nicht geben 
wollen. Aber ich hoffe, diese Vermutungen sollen durch euch selbst zu Wahrheiten werden. Denn es sind, wenn Ihr 
sie dazu machen wollt, gewissermaßen Vorschläge zu Versuchen” (Gespräch über die Poesie, 313). 
 






breakthroughs, it will just as much postulate itself as providing modern life what it sorely lacks: 
its own singular mythological poetics. 
But before reaching this point in the Rede, Schlegel identifies idealism as a potential 
candidate for the mythologization of the modern age—as the movement towards an alternative 
center point, or the central possibility for modernity to change its course—if only to claim that 
idealism must also be mythologized. And here again the Systemprogramm’s metaphysical 
assumptions can be understood as a background to Schlegel’s notion of the idealist system of 
thought and its possible relations to the project of new mythology (as will become evident, the 
later additions to the 1822 version will shift this understanding to a certain extent). At first, 
idealism provides a model for what Schlegel wants new mythology to constitute, or rather, the 
origin of idealist thinking stands as a model for how the new mythology—the expansion of 
human creative power or Kraft as a process of mythologization—will eventually find its own 
foundational orientation.  
Idealism, Schlegel writes, appears “gleichsam wie aus Nichts entstanden, und es ist nun 
auch in der Geisterwelt ein fester Punkt konstituiert, von wo aus die Kraft des Menschen sich 
nach allen Seiten mit steigender Entwicklung ausbreiten kann, sicher sich selbst und die 
Rückkehr nie zu verlieren.”285 But even this philosophical development, a “sehr bedeutender 
Wink und eine merkwürdige Bestätigung,”286 a signal that modernity is on the cusp of profound 
change, can only become effective when the idealist system of thought is itself reformulated, 
transcended, or rather, mythologized. The poet is isolated, Schlegel claims, but this situation is 
also characteristic of the status of all modern knowledge practices, including the latest 










philosophical paradigm of transcendental idealism, precisely the philosophical context with 
which early Romantic poetics entangles itself. The thought, or more exactly the divination that 
“Alle Wissenschaften und alle Künste wird die große Revolution ergreifen,”287 only arises 
against a backdrop of disciplinary isolation, where the messianic event alone, the inaugural end 
of the process of mythologization, could bring the different sciences and arts—philosophers and 
poets—into magnetic contact, reciprocal and indifferentiated in their common dedication to the 
new mythological revolution. Idealism must therefore be liberated from its disciplinary isolation 
as well. 
In what Schlegel takes to be an evident historic shift towards a more global or 
synthesized disciplinary field,288 Poesie must indeed draw on idealism, but in turn, the idealist 
system must transcend and bind itself to its opposite to become a hybrid of idealism and realism, 
or a boundless realism (“grenzenloser Realismus”).289 Idealism, in other words, is to connect 
with naturephilosophical physics or the dynamic recognition (“dynamische Erkenntnis”) that 
attends to natural reality. This is an insight that poets, or poet-physicists and Romantic scientists, 
                                                 
287 Ibid. 
 
288 One could think here also of Novalis’ concurrent project in the Brouillon. As already discussed in Chapter 1, 
under the rubric of Encyclopädistik, Novalis explores the possibility of a pan-disciplinary science—a grand unified 
theory—in more more detail than Schlegel at the time, although Schlegel will return to this project more intensely in 
his last phase of work in the 1820s (discussed in Chapter 4). 
 
289 Ibid., 315. This notion of realism does not refer to a poetics of mimetic reproduction, as in a schematic formula 
for a literary or naturalist realism. Although such an ideal of literary writing is indeed understood as one aspect of 
the new mythological task: by 1822, Schlegel, as we will see below, speaks of a nature poet (Naturdichter) in just 
this sense, if only to immediately plug this poetic agent into a reciprocal relationship with the naturephilosophical 
scientist (Naturwissenschaftler). Rather, Schlegel’s notion of realism constitutes a metaphysical doctrine, one that 
follows the general tendency of contemporary Naturphilosophie to reassert a world (nature) that is not dependent on, 
nor produced by, the human mind. The real exists immanently, as the material environment, and precisely for this 
reason its alterity has the highest potential to alter human life and make it effective in new ways—provided realism 
is used to inject intellectual-spiritual existence with the ontological otherness of nature. On this sense of the 
materialist/realist impulse at the center of Naturphilosophie, see Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after 
Schelling (London: Continuum, 2006) and his critique of the essential “ethicization” at the heart of the Kantian 






are uniquely situated to explore. For Schlegel this entails that both model approaches—the 
idealist Fichtean in provenance, the realist Spinozan—be reconceived together as merely partial 
instances of a higher-order system of thought, namely: as a new mythology based on dynamic 
physics: 
Idealismus in jeder Form muß auf ein oder die andre Art aus sich herausgehn, um in sich 
zurückkehren zu können, und zu bleiben was er ist. Deswegen muß und wird sich aus 
seinem Schoß ein neuer ebenso grenzenloser Realismus erheben; und der Idealismus also 
nicht bloß in seiner Entstehungsart ein Beispiel für die neue Mythologie, sondern selbst 
auf indirekte Art Quelle derselben werden. Die Spuren einer ähnlichen Tendenz könnt ihr 
schon jetzt fast überall wahrnehmen; besonders in der Physik, der es an nichts mehr zu 
fehlen scheint, als an einer mythologischen Ansicht der Natur.290 
 
Idealism no longer limits itself in relation to material nature, but rather is elevated (erhoben) to a 
boundless realism. When it leaves or alienates itself in order to return changed but still faithful to 
its origins (“auf ein oder die andre Art aus sich herausgehn, um in sich zurückkehren zu können, 
und zu bleiben was er ist”)—when, put differently, idealism is pushed into a kind of recursive 
system of constant conceptual revolution—it will not just offer an example for new mythology to 
imitate its unique “Enstehungsart.” Idealism will be an organ or tool of new mythology. As such, 
it provides a source, albeit an indirect one (“auf indirekte Art Quelle derselben werden”), for 
mythologization. The success of contemporary philosophy itself, Schlegel suggests, is 
necessarily a matter of constant dynamic movement, something that contemporary physics 
already describes in great detail. It must only be recognized as such, and then it can be 
instrumentalized for the future.291 
                                                 
290 Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie, 315. My emphasis. 
 
291 Referring to the predominant model of the biological organism in Romantic discourse, Weatherby notes that the 
“Romantics were certainly interested in the life sciences, but they wanted more than a model from them […] their 
thinking—or at least that of Novalis—was not driven by models but by the problem of function” (Weatherby, 
Transplanting the Metaphysical Organ, 207). In the new mythological texts in question here, however, it becomes 
clear that what is at stake in the romanticization of the contemporary natural and life sciences (which Novalis also 
pursues) is precisely a kind of model for a rejuvenated human function: a specific kind of knowledge practice 






Physics, in Schlegel’s view, follows this formula for change as well. As described above, 
physics currently offers itself as a source and model for new mythology for similar reasons as 
idealism, albeit through an opposite or reversed process. It can take on the role of reorienting 
modern consciousness if its insights into natural phenomena become mythologizable—above all 
its insights into a dynamic natura naturans, i.e., into the contemporary discoveries of 
naturephilosophical physics that provide evidence of a unified, immanent field of energetic 
(electrical, magnetic, galvanic, etc.) forces. This physics lacks nothing other than the final push 
towards a mythological view of nature to make it maximally transformative. While idealist 
philosophy, on the one hand, has remained too ideal, so to speak, and must be made materialist-
realist without abandoning its original intention of conceptualizing freedom, on the other hand, 
the natural sciences have for their part been too empirical (just as in the Systemprogramm where 
“jetzige Physik” appears limited by its particular experimental methods). Everything that is rigid 
in the natural sciences, as in philosophical systems, requires immediate mythologization. 
Schlegel provides a coda on dynamic physics in precisely this sense before the conclusion of the 
Rede: here physics is described not merely a particular field of natural-scientific explication, but 
a revelation of nature with profoundly spiritual consequences: “Ich kann nicht schließen, ohne 
noch einmal zum Studium der Physik aufzufodern, aus deren dynamischen Paradoxien jetzt die 
heiligsten Offenbarungen der Natur von allen Seiten ausbrechen.”292  
But this focus on dynamic physics, both after the close of Ludoviko’s speech among the 
symposium of friends, and in the corrections and expansions Schlegel added to the so-called 
zweite Fassung of the text (beginning in 1822), continues in greater detail in the Rede and 
                                                 
indifferentiation), that can then be recognized and reapplied in a number of other non-scientific contexts (such as in 
politics). 
 






elsewhere in the Gespräch. In many ways it is these more marginal moments—and the parallax, 
so to speak, that emerges between the first and second versions—that articulate the tightest 
connection between Poesie and the mythological view of dynamic nature. For example, in the 
last passage above the phrase: “besonders in der Physik, der es an nichts mehr zu fehlen scheint, 
als an einer mythologischen Ansicht der Natur” is later replaced and expanded upon in 1822 
with: “besonders in der Naturphilosophie, deren mannichfaltige Wege und Abwege uns bald den 
Schlüssel und den Übergang zu jeder […] neuen mythologischen Ansicht der Natur, darbieten 
werden.”293 Even while physics is deleted as a term, the naturephilosophical perspective, which 
encompasses physical dynamics, emerges more openly. But a number of further significant 
changes between the 1800 and 1822 versions should also be emphasized in this context. 
Together, they gradually concentrate Schlegel’s imbricated notion of Mythologie/Poesie/Physik 
as providing a symbol-world of nature or a natural poetics (and this with political implications as 
well). Arising first as an extension of the original Rede’s discussion of idealism as a boundless 
realism, also a “wildesten und wütendsten” realism, and then in the subsequent reflections on the 
German nation (to be explored in more detail presently), the final representative change in 
Schlegel’s 1822 edition—and the most open-ended or speculative one—is not even contained in 
the Rede proper, but unfolds in the dialogue that follows it. We will examine a number of these 
moments in the remainder of this section. 
Regarding the first moment, which again takes up the discussion of an updated 
idealism/realism: the first lengthy addition in the 1822 Rede revisits the possible future synthesis 
                                                 
293 In the second version of the Gespräch, Schlegel variously translates Physik as “Naturwissenschaft” and 
“Naturphilosophie.” Poesie becomes at times “symbolische Sage und Dichtung,” and “lebendige 
Naturoffenbarung,” while Mythologie often appears as a “fest bestehende Symbolik der Natur und der Kunst,” 







of the ideal and real, and, unsurprisingly, reasserts the need for a kind of joint position between 
them.294 In this second version, however, Poesie, “die ja auf der Harmonie des Ideellen und 
Reellen beruhen soll,” now finds its direct source (it is, in other words, no longer only “auf 
indirekte Art Quelle”) in a scientific imaginary of nature: “in jener wissenschaftlichen Fantasie 
nämlich, welche der bloß dichterischen noch vorangeht und selbst nichts andres ist, als das 
Vermögen der Naturanschauung.”295 In reference to the 1800 text, Weatherby notes that the 
“coming poetry that will found the New Mythology inherits the philosophical problem of 
Idealism and forges a bilateral unity with science.”296 But after two decades, Schlegel’s sustained 
critique of contemporary philosophy, and above all his critique of idealism, has significantly 
eroded his confidence in what he understands as the dangerous abstractions that systematize the 
ideal ego. A totalizing and monistic formulation of nature, simply put, has since become more 
important. 
While admitting its undoubtedly powerful form of revolutionary energy, Schlegel often 
has occasion to note throughout the 1820s that the “Ultradenken” of absolute identity, freedom, 
and spirit (including transcendental idealism), actually only overcodes and obscures—when not 
perverts—the true “Gottes-Revolution” whose approach is assured from the standpoint of 
religious faith in the apocalypse.297 Thus for the Schlegel of 1822, re-editing his collective 
                                                 
294 Schlegel’s coordination with Schelling’s naturephilosophical project in this same period should be apparent, most 
especially regarding the latter’s call for a so-called Real-Idealismus. On Schelling’s articulation of a hybrid realism-
idealism, see Sebastian Gardner, “Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in light of Kant’s third Critique and Schelling’s 
Real-Idealismus.” Continental Philosophy Review, no. 50 (2017), 14-16. 
 
295 Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie, 316. 
 
296 Leif Weatherby, “A Reconsideration of the Romantic Fragment.” The Germanic Review, no. 92, vol. 4 (2017), 
411. 
 






works—long since the advocate of positive Lebensphilosophie and spiritist Religionspolitik298—
the imaginative or mythological view of nature as a kind of “wissenschaftliche Fantasie” now 
unifies Poesie largely on its own, without the support of idealism, and indeed without any 
overtly philosophical system at all. It is only science and fantasy, or the confused manner in 
which each interacts with and expands the other at the site of the natural body and body politic, 
that Schlegel emphasizes. Idealism is no longer a primary concern, or rather, only the self-
overcoming of idealism remains constant in this shift in Schlegel’s development. This later 
emphasis on scientific fantasy, or on the cognitive stimulus of engaging with material nature (the 
“Vermögen der Naturanschauung), sees natural scientific imagination as the true material of new 
mythology, as opposed to idealism in its present forms. This shift towards a more dedicated 
speculative realism of nature succinctly reflects Schlegel’s transition from his early to late 
systems of thought.299  
                                                 
298 See Chapter 4. 
 
299 This transition is addressed in detail in Chapter 4. It can generally be thought as a transference of initially 
aesthetic-revolutionary commitments (as representative, for example, in the phase of the Athenäum, in which the 
confrontation above all with Fichtean idealism is central) into a religious eschatology with an explicitly 
physiological framework (in Schlegel’s last phase in Vienna, in which the idealist system has long since been 
subjected to a sustained and sweeping critique). Within the Rede itself, this shift in the development of Schlegel’s 
thought—i.e., the shift between the 1800 and 1822 versions in question here—is most evident in the appearance of a 
discussion of spiritualism in the later version: “Wenn uns daher unser naturphilosophischer Freund, den Realismus 
von der dichterischen Seite gezeigt hat, und als Grundlage der Fantasie und Quelle einer neuen tieferen Naturpoesie 
darstellen wollte; so wäre zu wünschen gewesen, und bliebe noch übrig, nur einen Schritt weiter zu gehen und uns 
zum Spiritualismus zu erheben [...] Der Spiritualismus aber ist die Lehre von der dreifachen Grundkraft des 
göttlichen und des menschlichen Daseins, oder von dem vereinigten Wirken und Leben des Geistes und der Seele in 
Gott und seinem ewigen Worte (Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie, 360, my emphasis). The desired realism is now 
elevated one conceptual and practical order higher, appearing as a kind of Naturkunde, as Schlegel puts it, of spiritist 
(and spiritual) phenomena. Hans Eichner comments on the differences between the first and second versions: “Die 
Zweitfassung des »Gesprächs über die Poesie« ist […] weniger einheitlich als die Fassung von 1800. Aber auch 
diese zweite Fassung hat ihren eigentümlichen Wert und Reiz. Erst sie ist ein wirkliches Gespräch in der vollen 
Bedeutung des Wortes—ein Gespräch des katholischen Spätromantikers der Zwanzigerjahre mit dem jugendlichen 
Rebellen von 1800” (Hans Eichner, “Nachwort” in Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie, 24). The full implications of 







A crucial fragment from Schlegel’s 1815 notebooks tracks the emergence of this change 
and offers a kind of median from which to approach the two different versions of the Rede. Here 
Schlegel speculates on prayer in the same terms in which he formulated divination (Divinieren) 
as an empowerment of thought fifteen years earlier. In this 1815 fragment (which also deserves 
note because it touches on the main philosopheme of Ritter’s late works) Schlegel writes: 
Heißt Beten nicht in dem wahren, dem reinsten und höchsten Sinne energisch denken? 
Sollte es nicht möglich seyn, unser geistiges Wollen und inneres Denken eben so 
innerlich und geistig zu bekräftigen, wie man durch Magnetismus die Nerven stärken 
kann?—Philosophieren heißt dynamisch denken—jenes energische Denken ist aber 
offenbar etwas viel höheres und wird ohne Zweifel erfordert, um das dynamische Denken 
oder die Philosophie vor der Verirrung zu bewahren und auf ihr rechtes Ziel zu lenken 
und zu leiten.300  
 
The speculative naturephilosophical standpoint evident in the first version of the Rede has 
obviously intensified over the years. By this point, divination, or now prayer (“Beten”), no longer 
grants access to an essentially aesthetic capacity as Schlegel held in the original version, but 
rather communicates with the natural dynamic itself, the cosmic system of material force-
movements, such as magnetism, that the human participates in and draws on in its self-appointed 
task of collective transfiguration (in Novalis’ sense). But this later vision of a religious 
naturephilosophy, a “dynamisch Denken” dedicated to “etwas viel höheres,” is just as much in 
danger of losing itself: it must protect itself so as to not lose sight of its proper goal (“rechtes 
Ziel”). 
In the 1822 Rede, such a “Verirrung” is found precisely in the inevitable failure of 
idealism. More exactly, the threat of confusion that constantly accompanies humanity’s 
messianic development is to be dispersed in a paradigm-shift idealism will or must go through, 
leading to the necessary higher-order dynamic system of thought for the modern society of the 
                                                 






future. But at least for the present, it has succumbed to an illusion made of its own ambitions. 
Idealism’s desire to define the highest instance of subjective world-generation has since revealed 
itself as a fallacy and “Irrtum” for the later Schlegel:  
Ich sehe also für jetzt nicht darauf, daß der Idealist, wie ein neuer Prometheus, die Kraft 
des Göttlichen allein in sein eignes Ich legen will; da dieser titanische Übermut und 
Irrtum unter schwachsinnigen Sterblichen überdem nicht weit um sich greifen kann, und 
von selbst seinen Gegensatz hervorrufen muß.301 
 
He goes on to claim that the overweening confidence that idealism invests in the subject—and 
here the image of a mankind-subject or Prometheus from the Systemprogramm arises again, but 
now with an explicitly hubristic connotation—will be recognized as such in the coming 
“Wiedergeburt” of new mythology. This occurs only when idealism turns itself into its opposite 
(“Gegensatz”) in order to rediscover reality, when its inward orientation becomes reflexive with 
the exterior natural environment.  
Idealism, in other words, is to be set into motion, moved beyond the foundational 
positions that self-limit its access to the real of nature, to natural reality. What arises through this 
corrective, in short, will be the aforementioned boundless realism, although Schlegel—similar 
again to the initial gesture of the Systemprogramm—defers to the future a new mythology ready-
to-hand in such an updated philosophical-scientific theory. What idealism needs is an 
iconoclastic supplement of a different system, which, as noted above, is simply the Vermögen 
der Naturanschauung. Nature itself, or rather the human’s capacity to intuit, imagine, and 
scientifically explicate the reality of nature (and not merely, as with the idealist, to only explicate 
the capacities of the human subject in contradistinction to and/or source of objective reality), is 
ultimately the “Mutter und Quelle aller Mythologie, und zugleich herrschend und mächtig in der 
                                                 






jetzigen Zeit, welche von der dynamischen Wissenschaft zu ihr hingetrieben und zurückgeführt 
wird.”302 New mythology appears as a process of active construction, with final goals deferred to 
future work, but the contemporary dynamic sciences are increasingly revealing the 
naturephilosophical system which will have to eventually inform it. 
 The second lengthy addition to the 1822 Rede returns again to this more emphatically 
naturalist derivation of new mythology, and lends it a more explicitly political significance as 
well. In this second moment, Schlegel extends the search for “das andere System” in the nature 
symbolism of different national cultural heritages. Like natural science, nature poetry must also 
be reawakened through mythologization: “auch die andern Mythologien müssen wieder erweckt 
werden nach dem Maß ihres Tiefsinns, ihrer Schönheit und ihrer Bildung, um die Entstehung der 
neuen Mythologie zu beschleunigen.”303 The Orient in general, Indian and Spanish philosophical 
and literary traditions in particular, must be reactivated (Schlegel hopes for a new generation of 
translators) in order to educate a German nation, “die immer stumpfer und brutaler wird.”304  
 Once more, nature arises in the second version of the Rede as the essence of whatever 
poetic resources modernity can draw on to accelerate the new mythological development: here 
specifically it is a matter of how the modern German nation can supplement itself with a natural 
poetics constructed out of the “andern Mythologien” that German intellectual and cultural life 
has traditionally ignored. True poets of every culture, Schlegel adds, fasten on the “unermeßlich 
reiche Natur-Symbolik […] welche die Dichter aus der sichtbaren Fülle der Natur so wie sie dem 
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sinnlichen Auge erscheint, entlehnen.”305 National Bildung is tasked to the “wahren Dichter,” for 
whom the wide traditions of natural “Bilder und Gleichnisse” have a profound significance 
(“eine tiefe Bedeutung”).306 Schlegel continues from the above: 
Und wohl wäre es lohnend und belehrend, wenn ein im Geist erhellter Naturphilosoph, 
diese Symbolik, welche in den Sinnbildern der Poesie verborgen liegt, hervorzöge und als 
ein großes Ganzes ordnend ans Licht zusammenstellte; oder auch von der andern Seite, 
wenn ein begeisterter Naturdichter, nicht bloß unbewußt und aus glücklichem Instinkt, 
sondern mit Bewußtsein, was er als Denker und Seher in der Natur erkannt, nun in Poesie 
in jenem bildlichen Frühlingsgewande aussprechen wollte.307 
 
Mirroring the proposed dynamicization of the disciplines that the Systemprogramm concludes 
with—where the philosopher must be brought into contact (Berührung) with the masses, and, in 
the same movement, the base sensuousness of popular life must no longer be isolated but rather 
indifferentiated from elite enlightenment reason—new mythology again appears as a mutually-
reciprocal process of energy transfer, as a magnetized point swinging between opposing 
practices of modern life. In line with the general aim of mythologization, the natural scientist 
must infuse himself with the energy of aesthetic experience, and the poet, in turn, must become a 
theoretician and observer of nature. What is called for, on the one hand, is a naturephilosophy 
that systematically describes the natural symbolism that poets have always employed, whether 
consciously or not, a science that organizes and brings to light (“ordnend ans Licht 
zusammenstellt”) the sum poeticization of nature “als ein großes Ganzes.” On the other hand, 
new mythology is only waiting for a “begeisteter Naturdichter” to mobilize the insights of 
natural scientific investigation, to incorporate into a national literary corpus “was er als Denker 
und Seher in der Natur erk[e]nnt.” In this way, new mythology rewards and edifies a repressed 
                                                 










and regressive German society; it is “lohnend und belehrend” for an increasingly brutalized 
national culture in need of widespread change.     
But in many ways the most expansive formulation of what Schlegel proposes in the Rede 
as new mythology—and what Ritter’s own new mythological speech will perhaps more aptly 
term “Physik als Kunst”—is already given in the 1800 version, and this just after Ludoviko’s 
speech has ended. This third and final representative moment is found in the second response of 
the group’s discussion after the recital of the Rede. Here Lothario, going straight to the heart of 
the issue, problematizes the proper source of new mythology. For him, it is clear that his friend 
Ludoviko privileges physics as this source, but Lothario wants to shift the focus to history, “die 
sowohl der eigentliche Quell seiner Mythologie sein dürfte, ebensosehr als die Physik [later 
changed in 1822 to ‘Naturanschauung’].”308 Ludoviko returns later in the discussion to address 
Lothario’s concern: “Man knüpft da zunächst an, wo man die ersten Spuren des Lebens 
wahmimmt. Das ist jetzt in der Physik [later ‘Naturphilosophie’].”309 He elaborates on his 
response to Lothario again after a few moments: 
Ich zog die Physik aber auch darum vor, weil hier die Berührung am sichtbarsten ist. Die 
Physik kann kein Experiment machen ohne Hypothese, jede Hypothese auch die 
beschränkteste, wenn sie mit Konsequenz gedacht wird, führt zu Hypothesen über das 
Ganze, ruht eigentlich auf solchen, wenngleich ohne Bewußtsein dessen der sie 
gebraucht.—Es ist in der Tat wunderbar, wie die Physik, sobald es ihr nicht um 
technische Zwecke, sondern um allgemeine Resultate zu tun ist, ohne es zu wissen, in 
Kosmogonie gerät, in Astrologie, Theosophie oder wie Ihrs sonst nennen wollt, kurz in 
eine mystische Wissenschaft vom Ganzen.310 
 
Schlegel reverses precisely that experimental restriction that the Systemprogramm sees in 
contemporary physics. It is not the experiment per se that Schlegel rejects—as in the 
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Systemprogramm where a strict empiricism is understood to retard the true experimental core of 
speculative physics—but rather only that form of experimental thinking that refuses to become 
conscious of its implied cosmic consequences. Physics’ inability to elevate its procedures beyond 
merely technical purposes (“technische Zwecken”) has prevented it from becoming a higher 
hypothesis of general results (“allgemeine Resultate”). This, for Schlegel, is exactly what needs 
to be changed in the natural sciences, or rather such a holistic framework must be consciously 
affirmed in all truly experimental physics, just as the author(s) of the Systemprogramm demand.  
 Weatherby reads this passage as affirming that “any physics contains an implicit 
metaphysics in the movement from local hypothesis to holistic implication,” but its primary 
significance for Schlegel’s sense of mythologization is that physics, “including its implicit 
metaphysics, possesses a procedure that precipitates the ‘great revolution’ and makes the 
‘centerpoint’ for the new mythology visible.”311 Schlegel clearly claims this open-ended or 
expansive formulation of new mythological physics as its most remarkable, and indeed 
miraculous (“in der Tat wunderbar”), characteristic. To mythologize physics is to strip it of its 
former disciplinary boundaries and set it free. This amounts to a deterritorialization of physics’ 
rigid disciplinary definition, what Weatherby, by way of reference to the methodological norms 
of Newton’s Principia, calls science’s merely local application of hypothesis, which can also be 
understood as a feature of a limited mechanistic approach to cause-effect relationships. And yet, 
this deterritorialization is only effective insofar as it leads to reframing physics as the purview of 
all manner of other disciplines. Physics will also form the center point for a theory of the origin 
of the cosmos (“Kosmogonie”), a divinatory science of astral bodies (“Astrologie”), and a 
doctrine of God’s immediate presence (“Theosophie”). In the last instance, higher physics will 
                                                 






become a metadisciplinary and supernatural science of “holistic implication,” as Weatherby puts 
it, a new “mystische Wissenschaft vom Ganzen.” In this sense, Ludoviko’s response to Lothario 
contains Schlegel’s most universal, or rather, cosmological formulation of new mythology. This 
can be understood as a reintroduction of nature into the domains of philosophical, aesthetic, and 
political experience, as an active alteration of contemporary knowledge practices for a program 
of total cultural revolution. 
2.4 Cosmik 
If Schlegel’s contribution to new mythological discourse consists in a translation of the 
Systemprogramm’s “Physik im Großen” into a Naturpoesie with cosmological extension, it 
nevertheless also addresses a naturepolitical consideration not foreign to the Systemprogramm, 
albeit one that is thematized in the Rede to a far lesser extent than in that inaugural manifesto of 
new mythology. Briefly emphasizing the didactic-political function of new mythology for the 
German nation, Schlegel asserts that a national project of Bildung must channel the nature 
poetics of heterogenous cultural and literary traditions for its own purposes. German culture, he 
insists, must rediscover in nature that different other, “das andere System,” in order to avoid 
social degeneration and cultural isolation. It is here that Ritter’s own new mythological 
reflections are most directly foreshadowed in the intersection of the Systemprogramm and the 
Rede. In the first place, Ritter will take up Schlegel’s more general invocation of a mystical 
science of the whole, articulating it in his own terms as a Cosmik and a Kunst des Lebens, as we 
will presently see. But secondly, Ritter will provide his version of a Naturpolitik, a politics 
informed by the dynamic model of natural energetic forces, that imagines an alternative form for 
the national German state and citizen. When Schlegel and the author(s) of the Systemprogramm, 






changing modern society such that egalitarian and aesthetically-emancipating worlds could 
emerge in the future—Ritter specifies this same program to a far greater extent, even while 
shifting its parameters. He offers a version of dynamic-electrical physics with the potential to 
intervene in the sociopolitical status quo, contributing to the development of Romantic 
Naturpolitik around 1800 and in many ways representing its summit-point. 
Up to this point, we have concentrated on the foremost canonical thinkers of new 
mythology, allowing the analysis of the physics-politics assemblage in new mythological 
discourse between the Systemprogramm and Rede to develop so that Ritter’s late project can 
emerge in comparison. As such, Ritter deserves some introduction here before turning to his own 
formulation of Naturpolitik. The Romantic physicist par excellence,312 Ritter’s higher physics 
                                                 
312 Ritter’s biographer Walter D. Wetzels notes that: “Bei dem Phänomen der ‘romantischen Physik‘ ist man in der 
günstigen Lage, alles an einer repräsentativen Figur demonstrieren zu können. Zu dem inneren Zirkel des 
Schlegelkreises, wie er sich um 1800 in Jena etabliert hatte, gehörte nämlich der Naturwissenschaftler, der sowohl 
für die Romantker, wie auch für alle späteren Interpreten dieser Periode der Physiker der Romantik gewesen ist: 
Johann Wilhelm Ritter” (Walter D. Wetzels, Johann Wilhelm Ritter: Physik im Wirkungsfeld der deutschen 
Romantik [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973], 15). Next to Wetzels’ biography, and Klaus Richter, Das Leben des Physikers 
Johann Wilhelm Ritter: Ein Schicksal in der Zeit der Romantik, the most comprehensive contemporary account of 
Ritter’s life and work appears in Stefan Höppner’s Natur/Poesie: Romantische Grenzgänger zwischen Literatur und 
Naturwissenschaft. Höppner, besides delivering a wealth of interesting anecdotes concerning romantic science (e.g., 
“Tatsächlich ließ in den galvanischen Experimenten eine große Zahl von Fröschen ihr Leben. Allein Alexander von 
Humboldt soll für seine Monographie zum Galvanismus 3000 Frösche verwendet haben” [Stefan Höppner, 
Natur/Poesie: Romantische Grenzgänger zwischen Literatur und Naturwissenschaft [Würzburg: Epistemata, 2017], 
212] also provides the most complete summarization of Ritter’s reception up to the publication of Thea Dorns‘ novel 
Die Unglückseligen (2016), in which Ritter is resurrected (literally) as a literary figure. In addition to drawing on the 
biographical work of Wetzels, Richter, and Höppner, I am also indebted in the following to Stuart Walker 
Strickland’s excellent dissertation on Ritter’s work on siderism and rhabdomancy, Circumscribing Science: Johann 
Wilhelm Ritter and the Physics of Sidereal Man. Like Wetzels, Strickland finds in Ritter a representative figure of 
Romantic physics, but also points to his position as a historiographical castaway. Ritter’s biographical inscription, 
Strickland claims, mirrors the historical reception of Naturphilosophie as a whole. This is the case, Strickland 
argues, insofar as the full scope of Ritter’s life’s work was pushed from view, becoming an object to be suppressed 
from the standpoint of modern scientific (positivist) normativity: “my contention,” Strickland writes, “is that 
biography recapitulates historiography, that the Campetti episode [in which Ritter investigated water-dowsing 
during his last phase in Munich] occupies the same space in the structure of Ritter's biographies as Naturphilosophie 
occupies in the narratives of the history of science. The same strategies of containment, the same structural 
exclusions, the same attempts at recuperation which silence all that is most interesting and threatening, in short, all 
the moves we […] encounter in […] accounts of Ritter's life, are at work in the historiography of Naturphilosophie 
as well” (Stuart Walker Strickland, Circumscribing Science: Johann Wilhelm Ritter and the Physics of Sidereal 
Man. Dissertation [Harvard, 1992], 7). Specht reinforces Strickland here: in his discussion of Ritter’s Physik als 
Kunst, Specht claims that he offers “eine in den Ausgangspunkten noch durchaus konventionelle, in ihrer 






approaches the emerging evidence of formerly esoteric natural phenomena around 1800 
(electrical circularity, magnetic polarity, galvanic enchainment, sidereal actio in distans, etc.) not 
as so many inert natural data separated from the human by an unbridgeable ontological and 
epistemological gulf, but as the index of a not-yet fully discovered identity between human and 
nature that points to the potential to alter both. Where he explicitly mythologizes this basic 
naturephilosophical perspective is in his insistence that new scientific research into a dynamic 
natural order (a natural order structured above all by electromagnetic dynamics) does not only 
deepen our understanding of the natural cosmos, it also gives evidence of an “Erlösungs-” and 
“Entwicklungsgeschichte”313 of humanity as its primordial separation from and messianic 
reunification with nature. In this sense, Ritter is a unique “Verkünder der neuen Physik [der] 
Romantik,”314 who develops a foundational mythic narrative for the production (or poeisis) of a 
new human vocation vis-à-vis its natural surround. 
In terms of the wider discursive environment out of which Ritter’s late works emerge, it 
should be noted that the sociopolitical consequences that follow from the mythologization of the 
natural sciences is of central importance to the Frühromantiker in general, and were always at 
stake in the contemporary relevance of naturephilosophy, especially as a marked positivistic 
emphasis of the sciences began to react against it. Keith R. Peterson provides the broad contours 
                                                 
Naturwissenschaften” (Specht, 124). He continues along Strickland’s lines above: “In seinen letzten Lebensjahren, 
ist Ritter, der zu Beginn seiner Laufbahn wissenschaftlich so rasch reüssierte, in akademischen Kreisen eine persona 
non grata. So kann man ihn mit seiner Werkbiographie wohl als eines der ersten ›Opfer‹ betrachten, das die 
Ausdifferenzierung der Erkenntnistypen und Institutionen von Naturwissenschaft und Philosophie mit Beginn des 
19. Jahrhunderts fordert” (Ibid.). 
 
313  Wetzels describes Physik als Kunst as an “Erlösungsgeschichte des in der Natur gefesselten Geistes durch den 
Menschen, und sie ist deshalb gleichzeitig die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen zu seiner eigenen, geistigen 
Vervollkommnung” (Wetzels, 45).  
 







of this reception at the beginning of the nineteenth century, characterizing Naturphilosophie—
and again, Ritter’s model of natural science is situated squarely within this framework, just as it 
is within that of new mythology—as a program with wild political implications: “the critical 
apparatus that the philosophy of nature brought to bear on the modern scientific project,” 
Peterson notes: 
demanded not merely a theoretical or epistemological shift, but a reformulation of the 
relation between human beings and nature, often entailing novel political or ethical 
commitments. Early philosophy of nature met opposition in part because its ethical and 
political interests—not just its allegedly wild and ‘unverifiable’ analogizing—were 
thought to have invalidated its ‘scientific’ claims.315  
 
What appeared unacceptable to the coming positivist turn of the nineteenth century, to 
paraphrase the above, was naturephilosophy’s re-articulation of natural phenomena as directly 
sociopolitical, a clear breach of disciplinary divisions in favor of an analogical or figurative 
imaginary that effaces conceptual divisions, thereby opening up—or inventing—connections 
between a diverse body of methodologies and activities.316 According to this view, science could 
                                                 
315 Keith R. Peterson, “Introduction” in First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2004), xi. In a discussion of Ritter’s scientific practice in relation to other 
Naturphilosophen like Schelling, Helmut Müller-Sievers similarly draws attention to a certain wildness present in 
Ritter’s work. He compares Ritter (not inaccurately) to the author of the 1903 Denkwürdigkeiten eines 
Nervernkranken, the Gerichtspräsident Daniel Paul Schreber, whose delusional visions and imaginative ontological 
systems later fascinated Freud and many others. Müller-Sievers writes of Ritter’s works that “just as in Schelling’s 
systems, the specialized investigations and reinterpretations of natural phenomena culminate in the vision of a 
thoroughly immanent universe, held together by the interplay of identity and difference, a Weltorganismus in which 
everything is also everything else, in which the electrical, chemical, or magnetic properties of the earth recur in the 
sensory equipment of the human being, who, consequently, is but an abbreviated earth, and the earth nothing but a 
drawn-out human being. These chains of analogies often read like the memoirs of an early-nineteenth-century 
Schreber” (Helmut Müller-Sievers, “Skullduggery: Goethe and Oken, Natural Philosophy, and Freedom of the 
Press.” Modern Language Quarterly, no. 59, vol. 2 [1998], 236). 
 
316 This finds its critical reflection in the oft-repeated claim that Ritter ontologizes the insights of Naturphilosophie 
and Romantic transcendental reflection, finding them concretely embodied in the realia of empirical nature. Specht, 
for example, notes that in contrast to Novalis or Schlegel, Ritter: “überschreitet [...] transzendentale 
Erkenntnisgrenzen explizit und behandelt die transreflexive Einheit von Natur und Geist nicht als erkenntnisleitende 
›Idee‹, sondern als Realie” (Specht, 121). It is exactly this that Hegel ridicules in the “Vorrede” to his 
Phänomenologie des Geistes: as Hegel puts it: “Wenn der naturphilosophische Formalismus etwa lehrt, der Verstand 







not lead to politics without a mutual degradation of both.317 But against this, so the 
Naturphilosophen asserted, just as nature must be rethought as dynamic, so too must human 
sociality. Ritter, as will become clear in the sections below, can be understood to deliver on some 
of the most “novel political or ethical commitments” of Romantic science in this sense. 
The major tendency in Ritter’s critical reception most recently has been to move away 
from his long-held characterization as a mystical pseudo-scientific thinker or mere “eccentric 
physicist”318 as Strickland puts it (at best the inventor of the dry-cell battery or the discoverer of 
ultra-violet light). Different aspects of his oeuvre are increasingly situated vis-a-vis the broader 
aesthetic programs of Frühromantik in a rediscovery of the original context within which Ritter 
himself understood his work to emerge. Höppner, who also identifies a marked 
“Schlegelianismus der Naturwissenschaft” in Ritter’s system of thought, calls this on-going 
aesthetic recuperation an outstanding task for scholarship.319 But if this openly speculative-poetic 
nature of Ritter’s thought, which is indeed manifest even in his most rigorously scientific 
treatises, is only now garnering some recognition, the further recuperation of whatever political 
valence is to be found in his works seems to be an even more esoteric project. Perhaps for just 
this reason, Ritter’s Romanticism has never been read in any sustained way as a political body of 
thought. Not even within the ideological factory of National Socialism—which proved 
successful at adapting or co-opting a variety of seemingly distant traditions and thinkers for its 
                                                 
317 For an overview of critical reactions to Ritter’s work during his lifetime, see Jocelyn Holland, German 
Romanticism and Science (New York: Routledge, 2009), 114. 
 
318 Strickland, 5. 
 
319 “Obwohl gerade in den letzten Jahren,” Höppner writes in 2017, “einige hochwertige Studien und Editionen 
erschienen, bleiben in der Forschung erhebliche Lücken. Dies betrifft vor allem die poetischen Elemente in jenen 
Texten von Ritter, die sich an der Grenze zwischen Poesie, Naturwissenschaft und Philosophie [bewegen]” 
(Höppner, 209). The work of Jocelyn Holland must be singled out here, as at least for English-language scholarship, 
Holland has provided one of the most sustained treatments of Ritter’s boundary-movements between aesthetics, 






own purposes—not even there did Ritter’s contributions to science, or even the more mythic-
nationalistic aspects of what we have to call his proto-vitalist vision, gain any political traction 
(in contrast to other Romantic scientists revived within German fascist thought, such as Henrik 
Steffens and Lorenz Oken).320 And yet, a dedicated concern to address the political within the 
scope of natural science seems hard to deny given the textual evidence, for his entire late 
production is characterized by an imaginative engagement with social and historical evolution, 
when he is not foregrounding a discussion of the intersection between aesthetic experience, 
natural science, and political organization more explicitly. It is this aspect, more than any other, 
that places him within the new mythological framework of Naturpolitik. 
Ritter’s notion of scientific practice appears as a kind of meta-physics, as a 
metadiscipline that repositions the new natural phenomena being discovered around 1800—
electricity, magnetism, galvanism, siderism, as mentioned above, but also more specific physical 
processes, such as chemical oxidation and combustion—into what he understands as the 
universal framework of intelligibility: life as the free unfolding of procreative force.321 The 
ultimate or most abstract instance of this research, the principle of life-generation as such, 
includes all being, (in)animate and (in)organic life, in its natural force field. Ritter is precisely 
not the stereotypical physicist, overly empirical, circumscribed by an unnecessarily restrictive 
                                                 
320 Höppner, 242. Höppner claims that Ritter “im Gegensatz zu diesen [Steffens and Oken] nie publizistisch explizit 
zu patriotischen Themen äußert” (Ibid.). Thus for Höppner—and his is a representative position—Ritter, having died 
before the censorship movement of 1812 that helped galvanize German intellectual opposition to French occupation, 
(and having never attacked Napoleon personally in any of his published writings), is to be considered a largely 
apolitical figure. But it is precisely such a realpolitisch reading practice that this dissertation breaks from. Ritter is 
indeed apolitical in the more narrow or practical sense (one, for example, that excludes nature speculation, much 
less Naturphilosophie, from the domain of political relevance) and, to be sure, he is not interested in providing a 
commentary on contemporary political events; nevertheless, Ritter’s true politicality, I claim, arises precisely as a 
Naturpolitik. I emphasize this further below in the discussion of his politics of the Glied. 
 







experimental method, targeted in the Systemprogramm with doubt, charged with a lack of 
speculative imagination. He is rather what he himself would call a cosmicist, whose science is 
also a matter of speculative and indeed religious experimentation with nature.322 Ritter is 
interested in a “Cosmik” or “Physik in ihrer allgemeinsten Bedeutung,” designations that 
Schlegel and the author(s) of the Systemprogramm (and Schelling) would have understood as 
part of their attempt to transcend the narrow disciplinarity of physics—and indeed of all 
philosophical, scientific, or aesthetic disciplines—in favor of a holistic scientific art of vital 
genesis itself. This higher physics, for Ritter as much as for his contemporaries, is to effect total 
existential change even for a (human) nature already marked by constant chaotic evolution.  
One finds this characteristic new mythological gesture programmatically stated in the last 
sentences of Ritter’s Versuch einer Geschichte der Schicksale der chemischen Theorie (1808). 
Its conclusion serves as a concise introduction to Ritter’s concerns in his last phase of 
productivity, where a decidedly mythological turn emerges out of his earlier, more narrowly-
focused scientific work on chemistry, galvanism, and electromagnetism. As much a history of 
humanity from the perspective of a “Geognosie des Unorganischen, so gut, wie eine Physiologie 
des Organischen,” the Versuch ends with the following: only from the perspective of cosmics 
can “das Schaffen, Bilden und Gliedern der Natur, zugleich mit dem, was im Gegliederten doch 
                                                 
322 Schlegel, Novalis, and Goethe all acclaimed Ritter as a genius on earth: “Ritter ist Ritter und wir sind nur 
Knappen,” Novalis writes to Caroline Schlegel (cited in Höppner, 210). Ritter himself had a long professional 
relationship with Schelling, originally strained by his critique of the latter’s abstruse philosophical style and lack of 
empirical method. As to Ritter’s own views on the connections between philosophy, physics, and a properly 
speculative mode of scientific experimentation, the following entry from the Fragmente is representative (which 
also ends with a critique of Schelling): “Philosophie ist durchaus nichts als Physik. Hat sie ihre Deduction vollendet, 
wie etwa der Physiker eine Deduction der Voltaischen Säule aus ihrem Princip vollenden kann, so bleibt ihr wieder 
nichts übrig, als, wie der Physiker, zu experimentiren—im Glauben. Religion ist ein Experimentiren dieser Art, und 
es wird den Geist auf selbige Weise eine Stufe oder Potenz höher heben, als gegenwärtig die Entdeckung des Ichs. 







noch fortwirkt […] zu einen Ganzen verbunden zu erhalten, begriffen werden kann.”323 The need 
for a synthetic perspective that is holistic and local, observational and interventionist, that 
includes the human as well as the natural within its scope of investigation, represents the 
methodological ideal of Ritterian Cosmik. Life’s production of organizational form (at the 
global-unified scale, as “Schaffen,” “Bilden,” and “Gliedern”, as well as at the local-individuated 
scale of its discretely organized members, as “Gegliederten”) may apparently be maintained as a 
system or whole: “zu einen Ganzen verbunden zu erhalten.” And this is done so by human 
agency, through scientific work, and above all through a dynamic physics that focuses on the 
basic energetic matrix of all life. The creation, construction, and membering (Gliedern) of nature 
has to be recognized as such in order to maintain it as a whole. Provided with such a 
cosmological approach, we may accordingly alter, or, as the case may be, actively conserve the 
nature of nature, and thus also alter and/or conserve the nature of ourselves as a social organism. 
For Ritter, we can strive to sustain things in an intelligible unity (or fail to), just as we find the 
dynamic of a constantly becoming nature striving to do so.  
But the unified manifold of all things, the organizational integrity of life as a whole, is 
just as much already present in the human subject and its individualized interactions with nature. 
Inhering in the real all around us, the cosmic interface can be observed and recognized 
(“begriffen werden”), even as observation also entails a certain intervention in it. Here the 
Versuch concludes, just as in the Systemprogramm, by linking a future physics of dynamic 
forces—or rather a transcendental physics renamed Cosmik in Ritter’s terms—with a recoding of 
the epistemological and practical limits of modern experience vis-à-vis nature. Again, the aim is 
                                                 






to grasp life as such and change it, to intervene in the possibility of the present by making the 
new mythological scientific program effective. 
The Versuch actually ends in a footnote to its last labyrinthine sentence, or rather, the text 
as a whole concludes with a kind of double ending between its main body and that of its 
extensive footnotation. The footnote to the last sentence returns to the vital principle that the 
Versuch codifes as the science of cosmics. Ritter names this principle, that of procreative life 
itself, electricity:  
Ist irgend im Vorigen die Electricität als Inhaber und Realisirer des gliedernden und 
individualisirenden Princips auf Erden wahrscheinlich geworden, und, ist diese 
Electricität selbst wieder nichts, als Licht, nur unter anderem Vorkommen, so ist damit 
eben so gut auch das Licht zum bildenden, gliedernden und individualisirenden Princip 
auf Erden erhoben [...] Schon der Himmel ist ein Bild von uns, gebildet nach demselben 
Gesetz, wie wir. Und wie möchte überhaupt die Welt uns Freude und Befriedigung 
gewähren, träfen wir nicht überall auf Aehnliches! Das eben macht es möglich sie zu 
erforschen d. i. zu begreifen; wir bringen dazu nichts mit, als uns selbst, und scheint sie 
uns groß, so sind auch wir es, nur daß wir freylich es an ihr erst werden.324 
Electricity, the specific form of the universal life principle of light, is the constructing, 
organizing, and individualizing force of/on Earth. The Versuch has done nothing but show this, 
or so Ritter hopes. It is up to us to recognize and attain the power we find increasingly 
illuminated in the discovery of electricity. Nature, echoing the natural network of Poesie 
Schlegel dramatizes in the Rede, involves us in a web of similarities and correspondences 
(“Aehnliches!”); we find ourselves reflected in nature and rejoice (“Freude und Befriedigung 
gewähren”). And because of this dual aesthetic-affective identification with nature we can, 
through drawing ever closer to the center source of its forces, also involve ourselves in its 
processes of metamorphosis. Electricity as nature’s transcendental “Inhaber,” “Realisierer,” and 
“Princip” appears as the material basis of humanity insofar as the human essentially constitutes, 
                                                 






like all organic life, a species variously affected by natural dynamic forces (although Ritter will 
also extend this principle, as already mentioned, to include inanimate, inorganic being). The 
human is part of electrical activity, or rather, cosmics makes incumbent upon humanity the task 
to become electric, to embark upon an open-ended anthropological revision through natural 
scientific insights into electricity. Electricity will provide the Bildung—as with Novalis’ elastic 
sense of Bildung—to change the constitution of modern society.  
 Such an expansion of human capacity through the pedagogy of nature (once again with 
an echo of the Rede) can only be completed when humanity achieves total knowledge of 
energetics, an equally material-ontological and mythic-historical consciousness of full 
participation in the environment of physical forces.325 Given the inexhaustibility of any 
investigation into an essentially dynamic nature—nature constantly progressing through an 
infinity of forms of graduated becoming, continuously determined in a flux of opposing energetic 
forces—Ritter’s Cosmik proposes an “Aufgabe des Menschen und seines Geschlechts” that 
potentially never concludes in perfected completion.326 If the aesthetic program of Frühromantik, 
as Schlegel defines it, is to be forever “noch im Werden; ja das ist ihr eigentliches Wesen, daß 
sie ewig nur werden, nie vollendet sein kann,”327 then we can say that early Romanticism’s 
speculative naturalism, or rather its electrical program in Ritter’s version, similarly invokes a 
                                                 
325 In terms of the early Romantic program of anthropological revolution, Ritter’s footnote at the end of the Versuch 
(and elsewhere and frequently in his late works) provides an image of the humanity as a collective body electric, 
constantly subject to—but able to modify as well—naturally-generated processes of electric potentialization (this 
Schellingian image will be extended in greater detail in the Fragmente). Accordingly, when Novalis exhorts his 
contemporaries to romanticize the world, Ritter calls for more reflection on what a specifically electrical 
romantisieren would entail. And whereas Novalis explores the generic possibilities of Märchen to this end, Ritter 
proceeds through mythopoetic narrative, through an origin story of humanity as the unfolding of natural science 
(above all in Physik als Kunst), not to mention through the actual experimental record he left behind. 
 
326 Ritter, 528. 
 






progressive process of existential change for the Romantic subject/poet/scientist. This figure is 
on the way to discovering the invisible connection between natural and social reality in a 
boundless realism. And yet its teleological end is just its own on-going movement of scientific 
discovery. 
Returning to our point of departure, the new mythological gesture between Ritter, the 
Systemprogramm, and Schlegel’s Rede resolves into a basic drive to analyze reality (the 
sociopolitical, aesthetic, or natural given—and all of them again together), but only so as to 
manifest or prophesize its future fulfillment, and to do this in the form of a Wissenschaft that 
immediately transgresses the boundaries of the disciplines it calls on, exploding the limits of the 
conventional anthropological definition as expressed in contemporary discourses of politics, 
philosophy, poetry, and natural science. Given this commitment, the resulting image of the 
human subject and collective would of course be radically other, the image of a fundamentally 
different system (Schlegel’s anderes System). This is because for Ritter, the desired science of 
electrical forces reconfigures all physical and psychic phenomena, as well as their disciplinary 
study, into a treatment of their given electromagnetic state that we have yet to even comprehend. 
Ritter’s system aims for a cosmic perspective that reveals—empirically as much as speculatively, 
and through painstaking and often painful experimentation328—the grand mystery of the total 
electromagnetic state. But it also demands that the human become something other in its light: 
“und scheint sie uns groß,” Ritter claims of nature, “so sind auch wir es, nur daß wir freylich es 
an ihr erst werden.” 
                                                 
328 See Stuart Walker Strickland, “The Ideology of Self-Knowledge and the Practice of Self-Experimentation.” 







2.5 The Politics of the Glied 
As in the Versuch, Physik als Kunst similarly ends with the new mythological desire to 
raise science to an infinite form of knowledge, but here Ritter insists that a boundless scientific 
realism is only possible when knowledge transcends itself and becomes practical activity. “Was 
ist ein Wissen,” he asks, “welches nicht der Uebung fähig ist, und was ist diese Uebung sofort 
selbst?—Und ist, was Wissen schaft, unendlich, so wird nach diesem Wissen auch das Können, 
wofür es einzig da ist, eben so unendlich seyn.”329 The conversion of theory into praxis, the 
effective implementation of scientific knowledge for self- and world-intervention—which 
always involves an irreducible element of speculative or imaginative experimentation—such 
conversion and implementation comprises the real value of knowledge production (“was Wissen 
schaft”). Scientific knowledge becomes a “Können,” an infinite human capacity, activity, or 
power. Key here is that Ritter’s version of physics appears just as much as an aesthetic praxis, a 
productive art or Poesie, as the title Physik als Kunst already announces. Physics is the highest 
art insofar as it becomes a practical activity of life: the insights of cosmics flow directly into a 
progressively expanding “Kunst des Lebens.”330 
Summarizing the rhetorical movement of Physik als Kunst as a whole, Jocelyn Holland 
points to the essay’s general “theme,” its central mythic narrative, “of mankind’s separation from 
nature and the call for their reunification.”331 “By bridging this divide,” Holland continues: 
man will complete the work which nature left unfinished and achieve an exquisite 
harmony with the world around him. Within this project, physics is abstracted from 
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empirical experimentation and valued as an art with theological and aesthetic 
underpinnings, “higher” than all other arts and capable of facilitating man’s goal of self-
completion.332  
Restoring harmony with nature, as Holland points out, is clearly the final didactic content of the 
mythological-scientific narrative of Physik als Kunst. But physics is not just valued for its 
theological and aesthetic valence. Ritter’s narrative also requires that the proper sociopolitical 
organization first be in place for the science of this restoration, physics as practical cosmics 
and/or Kunst des Lebens, to flourish. Already in the first sections of Physik als Kunst, what 
Holland calls the theological-aesthetic potential of Ritterian physics is predicated on its 
institutionalization, on an institution of and for science. Ritter simply terms this scientific body 
Staat, the site of messianic research. Humanity’s self-completion is indeed a scientific 
endeavor—the discovery and investigation of electricity as the principle of light of all life, as the 
Versuch details.333 But it is first a matter of individual human members (Glieder) joining 
together in a collective form dedicated to natural scientific knowledge, an institutional organism 
or an organic institution, of which the state is the highest and most effective instance. The term 
and function of the member, its signal operations and activities, occupies the center point of 
Ritter’s naturepolitical reflections on the state in Physik als Kunst, providing an image of the 
postulated connection between natural science and political organization, or the political 
activation of physics for the purposes of rerouting the progression of modernity. 
Accordingly, we can identify a significant aspect of Ritterian cosmics, and the pedagogy 
of active living Ritter associates with it, as just as much a form of political knowledge practice 
(wissen-schaffen) instantiated in the properly scientific state. This approach to social/scientific 
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practice is both based on, and ultimately leads to, a state organization led by scientific 
representatives dedicated to Romantic science in Ritter’s form, or to the naturephilosophy of 
energetic forces. Cosmics ultimately appears as a kind of Staatskunst or as the total dynamic 
Kraft of the state. Through these most super-individual forms of organizing and regulating the 
totality of available knowledge and resources, of managing the whole of interpersonal relations 
at the collective level (statecraft), humanity will achieve its highest productivity, but only after 
the full extent of electromagnetic discovery is recognized. In a characteristically opaque passage, 
Ritter begins to articulate the connection between a “höhere Physik” of dynamics, the most 
promising fruit of scientific discovery around 1800, and the utopian development of the state: the 
fruit, in turn, of all human evolution through time: 
wie So Sehr Viel Höher muß nicht jetzt die Frucht des so viel größern schleunigern 
Gedeihns derselben werden, wo sie aus Quellen genährt wird, die man fast die Hoffnung 
nicht mehr hatte, einst noch zu erschließen! Der sonst nur Staats-Bewahrer hieß, ist jetzt 
ein Staats-Verjünger, und Einmal neuer Schöpfung Seiner Zeuge, sieht man zu ihm, dem 
Nie Veralternden, als einem Staats -Verewiger hinauf.334        
From historic state-preserver to present state-rejuvenator to future state-immortalizer: this will be 
the evolutionary process not of one scientist revealing the wonders of the electrical dynamics 
subtending all life-generation, but of the self-completion of humanity as a whole. It will be its 
flourishing, “Frucht,” or “Gedeihns,” variously constricting and expanding along its trajectory 
towards existential (or here explicitly political) perfection, towards an eternal ideal state structure 
or embodied figure (“Staats-Verewiger”). This dynamic growth, culminating in perfection, 
harmony, and unity, is established in Physik als Kunst as the mytho-political frame narrative of 
the history of physics.  
                                                 






 The last messianic work of this organic process of Staatskunst will not merely be a result 
of the desired scientific breakthroughs and paradigm-shifts to follow through the practice of 
cosmics, but the emergence of the state itself—a state composed, as we will see, of members—as 
the steward of the active potential modern humanity gains in embracing cosmics. Science, 
properly understood and practiced, necessarily leads to its own politicization; physics as Cosmik 
becomes, in a word, cosmopolitics, in which a theory of the cosmos is allowed to directly 
impinge on sociopolitical experience and construction. We can summarize this mythic narrative 
of Naturpolitik as follows: physics is the transhistorical discipline in which humanity 
understands its relations to the wider cosmos and thereby discovers a path of return to natural 
harmony, to its natural state of perfection. Insofar as this is a scientific pursuit that affects all 
humanity, it will ultimately appear in the highest collective form of human organization and 
productivity, in the perfect state. But at all points this naturepolitical order is open to change, 
itself a matter of the progression of the scientific status of the age. 
  Physik als Kunst locates the source of the ideal cosmopolitical state in nature itself, and 
does so by relying on the structural role of the member. Nature already provides humanity (and 
for Ritter, the human is nature’s privileged life form335) with an inherent structure and process, 
culminating in the ideal realization of the future scientific state. The task is to describe this 
structural process so as to consciously follow the natural trajectory unfolding into the future, so 
as to not lose the course laid out for humanity, but rather to follow the emergence and 
development of that most significant of natural formations in the Glied. The human is naturally a 
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political animal; it finds itself always already embedded in an environment everywhere dedicated 
to its teleological growth, led through a natural education to the more effective implementation 
of its powers at every scale of (individual and collective) social organization. Ritter explains this 
idea in a central passage of Physik als Kunst, and here we have the first explication of the 
sociopolitical member and its systematization as a form of membering (Gliederung): 
sie [nature] gab bey seinem [man’s] ersten Eintritt in die Welt bereits, ihm den seitdem in 
so reiche Erfüllung gegangenen Segen seiner Vermehrung bis zu ungezahlten Individuen 
mit. Im Grade dieser Erfüllung seiner,—die man als eine systematische Gliederung des 
Einen Ganzen, was von nun an nicht durch das Individuum mehr, sondern durch die 
ganze Menschheit, fortbestehen sollte, anzusehen hat,—wurde die Aufgabe des Einzelnen 
Selbst eine minder große, und auch eine minder schwere; denn nicht allein, daß es nicht 
mehr Forderung war, sich bis zum Ganzen unmittelbar herauf zu vollenden,—indem die 
nächste nur auf Ergänzung zu dem Gliede, was jeder einzelne von diesem ganzen sein 
soll, gieng,—wurde, außer der eignen Geschichte seines Weges, auch die aller seiner Mit-
Bewerber um das Ziel desselben noch, für ihn zum lehrenden Beförderer seines Wandels 
auf ihm.336   
Ritter plots a complicated emergence of natural human organization, a process that describes the 
gradual evolution of a higher-order humanity as it functionally differentiates its collective task in 
the course of time. Nature, which after its original tragic division from humanity variously 
approaches and recedes from reunification with it, has still blessed the human with the means to 
overcome its fallen status as the sole Mängelwesen, the only species-being cursed by 
postlapsarian self-consciousness of its distance from nature and its natural state. More 
specifically, Ritter’s condensed image of this evolutionary passage consists in three interrelated 
aspects, the first two of which are familiar to the contemporary paradigm of organic politics: 1) 
the micrological “Individuum” or “Einzelnen,” which can be compared to the limited operational 
horizons and absence of autogenerative capacity that defines the functionally-mechanical part, 
the individual Teil or organ of the organism; 2) macrological “Menschheit,” the collective 
                                                 






teleological organism or whole; and finally 3) the Glied or member which mediates the interface 
between micrological individual and macrological collective, transcending the first two aspects 
in a third figure. 
Nature proceeds systematically, according to an ordered process of emergence: first it 
individuates, producing countless atomized individuals existing only in relation to themselves 
(“ungezahlten Individuen”). The next stage is the recognition on the part of the individual that it 
is only one individuated aspect of a systematic membering of the cosmic unity (a “systematische 
Gliederung des einen Ganzen”). Then the individual is confronted with a seemingly impossible 
task: to immediately reconnect with the cosmic whole, to achieve a direct identification with the 
source of being that originally individuates and separates everything. Instead of immediately 
identifying with the whole, the individual reconceives itself practically as a member between the 
two, no longer understands life-forms as always partially embodying both individual organs and 
the collective organism as such, but as the movement between each, itself a higher-order 
dynamism that only sees continuous processes of Gliederung filling space and time. The 
individual and whole rethinks itself as a movement of cosmic membering, partitioning beings 
(Holland’s term for Gliederung) even while suturing them together in shared evolutionary 
development. Ritter’s concept of the member thus indicates a movement towards ever more 
complex processes of Gliederung. The function of this latter term, here and elsewhere, is to bring 
together two opposed poles—individual and whole, and, continuing after this passage, also 
citizen and state—in a relation of mutual permeability. This is to be a social dynamic that recasts 
the classic polarity of individual vs. whole, subject vs. collective, one that allows the thought of a 
new Indifferenzpunkt, the third moment of the member, in a combination of opposed social 






The final stage, or the third gift of nature to humanity in their progressive re-unification, 
consists in the historical emergence of a mediating instance between the polar positions of 
individual and whole: the Glied (as we will see, this emergence comes with the epochal 
discovery of electromagnetism in modern times). The third stage attenuates the impossible 
second task of immediate transcendence from individual to whole, making the “Aufgabe des 
Einzelnen Selbst eine minder große, und auch eine minder schwere.” Holland translates this in 
the passage above as follows: “the next requirement now concerned development into the 
member, or what the individual should be in relation to the whole.” For Ritter, we are neither 
simply the totality of individuals, in which individuals are understood as so many isolated parts 
in an aggregate multiplicity. But nor are we merely a collective whole or monolithic abstraction 
that qualitatively erases individual differences in favor of a homogenous unity. Either standpoint 
lacks the necessary perspective on its own. In an entirely different context (in a discussion of 
modern political affect), Carlo Ginsburg provides a clear image of this combined perspective:  
To speak of every human being having two bodies (the physical and the social, the visible 
and the invisible) is insufficient. It is more helpful to consider the individual as the point 
of convergence of multiple sets. We simultaneously belong to a species (Homo sapiens), 
a sex, a linguistic community, a political community, a professional community, and so 
on and so forth […] To achieve a fuller understanding of an individual’s deeds and 
thoughts, present or past, we have to explore the interaction among the sets, specific and 
generic, to which he or she belongs…help[ing] us to rethink our multiple identities, their 
interaction and their unity, from an unexpected angle.337 
From the angle of the member, “everybody’s two bodies,” as Ginsburg puts it, appear 
indifferentiated in the movement between their singular and global identities, in constant flux. 
Human life, like all natural life for Ritter, is subject to a series of relational or relative 
interactions between (cosmic, invisible, collective) whole and (individuated, visible, physical-
                                                 







organic) part that can only be grasped as a process of infinite membering.338 But what is most 
important is that this mediating figure of the Glied, synthesized in its simultaneous oppositions 
and congruencies, becomes fully effective and leads to an infinite form of practical education: 
when “Mit-Bewerber” become “lehrenden Beförderer.”  
Immediately after this passage, Ritter describes in more detail how the systematic process 
of membering takes place within an institutionalization that further focuses its inherent drive to 
transformation. Nature provides this institute for humanity’s self-evolution. The human-nature 
tragic divide unfolds in mythic or prehistorical time as an initial process of limited 
individualization, but through the natural supply of an opposing or counter-acting formation 
embodied at a particular site, the space in which the member is engendered and encouraged 
(identified before as the scientific state, now specified further as natural “Anstalt”), the need for 
a qualitative leap or total access to the whole is mitigated: 
                                                 
338 Holland notes that: “the problem of a limited, historical, perspective haunts Ritter. This is not necessarily a 
limitation derived from what we now think of as a rapid increase of empirical information around 1800 accompanied 
the branching of a ‘universal science’ into particular disciplines. Ritter seems less troubled by quantitative ignorance 
than by the qualitative difficulty of moving from the part to the whole. This impediment articulates itself in different 
ways: as a problem for the narrator’s task, and, what is more worrisome, as the inability to visualize the fundamental 
tendency of the epoch within which one lives” (Ritter, 599). I would argue that this mereological problem in Physik 
als Kunst is at least addressed (and this in detail), if not solved, in Ritter’s figure of the member, which essentially 
adds a third element to the part-whole assemblage. Indeed, the third element as such, or what Antje Pfannkuchen 
calls “transcend[ing] a simple binarity” (Antje Pfannkuchen, “The Dynamic Polarity of Romantic Light” The 
Germanic Review vol. 92 [2017], 355) is often precisely what allows the characteristically Ritterian isomorphism of 
idealist and empiricist speculation. Not incidentally, the figure of the thrupple is the organizing principle of 
galvanism (i.e., electricity produced by chemical processes), and one of the central areas of Ritter’s research. In one 
of the few dated entries in the Fragmente, Ritter almost prays to the triadic structure of galvanism: “(1799) Ueberall, 
wo drey Individuen eine Figur bilden, deren gegenseitige Einwirkung aufeinander nicht blosser Grad Einer, 
identischen Ordnung, ist, ist Galvanismus. Auch überall, wo differente Ordnungen des Systems der allgemeinen 
Gravitation an einander grenzen, als gleichsam verschiedene Voltaische Klassen, ist er zugegen, und bildet 
gleichsam das Heftpflaster für die Wunden der Natur. Ein wahrer Janus bifrons inversus! Weltkörper verhalten sich 
hier wie Metallstangen, eine Sonne bildet den Wassertropfen; Sternensysteme und Nebelflecken sind die 
Dunstbläschen im Athem der Natur, wenn sie den Hauchversuch im Großen construirt,—sie selbst die Kette. So hat 
sich die Natur das Sternbild des Galvanismus selbst an den Himmel gesetzt” (Ritter, 292). Ritter would have 
understood Schlegel’s notion of prayer as a dynamic form of thinking (as already noted above), Schlegel asks: 







So bildete sich mitten in der Sorge, die jeder einzelne zunächst nur für Sich Selbst zu 
tragen hatte, schon eine Anstalt der Vereinigung Aller zum Ganzen, und dieses Ganze 
Selbst gedieh im selben Maaße, als seinen einzelnen Gliedern es, ihrer Bestimmung 
ferner nachzukommen, gelang.339 
Providing this “Anstalt der Vereinigung Aller zum Ganzen,” as opposed to the atomized or 
individualistic anxiety or care (“Sorge”) that had previously dominated the activity of the 
singular subject, is the main function of the state, as Ritter goes on to elaborate. And so the state 
too is a natural function, something that follows directly out of the immanent natural system as it 
progresses between part, whole, and culminates in member.340 The natural emergence of 
Gliederung over time becomes institutionalized in a state structure, but only in the sense that it 
represents the place where the “letzte Bestimmung des Ganzen” will thrive (gedeihen), finding its 
greatest collective potential in the form of an institute of members: 
Mit der beschleunigten Cultur der Individuen, schloß nemlich auch das Ganze, dessen 
Glieder sie zu seyn, sie selbst einst von ihm ausgegangen waren, sich immer inniger und 
enger: der Staat gedieh. Noch nie gefühlter Segen goß auf jedes Individuum sich von ihm 
aus; zur Menschheit fühlten seine Glieder sich vereinigt; von nun an war ihr Werk bloß 
ein gemeinschaftliches noch, und glänzender als jemals leuchtete die letzte Bestimmung 
des Ganzen, dem sie sich immer enger zu verbinden strebten, ihnen jetzt entgegen. Von 
neuem höher steigendem Dank erfüllt, ertheilten sie dem Geber jener dahin führenden 
Gesetze, den zweyten Namen eines Staats-Begründers und Bewahrers [...]341 
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340 When Ritter speaks of the state, he does so in an exact obverse of its image in the Systemprogramm’s political 
critique; the Ritterian state is properly natural because it is provided by nature itself, whereas in the latter text, the 
state is far more a kind of perverse apparatus: the state necessarily rules through the imposition of an ideological 
anti-nature, a machinic state of alienation that is created by humans and imposed as a kind of second- or false nature 
on nature itself (and on everyone who is governed by the machine state). And in comparison with the rhetorical 
structure of the Systemprogramm, Ritter here explicitly posits the natural state or “Anstalt” as opposed to only 
providing the critical analysis of the post-revolutionary machine state from a merely implicit framework of the 
organic/dynamic. The ideal of the Glied, or the task of the individual (“Aufgabe des Einzelnen Selbst”) to become 
natural and assume the role of a member of a natural collective institution, resolves into a wholly positive rhetorical 
image of Naturpolitik. While the Systemprogramm depends on a collapsed concept of individual/collective, or 
mankind-subject, as the agent that abolishes mechanistic governmentality in a gesture of violent revolutionary élan, 
Ritter’s member fulfills the mediating role—between Individuum and Menschheit—in the cosmic narrative of 
human-nature reunification. Ritter’s state, put differently, is constituted by joyous members openly invoking 
electrical phenomena as their model of sociopolitical organization. 
  






The state-founder and preserver is that primordial and future figure (at this point in the text not 
yet an institution with a proper name), that necessary general postulate that explains humanity’s 
natural evolution through systematic membering. This figure finally organizes the dynamic 
continuum between individual (Einzelnen) ↔ member (Glied) ↔ collective whole (Menschheit). 
But more accurately, one would have to speak here not of a single or individual figure (the state 
founder, protector, rejuvenator, immortalizer) as the center of the political community of 
membership, but of the collective of members themselves as representing the state, the Glieder 
who are mutually drawn into closer relationships (“immer inniger und enger”) to the same extent 
as the state expands (“der Staat gedieh”). The member establishes a new dynamic within the 
natural political environment, and institutionalizes itself in political form. The Ritterian state is 
nothing more nor less than its members’ active movement of self-realization, transcending the 
bounded categories of individual and whole in a higher-order system: in a speculative political 
physics.  
Conclusion: Bavarian Naturpolitik 
 Herder, Ritter’s close friend and mentor, had already provided much of the foundation for 
this narrative of the member as a uniquely modern political formation.342 The contemporary 
reader of Herder’s magnum opus Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-
1791) could have found an ironic inversion of Ritter’s desired Anstalt/Staat as understood above. 
“Ja endlich,” Herder writes in the Ideen, “da, wie alle Staatslehrer sagen, jeder wohleingerichtete 
Staat eine Maschine sein muß, die nur der Gedanke Eines regiert; welche größere Glückseligkeit 
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an understanding of Romanticism. Herder’s influence on Ritter was likewise enormous. Strickland writes that Ritter 
“was welcomed almost as a son” in Herder’s house, and this is certainly in line with Ritter’s own reverential ode to 







könnte es gewähren, in dieser Maschine als ein Gedankenloses Glied mitzudienen?”343 An 
alternative point of departure into an understanding of Ritter’s politics of the Glied could proceed 
solely from a reading of this one passage in Herder’s work.  
 Accordingly, one notes in Physik als Kunst the reversal of each of the operative terms 
from Herder’s comment: moving progressively through the above, we can see that Herder’s 
“Maschine,” for Ritter, is translated into a vision of the dynamic state of the member, which is 
precisely not a mechanistic or unnatural imposition on the citizen-subject, but an outgrowth of 
cosmic evolution in its human naturepolitical manifestations. The “Gedanke Eines”—for Herder 
that of a single absolutist (monarchical or republican) authority—becomes for Ritter the social 
collective as it appears in the form of an institution or a community of members, themselves 
embodying the mythic task of the eternal state of nature in human form. What Herder cynically 
terms “Glückseligkeit” (“welche größere Glückseligkeit könnte es gewähren”)—by which he 
suggests the citizen’s horror of the modern state’s instrumentalization, existential reduction, and 
alienation of its individual subjects (that the Systemprogramm also forcefully denounces)—
becomes for Ritter, by contrast, the “gewähren” of “Freude” and “Befriedigung” that 
participation in this natural organization brings humanity (“wie möchte überhaupt die Welt uns 
Freude und Befriedigung gewähren, träfen wir nicht überall auf Aehnliches!” Ritter writes above 
in the Versuch, a clear intertext with Herder’s commentary). And finally, the “Gedankenloses 
Glied” becomes Ritter’s privileged member, the point of sociopolitical mediation or Indifferenz 
between the poles of individual and whole. Not gedankenlos but precisely the conscious agent of 
                                                 







the species vocation of humanity: the agent who heals humanity’s traumatic severing from 
nature, searching through science for the appropriate source-materials with which to do so. 
Ultimately, for Ritter there is only one naturepolitical Anstalt: nature provides the 
organizational structure in which the membering of human society emerges. Nature already is an 
institution which leads us to discover ourselves in relation to each other and the surrounding 
environment:  
wir [müssen] doch zuletzt nur—Eine—Große—Anstalt der Natur erkennen […] den 
Menschen aus Sich Selbst auf die Entdeckung des höchsten und Einzigen aller Wege zu 
leiten, der ihn auf die sein Eigenes Glück vollziehendste Art dem letzten Ziele des ihm 
aufgegebnen Strebens ohnfehlbar zuführt.344 
It is by investigating the encompassing natural institution, the establishment of cosmic 
procreative force, that humanity finds new redemptive knowledge of itself as well:  
um sich einer früher getrennten Natur mit Erfolg von neuem zu vereinigen, das sicherste 
Mittel dieses sey, Sich, und dann diese Natur Selbst, zu kennen, woraus sofort die 
Vereinigung sich ohne Weiteres ergebe, ist eine Wahrheit, die sehr einfach scheint, 
demohngeachtet aber erst erfunden werden mußte.345 
It is at this point that Ritter can link his on-going research on electromagnetism to the above 
discourse on political Gliederung: in what, Ritter asks, can this discovery be found, what 
discovery initiated modern dynamic science as the messianic reunification with the natural 
institution? “Eine viel bedingtere und spätere Entdeckung,” he continues in this same passage, 
“war von wo für die Verfolgung einer solchen Gleichung zwischen der Natur und Sich, er 
auszugehen habe, und dann:—in was der so gegebene Punkt des Ausgangs wohl zu finden 
sey?”346 The text immediately answers its own rhetorical question: the species-epochal 
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recognition that first began to illuminate humanity’s path back (or forwards) towards 
reunification with nature—towards the proliferation, in other words, of members, systematic 
membering, and cosmopolitical membership—is the mythic and now modern scientific 
discovery of fire. With a nod to the Pre-Socratic monism of fire, among other essential elements, 
Ritter quickly passes from such primal scientific scenes to their appearance in contemporary 
physics. Dynamic Naturphilosophie around 1800, he argues, is still a kind of open-ended 
doctrine of fire:  
Wieweit bis gegenwärtig diese Feuerwissenschaft, die Lebenswissenschaft zugleich, und 
ganz dasselbe, was Physik in ihrer allgemeineren Bedeutung seyn kann, auch ist, 
vorgeschritten sey?—ist eine Frage, die man mit gleicher Ungeduld jetzt an uns thun 
wird.347 
This impatience, Ritter claims, is also shared by the contemporary scientific community. And as 
we saw above, such impatience is certainly shared by Ritter’s new mythological predecessors 
(Schelling and Schlegel) as well. The progress of electromagnetic discovery, the new 
Feuerwissenschaft, has reached such a critical mass—most of the early breakthroughs in the field 
occurring at least in nuce in this period (Ritter being a not-insignificant contributor)—that 
dynamic physics now appears as a kind of second, revolutionary Prometheanism. This is exactly 
                                                 
347 Contemporary scientific discovery is obviously of central importance to Ritter; as Wetzels notes, discovery 
(Erfindung) is just as much a form of historical and ultimately cosmological revelation for him: “Für Ritter bedeutet 
[…] die Tatsache, daß der Galvanismus gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts entdeckt wurde, ganz konkret, daß der 
lebendige Geist in der Natur sich seiner selbst bewußt wurde. Die Entdeckungsgeschichte der Natur ist die 
Geschichte ihres Weges zum Bewußtsein, genauer: die Geschichte der Entdeckungen ist die Entwicklungsgeschichte 
der Natur zur Bewußtheit. Gleichzeitig sind naturwissenschaftliche Entdeckungen natürlich eine weitere Stufe in der 
Fortschrittsgeschichte des Menschen. Wissenschaftsgeschichte als Erlösungsgeschichte der Natur, gleichzeitig als 
die wissende Rückkehr des Menschen in die Gemeinschaft mit allen Dingen und Erscheinungen in der Natur; das ist 
das beherrschende Thema dieser Rede. Ritter geht dabei von der anfänglichen, glücklichen Einheit von Mensch und 
Natur aus, beschreibt ihren notwendigen Zerfall und den mühsamen, aber offensichtlich erfolgreichen Weg der 
Physik, auf einer höheren, d.h. bewußteren Stufe die alte Intimität mit der Natur wiederzugewinnen” (Wetzels, 45). I 
would only add to this synopsis the following: Ritter stipulates that such a restoration of the “alte Intimität” between 
human and nature comes in the form of a political organization. The ideal state institution—as the most productive 







the kind of material content the Systemprogramm and Rede explored as a potential source of new 
mythology. 
In a Novalisian vision of initiates gathering together to study the strange and wonderful 
network of human-nature correspondence, the most explicit new mythological image of Physik 
als Kunst—the magnet—is found precisely here with the modern insight into fire. What the 
dynamic scientist actually does, or rather what the Anstalt of Romantic scientists will make 
possible, is a collective research project on magnetism that rethinks the very conditions of 
possibility of life as such:  
Wie Schüler um einen mit fremder Weisheit Ausgerüsteten, versammelten sie sich um 
ihn [der Magnet], ihm zu folgen; auch ihnen könne sichrer Weg auf diese Art nicht 
fehlen. Und wirklich schloß er ihnen ein noch völlig unbekanntes Land auf; einen neuen 
Quell des Feuers lehrte er sie kennen, den Electrischen. Wie ein zweyter Prometheischer, 
den ersten selbst noch übertreffender Raub, wurde dieses Feuer von den Sterblichen 
empfangen. Nicht Donner und Blitz dem Himmel abgelernt zu haben, war, deß man sich 
erfreute: die große Frage um das Leben erhielt jetzt neues Leben.348  
But Ritter will not remain entirely within the register of mythic narrative we have seen him so far 
sustain; there is an important slippage just here between the strange (“fremder”) ancient wisdom 
of magnetism and the modern revelation of the “Electrischen”: while they seem to share the 
same discursive language and image-worlds,349 the evolution of fire into electricity brings with it 
a new opportunity for modern humanity. The community (Versammlung) of magnetic 
Naturforscher, just now establishing a field of investigation in the “völlig unbekanntes Land” of 
electrical life (and one could perhaps think here of the meaning of Novalis as a pseudonym, as 
the one who clears out or opens up new land),350 suddenly appears as the emergence of a 
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349 Holland writes: “Ritter finds in the electrical spark a template of all forms in the organic and inorganic realms, 







contemporary scientific body, a modern institution that proliferates natural scientific research. 
And it should be remembered that at the time of writing, Ritter was already a member, a 
“Mitglied” or “Schüler” of just such an institution, namely: the Royal Bavarian Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, to whose community of intellectuals (Schelling among them) Physik als Kunst 
was originally presented.  
Ritter’s account has thereby become self-reflexive, for the Academy has gathered around 
him for the report of the second, this time scientific and new mythological Promethean theft of 
fire through electromagnetism: Ritter as individual is the receiver and announcer of this new 
mythological gift—not to mention the fact that his research is essentially dedicated to producing 
electromagnetic phenomena—but in line with the doctrine of Gliederung, he will not be satisfied 
until he can articulate such individual events of (self)discovery as part of a historical process of 
collective development, as part of a naturepolitical narrative with direct significance for the 
national community in which he lives. The academy of sciences, at least in his speech, is to 
become the institute in which this significance is developed further, and this as a shared project 
of a community of scientific members. 
The rhetorical transition from mythic origin-story to the contemporary historical present 
occurs just as Ritter identifies electrical discovery as leading to the rejuvenation of the question 
of life itself (“die große Frage um das Leben erhielt jetzt neues Leben”). And here he draws on 
the same messianic trope the Systemprogramm ends with. Ritter continues the passage above: 
“Wer von oben seine Hand ihm [humanity] dazu bietet, ist wie Sie Selbst [the “Harmonie” of 
                                                 






Gliederung] ihm heilig.”351 He immediately identifies the transcendent agent, or rather 
collective—that body which will lead humanity to its redemptive Feuerwissenschaft—as the 
very institute he addresses: 
Es begeht ein Institut am heutigen Tage sein Jahresfeyer, das bestellt ist, sich mit dem zu 
beschäftigen, was durch Vermehrung der Cultur der Individuen, sie selbst dem Glücke 
der Vereinigung zu einem höhern Ganzen immer fähiger und würdiger zu machen hat. 
Erhabne Stiftung! Das Haupt des Staats Selbst sieht in ihren Gliedern nur die Erräther 
Seines Eignen Willens! Sie, die gewürdigt sind, an sich zuerst Ihn zu vollziehen, sollen 
einer Nation die Zeugen seiner Vortrefflichkeit, und Beyspiel, seyn. O daß, ein Mitglied 
dieses schönen Bunds, ich fähig wäre, seiner Erneuerung Fest so mitzufeyern, wie ich 
wünschte. Vollende Treue, was der That gebricht!352 
Given the simultaneously open and over-determined image of the state already at play in this 
portion of Physik als Kunst, the “Haupt des Staats Selbst” now appears to flicker between, on the 
one hand, all the various figures of the mythic state—Staats-begründer/Staats-bewahrer/Staats-
verjünger/Staats-verewiger—who, as the final instance of humanity’s movement through natural 
science towards cosmic reunification, appear as nothing other than the collective agent of 
national Wissenschaft. On the other hand, the head of the state itself appears directly as the 
present reigning sovereign Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria, under whose official auspices the 
Akademie der Wissenschaften pursues its work. The academy’s research scientists and historians, 
insofar as they represent that organ of the state that pursues humanity’s messianic discovery of 
nature through science (or so Ritter understands the institute’s mandate, exhorting his colleagues 
to do the same) these researchers appear now as the modern embodiment of Ritter’s doctrine of 
naturepolitical membership. The head of the state already sees in them its privileged “Gliedern” 
(the “Erräther Seines Eignen Willens”). Ritter calls on his community (“Sie,” the members of the 
                                                 
351 Ritter, 534. To repeat the Systemprogramm’s closing line: “Ein höherer Geist, vom Himmel gesandt, muß diese 
neue Religion unter uns stiften.”  
 






academy) to become the representative body of a coming scientific state in Bavaria, the 
“scientifische Republik” Novalis also calls for, based on a holistic metadisciplinary practice.353 
 And yet, this vocation for contemporary science, as in the Systemprogramm and Rede, is 
also a matter of deferral, a development for a future body of members: “O daß, ein Mitglied 
dieses schönen Bunds, ich fähig wäre, seiner Erneuerung Fest so mitzufeyern, wie ich 
wünschte.” Even while Ritter ingratiates himself with the institution that supports his work—and 
the political regime that in turn sponsors all science in Bavaria—he openly acknowledges that 
the full import of modern wissen-schaffen has not yet been revealed: the renewal (“Erneuerung”) 
he desires for it is not yet in sight. Whenever it does become visible, the scientist, who 
understands the nature of nature as a field of dynamic membering, will embody the highest form 
of humanity by striving for reconciliation with an alienated nature—and the individual and 
collective alike, bound up together in the third instance of the member—will feel itself most 
human when it dedicates itself to a natural science no longer alienated from social application.354   
  But Ritter still remains faithful to his projected vision of a nation of scientists, for which 
his own institute remains but a prototype (“Vollende Treue, was der That gebricht!”), even if the 
efforts to realize it, and he self-deprecates his own in this regard as well, often appear wanting 
                                                 
353 In Blüthenstaub, Novalis writes: “innigste Gemeinschaft aller Kenntnisse, scientifische Republik, ist der hohe 
Zweck der Gelehrten” (Novalis, 2:450). He continues in the next fragment, essentially describing what Ritter 
understands as a cosmics, the new mythological super-science: “Sollte nicht die Distanz einer besondern 
Wissenschaft von der allgemeinen, und so der Rang der Wissenschaften untereinander, nach der Zahl ihrer 
Grundsatze zu rechnen seyn? Je weniger Grundsatze, desto hoher die Wissenschaft” (Ibid.). 
 
354 Marx gestures towards a similar expansion of the role of the modern scientist as sociopolitically expressive and 
effective: “auch wenn ich wissenschaftlich etc. tätig bin, eine Tätigkeit, die ich selten in unmittelbarer Gemeinschaft 
mit andern ausführen kann, so bin ich gesellschaftlich, weil als Mensch tätig” (Karl Marx, Ökonomisch-
Philosophische Manuskripten aus dem Jahre 1844 [Berlin: Dietz]. To use Marx’s terms: for Ritter, to be a scientist 
in its true sense means to engage with the known and unknown phenomena of nature in order to overcome nature’s 
alienation from humanity, and the human’s alienation from its fellows, and so to bind humanity together in reworked 






from the perspective of the ideal naturepolitical institution. For him there is much more work to 
be done, although the important breakthroughs are already occurring. And he continues this 
work, or the call to construct a national organ based on naturephilosopical science—the 
construction of the Ritterian Wissenschaftsnation—in the prologue to the Fragmente, where he 
introduces the massive fragment collection as an invitation to found an alternative German state. 
Here the fictional narrator of the prologue is presented as the editor-compiler of the young 
physicist’s estate, and his comments on the overall project of the young physicist can be 
understood as Ritter’s most nationalist construal of the mission of new mythological science: 
Er [the young physicist] hatte den Gedanken,—verzeiht ihm, wenn er kühn erscheint,—
Euch, [the German nation]—was Ihr noch nie gewesen,—als Nation zur Pflege der 
Wissenschaft einzuladen [...] Der Augenblick indeß sey nahe, glaubte er, wo Ihr, auf eine 
eigenthümliche Weise, und dabey nicht minder für gleich eigenthümliche Zwecke, 
praktisch in das große Werk der Natur eintreten wollen werdet,—um von ihr 
Entschuldigungen zu genießen, die Ihr von keiner weltlichen Macht mehr verlangen 
könnet, und die Euch mit der höchsten in der Wissenschaft selbst krönen werden. Er hatte 
einen Plan entworfen, und oft mit mir sich über ihn unterhalten (weil er beständig an ihm 
bildete und nachtrug), der die Schicksale der Wissenschaft in Deutschland, und die von 
ihm mit größter Zuversicht gehoffte Wiedergeburt derselben durch aus, von allem 
Wechsel menschlicher Begebenheit und Laune unabhängig machte, und sie gänzlich in 
die Hände derer legte, die nie fielen, wo es werth war, zu stehen: in die Eurigen.355 
Fidelity to this plan remains, and so at the end of Physik als Kunst, by way of returning to the 
political frame-narrative of the text, Ritter again invokes a kind of heterotopic state institution 
that practically engages the great work of nature (“praktisch in das große Werk der Natur 
eintreten”). This state is simultaneously actual and ideal. It is a national body of German 
scientists whose work on dynamic force itself represents the coming utopian figure, the scientific 
Prometheus of imaginary Bavaria. But it is also a real institute of state-sponsored research that 
needs the support of the present Bavarian monarch.356 Above all, what it needs is a national 
                                                 







basis, a citizen-body of scientists capable of engaging with the new dynamic concept of nature. 
Nevertheless, for Ritter, just as for his new mythological predecessors, it would appear that 
German postrevolutionary society is not yet ready for such an alternative proposed in their 
















                                                 
356 Ritter’s Staat or Anstalt is clearly speculative and futural: while addressing the Bavarian King, Ritter is just as 
much addressing an imaginary one, as we have seen. Schelling also invested profound hopes in the development of a 
natural science as a project of speculative politics. For him, as for Ritter, this was to be a more specific national—
indeed regional—project of cultural renewal whose proper place had to be within the contemporary Bavarian state. 
They both believed that southern Germany (and precisely not Prussia) was the site where this development could 
flourish the most. Schelling, furthermore, found direct political significance in Ritter’s research (see Strickland, 








CHAPTER 3. EXCURSUS: NACHTPOLITIK 
 
Wäre also nicht noch immer ein Buch zu schreiben, welches das ganze Verderben unsrer 
Regierungen, und unsrer Sitten, hier von seiner lächerlichen, hier von seiner schrecklichen Seite 
zeigte [...] ?- Es müßte in einer bildlichen Einkleidung, mit etwas scherzhaften Wendungen 
geschrieben sein, teils um der Deutlichkeit willen, teils um von unserm frivolen Zeitalter gelesen 
zu werden. 
- Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Zufällige Gedanken in einer schlaflosen Nacht357 
 
Die Polizei, bekanntlich ein prosaisches Institut ohne Glauben an Gespenster, hat auch kein 
Herz für Romantik. 
- Theodor Fontane, Wanderungen durch die Mark Brandenburg358 
 
Da es nun einmal gegen die bürgerliche Ordnung ist, und es durchasu nicht erlaubt wird, 
romantische Poesie in das Leben zu führen, so bringt man lieber sein Leben in die romantische 
Poesie hinein; dagagen kann keine Polizei und keine Erziehungsanstalt etwas haben.  
- Dorothea Schlegel, Letter to her son359 
 
Introduction: Romanticism in Descent 
Wild political thinking proceeds speculatively, in conceptual and practical movements of 
ecstatic unbounding or unbordering, but this also means to the fullest extent of critical reflection, 
which necessarily includes self-criticism. As we have seen, the Romantic political imaginary is 
invested in ideal forms of life and practices of knowledge—whether understood in affective, 
natural-scientific, or aesthetic terms—that always either originate in or somehow bridge to the 
cosmic dimension, resolving into figures of a transcendent absolute, of whatever particular cast. 
Romanticism, as a politics and otherwise, constitutes an idealism of a kind, if not exclusively or 
                                                 
357 Johann Gottlob Fichte, “Zufällige Gedanken in einer schlaflosen Nacht.” Schriften zur Revolution (Wiesbaden: 
Springer, 1967), 2. 
 
358 Theodore Fontane, Wanderungen durch den Mark Brandenburg (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1907), 104. 
 






exhaustively so. Thus a major strand of Romantic political self-criticism resolves into a 
materialist critique of its own abstract theoretical systems and aesthetic fantasies, a dedicated 
attempt to reassess its writerly ideal and idealist existence in its connections to the realities of 
everyday life—the transitoriness of all things, the vain attempt to make it intelligible, intentional, 
the capriciousness and evident lack of teleological aim to life. But it also turns to its embodiment 
in contemporary society—in interpersonal social relations, participation in the practical 
procedures of civil institutions and political laws, in the modern subject’s entanglement in 
processes of socioeconomic capture and rationalization. Romanticism, at least in a certain 
instance, brings itself back down to earth in this self-critique, or is forced downward from 
transcendence by a Romantic “base materialism”360 that demands a propaganda of the deed, an 
oppositional confrontation with, and not just an imaginative reconfiguration of the current status 
quo, a material intervention into the present intellectual and sociopolitical determination of the 
historical moment.  
But precisely here we see another version of a wild political imagination in a series of 
descending gestures, trajectories that do not fly towards an aerial absolute, so to speak, but 
embed themselves all the more deeply in the mundane or earthly core of human life in its modern 
appearance. And so when the idealist patterns of Romanticism itself, in a self-reflexive 
movement, are assessed along these lines in application to their sociopolitical environment—in 
lived interaction with the ideological control-structures of the modern age and its projected 
                                                 
360 I borrow the term from George Bataille’s critique of Surrealism, in which Bataille, himself a kind of para-
Surrealist, castigates the Surrealist movement (Andre Breton above all) as only pursuing an apolitical Icarian 
fantasy; he postulates, in contradistinction to the thought of the “superman,” the figure of the “old mole,” Marx’s 
subterranean agent of revolutionary material change (Georges Bataille, “The ‘Old Mole’ and the Prefix Sur in the 
Words Surhomme [Superman] and Surrealist.” Visions of Excess. Translated by Allan Stoekl [Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1985], 32. As we will see in the following, Bataille’s sustained attack on his own 






quotidian practices, norms of comportment and horizons of conventional activity—it results in a 
self-transformation that makes it all the more effective, indeed produces its most transgressive 
revolutionary image, as we will see, in a new activation of political nihilism. Here the Romantic 
text involves itself in existential change by finding the most direct access to the reigning 
structures of society, and targets itself in the process. 
Such a Romanticism in descent can be found in the much-neglected novel Nachtwachen, 
written in 1804 by August Klingemann and published pseudonomously under the name 
Bonaventura.361 It is itself a kind of para-romantic work from an imaginary author that comes, as 
it were, from the outside in order to deliver an envoy to the political aesthetics in formation in 
this period. When Nachtwachen is used for an exploration of political Romanticism—the 
intention of the following excursus—it coalesces, in the most general terms, into yet another 
Romantic imperative: the modern poet must come down from his or her tower of isolation, they 
must adapt their transformative practice to the development of the times, taking into 
consideration the increasingly strict social regimentation, economic exploitation, and general 
existential control that confronts the modern subject. Nachtwachen proposes a solution, the 
means to transform Romantic practice with its own resources: infiltrate the structure; apply 
romanticization in practical situations, to everyday events and encounters; increase the anarchic 
chaos subtending modern sociopolitical domination by accelerating it from the inside, within its 
own institutions and networks; turn the state apparatus against itself; proliferate acts of 
microresistance in the form of pranks; in short, disrupt the status quo of everyday (or everynight) 
relations in whatever way possible. The Romantic poet, in effect, so says Bonaventura, must 
                                                 






begin to work for the state, but as a kind of secret agent still pursuing the aims of a totalizing 
Romantic revolution that destroys the state—and all social controls—in their present forms. 
The same operations of thought that the modern Romantic poet depends on must be 
rechanneled back onto aesthetic activity in order to make it actually practicable: in Nachtwachen 
imaginative procedures of elevation towards ideality must be countered with descent, and thus 
rendered elastic through the material energetic change in this shift, the dynamic alteration 
introduced through a radical imposition of objective social concerns, in correspondence with the 
concrete instantiation of the present sociopolitical environment. The program of existential 
transformation must be pursued, this time, not in the excess of speculative ideals, but in the dirty 
realia of quotidian existence, in encounters in the public sphere, down in the street. And yet this 
too is a speculative endeavor, and no Romantic Realpolitik: Nachtwachen pushes the political 
imagination towards a new sense of materiality and commitment to material conditions, but 
solely in the attempt to dramatize a more effective—because sociopolitically consequent—form 
of imaginative intervention. In this sense, the novel represents the practical version of the wild 
political paradigm even in its most abyssal or nihilistic expressions (explored in more detail 
below), the mode in which operations of the Romantic system of thought are rethought at the 
basis of actual embodied situations, scenes of everyday life such as one would find in any given 
German-speaking community around 1800. 
Nachtwachen unfolds as a fragmentary series of journal reports by its protagonist, 
Kreuzgang, as he fulfills his duties as nightwatchman for his city. A kind of failed romantic poet 
himself, among many other occupations, Kreuzgang has found his true place as part of the local 
police. In fidelity to his idée fixe, his incomprehensible and contradictory nature, as a 






supposed to keep, perverting the very concept of the Polizei he ostensibly safeguards at night. 
The nightwatch becomes a movement according to his own sense of chaotic anarchy, 
transforming the nightscape into the dramatic scene for his—and all of wider society’s—
nihilisitic despair and will-to-destruction. The journals of Kreuzgang’s different nightwatches, 
which jump in time and space, weaving his prior history into the diegetic present (itself 
uncertain), relate an ongoing confrontation, but also breakdown, between a modern subject, as 
romantic outsider-figure, and the social strictures of the postrevolutionary world. 
Even so—or precisely as its consequence—this breakdown happens in dialogue with a 
critique of the modern poet’s status under conditions of nascent modernization. It includes a 
vision of an alternative artistic practice: that of the nightwatchman himself, whose anti-Polizei 
model offers a novel interventionist aesthetics. The poet of the city, the constant object of 
Kreuzgang’s routine observations—on his rounds, down on the street below, looking up at the 
poet’s candlelit garret window, writing through the night in a frustrated attempt to reach the 
Absolute (and to dodge his creditors)—this becomes the nightwatchman’s occasion for 
polemical engagement with the task of modern aesthetics in general, his call for the Staatspoet to 
recognize the fact of social-material embeddeness, and act on it, in order to avoid the complete 
ineffectiveness and irrelevancy the establishment imposes. Poetry—and its specifically Romantic 
form—is policed, in this sense, by one of its own members, but only in order to increase the 
power of its ungovernability. The obverse of this is that the Polizei, the institution of law and 
order for the establishment, is thereby romanticized, transformed from within by one of its own 
agents subverting its governance. Kreuzgang’s nightwatches, or the experimental practice of 
nachtwachen he describes, represents an alternative Romanticism in this sense, and the 






essentially Romantic operations of thought back onto its characteristic aesthetic practices, 
extending their speculative content precisely in their material concretization, dramatized in 
different scenes through the eyes of a nightwatchman, observing and reflecting on his 
community at night. 
From a certain perspective, it might appear unexpected that one of the most extreme and 
self-critical subjective figurations of Romanticism would come in the form of a policeman, and 
this a lowly nightwatchman at that, perhaps the only state agent or occupation possessing a clear 
affinity with the Romantic poet of the night. And yet perhaps not: when Romanticism begins to 
critically (and satirically) reflect back on its own position within the contemporary moment, it 
would appear altogether logical that it would be a nightwatchman figure who would perform this 
policing function on the sociopolitical naivete of modern aesthetics. And it is entirely fitting that 
when the Romantic system of thought does become the object of a certain form of aestheticized 
nightwatchman—whose activity of nachtwachen involves so much more than just securing the 
territory, including a whole aesthetics itself, an anti-aesthetics, as Kreuzgang puts it—the 
resulting vision would be far more a kind of anti-Polizei function applied to poetic and social 
practices alike, a Nachtpolitik designed as an experimental disruption of status quo modern life.  
3.1 The Polizei-Function around 1800 
Joseph von Sonnenfels, the literary author, theorist and professor of political science, 
begins his 1770 Grundsätze der Polizey, Handlung, und Finanz with a discussion of the general 
definition of the police. For Sonnenfels, the seventeenth and eighteenth century administrative-






provides a diffuse and ill-defined notion of the police.362 Accordingly, one of the main tasks of 
his treatise is to identify the proper function of what was then called “good policy” (gute Policey) 
in its institutionalization within the larger state apparatus and specific relations to the populace. 
Moving through a review of the contemporary field of Polizeiwissenschaft, whose theories all 
appear to him “nicht ganz richtig,” Sonnenfels emphasizes the dual-attribute ascribed to the 
police up until the nineteenth century: it is responsible for the security of the territory, but above 
all for the domestic quality of life of its subjects:363 
das Hauptaugenmerk [ist] nicht auf das Sicherheits—sondern viel mehr einzig auf das 
Wohlfahrts-Fach gerichtet [...] Nach diesen Begriffen hätte dann die Staatspolizei der 
physisch und moralischen Wolfart des Staats, die Vervollkommnung des physischen und 
moralischen Zustandes vom Volke zum Gegenstand, und wäre also eines Theils 
Bevölkerungs-Oekonomie-Gewerbs-und Handelspolizei, andern Theils Religiosität-
Kirchen-Aufklärungs-und Sittenpolizei.364 
Coming to his own definition, Sonnenfels immediately qualifies the above, adding that the 
Polizei must indeed include a mandate of security (Sicherheit) for its state and population:   
Nach meinen Ansichten ist die Polizei derjenige Theil der Staatsgewalt, welcher nicht nur 
für Erhaltung der Sicherheit im Innern Sorge trägt, sondern auch die Wohlfahrt der 
                                                 
362 Almost half a century later, one of the Grimms’ definitions of the Polizei could still begin in a similar fashion: 
“die versuche, den begriff der polizei wissenschaftlich zu construieren, beginnen seit der mitte des vorigen jahrh., 
doch ist es noch heute ein vielumstrittener begriff [...]” Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch 
(München: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1984), 1982. 
 
363 This general definition can be found in a variety of texts concerning the Polizei around 1800. In his 1799 
Handbuch der Teutschen Policeyrechts, for example, Günter Heinrich von Berg writes that the Polizei is charged 
“nicht allein auf die Gefahren der Sicherheit, sondern auch auf die Gefahren der Wohlfahrt ihr Augenmerk zu 
richten [...]” (Günter Heinrich von Berg, Deutsche Geschichte in Quellen und Darstellungen, ed. Walter Demel und 
Uwe Puschner [Stuttgart: Reclam, 1995], 238. The Polizei is thereby given a broad social welfare function that is 
largely absent in the more narrow concept of the police as a force of retributive and punitive justice, as evident in 
modern police forces’ stress on “to protect,” rather than “to serve.” Thus Michel Foucault could write that the “full 
and strict sense” of the police in the eighteenth century is “not the repression of disorder, but an ordered 
maximization of collective and individual forces” (Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality [New York: Vintage 
Books, 1988], 24). The difference with today’s explicitly repressive police institutions can perhaps best be captured 
by the fact that German Kameralismus is dedicated to the production of allgemeine Glückseligkeit as opposed to the 
enforcement of negative rights. For a discussion of this difference, see Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch, 
“Cameralism as ‘political metaphysics’: Human nature, the state, and natural law in the thought of Johann Heinrich 
Gottlob von Justi.” European Journal for the History of Economic Thought 16, no. 3 (2009). 
 







Staatsbürger in allen Fällen, wo die andern besondern Zweige der Staatsgewalt ihrer 
eigentümlichen Bestimmung noch nicht wirksam sind, zu befördern sucht.365  
 
The police, at least in Sonnenfels’ prescriptions, is therefore a comprehensive program of both 
physical and moral welfare and protection, essential for the maintenance and defense of the 
entire domestic field of production and risk, from finance and commerce to religion and 
education.366 As security force, but above all as welfare provider, the domain of the police 
extends across every aspect of social and official organization, indeed penetrates into the 
citizen’s everyday behaviors and interactions, regulating but also helping to perfect the body of 
the state as a smoothly functioning—and easily governable—totality.367 
One aspect of Sonnenfel’s treatment of the Polizei deserves note, and this shows its 
departure from the contemporary field of Polizeiwissenschaft: in addition to its security and 
welfare functions, the ideal institution or practice of the Polizei constitutes an ad hoc extension 
of any and all state entities that, as he writes, are “noch nicht wirksam,” or remain to be 
improved in the future. It substitutes for the limitations, insufficiencies, and ineffective nature of 
a governmental apparatus that in this period is just beginning to rapidly differentiate itself into 
various functional bodies, branches, and disciplines (Zweige der Staatsgewalt), reorganizing 
itself according to new discursive and scientific shifts in governmental practice (e.g., 
                                                 
365 Ibid., 13. My emphasis. 
 
366 Again compare the Grimms’ definition: “im allgemeinsten sinne ist polizei die sorge eines staats oder eines 
gemeindewesens (unter staatlicher leitung) für das gemeinwohl mittels obrigkeitlichen zwanges; sie zerfällt nach 
umfang und wirkungskreis in eine staats- oder landespolizei, gemeinde- oder ortspolizei (stadt-, dorf-, landpolizei), 
verwaltungs-, wohlfahrts-, sicherheits-, gesundheitspolizei, straszen-, baupolizei u. s. w.: die polizei hat eigentlich 
zum zweck das bequeme leben der glieder des staats” (Grimms, 1982). For a discussion of this and the earlier cited 
definition from the Grimms see Leif Weatherby, “Police Psychology: E.T.A. Hoffmann, Johann Beckmann, and 
Technological Narration,” Romantic Circles (Dec. 2016). 
 
367 Joseph Vogl describes this aspect of the Polizei not as totalizing, but as totalitarian: the “Policey-Träumen des 
achtzehnten Jahrhunderts” had the intention of “alle Bereiche des politischen Körpers in einer Weise zu 






cameralism). In addition to increasing the “Wohlfahrt der Staatsbürger in allen Fällen,” the 
Polizei is also responsible for the general welfare of the state itself insofar as it helps regulate the 
state’s total efficacy when and where needed, projecting its needs into the future.368  
This idea foregrounds a certain futural aspect of the Polizei, namely: as a kind of organ of 
the noch nicht of the state. As such, the Polizei is responsible—sometime in the future, whenever 
necessary—for filling in all the gaps and holes in the territory that the state has not yet been able 
to administrate, to render the state more effective everywhere it proves unable to do so. Thus the 
ideal institution of the Polizei becomes in this way also a conceptual operation, a generalized 
Polizei-function that can be extrapolated and applied to any social processes and bodies as they 
develop, mediating for them, helping them flourish, and above all rerouting their productive (and 
disruptive) energies back into the control structures of the state. The Polizei-function is that 
which progressively secures anything that still lies beyond the grasp of the normative regime of 
the state or society and its individual institutions and services, everything that operates in excess 
to what has already been made governable and utilizable in the pool of resources and dangers 
(Gefahren) the community possesses and is confronted with. 
Hence the various, and in the end unsuccessful, attempts of Polizeiwissenschaft—of 
which Sonnenfels is well aware—to specify the expansive and diffuse Polizei-function in the 
context of an already-existing state apparatus (including its police force) with practically limited 
resources and manpower. But Sonnenfels envisions a state that is conscious of itself, 
theoretically at least, as infinitely expandable and totalizable through its Polizei-function. There 
                                                 
368 As Vogl puts it, “Die Policey ist also Erkenntnisweise, Instrumentarium und Interventionsprogramm zugleich, 
und die zahlreichen zeitgenössischen Definitionen kreisen im wesentlichen um zwei Momente polizeilicher 
Finalität: um die Optimierung sozialen Potentials und um den Versuch, dem Staat unter konkreten Bedingungen 






is no limit, in other words, to a state’s potential horizons of control provided it continuously 
deploys this mobile—and indeed metadisciplinary—institution of the police. It is capable not 
only of stop-gap policing the immediately practical problems of a community as they arise day to 
day, but also of forecasting the future, predicting those areas of new and potentially dangerous 
social interaction that will need to be captured and controlled as they gradually emerge.369 The 
police must constantly reach beyond itself to shore up the boundaries of the state, and thus to 
allow its more effective operation; it always seeks to administrate the Interzones that surround 
the homogenous sphere of the well-ordered community. For Sonnenfels, good policy, and its 
agents, identify and refunctionalize social heterogeneity as it comes into conflict with the 
control-structures of the police-state. 
In another sense, however, the very fact that Polizeiwissenschaft in the eighteenth century 
is so varied and prolific would seem to indicate a certain anxiety about the impossibility of total 
state control, and thus the need to repeatedly address and delineate the subject. As a kind of 
Staatsangst, this anxiety would be the obverse of what Vogl, citing Foucault, terms the 
“Staatsbegehren” of modernity, its “‘gigantischer und unbezähmbarer Durst’ nach dem Staat.”370 
Here the Polizei-function, by the very fact that it proceeds according to a kind of totalizing logic 
of state networking, attests not only to the state’s fear of lack of power, but also to the material 
historical condition of the state around 1800—its current stage of unequal scientific-
technological and practical development—as unable to totally regulate its populace. Staatsangst, 
as the negative corollary to Staatsbegehren, is the state’s fear that it is not yet (noch nicht) fully 
                                                 
369 It is in this sense that Vogl notes: “Lässt sich Politik als Kunst definieren, ‘in der Zukunft zu lesen,’ so befasst 
sich die Policey nun mit der Aufgabe einer cura advertendi futura, mit der Aufgabe also, die Zunkunft des Staats 
vorhersehbar zu machen” (Ibid., 607). 
  






capable of administrating and governing the excesses, deviations, and outliers of its citizen-base 
in such a way as to incorporate them into a unified, controllable, regulatable social sphere. 
3.2 The Problem(atic) of the Nightwatchman 
There is perhaps nowhere that such a Staatsangst manifests itself more acutely than in the 
contested Polizei-function of the nightwatchman around 1800. The voice and horn of the 
nightwatchman, echoing through the empty streets of the city, was a familiar facet of the 
European nightscape from the Middle Ages to the mid-nineteenth century. Far older than the 
institution of the police to which he was eventually subordinated, starting in the eighteenth 
century in Germany, and especially in the context of a rapidly modernizing Polizeistaat and 
Polizeiwissenschaft, the nightwatchman becomes a point of contention or weak link, a potentially 
irresponsible and untrustworthy agent of the state.371  
Sonnenfels describes the institution of the nightwatch in its ideal form as an essential sub-
organ of the Polizei. The nightwatchman is responsible for protecting the citizens and property of 
his community, serving and protecting during the most dangerous time in the circadian rhythm of 
the city, when socially-deviant practices flourish under the protection of darkness. While keeping 
the “Sicherheit in den Städten zur Nachtzeit,”372 guarding against such abnormalities in the form 
of suspicious and foreign persons, criminals, and beggars, Sonnenfels describes the 
nightwatchman’s duties as also including the following: “die Stunden aufzurufen”373—
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Roger Ekirch, At Day’s Close: Night in Times Past [New York: W.W. Norton, 2005], 75.  
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reinforcing early modern time discipline;374 the maintenance of “die Beleuchtung der 
Städte”375—contributing to the transformation of the urban environment into a visible and 
controllable area; and finally, keeping “ein beobachtendes Aug”376 on the lookout for the 
outbreak of fire at night—the nightwatchman’s most important duty from the practical standpoint 
of city authorities.377 The nightwatchman, in sum, provides a number of different state services 
simultaneously under the domain of both welfare and security, operating as the only active 
policeman in the risk-filled timespace of the night. 
But if the Polizei must be mobile and elastic enough in order to fill in the gaps “in allen 
Fällen, wo die andern besondern Zweige der Staatsgewalt […] noch nicht wirksam sind,” for 
many other municipal adminstrators in this period the nightwatchman often constitutes a kind of 
gap or weak link in the structure of the Polizei itself. The different ways the nightwatchman 
actually disrupts his community can be tracked in many city ordinances that address exactly this 
problem. Not only is the calling of the hour often reported as a disturbance to the sleeping 
populace, it also alerts criminals to the exact location of the only policeman (according to one 
                                                 
374 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari observe that alongside the clock’s function as “a technical machine for 
measuring uniform time,” it is also “a social machine for reproducing canonic hours and for assuring order in the 
city” (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1983], 141). This 
latter social-disciplinary function is even more pronounced in connection with the nightwatchman whose role is to 
both call the hour at night and police what is deemed permissable in the urban night. On the role of time discipline in 
capitalism see E.P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism.” Past & Present, no. 38 (1967). 
As to the standardization of time discipline specifically in Germany around 1800, see Michael J. Sauter 
“Clockwatchers and Stargazers: Time Discipline in Early Modern Berlin.” American Historical Review 112, no. 3 
(2007). 
 
375 Sonnenfels, 204. 
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377 A similar description of the nightwatchman’s duties can be found in an 1809 ordinance by the Fürstentum Lippe-
Detmold: “Es liegt dem Nachtwächter die wichtige Pflicht ob, die Nachtheile und Gefahren, welche dem Vermögen, 
der Gesundheit, und dem Leben der Menschen während ihrer nächtlichen Ruhe durch Feuer, Diebstahl, Raub, 
andere Bosheit und Nachlässigkeit oder Zufall zugefügt werden können oder drohen, so viel in seinen Kräften 






official edict: “Da durch das Singen [calling of the hour] die nächtliche Ruhe der Einwohner des 
Orts, insbesondere der Kranken gestöhret wird, auch der Zweck der Sicherheit dadurch vereitelt 
werden kann, so hat der Nachtwächter sich desselben zu enthalten […]”)378  
Beyond this, the nightwatchman himself often does not fit the model of the upstanding 
citizen, much less policeman. Tending to come from the lower classes, he is apt to neglect his 
duties in favor of sleeping or drinking through his nightwatches.379 In his Policey- und Cameral-
Magazin of 1773, for example, Johann Heinrich Ludwig Bergius proposes a 
Nachtwächtermeister be appointed who polices the nightwatchman: he must “auf der 
Nachtwächter Leben und Handel gute Acht haben, und wenn er merkt, daß sie ein liederliches 
Leben führen, Diebe und Säufer sind, oder mit verdächtigen Leuten Umgang halten, muß er […] 
der Commißion sofort anzeigen, damit sie zur gebührenden Strafe gezogen werden können.”380 
Rather than ensuring the security of the community at night, the nightwatchman himself often 
has to be reigned in as an unreliable and unruly employee, constantly testing and forcing the 
hand of the state he is supposed to maintain: “So muß das Policeydirectorium diese Leute 
[nightwatchmen] durch eine große Aussicht in der allergenauesten Ordnung erhalten,” Bergius 
concludes.381  
In a period in which state surveillance is beginning to learn how to systematically track 
and regulate the behavior of its citizens, it also discovers that it must take care to surveil its own 
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379 This disreputable image of the nightwatchman is perhaps best expressed in the English-speaking world in 
Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing where a nightwatchman says: “We would rather sleep than talk: we know 
what belongs to a watch” (William Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing [New York: University Society, 1901], 
72). 
 
380 Johann Heinrich Ludwig Bergius, Policey- und Cameral-Magazin, vol. 7 (Frankfurt: Andreä, 1773), 4. 
 






enforcers at night. The nightwatchman becomes exactly that part that the state has not yet been 
able to completely administer. In this case, the Polizei is forced to self-police: it itself is the 
dangerous not yet that the state has to address. With the nightwatchman, a significant absence of 
governmental oversight is to be found within its own institutions, and thus a double-redundant 
model of organization is put into effect where the nightwatchman is subject to the observation of 
other police institutions (Nachtwachen will dramatize precisely this when Kreuzgang is finally 
brought under control).  
It is against the backdrop of this ambiguous position of the nightwatchman vis-à-vis the 
emergent modern state apparatus—as, in one sense, an essential agent regulating the dangerous 
zone of the urban nightscape, and then again in opposition to this, as the very symbol of the 
state’s inability to control—that one may understand the police’s appearance within 
contemporary literary discourse. The intersection of the Polizei with specific literary works and 
the general field of German aesthetics around 1800 is emerging in increasing complexity in 
contemporary scholarly engagements, with Vogl, for example, identifying “seit dem Ende des 
18. Jahrhunderts eine Ästhetisierung der Polizei, vor allem aber auch eine Verpolizierung der 
Ästhetik.”382 Sonnenfels draws attention to this first aspect, to the aestheticization of the police: 
for him, the diffuse understanding of the Polizei is no less in flux in the popular understanding 
and literary imagination than in the theories of eighteenth-century Kameralismus from which it 
stems. “Das Wort Polizei,” he notes, “wird von den Schriftstellern [...] auf eine ganz verschieden 
                                                 
382 Vogl, “Staatsbegehren,” 616. See also Torsten Hahn, “Großstadt und Menschenmenge. Zur Verarbeitung 
gouvernementaler Data in Schillers Die Polizey.” Rhetoriken des Verschwindens (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 2008). For the French context of the intersection between police and aesthetic discourses around 1800, 






Art erklärt; es ist instruktiv, die merkwürdigsten Ansichten, welche diese von der Polizei 
aufstellen, hier aufzuführen [...]”383  
As indicated at the outset, the contemporary literary sphere—and not just the specifically 
Romantic discourse network—takes up the police functions of the nightwatchman in a variety of 
ways: his characteristic subject and activity becomes a diverse problematic to reimagine the 
nexus between sociopolitical control and the heteronomy of aesthetic experience. In general, the 
literary figure of the nightwatchman can be understood in its functional position within the 
discursive field of present society, linked directly to its diegetic emplotment: it is always 
positioned somewhere along a continuum between, on the one hand, complete social order—
where the nightwatchman represents the continued control over the nightscape by the state and 
bourgeois society, by the well-ordered polis—and, at the other pole, nocturnal anarchy—where 
the activity of the nightwatchman as unreliable servant of the state is identified with the 
heterogenous sphere of poetic experience. In the latter, the nightwatchman assumes a kind of 
anti-Polizei-function as a transgressive aesthetic subject who, like the Romantic poet, seeks an 
attunement with the chaotic liberation of the night.  
Whether as the enforcer of normative control over the socially-disruptive forces of the 
nocturnal imagination, or as ambiguously sharing in the poet’s transformative experiences—as a 
flâneur of the night intimately familiar with the estranging effects of its mysterious 
atmosphere—the literary figure of the police officer on nightwatch reflects the ongoing 
conflation of political and aesthetic concerns around 1800. Thus the field of Polizeiwissenschaft 
that Sonnenfels and other eighteenth century theorists help establish, alongside the nightly reality 
of police forces and nightwatchmen in communities across German-speaking lands, sets the 
                                                 






background for the literary nightwatchman as a “Verbindungsmittel”384 between the question of 
state control—or the possible limits of its domains and functions—and what Friedrich Schlegel 
calls the “Freiheit der Einbildungskraft,”385 or, in other words, forms of the wild political 
imagination.  
Besides Nachtwachen itself, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister (1795) and Hölderlin’s poem 
Brod und Wein (circa 1800) offer exemplary forms in which this political/aesthetic conjuncture 
becomes clear through different figurations of nightwatchman: between these works, he becomes 
expressive of either chaos, order, or poetry, respectively. Accordingly, the nightwatchman 
sometimes embodies forms of nightly Ordnung, dramatizing an instance of the police-control of 
the night—which for the modern poet amounts to a suppression of poetry and the night itself as 
the mother-source of creative imagination (such as in Goethe’s figure). Or, as in Hölderlin’s 
nightwatchman, he contributes to the generation of a poetic atmosphere, reinforcing the poet’s 
experience at night, but also reintegrating it into the productive economy of the day, and thus 
harmonizing the control of practical organization with the transformative freedom of aesthetic 
experience. By contrast, Kreuzgang embodies the fullest anarchic possibility of nocturnal 
liberation, of turning loose such chaotic-creative elements against this same Ordnung and indeed 
                                                 
384 The term “Verbindungsmittel” is Fichte’s. In Vogl’s gloss of the same, the Polizei takes “einen neuen, 
epistemologisch-prägnanten Aufgaben- und Funktionsbereich ein. So wird sie [die Polizei] nach Fichte zu jenem 
Organ, das als ‘Verbindungsmittel’ die ‘Wechselwirkung’ zwischen souveräner Gewalt und dem unüberschaubaren 
Terrain gesellschaftlicher Kräfte beschreibt und reguliert” (Vogl, “Staatsbegehren,” 615). As we will see in what 
follows, the ambiguous figure of the nightwatchman in Goethe, Hölderlin, and Klingemann, as both agent of and 
oppositional element to the Polizeistaat, functions as a literary Verbindungsmittel between the anarchic freedom of 
the aesthetic imagination and the often opaque, if not near-invisible forces of social, economic, religious, and 
political control that characterize German society around 1800. 
 






against all normative orders of modern society, including the idealist norm of Romantic literary 
practice.386 
Order: in Book I of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, Wilhelm learns that he is to 
embark on a journey in order to, as his father puts it: “in der Welt umsehen […] und zugleich 
unsre Geschäfte an fremden Orten betreiben.”387 For Wilhelm, the house of his father has always 
been inhabited by so many “Wächter” from whose chains he now sees a chance of escaping 
(“wie ein künstlicher Dieb oder Zauberer in der Gefangenschaft manchmal die Füße aus den 
festgeschlossenen Ketten herauszieht”).388 At nightfall, as he goes to tell his beloved Mariane 
about his planned trip, Wilhelm pauses in the stillness of the urban nightscape, celebrating his 
newfound freedom at the center of his community, the town square now abandoned and waiting 
for the day’s activities to resume:  
Endlich schlug die nächtliche Stunde; er entfernte sich aus seinem Hause, schüttelte allen 
Druck ab und wandelte durch die stillen Gassen. Auf dem großen Platze hub er seine 
Hände gen Himmel, fühlte alles hinter und unter sich; er hatte sich von allem losgemacht. 
Nun dachte er sich in den Armen seiner Geliebten, dann wieder mit ihr auf dem 
blendenden Theatergerüste; er schwebte in einer Fülle von Hoffnungen, und nur 
manchmal erinnerte ihn der Ruf des Nachtwächters, daß er noch auf dieser Erde 
wandle.389 
                                                 
386 It should be noted at the outset that Goethe’s, Hölderlin’s, and Klingemann’s models of the nightwatchman do 
not form a dialogue of immediate allusions and direct references to each other, such that, for example, each author 
read the other and developed their version of the nightwatchman accordingly. Instead, the nightwatchman as literary 
figure can be understood as bringing these texts together as a recognizable pattern: as evident in their juxtaposition, 
the nightwatchman reimagines the relation between the historical Polizeistaat and the bourgeois political, economic, 
and social norms it protects as they come into contact, and often conflict, with contemporary tropes of the aesthetic 
imagination. Between Goethe, Hölderlin, and Klingemann we thus find an elastic figure of the nightwatchman 
dedicated either to a stabilization of the given (social, economic, political) order, to its disruption, or to an 
ambiguous figuration that binds and separates different elements from both. At its most complex, the literary 
nightwatchman around 1800 functions as an oscillation between the two poles of order and disorder, and as an 
experiment in estranging both. This is most evident in Nachtwachen. 
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Losing himself in a place similarly “losgemacht” of its economic cares, Wilhelm finds the 
appropriate environment for his imaginative moment. Raising his hands to the heavens, he sways 
high above his former life in a space of sheer possibility. But then another kind of Wächter—not 
that of the home but of the community, the nightwatchman—brings Wilhelm back down to the 
mundane reality he can only temporarily escape, reminding him “daß er noch auf dieser Erde 
wandle.” The intrusion of the nightwatchman’s call into Wilhelm’s nocturnal reverie dramatizes 
a kind of primal scene of the creative imagination posed against the principles of reality, an 
essential trope of the artist’s conflict with the social surround: unproductive poetry appears here 
defeated, or at least interrupted, by quotidien necessity and everyday care. Wilhelm’s 
transcendent moment—given over to his libidinal and artistic desires—falls with the 
reintroduction of base reality. Brought back down to a prosaic earth, Wilhelm’s encounter stages 
the timeless opposition between the freedom of the imagination and the regimes of social order. 
But this is also a paradigmatically modern encounter: this scene offers an image of 
modern life as a confrontation between the aesthetic imagination and its antithesis in the form of 
status quo bourgeois-utilitarian normativity. Wilhelm’s transgressive imagination (from the 
standpoint of his family and establishment society), his wish to become an actor, is captured by 
what amounts to one monolithic complex of social control: inasmuch as the nightwatchman 
polices Wilhelm’s imagination, he is part of the larger set of Wilhelm’ watchers, intent on 
integrating him into the homogenous sphere of contemporary productive life that increasingly 
excludes the artistic professions of the modern aesthetic regime. Nightwatchman and familial 
pressure function as the same singular force, differing in their specific form of articulation but 






the imagination: Wilhelm is to be rescued from the dangers of freedom.390 The call (Ruf) of the 
nightwatchman symbolically forecasts the bourgeois position his father and others want him to 
assume, reflecting all the public and private norms that steer Wilhelm away from his theatrical 
ambitions and towards a socially-responsible and economically-secured vocation (Beruf). This 
scene from Goethe’s Meister constitutes the first model of the nightwatchman relevant to the 
following considerations. Here the domain of the poetic is effectively policed in the name of 
order. 
To be sure, the nightwatchman figure would seem to be uniquely situated to police a 
night sphere often associated with phenomena of the aesthetic imagination. After all, the 
nightwatchman is the only agent of the Polizei normally active at night. Everyone else except for 
poets, secret lovers, conspirators, and criminals—everyone, in other words, except for any 
subjects engaged in transgressions against social and state sanctions—is supposed to be asleep. 
The nocturnal environment is commonly understood as the Other of the quotidian day of 
rationality and industrious production, as the zone of sublime inspiration and erotic desire as 
much as violence and irrationality.391 Nevertheless, the figure of the nightwatchman provides a 
                                                 
390 This functional parallel between familial sphere and nightwatchman is also reflected in contemporary 
Polizeiwissenschaft. Günther Heinrich von Berg understands the police to function simultaneously in differentiated 
forms (similar to Sonnenfels’ concept of the Polizei), including in the family and above all in the father. “Die 
Policey,” Berg notes, is a matter of “häusliche Gesellschaft” as much as the “Hausvater,” but in the last instance it is 
“Gegenstand der höchsten Gewalt” (von Berg, 237). 
 
391 The night in this period as co-terminous with aesthetic experience stems not least from Goethe himself, but also 
Klopstock, Hölderlin, and above all from the romantic symbol of the night established by Novalis, August 
Klingemann, E.T.A. Hoffmann, and Joseph von Eichendorff, among others. In Richard Brinkmann’s formulation of 
the romantic concept of the night, it is the “Reich des Jenseitigen, der wahren Erkenntnis, der Liebe, der Erlösung, 
der Herrlichkeit; des Todes freilich auch, des Todes aber als Beginn des eigentlichen Lebens. Nacht als Reich 
hellerer Klarheit im Gegensatz zu der falschen und verfälschenden Deutlichkeit des Tages. Nacht jedenfalls als das 
Reich des Hohen und Erhabenen, des Höheren in jedem Betracht, des Ruhigen und Glücklichen, des Erfüllten und 
Vollendeten” (Richard Brinkmann, Nachtwachen von Bonaventura: Kehrseite der Frühromantik? [Pfullingen: 
Günther Neske, 1966], 10). For a broad discussion of the provenance of the contemporary trope of the night out of 
Enlightenment discourses of psychology, anthropology, medicine, cameralist police science, and literature, see 
Roland Borgand and Harald Neumeyer, “Der Mensch in der Nacht-Die Nacht im Menschen: Aufgeklärte 






positive referent of an aestheticized “nocturnality”392 in this period as well. The nightwatchman 
thus also appears as a kind of corollary of the contemporary nightscape’s poetic agents: no 
longer exerting a Polizei-function in the name of order, he now lends his call to the 
transformation of the night environment into an object of aesthetic generation. Along these lines, 
a brief but revealing instance of this parallel between nightwatchman and nocturnal poet arises in 
Hölderlin’s Brod und Wein. Hölderlin’s elegiac poem includes the second model of the 
nightwatchman relevant here. 
Poetry: Rather than establishing an antagonistic opposition between nightwatchman and 
aesthetic subject as in Goethe’s Meister, in Brod und Wein the nightwatchman’s call is an 
essential element in the poem’s dense weave of disparate symbolic forces and existential signs. 
These elements of the poem’s internal narrative consistency, albeit presented in a mode of 
questioning and sometimes elegiac despair, together admit a final image of reconciliation 
between norms of social order/productivity and the liberating forces of aesthetic imagination. 
Here the nightwatchman does not form a moment of interruption as in Meister, but rather a 
constitutive feature of the coherent poetic speech-act of Brod und Wein: he reinforces the secret 
imbrication of aesthetic experience and contemporary sociopolitical life, intensifying the 
ambiguous vision of the potential salvation of modern existence, brought about through a new 
openness or receptivity to the poetic ground of all life. 
The confluence of night, poetic word, traces of the gods (or lack thereof), and a figure of 
human economic-productive drives (embodied by the Markt) is already suggested in the first 
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domain beyond the limits of rationality, to a stage and state of mind aligned with noctunality” (Elisabeth Bronfen, 






strophe. And it is here that the nightwatchman appears: “Still in dämmriger Luft ertönen 
geläutete Glocken,/Und der Stunden gedenk rufet ein Wächter die Zahl.”393 The 
nightwatchman’s call, as opposed to being an inert sound-effect, a mere backdrop to the nightly 
mise-en-scène of the poem, by contrast appears as the first moment in which the symbolic 
functions of day and night begin to suffuse each other. The nightwatchman harmonizes the 
poetic night with signs referring to the regulated time of daytime productivity (Glocken, Stunden, 
Zahl), forming the first hinge between the aestheticized nightsphere and the economic codes of 
Tag and Licht to follow. While the day and light make clear processes of differentiation and 
separation, the night removes such demarcations, occluding and collapsing identities and 
boundaries. Like the poet bringing profane, productive day and sacred night together, the 
nightwatchman extends this sense of daytime as clear articulation into a indifferentiated night 
without labor and goals, when “von Werken der Hand ruht der geschäftige Markt.”394 The 
nightwatchman’s role, like the poet’s (“wachend zu bleiben bei Nacht”), helps integrate the 
expansive time and space of the night and poetry in a worksite alternative to, but still 
commensurable with the labour of the day.395 
The nightwatchman thus stands at the intersection (as Nachtwachen puts it, at the 
Kreuzgang) between the Polizei as a complex institution of normative control over everyday life 
and the aesthetic imagination understood as a force of subjective and collective existential 
change. Goethe’s Meister presents a nightwatchman, operating in the name of bourgeois-
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economic Ordnung, as a policeman of imaginative acts that escape the control of dominant social 
regimes, as, for example, when young Wilhelm dreams of a future that does not conform to the 
expectations of his family and society. Hölderlin’s “Brod und Wein,” by contrast, offers a 
nightwatchman as a mediator between economic productivity and the aesthetic imagination as 
proper to the night, a figure who establishes a connection between the real and the imaginary 
rather than enforcing their separation as in Goethe’s work.  
Chaos: Klingemann’s Nachtwachen is an amalgam of Goethe’s and Hölderlin’s models, 
but serves an entirely different project centered around the nightwatchman. Dedicated to turning 
the Polizei-function against itself (and against the norms of bourgeois culture which appear as 
both cause and effect of the police-state) Nachtwachen constitutes one of the most forceful 
refutations of the entrenched contemporary status quo in the German literary imaginary around 
1800. For Bonaventura, the nightwatchman still “polices” the polis, i.e., he still stands watch 
over the nocturnal environment of the city and intervenes when necessary, but this always in an 
essential perversion of state-control, according to a self-proclaimed ordo inversus of the police 
profession that targets—and no longer reinforces—the poet’s mode of being in modern society. 
Kreuzgang operates only so as to increase the quotient of chaos and revolutionary disruption that 
the state constantly tries to contain. In this sense, his nightwatches offer a doctrine of the anti-
Polizei and apply it as an anti-aesthetics, redirecting its energies, as we will see, back onto the 
Romantic Staatspoet and the city he is supposed to protect. 
3.3 Nachtwachen and Political Nihilism 
Rudolf Haym, the early doyen of Romantikforschung, first brought attention to 
Nachtwachen’s striking novelty and exemplary status as a romantic text. “Die höchst barocke 






skeptischen Humor durchzogener Situations- und Erzählungs-Bilder durch die Fiktion verbindet, 
daß ein zum Nachtwächter gewordener Poet seine nächtlichen Erlebnisse erzählt, gehört ohne 
Zweifel zu den geistreichsten Produktionen der Romantik.”396 And yet despite Haym’s early 
recognition of the narrative and structural complexity of the novel, the pseudonymity of its 
author has come to eclipse Haym’s initial attempt at a text-immanent analysis. By contrast, its 
reception history has remained fixated on the so-called Verfasserfrage.397 In the wake of the 
resolution of the authorship problem—the novel is now generally accepted as Klingemann’s—
contemporary Nachtwachen studies have largely dropped the Verfasserfrage and re-focused on 
its self-reflexive and experimental character.398 The scholarly field is increasingly attuning itself 
to the novel as a delicate seismograph of philosophical, aesthetic, and socio-political concerns 
around 1800.399  
On the face of it, Nachtwachen departs from previous models of the nightwatchman in 
that its protagonist, the nightwatchman Kreuzgang, simply has a complex identity in his own 
right. As Neil Brough and R.J. Kavanagh note, it is not until Nachtwachen (nor after, for that 
                                                 
396 Rudolf Haym, Die Romantische Schule (Berlin: R. Gaertner, 1920), 636. 
 
397 Schelling, Caroline Schlegel, E.T.A. Hoffmann, Karl Friedrich Gottlob Wetzel, Clemens Brentano, Jean Paul, 
Johann B. Erhard, Jens Baggesen, Wolfgang Adolph Gerle, Johann Karl Wezel, Ignaz Ferdinand Arnold, and Georg 
Christoph Lichtenberg were all put forward as potential authors at various times. In 1987 the debate was largely put 
to rest when Ruth Haag found a list of Klingemann’s publications in the University of Amsterdam’s manuscript 
collection in which Klingemann himself had noted: “Nachtwachen von Bonaventura, Penig Dienemann 1804” (Ruth 
Haag “Noch einmal: der Verfasser der Nachtwachen von Bonaventura,” Euphorion: Zeitschrift für 
Literaturgeschichte, no. 81: 3 [1987]). 
 
398 As for example in an emphasis on the novel’s proto-deconstructivist handling of the Satz vom Widerspruch in 
Thomas Böning, Widersprüche (Freiburg: Romback, 1997); its reconceptualization of the aesthetic tradition of the 
grotesque in Ina Braeuer-Ewers, Züge des Grotesken (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1995); its dramatic vision of nihilism 
as embodied in the figure of Kreuzgang in Dieter Arendt, Der poetische Nihilismus in der Romantik (Tübingen: M. 
Niemeyer, 1972); and its status as a “Romanexperiment der deutschen Romantik” in Nicola Kaminski, Kreuz-Gänge 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001).  
  
399 But given that these latter concerns are overwhelmingly ignored in the novel’s prior Wirkungsgeschichte, one of 






matter) that the nightwatchman figure “emerges fully fledged” in the German literary sphere, 
fleshed out rather than merely serving as an extension of the poet or police.400 But beyond this, 
the significance of the nightwatchman in Nachtwachen offers a combination of its Goethean and 
Hölderlinian predecessors. In this third literary model of the nightwatchman, Kreuzgang does not 
police the aesthetic subject in the name of the establishment, as for example in Goethe’s Meister 
above. Nor does he comply, unsurprisingly, with a uniquely Hölderlinian notion of poetic 
mission. The militant atheist Kreuzgang wants nothing to do with Hölderlin’s aesthetic 
mediation of the sacred for a modern age caught between “Gottesferne” and the desire for “der 
kommende Gott.” He does, however, respond to the essential question of “Brod und Wein” 
(“wozu Dichter in dürtiger Zeit”) with an affirmation of a certain kind of poetic experience as 
equal parts antinormative revolt and alternative aesthetic strategy. His stance—or the basis of his 
strange sense of policing, his unique practice of nachtwachen—is one of metaphysical and 
existential cynicism, pessimism, nihilism, and above all base materialism. Kreuzgang rejects the 
world around him by drawing attention to its ultimately meaningless character. Transcendent 
signifiers of any kind are anathema to him, and their standard-bearers, such as a bourgeoisie 
triumphant in the name of philosopical, moral, and scientific progress, deserve nothing but 
invective and hate.  
The complex narrative bears some basic reconstruction: in a form between 
Verbildungsroman and mennipean satire, Nachtwachen recounts the story, as Horst Fleig puts it, 
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of the “Ekstase eines lange unterdrückten Einzelgängers.”401 A youthful shoemaker with a 
fondness for Hans Sachs and Jakob Böhme, born to an alchemist father, gypsy mother, and the 
devil himself as godfather, within the novel’s scattered intra-diegetic autobiography we learn that 
Kreuzgang has previously been a poet, ballad-singer, actor, madhouse inmate, and finally 
nightwatchman, the profession in which he achieves something like his own version of 
enlightened maturity in darkness. With alternating ironic humor and despair, he narrates his life 
as a story gradually arching towards a crushing sense of ennui, a nihilism brought on in direct 
proportion to his critical insight into the abject nature of modern society.402 His natural 
predisposition for incomprehensibility—what he calls his “fixe idee,” mentioned earlier—but 
also the control apparatuses of state, church, and market block him from anything but an 
outsider’s existence.403 Even in his occupation as a nightwatchman, the point at which he 
achieves the fullest integration into the establishment of his city (albeit only at the bottom of the 
hierarchy of the police), Kreuzgang is frustrated. The state eventually takes away his 
nightwatchman’s horn—which, as we will see, constitutes his only political weapon and 
aesthetic response to the society that represses him—because he subverts its intended use as a 
security measure, constantly blowing it at all the wrong times as a prank. He is just the sort of 
unruly and irresponsible subject that no state would ever want to employ for the important task 
of policing the city at night, that kind of weakest link that early administrators and theorists of 
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402 Jeffrey Sammons, in one of the earliest and most exhaustive text-immanent interpretations of Nachtwachen, has 
shown that the novel proceeds according to a triadic narrative cycling towards ever-worse nihilistic crises (Jeffrey 
Sammons, Nachtwachen von Bonaventura: A Structural Interpretation [Hague: Mouton, 1965]). 
 
403 Bonaventura, Die Nachtwachen des Bonaventura. The Nightwatches of Bonaventura, ed. and trans. Gerald 
Gillespie (Edinburg: University Press, 1972), 96. All citations from Nachtwachen drawn from this edition and noted 






the Polizei went to great lengths to police. Even so, the activities of his nightwatches achieve 
apocalyptic effect, although his efforts to politicize the poet fail: with the cord that came with a 
publisher’s rejection letter, the Staatspoet hangs himself in his attic room. Bonaventura kills his 
romantic poet, the figure who stands in for a generically recognizable romantic type. 
 “Eins ist nur möglich,” Kreuzgang reflects while on one of his nightwatches, effectively 
summarizing his entire relation to the state, local community, and present historical moment: 
“Entweder stehen die Menschen verkehrt, oder ich. Wenn die Stimmenmehrheit hier entschieden 
soll, so bin ich rein verloren.”404 The ending lines of the novel would seem to prove the latter 
option. After encountering an insane “Geisterseher” and his long-lost mother in a cemetary, 
Kreuzgang digs up the grave of his father and declares: “‘Ich streue diese Handvoll väterlichen 
Staub in die Lüfte und es bleibt—Nichts!’ Drüben auf dem Grabe steht noch der Geisterseher 
und umarmt Nichts! Und der Widerhall im Gebeinhause ruft zum letzten Male—Nichts!—”405 
Here the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost appear ironically transformed: in an unholy trinity, the 
devil, Kreuzgang, and the ghost-seer are witness to nothing, or to nothingness itself, and the 
nightwatchman’s call of “Nichts!” echoes through their proper church, the mortuary 
(Gebeinhaus). These lines, finishing with a Bindestrich connecting “Nichts!” to nothing except 
the blankness of the last page, would seem to bring Nachtwachen’s nihilistic vision to a finale, 
dramatically concluding the novel with an assertion of the futility of meaningful existence.  
But this sense of nihilism in Kreuzgang’s life, at least on the evidence of the 
nightwatches themselves, is just as much a directly practical form of reflection, becoming an 
experimental ethos—a wild politics—that begins precisely out of a fundamental insight into the 
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transitoriness, provisionality, and essential duplicity of all natural and human life. Political 
nihilism appears in a complex form in the novel, once as a critical application and again as 
positive existential practice: on the one hand, Kreuzgang addresses, or criticizes, the poet of the 
city in the terms of what Jean Paul calls “poetischer Nihilismus,”406 the critique of the modern 
(Romantic) poet who finds the source of reality only in their own aesthetic constructions. The 
poetic nihilist, the Staatspoet in the novel, relies on a kind of idealist aesthetics of the genius 
without access to the external world, blocked by its own presuppositions from the real, the 
natural, or the reality of the present historical moment. Poetic nihilists believe in nothing because 
they only believe in themselves. Here Kreuzgang intervenes and brings Romanticism—itself 
nihilistic—into descent towards the real ground, reintroducing the essentially material, and 
therefore actually meaningful consideration of present life in connection with exterior reality. 
But, on the other hand, it is precisely a kind of productive drive inherent in the nihilistic 
destitution of all things that Kreuzgang takes up, motivating his interventions into the smooth 
operation of the city (and its characteristic aesthetic features, e.g., the occupation of the poet). 
The nightwatch, or the practice of nachtwachen, appears as the attempt to wipe the slate clean, 
with the status quo of modern life reduced to a tabula rasa through the imagination’s productive 
deconstruction. Such a nihilism neither believes in the transcendence of the human subject, nor 
in nature, reality, or God; but it does believe in nothingness, and it results in a series of 
                                                 
406 Jean Paul, Werke, vol. 5 (Munich: Hanser, 1959), 9. Jean Paul takes up Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s original sense 
of nihilism and uses it as part of an aesthetic critique (obviously targeting Romantic authors). Jacobi’s term was 
meant as a critique of Fichtean egoistic idealism which, in Jacobi’s view, left room for a source of true knowledge 
neither in external reality, nor in a transcendent concept of God. See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, “An Fichte,” in 
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actualizations, a process in which an intense commitment to nothingness itself leads to the need 
to spread its consequences throughout the wider world. 
Kreuzgang’s commitment to an abyssal truth becomes a drive not to inertia, stasis, and 
death, but rather to an active, if often violent transformation of himself, his own biographical 
narrative, and the community around him. His call of “Nichts!” becomes the center around which 
he incessantly circles in all his thoughts and interactions, generating a constant activity of 
positive negativity (what Friedrich Nietzsche will later call “active nihilism.”)407 Nachtwachen 
poses the problematic of nihilism as the switch or enabling condition for a variety of social and 
political interventions and experiments, performances and pranks. Its starting point is indeed the 
total negation of the allgemeine Glückseligkeit of state and society the Polizei is supposed to 
maintain—thus my claim that Kreuzgang inverts contemporary Polizei-functions—but there is 
also a wild political productivity recognizable beyond this initial negation. 
The nightwatch, as noted above, is an acute instance of Staatsangst, of the state’s anxious 
efforts to extend its network of administration over the dangerous and heterogenous sphere of 
nocturnality, including its own unruly agents. As such, the presence of the Polizei at night 
indexes the ungovernability of the nightsphere, pointing to a hole in the fabric of the state’s 
territory. In a word, where the police is, there is the ungovernable, and nothing is more 
ungovernable than the night. Kreuzgang’s nihilism, as the negation of allgemeine Glückseligkeit 
the Polizei attempts to spread as a form of control, effectively turns this Polizei-function against 
itself. He aims to increase the ungovernability of all those areas that the Polizei has not yet (noch 
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nicht) come to control, and those that are already secured by the state. As both an agent of the 
local Polizei-function of his community, and as an insurrectionary subject opposed to it, 
Kreuzgang has a privileged position both within and outside of the state from which to perform 
his strategic nihilism. Policing those aspects of his city that are not yet completely controlled and 
rendered governable—in the main, scenes of aesthetic and religious experience, specifically 
Romantic poetry and apocalyptic fear—Kreuzgang calls on them to become wild, interrupting 
and pushing them towards ever-more transgressive alternatives.  
In a kind of épater la bourgeoisie that will form the core of later nineteenth and early 
twentieth century avant-garde politics, the “black outpourings” of the alienated and eccentric 
nightwatchman express an existence at all times either in a mode of fight or flight towards an 
imaginary, as-yet unrealized form of life that no police order—or poetic one—can contain or 
render productive for its own purposes.408 Gerald Gillespie puts the matter thus: “In short, we 
may regard the Nachtwachen today as more than an unrealized programme of defiance. It is 
actually the manifesto of a new start for altered consciousness, and therein resides its 
modernity—whether pernicious or not.”409 
3.4 Anti-policing the Staatspoet 
“Wir Nachtwächter und Poeten,” Kreuzgang observes in the third nightwatch, emphasizing 
the similarities between the two vocations: “kümmern uns um das Treiben der Menschen am 
Tage, in der That wenig; denn es gehört zur Zeit zu den ausgemachten Wahrheiten: Die 
Menschen sind wenn sie handeln höchst alltäglich und man mag ihnen höchstens wenn sie 
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träumen einiges Interesse abgewinnen.”410 It is not the form of life corresponding to the 
alltäglich that Kreuzgang, in a kind of ersatz commerce (handeln), extracts from his fellow 
citizens during his nightwatches (einiges Interesse abgewinnen). It is rather in träumen in which 
Kreuzgang, like the poet, finds a surplus value, not of capital, but of interest.  
Thus the first order of the nightwatch will be to ridicule the timidity of a “schwankenden 
Zeitalter” that limits itself through the self-importance of its tasks, refusing to dream, reducing its 
horizons of speculative possibility and censoring absolute, autonomous, and above all ludic 
forms of experience. Things are too serious. There is, Kreuzgang observes, no sense for the fool 
(Narr) in the present age, and the age itself is a fool for thinking otherwise: 
In einem schwankenden Zeitalter scheut man alles Absolute und Selbstständige; deshalb 
mögen wir denn auch weder ächten Spaß, noch ächten Ernst, weder ächte Tugend noch 
ächte Bosheit mehr leiden. Der Zeitkarakter ist zusammengeflikt und gestoppelt wie eine 
Narrenjacke, und was das Ärgste dabei ist – der Narr, der darin stekt, mögte ernsthaft 
scheinen.– 411 
Herein lies the pettiness and mediocrity of contemporary life for Kreuzgang. It is not so much 
that the “Zeitkarakter” appears cloaked in a “Narrenjacke”—falling back on a motley mix of 
belief systems in its patchwork attempts at self-definition—but far more that the age poses, it 
wears a false mask, it is unwilling or unable to assert its open foolishness in the first place, and 
certainly never lingers in the extremes of such self-presentation, self-ironization. While 
Kreuzgang’s career has progressed through many different occupations, he at least has never 
ceased being an outright fool in his own estimation. The nightwatch provides the ideal conditions 
for this lifelong vocation—that of the Schlegelian incomprehensiblist, so to speak, the ironic 
Romantic subject—the necessary time and space in which to develop his mode of activity in 
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dialogue with a veritable theoretical system of foolishness, constituting a whole life practice of 
the fool that he goes to great lengths to expound. He is both passive and active Narr, recipient 
and giver of mockery: ridiculing himself for his own insufficiences and ignorance, but also, and 
primarily, lampooning his fellow citizens as the “spokesman of truth, the pricker of dreams,”412 
exposing all as far more foolish than the fool himself. For no one, he insists repeatedly, has gone 
far enough, no one has entirely shed their illusions nor pushed them to their absolute limits, the 
Romantics included. 
Kreuzgang’s model of the fool, that of a kind of romanticized or modernized Til 
Eulenspiegel, provides him with the essential program of his nightwatches, and what we can 
understand as the nature of nachtwachen: the meaninglessness of life, the petty corruption and 
bad faith at the heart of modern political, religious, and social conventions—empty idealisms and 
authorities in every form—are to be denounced, after which follows a series of experiments, 
pranks, and micro-revolts to scramble their domination. What constitutes the paradoxical 
productivity of this kind of initial nihilistic-critical reaction is that it provides the impetus to—or 
rather takes the form of—an endless verbalization, a chain of discursive acts whereby quotidien 
life is evaluated and judged. This occurs through a rhetorical attack in Standreden, rants, 
monologues, letters, plays, and finally culminates, as we will see, in an art of noise, the 
antipoeticum: the blare of the nightwatchman’s horn as protest not only to the form of life that 
bourgeois society valorizes, but indeed to all meaning-making activity, all order as such. This 
series of practical interventions does not perform a compensatory gesture for the profound crisis 
of nihilism, rather, it ought to be understood as the expenditure of a productive drive that pulls 
nihilism into aesthetic jouissance, that confronts the paucity of modern life with a radical 
                                                 






negativity, a materialism of nothingness. The pathos of despair follows into a free 
reconfiguration of present society in imaginative experiments at the material level. The major 
experiment—pursued across all the different nightwatches—will take the Romantic poet as its 
object. 
Emphasizing the differences between his nightwatch and that of the modern poet’s, 
whose activity, as understood in Hölderlin’s terms, is also “wachend zu bleiben bei Nacht,” 
Kreuzgang takes the current state of poetry to be in a crisis brought on by emergent processes of 
modernity: bourgeois society, according to him, has disarmed and recoded the poetic vocation, 
rendering it superfluous and harmless by subordinating it to its own utilitarian rationality: “so 
bleibt es doch heut zu Tage mit der Dichterei überall bedenklich, weil es so wenig Verrückte 
mehr gibt, und ein solcher Überfluß an Vernünftigen vorhanden ist, daß sie aus ihren eigenen 
Mitteln alle Fächer und sogar die Poesie besetzen können.”413 As in the Hölderlinian model 
above, the function of poetry as the mediator between the transcendent and the mundane, or mad 
inspiration and sober reason, appears ridiculous in the context of a society whose over-saturation 
of instrumental reason results in a pathological “Überfluß an Vernünftigen,” echoing Schlegel’s 
diagnosis in Über die Unverständlichkeit. “Die Dichter,” Kreuzgang observes, are usually, and 
now more than ever: 
ein unschädliches Völkchen, mit ihren Träumen und Entzückungen und dem Himmel voll 
griechischer Götter, den sie in ihrer Phantasie mit sich umhertragen. Bösartig aber 
werden sie sobald sie sich erdreisten ihr Ideal an die Wirklichkeit zu halten [...] Sie 
würden indes unschädlich bleiben, wenn man ihnen nur in der Wirklichkeit ihres freien 
Plätzchen ungestört einräumen und sie nicht durch das Drängen und Treiben in derselben 
eben zum Rückblick in sie zwingen wollte.414 
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The task becomes to introduce exactly this Rückblick, the perspective that sees the real material 
conditions of reality and forces an assessment of the sociopolitical irreality of the poet. The 
establishment does not want to force the poet back into reality, quite the contrary: it is precisely a 
space of utopian play that it grants aesthetic productivity, even while capturing it within 
publishing markets. Kreuzgang, by contrast, will be the one to initiate this descent into the 
material, interjecting his program of reflection as a violent interruption of the poet’s socially-
detached work. Thus when the nightwatchman polices the poet, he no longer seeks to project the 
poet’s activity into so many controllable forms of the future, into a sphere of isolation—within 
the overall process of the state’s reintegration of everything that is not yet (noch nicht) under its 
purview—he will, by contrast, arrest the flight of poetry through retrospection, demanding that it 
return to earth (erdreisen). 
Kreuzgang launches into a sustained critique of the Staatspoet, reflecting on modern 
aesthetic practice in terms of its economic and formal (or medium-specific) problems. On the 
first nightwatch, he sees the lonely light of the poet’s attic window: 
Ich wußte wohl, wer da so hoch in den Lüften regierte; es war ein verunglückter Poet, der 
nur in der Nacht wachte, weil dann seine Gläubiger schliefen, und die Musen allein nicht 
zu den letzten gehörten. 
 
O du, der du da oben dich herumtreibst, ich verstehe dich wohl, denn ich war einst 
deinesgleichen! Aber ich habe diese Beschäftigung aufgegeben gegen ein ehrliches 
Handwerk, das seinen Mann ernährt, und das für denjenigen, der sie darin aufzufinden 
weiß, doch keineswegs ganz ohne Poesie ist.415 
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The poet is economically precarious, indebted, so he should give up his profession and become a 
nightwatchman, embracing a different kind of poetic mission. “Nachtwächter sind wir zwar 
beide,” he continues, 
schade nur daß dir deine Nachtwachen in dieser kalt prosaischen Zeit nichts einbringen, 
indes die meinigen doch immer ein Übriges abwerfen. Als ich noch in der Nacht 
poesierte, wie du, mußte ich hungern, wie du, und sang tauben Ohren; das letzte tue ich 
zwar noch jetzt, aber man bezahlt mich dafür.416 
Poetic practice is transformed, or made practically feasible, by becoming a nightwatch, and a 
new excess (Übriges) is realized, a surplus value that is not merely economic, but also 
interesting (einiges Interesse abgewinnen). The police, in other words, is also a place for 
dreaming, and it pays. 
The occupation of the nightwatchman is even more exemplary in this respect because it 
has a new medium for its operations of nachtwachen: the city itself, out on the rounds of the 
nightwatch, in direct interaction with the nocturnal social sphere. The poet is circumscribed by 
literary expression, is ultimately limited to written language; poets are deaf to their own 
creations, which inevitably fail to represent the ecstasy of their experience. But for the 
nightwatchman, the nocturnal city is the medium of imaginative engagement. “Ich erinnerte mich 
an ähnliche überpoetische Stunden,” Kreuzgang muses while looking up at the poet’s window, 
wo das Innere Sturm ist, der Mund im Donner reden, und die Hand statt der Feder den 
Blitz ergreifen möchte, um damit in feurigen Worten zu schreiben. Da fliegt der Geist 
von Pole zu Pole, glaubt das ganze Universum zu überflügeln, und wenn er zulezt zur 
Sprache kommt – so ist es kindisch Wort, und die Hand zerreißt rasch das Papier.417 
 
The need to actualize in deed the flight of imagination comes up against its medium-specific 
limits. The new mythological attempt to toggle between opposed poles in a dynamic Universum 
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of force, and the need to codify this attempt in the form of a manifesto: Kreuzgang recognizes 
this drive but also its impossible prospect of communication. Hence, again, the nightwatch as an 
alternative poetic vocation, characterized not by literature but by sound, or his notion of music 
that exceeds the domain of language: 
Ich bannte diesen poetischen Teufel in mir, der am Ende immer nur schadenfroh über 
meine Schwäche aufzulachen pflegte, gewöhnlich durch das Beschwörungsmittel der 
Musik. Jezt pflege ich nur ein paarmal gellend ins Horn zu stoßen, und da geht's auch 
vorüber. 
 
Überall kann ich allen denen, die sich vor ähnlichen poetischen Überraschungen wie vor 
einem Fieber scheuen, den Ton meines Nachtwächterhorns als ein ächtes antipoeticum 
empfehlen. Das Mittel ist wohlfeil und von großer Wichtigkeit zugleich, da man in 
jetziger Zeit mit Plato die Poesie für eine Wut zu halten pflegt, mit dem einzigen 
Unterschiede, daß jener diese Wut vom Himmel und nicht aus dem Narrenhause 
herleitete.418 
The nightwatchman’s horn is an antidote to idealist poetic elevation; it exorcizes the romantic 
spirit of Romanticism’s own self-imposed (economic and formal) limitations, making it practical 
again in an era which relegates poetry to the madhouse alone, having fully stripped it of its 
sacred elements. Plato’s proscription of poetry from the polis happens under different terms 
around 1800. The modern poet must recognize this fact: the sonic blast both disrupts the poetic 
order and offers it a new form of expression. 
And so Kreuzgang announces his presence, down on the street, to the Staatspoet, making 
him into the experimental object of his nightly anti-poetics. He addresses the poet, or perhaps 
only in his inner monologue, and then blasts his horn up at him, calling out the time: 
Ich bin dir gleichsam wie ein satirischer Stentor in den Weg gestellt und unterbreche 
deine Träume von Unsterblichkeit, die du da oben in der Luft träumst, hier unten auf der 
Erde regelmäßig durch die Erinnerung an die Zeit und Vergänglichkeit [...] 
                                                 






Ich stieß ins Horn, rief ihm laut die Zeit zu, und ging meiner Wege.419 
The horn punctures the “tragische Stellung” of the Staatspoet’s posturing, just as in Goethe’s 
Meister, reminding the poet that he is still “hier unten auf der Erde,” subject to time, transience, 
and the limits of the artistic medium striving for immortal expression. But he also invokes a 
distinctly Hölderlinian plea: “O Freund Poet,” Kreuzgang says, before taking his leave of his 
post underneath his window: “wer jetzt leben will, der darf nicht dichten! Ist dir aber das Singen 
angebohren, und kannst du es durchaus nicht unterlassen, nun so werde Nachtwächter, wie ich, 
das ist noch der einzige solide Posten wo es bezahlt wird, und man dich nicht dabei verhungern 
läßt.”420  
The activity of nachtwachen, as a simultaneous critique of poetry and performance of its 
alternative, is expressed in the blast of the nightwatchman’s horn. As the instrument and 
aesthetic principle of the nightwatchman’s anti-poetics, the essential operation of Kreuzgang’s 
sonics can be understood as a kind of bathetic interruption.421 Kreuzgang’s horn as antipoeticum, 
or the bathetic negation of the “Überpoetische,” brings the poet back down to earth and opens up 
that pole of experience—base sociopolitical reality—from which modern poetry has chosen, or 
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421 Alexander Pope’s discussion of bathos is remarkably confluent with its dramatic operation in Nachtwachen. For 
Pope bathos is the “art of sinking in poetry,” and poetry is “a natural or morbid secretion of the brain” whose flows 
should not be dammed up: “hence it follows that a suppression of the very worst poetry is of dangerous consequence 
to the State” (Alexander Pope, Peri Bathous [Richmond: Oneworld Classics, 2009], 9-11). The poet of bathos, Pope 
continues, should “render himself master of this happy and antinatural way of thinking to such a degree as to be 
able, on the appearance of any object, to furnish his imagination with ideas infinitely below it” (Ibid., 15). For a 
discussion of Pope’s notion of bathos, and its contemporary significance today, see Sara Crangle and Peter Nicholls, 
On Bathos: Literature, Art, Music (London: Continuum International, 2010). Kant also provides an understanding of 
bathos germane to Kreuzgang’s antipoeticum, one, furthermore, that helps designate it as a kind of transcendental 
critique of a Romanticism lost in the clouds, thereby re-establishing its conditions of possibility within the limits of 
the politico-historical. Kant writes: “Hohe Thürme und die ihnen ähnliche metaphysisch große Männer, um welche 
beide gemeiniglich viel Wind ist, sind nicht für mich. Mein Platz ist das fruchtbare Bathos der Erfahrung, und das 
Wort transscendental” (Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik:380). In this sense, Nachtwachen 






been forced, to flee. Kreuzgang’s satirical engagement with the Staatspoet thus raises the 
problem of an increasingly depoliticized Romantic poetics. Re-politicization takes place by 
bringing poetry into contact with that which negates it: with reality in its present forms, in the 
actual public spaces of the community. If Kreuzgang’s antipoeticum is in fact a poetic 
antipoeticum, in other words, a romantic anti-romanticism based on satiric bathos (or an 
ironization of what Novalis terms Logorithmisierung), then it is one that begins with its own 
negation and interruption, bursting its own discursive limits and expressive medium by shifting 
occupations and taking up the practice of nachtwachen from the very beginning. This is an 
aesthetic regime made ungovernable in relation to itself, precisely by bringing it back down to 
the ground, solely through the inarticulate blast of the nightwatchman’s horn.  
The incomprehensible sound of the horn serves a critical and positive function: it disrupts 
the poetry that aligns itself with a state and with the norms of bourgeois existence (as represented 
by the Staatspoet, whether willingly or through coercion) in order to rethink poetic practice as an 
anti-poetics, as a productive disruption of its own entrenched ideals. Kreuzgang’s encounter with 
the Staatspoet can be understood as a dramatization of Romantic incomprehensibility, or more 
specifically, as its satirical application back onto one of its sources.422 His engagement with the 
                                                 
422 This is the context which allows Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy to refer to Nachtwachen, next to Friedrich 
Schelling’s “Epikurisch Glaubensbekenntnis Heinz Widerporstens,” as “romanticism’s other ‘satiric’ text” (Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy, 80). For them the “carnavalesque genre” of Nachtwachen is part of the operation of self-
ironization at the core of the Romantic system. However, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy erroneously attribute the 
authorship of Nachtwachen to Schelling (writing in 1978, the authors did not have access to Haag’s conclusive 
discovery in 1987 that Nachtwachen is the work of Klingemann). They therefore find it probable that Nachtwachen 
reflects the movement’s philosophical and aesthetic commitments from the inside, just as Schelling’s satire in 
“Heinz Widerporst” is the outcome of a satiric element immanent to Romanticism. I also understand Nachtwachen 
to be in direct dialogue with the theory of irony, incomprehensibility, and political imagination most notably 
established by Friedrich Schlegel, as well as in dialogue with anxieties about an encroaching religiosity in 
Romanticism, a religiosity represented above all in Novalis’ works (the impetus for Schelling’s “Heinz Widerporst” 
in the first place). But the fact that Klingemann (a lesser-known author and dramatist only indirectly in contact with 
the Romantic circle) authored Nachtwachen indicates a critical distance from the core Jena group that is reflected, in 
turn, in Kreuzgang’s own relationship to the Staatspoet. Thus, rather than arguing as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy do 
(namely that Nachtwachen can be understood as self-reflexive statement of Romanticism commenting on, censuring, 






Staatspoet appears as precisely that series of ironic asides delivered to the audience—to the 
readers of Nachtwachen, perhaps the poet, the community as a whole—that Schlegel places at 
the center of the theory of the fragment in “Über die Unverständlichkeit.”423 In Kreuzgang’s 
nightwatch, Romanticism interrupts itself—or more exactly, polices itself through a therapeutic 
blast of noise—so as to effect a further movement in its own discourse, an ironic shift towards a 
more practical social efficacy on the ground. 
3.5 The Apocalyptic Rückblick 
In the sixth nightwatch, Kreuzgang begins by explaining his predilection for spreading 
confusion wherever he goes. Like the poet, for whom “das Singen angebohren [ist],”424 Tollheit, 
Verworrenheit, and Chaos are so constitutive of Kreuzgang’s character that they cannot be 
suppressed. His entire character is their expression. He refers to these traits as a kind of 
physiological drive, the affliction or fixe idee that actually motivates his entire life, from 
childhood onwards; Kreuzgang observes: 
Ich bin leider in den Jugendjahren und gleichsam im Keime schon verdorben, denn wie 
andere gelehrte Knaben und vielversprechende Jünglinge es sich angelegen sein lassen 
immer gescheuter und vernünftiger zu werden, habe ich im Gegenteil stets eine 
besondere Vorliebe für die Tollheit gehabt, und es zu einer absoluten Verworrenheit in 
mir zu bringen gesucht, eben um, wie unser Herrgott, erst ein gutes und vollständiges 
Chaos zu vollenden, aus welchem sich nachher gelegentlich, wenn es mir einfiele, eine 
leidliche Welt zusammen ordnen ließe.425 
                                                 
position from outside the Romantic movement proper, the actual position from which its critical standpoint is 
brought to bear. Nachtwachen indeed satirizes Romanticism, but this in a contribution in its own terms to the 
Romantic wild political imaginary. 
 
423 Schlegel’s essay will be explored in further detail in the Conclusion.  
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First the perfection of an absolute chaos inside oneself, and thereafter the construction of a 
sufficient order to the world. The contours of the kind of world Kreuzgang desires, what his 
particular vision of a tolerable re-ordering of things looks like, begins with the complete 
inversion of his city’s hierarchy of control, and thus the inversion of his own Polizei-function. 
This will be another experimental prank, the most transgressive of the novel, brought about 
through the application of the horn as antipoeticum. Only this time, as opposed to a strategic 
intervention into the status of the Staatspoet, the horn disrupts at the widest of scales, activating 
popular fears of imminent apocalypse to revolutionize the contemporary state. Kreuzgang 
recounts his prank as a natural consequence of his chaotic practice of policing: 
Ach, diese fixe Idee ist mir übel genug bekommen, und hätte mich selbst beinahe einmal 
um mein Nachtwächteramt gebracht, indem es mir in der letzen Stunde des Säkulums 
einfiel mit dem jüngsten Tage vorzuspuken und statt der Zeit die Ewigkeit auszurufen, 
worüber viele geistliche und weltliche Herren erschrocken aus ihren Federn fuhren und 
ganz in Verlegenheit kamen, weil sie so unerwartet nicht darauf vorbereitet waren.426 
Instead of calling the hour at midnight on December 31st, 1799, Kreuzgang announces the End 
of Days. The nightwatchman’s horn has once again transformed the form and content of its call. 
Whereas before in the scene of aesthetic intervention the nightwatchman’s call introduces 
transience to stall a transcendent and timeless poetics, now, in the field of politics, Kreuzgang 
introduces “Ewigkeit” so as to emphasize the transitoriness of present social controls: “worüber 
viele geistliche und weltliche Herren erschrocken aus ihren Federn fuhren und ganz in 
Verlegenheit kamen.”  
                                                 






What follows is a carnivalesque ordo inversus of ecclesiastical, judicial, and political 
orders in which all agents of authoritative order scramble to appear just before God. “O, man 
hätte sehen sollen,” Kreuzgang exclaims,  
was für ein Getreibe und Gedränge wurde unter den armen Menschenkindern und wie der 
Adel ängstlich durcheinander lief [...] eine Menge Justiz – und andere Wölfe wollten aus 
ihrer Haut fahren und bemüheten sich in voller Verzweiflung sich in Schaafe zu 
verwandeln [...] Blutsauger und Vampire denunzierten sich selbst als Hängens und 
Köpfens würdig [...] Der stolzeste Mann im Staate stand zum ersten Male demütig und 
fast kriechend mit der Krone in der Hand und komplimentierte mit einem zerlumpten 
Kerl um den Vorrang, weil ihm eine hereinbrechende allgemeine Gleichheit möglich 
schien.427 
This is Kreuzgang’s most insurrectionary anti-Polizei action, the crowning prank and experiment 
of his nightwatches. His false apocalypse does not just expand and intensify one particular area 
of his community that still—or at least in part—stands outside the reach of state control, namely 
that of the poet and aesthetic imagination. Rather, here Kreuzgang brings the entire edifice of 
establishment society crashing down, opening up a vast hole in that which is already governed 
and disciplined. The aim here is a complete revolution of power dynamics. As Raymond 
Williams notes, revolution or revolt entails a movement of bathos: “from the point of view of 
any established authority,” revolution’s basic operation is “an attempt to turn over, to turn upside 
down, to make topsy-turvy, a normal political order: the low putting themselves against and in 
that sense above the high.”428 Kreuzgang’s revolt through bathos is made possible—ironically, 
ridiculously—through one blast of the horn that brings forth “eine hereinbrechende allgemeine 
Gleichheit.” Here equality appears not as the ideal around which the state forms and in the name 
of which it acts, but rather as something exterior and antithetical to the state which brings about 
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its dissolution: the bathetic prank, the imaginative operation of thought in practical 
application.429 Kreuzgang’s horn is thus not an alarm signal, a police-instrument of welfare and 
defense for the Ordnung of the city, but rather the inversion of its hierarchy and the herald of a 
new sociopolitical dispensation. He continues to relish the drama as it actively unfolds: 
O, was kann ich’s beschreiben, wie das Volk vor mir auf der Bühne in- und 
durcheinander lief und in der Angst betete und fluchte und jammerte und heulte; und wie 
jeglicher Maske auf diesem zusammengeblasenen großen Balle, die Larve von dem 
Antlitze fiel und man in Bettlerkleidern Könige und umgekehrt, in Ritterrüstungen 
Schwächlinge und so fast immer das Gegentheil zwischen Kleid und Mann entdeckte.430 
Wolves become sheep, kings become beggars, the weak appear in knight’s armor. The 
aristocracy is forced to grovel on the ground, complimenting the poorest of society. The false 
apocalypse introduces the kind of oscillation between extreme poles of experience Kreuzgang 
earlier attempted to introduce into the Staatspoet’s practice, bringing the transcendent into 
contact with the mundane, reducing the high to the low and vice versa. This is the definition of 
romantisieren. It is no longer just an aesthetic bathos, but rather its extension as political 
Logorithmisierung. 
 But the appearance of an “allgemeine Gleichheit” remains only temporary. The prank 
ends as a mere prank, but before it is discovered as such, Kreuzgang attempts to extend the state 
                                                 
429 Bonaventura’s notion of equality as fundamentally exterior to the state can be extended through recourse to 
Rancière’s concepts of equality and the distribution of the sensible. In Rancière’s analysis, the imposed status quo 
“concensus” between state and population, the present political situation, is maintained and protected by the 
“police,” a wide set of social, political, aesthetic, religious, symbolic, etc., forces that apportion those kinds of senses 
and speech-acts, individuals, groups, and institutions of equality that are made available or restricted to the modern 
subject. This concept of the police has remarkable affinity to the Polizei-function around 1800 as outlined above. 
Insofar as for Rancière’s police “there is no place for a void,” the police attempts to control the entirety of the social 
field by immobilizing and cancelling any political interventions that claim the equality of all over and against the 
hierarchical status quo. (Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Theory and Event 5, no. 3 [2001], 7). Equality, 
Rancière writes elsewhere, “is actually the condition required for being able to think politics,” but it “only generates 
politics when it is implemented in the specific form of a particular case of dissensus,” that is to say, through an 
intervention—like Kreuzgang’s—that calls into question the control of the Polizeistaat (Rancière, Politics of 
Aesthetics, 52). 
 






of exception as long as he can in one last performance (“In diesem entscheidenden Momente,” 
Kreuzgang explains, “da schon einige von den Schächern die Köpfe wieder empor recken 
wollten, hielt ichs für nützlich, sie wenigstens während einer kurzen erbaulichen Rede noch in 
ihrer Zerknirschung festzuhalten zu suchen [...]”)431 And here political nihilism becomes evident 
as a productive intervention, a discursive act that freezes the chaos for a moment and introduces 
retrospection. He provides a long speech castigating contemporary society, the course of 
philosophical and scientific progress, the whole history of mankind, as “Gar nichts!” “Teureste 
Mitbürger!” Kreuzgang begins his polemic:  
Was liegt uns wohl am Weltgerichtstage näher als ein Rückblick auf den unter uns 
wankenden Planeten, der nun mit seinen Paradiesen und Kerkern mit seinen 
Narrenhäusern und Gelehrten-Republiken zusammenstürzen soll; laßt uns deshalb in 
dieser lezten Stunde, da wir die Weltgeschichte abschließen wollen, nur kurz und 
summarisch überschauen, was wir, seit dieser Erdball aus dem Chaos hervorgestiegen, 
auf ihm getrieben und ausgeführt haben [...] was haben wir aber darin vollbracht? – Ich 
behaupte: Gar Nichts!432  
Castigating his community like a Zarathustra in the public market, Kreuzgang demands 
retrospection from his fellow citizens, just as he observed of poets that they only remain 
politically harmless provided “man ihnen nur in der Wirklichkeit ihres freien Plätzchen ungestört 
einräumen und sie nicht durch das Drängen und Treiben in derselben eben zum Rückblick in sie 
zwingen wollte.” Precisely this same critical perspective is what Kreuzgang constantly generates 
in his encounters with others, an Entlarvung or demasking of the illusions and self-obsessions 
marking modern society. The contemplation of the present given in relation to its world 
historical development, its trends and tendencies, the great progress it promises and delivers (or 
fails to), for Kreuzgang this Rückblick can only lead to nihilism and the recognition of the 
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nothingness of all human projects. And yet, just as in the confrontation with the Romantic poet, 
the insight into nothingness, or the critical perspective that affirms it in experimental acts, in no 
way blocks productive creation—to the contrary: it proves to be able to turn the world upside 
down, if only for a moment. 
 Extending the state of exception he has brought about, Kreuzgang’s public denunciation 
goes on to cover philosophers, scholars, theologians, jurists (“Halbmenschen”), and finally, the 
object of his most extreme invective, politicians:  
Was soll ich gar von euch sagen, ihr Staatsmänner, die ihr das Menschengeschlecht auf 
mechanische Prinzipien reduziertet [...] O, und was drängt sich mir nicht noch alles auf 
über die einzeln stehenden Riesen, die Fürsten und Herrscher, die mit Menschen statt mit 
Münzen bezahlen, und mit dem Tode den schändlichen Sklavenhandel treiben. – O es hat 
mich toll und wild gemacht, und wie ich die Erdenbrut jetzt vor mir herum kriechend 
erblicke mit ihren Verdiensten und Tugenden, so möchte ich nur auf eine Stunde bei 
diesem allgemeinen Weltgerichte der Teufel sein, bloß um euch eine noch kräftigere 
Rede zu halten!433 
The Romantic political critique of Enlightenment or mechanistic thinking emerges here again, 
and also an aspect of its sustained politicization of affect: in a genuinely Robespierrian hatred of 
exploitative authority, Kreuzgang identifies with the oppressed subject. A certain proto-
anarchism becomes apparent here as well, but its communal drive is grounded entirely in a hate 
that eschews all social participation: “Es ist größer die Welt zu hassen, als sie zu lieben; wer liebt 
begehrt, wer haßt, ist sich selbst genug, und bedarf nichts weiter als seinen Haß in der Brust und 
keinen dritten!”434 And yet it is never enough for Kreuzgang to simply affirm his nihilism and 
hate and then desist and give up in a recognition of the pointlessness of thought and action. He is 
always compelled to spin out more speech-acts, more polemical oratory and satiric asides. He 
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thereby affirms his own position through relentless negativity, resulting not in the complete 
renunciation of modern life such that nothing more could be done or said, but rather with “noch 
kräftigere Rede.” Kreuzgang’s flow of speech constantly opens up new scenes of intervention, 
new polemical occasions for his Nachtpolitik. 
Conclusion: The Nightwatchman Policed 
Before everyone discovers that the apocalyptic announcement is “nur ein falscher Lärm,” 
Kreuzgang performs one last turn of his prank, attempting to salvage his antipoetic act. The king 
and council, beginning to understand the nature of his grand hoax, “äußerte erboßt: daß es 
strenge Ahndung verdiene mit einer ganzen respectiven Stadt Komödie zu spielen, und daß man 
sich an mich als den ersten Lärmstifter halten müsse.”435 So Kreuzgang ironically suggests that 
his false apocalypse should be patented, institutionalized, and periodically repeated for the good 
of the state: 
Wie ein solches Gerichtstagansagen, selbst wenn es bloß blinder Lärm, doch von einigem 
Nutzen sein könne, und es sogar zu wünschen wäre, daß durch physikalische 
Experimente und einige Zentner Bärlappenmehl, um von den Anhöhen und Türmen 
damit herabzublitzen, regelmäßig, von Staats wegen, ein solcher Vorspuk gemacht 
werden möchte, damit der Mann mit der Krone, der in keinem Falle allwissend, dann und 
wann dadurch eine allgemeine Staatsrevision veranstalten, und den Staat selbst in puris 
naturalibus mit allen seinen Gebrechen erblicken könnte.436 
The summit (“Anhöhen und Türmen”)—previously the site of the transcendent poet and now 
that of hierarchical political power—should be occupied and used against the state itself. With a 
few hundredweight of “Bärlappenmehl” (a plant spore often used in pyrotechnics and lighting 
effects on stage), ersatz lightning strikes are to descend from on high, terrorizing the man with 
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the crown and forcing him into retrospection, towards a confrontation with the true nature of his 
state. Such “physikalische Experimente” would reveal state power as an empty core, demasking 
its ideological authority and exposing its nakedness “mit allen seinen Gebrechen.” A 
nightwatchman like himself, Kreuzgang suggests, would be the perfect person to perform such a 
service. 
 When Kreuzgang has finally expended his speech, the state has been rendered indecisive 
(“unschlüssig”); the experiment is incomprehensibile, sowing confusion and insecurity, but not 
leading to any definite conclusions or changes in the basic order of things:  
Keiner redete, als ich ausgesprochen, ein Wort, und der Mann schob die Krone auf dem 
Haupte hin und her, als wenn er mit sich unschlüssig wäre; das endliche Resultat war 
indes, daß meine Erfindung als unanwendbar verworfen wurde und ich aus höchster 
Gnade nur als ein Narr angesehen werden und für dieses Mal noch mit der 
Amtsentsetzung gegen mich innegehalten werden solle.437 
In contrast to the conclusion of the aesthetic scene of intervention, where Kreuzgang takes leave 
of the Staatspoet after he finds him hanged by the cord of his rejected manuscript (entitled “Der 
Mensch” with a farewell letter called “Absagebrief an das Leben”), killed off by the occupation 
that only provided him a precarious life, here Kreuzgang speaks directly to the state and 
effectively transforms it, but again, only for a moment. Whereas the Staatspoet (“der aus seinem 
Dachfenster trotzig in das Michelangelo-Gemälde hinabschauete und auf seiner poetischen Höhe 
auch das Weltende poetisch nehmen zu wollen schien”) commits suicide, in Kreuzgang’s 
apocalyptic Rückblick the state is not destroyed: it is merely temporarily subjected to the 
subversive experiment of the nightwatch, proving more powerful, more viable, than the modern 
poet. Kreuzgang is not even removed from his nightwatchman’s office for the crime of his prank. 







Rather, the Polizei-function of the state successfully folds Kreuzgang’s nightwatchmanship back 
into its order, on the one hand declaring Kreuzgang insane and a fool, on the other hand utilizing 
the newfound invention of Samuel Day’s nightwatchman’s noctuary (an early timeclock system 
for policing the nightwatchman to ensure that he has made all his rounds438) to hold Kreuzgang 
in line in the future.  
The nadir of the novel and of Kreuzgang’s experimental nihilism actually occurs here—
rather than in the final nihilistic outburst of the last lines of the novel—when the Polizei manages 
to silence the antipoeticum of his horn, reducing him “von einem singenden und blasenden 
Nachtwächter auf einen stummen […] wobei man zum Grunde anführte, daß ich durch mein 
Blasen und Rufen mich den Nachtdieben verriete und es deshalb als unzweckmäßig abgeschafft 
werden müsse.”439 “Die Tagdiebe,” Kreuzgang continues, “waren so mit einem Male meiner 
Aufsicht entzogen, und ich wandle jetzt stumm und traurig durch die öden Straßen, um in jeder 
Stunde meine Karte in die Nachtuhr zu schieben.”440 The Polizei-function comes to successfully 
police its own nightwatchman, plugging the positive chaotic space opened in Kreuzgang’s 
aesthetic and apocalyptic pranks through introducing the most modern technologies of 
Polizeiwissenschaft, applying them self-reflexively in the maintenance of governmental control. 
Kreuzgang’s invention—and the entire practice of nachtwachen—is thus instantly outmoded by 
the new science of power. Technically regulating and disciplining the keepers of time in the 
                                                 
438 Kreuzgang describes this invention in a footnote in the sixth nightwatch: “Diese Nachtuhren sind so eingerichtet, 
daß der Nachtwächter jedesmal in ein bis dahin verstecktes Loch, das erst bei der bestimmten Stunde hervorrückt, 
einen Zettel steckt, zum Belege, daß er regelmäßig umhergegangen ist. Am Morgen schließt dann ein Polizeioffizier 










city—whether that of the poet’s frustrated inscription of eternity or the fool’s unheeded 
insistence on the transience of all things—the police state has already effectively secured its 

































CHAPTER 4. RELIGIONSPOLITIK 
Die wenigen Revolutionärs, die es in der Revolution gab, waren Mystiker [...] in der künftigen 
Historie wird es als die höchste Bestimmung und Würde der Revolution erscheinen, daß sie das 
heftigste Incitament der schlummernden Religion war. 
- Schlegel, Ideen441 
 
Introduction: From Kunstreligion to Religionspolitik 
In a concurrence that would have a lasting impact on the trajectory of Romanticism, the 
first literary account of a conversion to Catholicism in Germany constitutes the first “poetisches 
Manifest der Frühromantik” as well.442 The scene of this conversion is found in Wilhelm 
Wackenroder’s and Ludwig Tieck’s 1797 Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden 
Klosterbruders. In its section entitled “Brief eines jungen deutschen Malers in Rom an seinen 
Freund in Nürnberg” the titular young German painter, an apprentice from Albrecht Dürer’s 
Nuremburg workshop now living in “das gelobte Land Italia,”443 first expresses his admiration of 
Italian Renaissance art, and then describes attending a mass in Rome with his new love, 
significantly named Maria. He reports to his friend and fellow apprentice Sebastian back home in 
Nuremburg that the undeniable force of the “alter, wahrer Glauben”444 so powerfully displayed 
in the religious ceremony proved enough to bring him to his knees. At its end, collapsed in a 
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corner of the cathedral “mit zerknirschtem Herzen,”445 he finds himself violently changed. The 
physical impact of his experience proves enough for him to relinquish the Protestant faith he 
shares with friend, master, and homeland. “Ich konnte der Gewalt in mir nicht widerstehen,” he 
writes, concluding a kind of protocol of a body-in-transformation, “ich bin nun, teurer Sebastian, 
zu jenem Glauben hinübergetreten, und ich fühle mein Herz froh und leicht.”446 
And yet, the conversion presented for the first time in the Brief would seem to have little 
to do with an acceptance of the Catholic church as the proper organ of divinity in the mundane 
world. What comes as a revelation is neither the trinitarian God of traditional Christianity, nor an 
embodied, divine figure of any kind (except in the near apotheosis of the artists Raphael and 
Dürer, the latter himself historically positioned, like the young painter, in the Reformation rift 
between Catholicism and a nascent Protestantism). Instead, as has often been observed, the kind 
of religion invoked here in the Herzensergießungen is one dedicated to the revelatory effects of 
artworks, to “art as religion”447 or so-called Kunstreligion. As Jutta Osinski notes, what one finds 
is a “Konversion zur Kunst, und nicht zum Katholizismus,”448 a thesis developed further in 
Bernd Auerochs’ definition of Kunstreligion around 1800. Following Auerochs, the religiosity of 
the Brief can be cast into one essential insight: “daß Kunstwerke Offenbarungen seien,” as he 
puts it.449 “Die Kunst hat mich allmächtig hinübergezogen,” the young painter tells Sebastian, 
“und ich darf wohl sagen, daß ich nun erst die Kunst so recht verstehe und innerlich fasse.”450 
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Speaking in the idiom of art he shares with his friend, he makes explicit the role artworks play as 
the existential hinge in a turn towards something that only partially corresponds to a specifically 
religious or Catholic conversion. Tieck would pay his own friend Wackenroder the honor of an 
epitaph that succinctly captures this conversion to art. As he writes in the introduction to the 
Phantasien über die Kunst, the “Fortsetzung” to the Herzensergießungen, it was always 
Wackenroder’s wish “für die Kunst leben zu können.”451 And so it is with the young painter of 
the Brief. 
The status of the Herzensergießungen and especially the Brief as a foundational text of 
Romanticism can be understood first and foremost in this model reciprocity between religion and 
art, the hybrid form of which combines and expands the traditional late eighteenth century 
discourses of both. In one of the most important contributions of two of its founding members, 
Tieck and Wackenroder invent a Kunstreligion for Romanticism that appears neither solely as a 
fetish of the aesthetic nor a mere aestheticization of religion, but far more as a new kind of life 
suspended in tension between the poles of spiritual reception and imaginative projection, a 
suspension effacing the rigid boundaries that had conventionally separated the functions and 
forms of the religious and the artistic in relation to each other (and to other spheres of life). This 
elastic concept of Kunstreligion would find further theoretical and poetic instantiations in 
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s and Novalis’ works (the former being the first to use the term).452 But 
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apart from its presentation of the “Phantasma”453 of Kunstreligion, the Brief also offers a 
condensed digest of many of the themes that would mark future versions of Romanticism. In its 
correspondences to the main gestures of both the early Athenäum454 and the late Concordia 
(1818-1823)455 journals, the influence of the Brief is apparent at both bookends of the Romantic 
movement and across its continuum. 
But while the Brief marks the inauguration of an equal parts religious and aesthetic life 
practice for a series of future Romanticisms, its contributions to the movement are not exhausted 
in just its vision—one that will become a veritable program—of Kunstreligion as a discourse 
                                                 
Schleiermacher’s ideas: “Schleiermacher hat Eine Art von Liebe und Religion verkündigt—eine Kunstreligion—
beinah eine Religion wie die des Künstlers, der die Schönheit und das Ideal verehrt” (Novalis, 3:562). 
 
453 Auerochs, 366. Pursuing his argument that Kunstreligion must be understood in terms of an Enlightenment 
critique of religion, Auerochs emphasizes the complexity of defining and generalizing its concept around 1800: “In 
Kunstreligion kommen zwei einander im Grunde widerstreitende Motive zusammen: ihr pantheistisch-
religionskritischer Zug […] [und] was als geglaubte und gelebte Religion in der Gegenwart vorliegt […] Es ist, als 
könnte man Kunstreligion einmal mehr auf Kunst (und damit auf Freiheit) und einmal mehr auf Religion (und damit 
auf Ernst) betonen. Die Schwierigkeit [...] liegt darin, daß sobald diese beiden kaum miteinander zu vereinbaren 
Motive wieder auseinandertreten, sich das Phantasma der Kunstreligion auch schon wieder auflöst” (Ibid.).  
 
454 On the one hand, the condensed intensity of the Brief (itself a self-enclosed fragment vis-à-vis the 
Herzensergießungen as frame) is close to the atmosphere of urgent experimentation of the early Jena circle. As a 
response to the exigencies of the moment around 1800, Kunstreligion contributes to the wider contemporaneous 
attempt in early Romanticism to draft a regenerative modern myth capable of regrounding and reorienting future 
life. After the publication of Schlegel’s Ideen and later Gespräch über die Poesie, this project of a new mythology 
would come to represent one of the founding gestures of Frühromantik. But the Brief appears as an early 
performance of that other founding gesture of the Athenäum as well, namely the invention of Romantic irony or the 
theory of Unverständlichkeit as both ground and undermining figure of all discourse, all philosophical and poetic 
thought. In this context, the young painter channels the incomprehensibility and inscrutable nature of what he calls a 
“geheime,” “unbekannte Macht” or “unsichtbares Wesen […] das allgewaltig von den großen Kunstwerken 
angezogen wird” into a form of stimulation, leading to his reflections on life, art, God, and the demand to transform 
all of them through the means of the other (Herzensergießungen:114). 
  
455 On the other hand, and in some ways more obviously so than with its relations to the Athenäum, the Brief can be 
understood as a manifesto avant la lettre of 1820s Viennese Spätromantik as well. For example, the Brief prepares 
the later Romantic hybrid that I describe as a Religionspolitik: the imagination of an ideal political order coupled to 
the rhetoric of an expansive notion of Catholicism. Religionspolitik, which will find a fuller explication below, 
functions as the means to an authentic (religious, aesthetic, sociopolitical) restitutio in integrum for a fallen 
modernity. In the Brief this latter tendency is still largely, but not entirely, bound to the sphere of individual 
redemption, not yet achieving the collective scale it would later in the 1820s. And of course, taking into account the 
biographical correspondence of the Brief to the milieu of the late Romantics, there is the young painter’s conversion 
to Catholicism. In this sense, what is at stake as much for the young painter as for the Spätromantiker is the complex 






binding the (religious, metaphysical) spirit to the artwork. For the Brief becomes a paradigmatic 
model of Romanticism not least through its offer of a physiological hermeneutic central to 
Kunstreligion as well. This evident physiological hermeneutic, or the way the Brief foregrounds 
an attention to the body as a kind of legible if sometimes indiscernible object of investigation, 
constitutes an insight into the revelatory potentials not just of a novel form of religious-aesthetic 
experience in general, but of the specific manner in which such experience manifests itself in and 
through corporeal signs. This is to say that Romantic Kunstreligion is—perhaps first and 
foremost, if we take the Herzensergießungen as a model—a discourse of the receptive and 
expressive body-in-transformation, and especially of the body in extreme and intense states, in 
ecstasy and crisis. 
Its narrative form occurs in what I noted above as the young painter’s astonished self-
protocol of his own body as it alters before his eyes. Watching himself change in the course of 
the religious ceremony, a spectator, as it were, of his own conversion, his experience at mass 
amounts to an observation and reading of the body as it becomes a medium of Offenbarung. As 
he describes it to Sebastian, he feels a twofold attunement to the force (Gewalt) of the mass. 
Once at the material or sensuous level, and again as transcendence, as the vessel of the soul, for 
the young painter the psychosomatic body records and communicates his conversion experience 
all at once, making his letter into a kind of second-order reflection on the event. Picking up on 
those transformative forces (whether religious, aesthetic or a con-fusion of both) whose singular 
intensity demand nothing less than full dedication and conversion, the young painter begins to 
interpret instinctual physical responses to the artwork of the mass as revelations of a mysterious 
power, as a decipherable text that gives physiological force a privileged role, a kind of testament 






the Catholic ceremony, one could say that his heart does not pour forth (Herzensergießung) 
metaphorically, but quite literally so. 
In terms of the conceptual evolution of the early Romantic system of thought, the Brief 
provides the first model for a hermeneutic approach to the body-soul complex that finds it at all 
points revelatory. In an early Romantic potenzieren and reorganization of its significatory 
processes, the body is rethought as a surface that registers transcendent changes in metaphysical 
(or spiritual) as much as physical (or aesthetic-sensory) experience, provided one develops a 
mode of reading or attention to the signs of transformation the body manifests. But even within 
the scope of the late Romantic treatment of the body, such as in the Concordia journal and 
elsewhere in Schlegel’s late work—where the cosmically recuperative element of Kunstreligion 
is stressed far more than in its original appearance in the Herzensergießungen—the body as a 
metaphorical figure still never loses its status as the matter of a material organism, subject to the 
determination of its natural and historical environment (as is evident also in the 
naturephilosophical tendency of Romanticism explored in the previous chapter). As the Brief 
first suggests, and, as we will see, as the last phase of Spätromantik will in its own way 
dramatically reassert, the most significant forms of experience can only be understood in relation 
to their origins in the bodily sensorium.  
Romantic texts emphasize the way discursive or logical thinking is relegated to a 
secondary epiphenomenon of base physiological processes, without, however, denigrating the 
physical body’s sensitivity to moments of spiritual transcendence, moments whose constitutive 
nature exceeds material-empirical frameworks of knowledge. Articulated expression, linguistic 
representation—not to mention scientific analysis—is often supplemented, when not directly 






The body (not just in the Herzensergießungen, but also in the discourse network of early and late 
Romanticism as a whole) is thereby granted a primary significance as a basic medium of 
experience that calls for its own kind of interpretation (albeit still conditioned through literary 
capture), one that collapses the distinctions between physical and metaphysical regimes of being.  
Paradoxically, it is this direct inspiration or infusion of the transcendent Absolute into the 
order of the mundane and physical—whose description often constitutes a challenge which 
discursive language struggles to meet—that results in so many attemps of Romantic texts to 
provide its narrative account. The recognition that an exhaustive or total depiction cannot suffice 
to capture the fullness of the body as revealed in a world of enigmatic force, indeed that such an 
ideal of perfect representation is an impossiblity for any given empirical object of contemplation, 
still does not check the attempt to provide its imaginative (and indeed scientific) explanation. Far 
from it: for the Romantics, the critical recognition of unrepresentability, whether of the Absolute 
or of Poesie, or, as is the case here, of the intricate mysteries of organic bodies, this becomes the 
immediate stimulus to a stream of textual production. 
It is only near the end of the Romantic movement proper, however, that this insight of 
physiological hermeneutics—namely the attempt to “read” the body as an essential part of an 
ongoing research project into the simultaneously transcendent and grounded lifeworld of the 
human—would find full development as a system center. Thematized again in the period of the 
Concordia456 journal and thereafter, in so-called Viennese Romanticism from roughly 1820 to 
1830, the late Romantic concept of the body is increasingly divested of its metaphorical-poetic 
                                                 
456 Ernst Behler describes the Concordia journal “als das ‘eigentliche Organ’ der katholischen Wiener 
Spätromantik” (Ernst Behler, “Nachwort“ in Concordia: Eine Zeitschrift [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1967], 7). The object of the Concordia was to show, as Behler puts it, a “höhere Wahrheit [...] mit 
dem ganz konkreten Ziel einer allgemeinen politischen, sozialen, wirtschaftlichen, ideologischen und literarischen 






content (a content still evident, for example, in the central metaphor of the heart and blood in the 
Herzensergießungen, even given this text’s careful account of physical corporeality). In late 
Romanticism the physical body—and its future possibilities and potentials—becomes an object 
of investigation in a comprehensive philosophical, historical, and political system of thought. But 
what the terminological field of the “body” (Körper, Leib) loses in metaphorical valence in this 
late period, it gains in conceptual and practical breadth. This gain comes, however, as a 
universalization and abstraction that runs the risk of almost negating the term’s specificity. In 
Spätromantik, this is to say, an expansive sense of the basic organic system is prevelant; bodies, 
put simply, are everywhere for the late Romantics.  
Even so, the term in all its dispersion defines a more or less coherent sphere of 
application, whose main fields can still be identified: it is not only the physical body of the 
animal human that is treated in late Romantic texts (its organs, limbs, skeleton, circulatory 
system, brain, and so on, which constitute the proper object of study of biology, physiology, 
medicine, etc.), but also its analogical relation with more general natural, religious, and political 
bodies found across the entire ontological field of being. The body thus variously appears in 
natural and celestial entities (Naturkörper); mundane vessels of the religious soul (Leib as in the 
phrase Leib Christi and in the tripartite division of Geist—Seele—Leib in Christian theology); 
and political institutions, “organische Gemeinschaften,”457 and sovereign persons 
(Staatskörper).458 In each instance of this semantic complex in late Romanticism, the given sense 
                                                 
457 Matala de Mazza, 32. 
 
458 On the long tradition of the body politic and the body of the king (as for example in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan), 
see Ernst Kantorowicz’ seminal work: The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton University, 2016). In a 
discussion of “Politische Physik,” Joseph Vogl summarizes this political-anthropological figure of thought as it 
transitions through the Enlightenment period. Referring to the work of the late seventeenth century cameralist 
Samuel Pufendorf, Vogl’s discussion is just as applicable to the spätromantisch correspondence between natural, 
religious, and political bodies in question here: “das corpus politicum,” Vogl notes “[wird] als >>grosser Mystischer 






of body in question becomes emphatically prophetic as well, expressing past, present, and future 
transformations in itself and its surrounding environment as a medium of communication, albeit 
one that is perpetually problematic and fraught with the difficulties of adequate description.459 
The late Romantic body speaks in a complex and polyphonic register: while often finding its 
terms through the discourses of the nascent modern natural and political sciences as much as 
those of metaphysics, spirituality, and traditional religion around 1800, it is still an opaque and 
ambiguous entity in the late Romantic system. 
But the political valence of this complex discourse of the body must be emphasized. The 
Romantic politics of the body is most evident when it becomes the primary field in which the 
religious drive to transformation is imagined and performatively drafted into being in late 
Romanticism. In the symphilosophical (or rather symtheocratic) program of renewal for the 
Restoration age, this notion of a physiological hermeneutic is at the core of what I call late 
Romantic Religionspolitik. Any examination of the political imagination of late Romanticism not 
                                                 
vereinigt werden, ein Leib, der darum auf das corpus mysticum mittelalterlicher Ekklesiologie zurückweist: ein 
Ausdruck, der vom Leib Christi der Eucharistie auf die kirchliche Körperschaft übertragen wird [...]” (Joseph Vogl, 
Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 51). Such Übertragungen or projections between concepts of the body are also mobilized 
in the late Romantic context, as will become clear below. 
 
459 I refer to this multivalent discourse of the body—for example, the treatment of organs of the body such as the 
heart—as a medium of language insofar as the body can be understood as one of the many ostensibly non-linguistic 
objects that the Romantics redefine as communicatively expressive in their own manner, if often only in an opaque 
or hieroglypically cloaked manner. Novalis, for example, draws attention to a secret language of things most 
evocatively in the first paragraph of Die Lehrlinge zu Saïs when he speaks of “jener großen Chiffernsprache” of the 
world as including both animate and inanimate forms of being (we will return to this in the conclusion). To provide 
a further example, in the Brouillon one finds one of Novalis’ characteristically laconic notes: “Klingt überhaupt 
eigentlich der Körper,” among many other experimental statements on the expressive possibilities of bodies 
(Novalis, 3:509). Rancière formulates this aspect of a Romantic theory of language when he writes that the 
“Romantic Age actually plunged language into the materiality of the traits by which the historical and social world 
becomes visible to itself, be it in the silent language of things or the coded language of images” (Rancière, Politics 
of Aesthetics, 36). Even more to the point, Hans Blumenberg, referring to this omnipresent but silent language of 
things and bodies, draws attention to one of Novalis’ formulations in the Brouillon that will find an echo in 
Schlegel’s late work: “Lehre von den Signaturen” (Blumenberg, 234). Blumenberg glosses this phrase eloquently: 
“die Naturlehre [for Novalis] werde nichts anderes zu sein brauchen als eine Dechiffrierkunst, für die die Körper und 
Figuren die Substantive, die Kräfte die Verben sein sollen” (Ibid., 236). Thus the materiality of the body in all its 
diverse meanings, for both the early and late Romantics, becomes in this sense a medium of language whose 






only has to treat the obvious importance of the general concept of the body as an organic form—
both in terms of its naturephilosophical and political investments—it also has to excavate the 
myriad ways in which bodies transcendent and physical lend a certain concreteness to the 
speculative physiological (and organicist) tropes of Spätromantik. What has to be assessed is the 
extent to which a certain discourse of the body establishes the site at which the late Romantics 
(building off of such early breakthroughs as the Herzensergießungen) synthesize their religious 
and political commitments. Through the discovery of an ideal—but also real-empirical—object 
in the body, they invest their dreams of the future utopian society with the resources of a new 
field of exploration: the physiological. (The same can be said for the manner in which the body 
establishes the site at which the program of Kunstreligion takes place in its fullest form in Tieck 
and Wackenroder’s contributions.) And here a relation emerges to the one figure who more than 
any other represents the beginnings and the ends of the Romantic movement, Friedrich Schlegel. 
For it is Schlegel who, in his last phase of production, the phase of Religionspolitik, develops an 
interest in the physical body of the individual as much as the collective body politic and begins 
to interpret it as a medium of apocalyptic political change. 
In what follows, I read the physiological hermeneutic dramatized in the Brief as a point of 
departure for a re-examination of Schlegel’s late Religionspolitik, a form of thinking itself 
impossible without his conversion to Catholicism (perhaps the most well-known in German 
literary culture). I first look at the Brief in more detail, and more specifically at how the young 
painter develops a mode of attention and interpretation—what I have called above a 
physiological hermeneutic—that binds the aesthetic as experience and representation (or 
Darstellung in the terms of the Brief) to the psychosomatic and sociopolitical effects of religious 






inflected bodies and the revelation of artworks (i.e., the binding operation as such presented in 
the Brief) is then taken up and translated into a major methodological approach of Schlegel’s late 
political thought. Religion-politik—a twofold concept and life practice like Kunst-religion—
depends on a “magical” or wunderbare form of analogical thinking for which the syncretism of 
early Romantic Kunstreligion provides an essential model.460 
In a sustained corpus of reflections stretching throughout the 1820s, Schlegel consistently 
reads the transcendent/physical body as the connection between, or rather the collapse of, 
religious and political domains of being (just as the body binds together the young painter’s 
religious and aesthetic commitments into a singular event) into a novel order or form of life that 
points towards the future, that reveals the identity of religious and political transformations in the 
immediate post-revolutionary period and beyond. The on-going expression of all these unified 
forms of experience and practice, Schlegel argues, is essentially a matter for a reading practice 
focused on the physiological level of both the individual and collective. And given this, it will be 
through a discussion of the body that he will attempt to predict (or prophecize) the course of the 
future as it leads to what he believes will be its final end in apocalypse. In the last decades of his 
life, Schlegel proposes a framework through which to read the record of local (political, 
philosophical, contemporary historical) changes in his own environment as part of the prophetic 
signature (Signatur) of the closure of world history, and he does so by way of developing a wild 
                                                 
460 One could also consider Novalis’ doctrine of magical idealism along these lines. In the language of the Brouillon, 
the syncretic operation in question here—or what I call Romantic religare below—would fall under the domain of 
what Novalis calls the “Gesetzen der Association” (Novalis, 3:505). Lothar Pikulik goes even futher in emphasizing 
the analogical method in Romanticism; for him, the analogy constitutes the most important conceptual movement in 
the Romantic system of thought, its characteristic Integrationstendenz: “Die spezifische Denk- und 
Anschauungsform, die die Bande zwischen dem Verschiedensten knüpft, ist die Analogie. Sie ist die romantischste 
aller romantischen Denkkategorien, weit wichtiger noch als die Ironie […] wenn nach romantischer Ansicht alles 
mit allem zusammenhängt, die Künste, die Wissenschaften, Natur und Geist, das Organische und das Anorganische, 
der Mensch als Mikrokosmos mit dem Universum als Makrokosmos, dann ist dafür eine allwaltende Analogie 
verantwortlich” (Lothar Pikulik, Signatur einer Zeitenwende: Studien zur Literatur der frühen Moderne von Lessing 






imaginative discourse on the formation of new religious bodies. Schlegel’s expansive concept of 
the body is at the center of a reading technology whose system of signification is based in the last 
and greatest, the divine revolution to end historical time and usher in the eschaton of the golden 
age. 
This chapter focuses on the essential binding operation of Schlegel’s version of 
Religionspolitik, namely: the flexible analogy drawn between, on the one hand, what is called the 
body as a site of hellsehen or prophetic clairvoyance (as stressed in early nineteenth century 
mesmerism, also known variously as Spiritualismus or what Schlegel and Johann Wilhelm 
Ritter, among others, call Siderismus), and, on the other hand, the signature of escatological 
history.461 Thus Schlegel, similarly to Tieck and Wackenroder’s project in the Herzensergießung, 
constructs a hybrid system not of religion and aesthetics, but of religion and politics, and, just as 
in the Brief, this Schlegelian Religionspolitik immediately takes up an examination of extreme 
bodily experiences, emphasizing the need to rethink the very possibilities and potentials of the 
body as such. The following sections will be occupied with charting in more detail the 
background, development, and most significant ramifications of this conceptual intersection in 
Schlegel’s late religious-political work-cycle. 
4.1 Romantic Religare 
To return to the Brief: a physiological hermeneutic emerges here as the sense, or rather 
sense-organ, that registers and interprets the young painter’s process of conversion. Through 
                                                 
461 The former concern—that of the spiritist body—is treated most extensively in Schlegel’s unpublished and almost 
entirely neglected Zur Geschichte und Politik notebooks. The latter—the identification and writing of signatures, 
i.e., the characterization of dominant, identifiable historical, political, and religious-philosophical tendencies—is 
discussed in his published 1820 Signatur des Zeitalters manifesto. The phase of Schlegel’s work that I am 
specifying with Religionspolitik, a significant lacuna in the critical scholarship, stretches from approximately 1820 
and the publication of the Signatur in the Concordia journal through the contemporaneous Zur Geschichte und 
Politik notebooks on which Schlegel was still working at his death in 1829. All of these works will be discussed in 






what he identifies as a kind of wondrous sensitivity or “wunderbaren Aufmerksamkeit,”462 he is 
able to first experience such extraordinary events as his metamorphosis at mass by closely 
attending to its physical impact.463 While the young painter describes his conversion in terms of 
the body struggling to communicate and process change, at the end of the Brief, attempting to 
summarize the results of his experience, he yokes this body language of transformation to an 
aesthetic theory sketched in a handful of lines. Here he expands on his assertion, “daß ich nun 
erst die Kunst so recht verstehe und innerlich fasse.” He speaks of a “Poesie der göttlichen Kunst 
[…] [die] bei mir länger wirkt”464 as a problem for a prescriptive poetics, the latter tasked to the 
corporeal effect (wirken) of art: “Kannst Du ein hohes Bild recht verstehen,” the young painter 
asks Sebastian, “und mit heiliger Andacht es betrachten, ohne in diesem Momente die 
Darstellung zu glauben?”465 This rhetorical question to Sebastian, which is just as much a 
programmatic imperative bordering on the blasphemous—Darstellung glauben, believe in the 
representation, the artwork or image—maintains that the impact of the most profound, or rather 
elevated representation (ein hohes Bild) is an illumination of the physical body as much as the 
spirit. In light of the young painter’s physiological description of the mass, it seems that the form 
                                                 
462 Herzensergießungen:115. 
 
463 Romantic discussions of religious experience often emphasize precisely this; for Schleiermacher, drawing 
dircetly on the Spinozist framework of a scientia intuitiva: “Religion ist Sinn und Geschmak fuers Unendliche,” and 
“Anschauung des Universums” (Friedrich Schleiermacher, Über die Religion: Reden and die Gebildeten unter ihren 
Verächtern [Hamburg: Meiner, 1958], 30). On the early Romantic discourse of religion in terms of a sense, sense 
apparatus, or organ of perception, see Weatherby, Transplanting the Metaphysical Organ, 216: “For 
Schleiermacher, religion is a sense.” Much of my discussion of a physiological hermeneutic in the texts in question 
here, and in particular the central importance and terminological complexity of the body as a legible medium, is 
indebted to Weatherby’s study of the history and function of the term ‘organ’ in early Romanticism. The present 
chapter finds traces of the Romantic organological discourse still present in Schlegel’s later works, whereas 










of belief he imagines here is a kind of physical belief or faith vouchsafed in the body, a faith in 
the image of the body passing through the crucible of religious-aesthetic change. 
Without recourse to classical eighteenth century models of aesthetic reception that value 
scientific cognition of beauty over the organs of base sensation, the young painter insists that 
“ein hohes Bild” is to be felt as an embodied presence, an erotics, received as a revelation that 
strikes and wounds the body before even registering on the so-called higher faculties of the mind. 
As an intensification of the pre-cognitive “Gemüt” (or an “ecstatic synaesthesia” as Jonathan 
Blake Fine puts it),466 the impact of art—here the Catholic mass as its greatest Gesamtkunstwerk 
exemplar—is granted a status most often associated with the immediacy and sensuality of 
religious rapture. Paying close attention to his own bodily signs during the collective trance of 
the religious ceremony, the young painter tells Sebastian: “ich folgte bloß meinem innerlichen 
Geiste, meinem Blute, von dem mir jetzt jeder Tropfen geläuterter vorkömmt.” He thus justifies 
his conversion to his friend as a response to a physical demand that is as much a reflex of the 
“innerlichen Geiste,” without, however, providing an intelligible image of exactly what he is 
converting to.  
                                                 
466 Jonathan Blake Fine, “The Birth of Aestheticized Religion out of the Counter-Enlightenment Attraction to 
Catholicism.” European Romantic Review, no. 26 (2015), 43. The conversion scene in the Brief specifies Fine’s 
term “ecstatic synaesthesia”: as the mass begins, the young painter tells Sebastian: “Mir war sehr feierlich zumute, 
und wenn ich auch, wie es einem bei solchem Getümmel zu gehen pflegt, nichts deutlich und hell dachte, so wühlte 
es doch auf eine so seltsame Art in meinem Innern, als wenn auch in mir selber etwas Besonderes vorgehen sollte.” 
(Herzensergießungen, 115). Already possessed with an affectively-charged “Gemüt” that prevents him from 
thinking “deutlich und hell,” the variation of aesthetic forms that follow in the course of the mass—music, dramatic 
gesture, sermon, architecture, painting—begin to successively compound their impact on the body of the young 
painter. “Mein Herz klopfte,” he tells Sebastian as the music starts, “Und indem die Musik auf diese Weise mein 
ganzes Wesen durchdrungen hatte und alle meine Adern durchlief – da hob ich meinen in mich gekehrten Blick und 
sah um mich her – und der ganze Tempel ward lebendig vor meinen Augen, so trunken hatte mich die Musik 
gemacht” (Ibid.). The eyes, along with the heart, become the vectors through which the con-fusion of all aspects of 
the religious ceremony exerts its intoxicating effects on the young painter. He cannot withstand the combination of 
all its different media; whereas he physically collapses—his body unable to withstand the effects of the ceremony—






In a bypassing of generic and practical divisions, Darstellung glauben provides a kind of 
model equation for future Romantic thinking by connecting the form-generating aesthetic 
imagination (representation, Darstellung) together with the body language of religious affect 
(physical belief, bodily Glauben). The very act of binding bears reflection here, as it is of central 
importance when one searches for the impact of the Herzensergießung more broadly throughout 
the tradition of late Romantic texts that developed in part off its basis. Insofar as the discursive 
bond as such, or the synthesis carried out in the operation Kunst = Religion or Darstellung = 
Glauben becomes increasingly significant as the Romantic movement evolves (above all through 
Schlegel’s works), the Brief inaugurates a notion of Romantic religion that follows the 
etymology of the original term ‘religion’ closely. As its supposed root in the Latin religare has it, 
the function of ‘religion’ is originally understood in a broad sense as one of binding, both a 
binding of people to each other and of individuals and communities to God.467 In the Brief then, 
romantic religion finds an early form in a kind of conceptual religare that plugs two (or more) 
seemingly separate modes of human experience into each other (Kunst + Religion, Darstellung + 
Glauben, Geist + Gemüt), expanding and potentializing the semantic and practical domains of 
the terms of each couplet. The young painter’s experience at mass emerges through such 
syncretic couplings, the terms of which appear interchangeable but not reducible, each 
                                                 
467 On the contested etymology of the word “religion,” and in what sense it can be understood as a ‘binding,’ see 
Augustine, Retractions (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1968), 56-57. For a general overview of its 
etymological debate, see Sarah F. Hoyt, “The Etymology of Religion.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 
vol. 32, no. 2 (1912). In On Revolution, Hannah Arendt observes an explicitly political meaning in the origin of the 
term that will be significant for what follows; speaking of the American Founding Fathers, Arendt writes: “If their 
attitude towards Revolution and Constitution can be called religious at all, then the word ‘religion’ must be 
understood in its original Roman sense, and their piety would then consist in religare, in binding themselves back to 
a beginning, as Roman pietas consisted in being bound back to the beginning of Roman history, the foundation of 
the eternal city” (Hannah Arendt, On Revolution [New York: Penguin, 2006], 190). Schlegel will imagine a form of 
religare as both a binding to the originary prelapsarian state of humanity and to the eschatological future, to the 
ideal of the postapocalyptic New Jerusalem that makes provisional and indeed evacuates the contents of 






reciprocally intensifying the other without being rendered inoperative or suspended: the artwork 
only discloses itself in the form and sense-organ of worship or belief; the inspiration of the spirit 
is tracked through the coursing of blood (“auf diese Weise mein ganzes Wesen durchdrungen 
[…] und alle meine Adern durchlief”); and the sign of the sacred is read in the ecstatic reaction 
to artworks. 
But this reading of the binding operations of the Brief must appear as an inadequate point 
of departure for a wider examination of the physiological import of Romantic Religionspolitik—
and specifically of Schlegel’s emphasis on corporeal, somatic bodies as legible signatures of 
apocalyptic events—and this in one central respect, namely that of the political. Not yet reaching 
the key consideration, namely that of an emergent politics of Romantic religion around 1800 that 
will echo forward through Schlegel’s late corpus of work, the above reading of the Brief requires 
this last point on its social and political valence before turning to Schlegel’s own version of a 
physiological hermeneutic of the apocalypse in his late works.  
The frame of the Brief, after all, is a rhetorical gamble that social divisions can be bridged 
after the German artist’s conversion to Catholicism—connected in a higher-order religare of art 
and religion. Its stakes are that the rifts between the young painter, Sebastian, Dürer, and their 
native German culture can be shored up with the kind of shift in perspective provided in the 
religious-aesthetic practice of a wunderbare Aufmerksamkeit. This practice does not so much 
negate the young painter’s native cultural context as raise its level of potentiality. This is evident 
insofar as the physical breakdown of his conversion event—the “Unordnung,”468 as the young 
painter puts it, through which aesthetic attention to the transcendent medium of the body first 
becomes possible—is also the precondition for an alternative set of social bonds at varying 







scales, from the intimate to the macropolitical. This is to say that the experience of his body-in-
transformation during mass is inseperable from an experience of an emergent body politic, a 
vision of a different social order precisely through the disordering of perceptual and existential 
boundaries.  
The social consequences of this conflation of individual and collective experiences is 
everywhere present in the text’s events. First, the German-Protestant young painter is engaged to 
his beloved Maria and joins the local Catholic laiety (and indeed the Brief can also be read as a 
conversion to a religion of love embodied in the overdetermined figure of Maria as much as to a 
religion of art). Then two friends, the young painter and Sebastian, separated by cultural, 
religious, and geographic distance, are brought back together in the name of a kunstreligiös 
sensibility (or at least this is the young painter’s hope). Finally, the cultural bond of an emergent 
idea of Europe around 1800, a homogenous but multivaried territory stretching north to south, 
from Dürer’s Protestant Germany to Raphael’s Catholic Italy, is produced in the imagination of a 
nascent Romantic movement with an already pronounced ecumenical and cosmopolitan 
tendency.469 It is the young painter’s conversion experience at mass that allows this latent 
political imaginary to emerge in his report to Sebastian. 
And yet, this kind of attention to the body as the site of a series of synthesizing or binding 
operations (between art and religion, or religion and politics) is not the only approach one could 
take towards an introduction of the late Romantic political imagination. To be sure, the generic 
function of religare or bringing together—whether disparate concepts, practices, historical 
traditions, or groups of people—can be understood as a fundamental operation of late 
                                                 
469 It is in this sense that an Enlightenment cosmopolitan impulse has been claimed for the Herzensergießungen in 
general. Auerochs, for example, notes that the text “führt auch ein beredtes Plädoyer für ‘Allgemeinheit, Toleranz 
und Menschenliebe‘ [the title of one of the Herzensergießungen’s chapters] [...] und erweist sich somit als liberal 






Religionspolitik, more significant, perhaps, than its specific attendant interests in the organic 
body in its own right or, as with Schlegel, its even more esoteric interest in the spiritist body. 
Indeed, the function of community or sociopolitical binding in general (irrespective of its 
specifically physiological formulations in Romantic discourse), appearing on the face of things 
as a latent but crucial aspect in the Brief, is nowhere more pronounced than in political 
Spätromantik. For the late Romantics, religion (now in a markedly anti-Enlightenment, anti-
secular form) and Restoration politics (now explicitly opposed to republican traditions) are 
bound together, or must become so in the future. Attempting a recuperation of the world 
historical mission of Catholicism for a post-revolutionary Europe re-establishing sociopolitical 
bonds after 1815 (such as in the Deutscher Bund and Heilige Allianz), the representatives of this 
last phase of the movement—Adam Müller, Joseph Görres, Franz von Baader, Carl Ludwig von 
Haller, Zacharias Werner, Friedrich Gentz, and above all Schlegel, among others—dedicated 
themselves to bringing together, binding in an act of religare, the resources of Catholicism with 
a program of a conservative social and political restoration. This activity is at the center of their 
programmatic vision, but in Schlegel’s sense of this task, the type of “restoration” and 
“conservatism” involved appears very much as a wild political task as well.  
The most intensive and extensive development of late Romantic Religionspolitik, as we 
will see in the following discussion, is found above all in Schlegel’s 1820 essay-manifesto 
Signatur des Zeitalters and in the notebooks Zur Geschichte und Politik that surround it. 
Nowhere more so than in these two closely related texts, the forging of collective bonds, both in 
theory and in a praxis that was to be actualized in the (potentially near) future, is of central 
importance. Such new social formations would result in a fundamentally alternative European 






religious community no one part of the social organism could abuse or coerce another (such as 
was evident in the practical consequences of French republicanism): a political model brought 
into being according to the precepts of late Romantic Religionspolitik.  
Thus the Brief’s statement of Darstellung glauben—if understood as a kind of paradigm 
of Romantic religare bringing together art, religion, and an alternative political community—
takes on yet another meaning when transposed onto the post-Napoleonic context. The late 
Romantics focus on reformulating the Darstellung of European political community (or a fiction 
of the state, as first Schlegel and then Novalis after him would influentially suggest early on, a 
poetic manifestation of a “Republik und Monarchie durch eine Unionsacte vollkommen 
vereinigt”470 as Novalis puts it). This founding political fiction first achieves the persuasive (and 
existentially transformative) force of belief, of Glaube—able, in other words, to function as the 
affective Archimedean point of German political community over and against the abstract-
legalistic traditions of English and French constitutionalism—by drawing on the historical, 
political, economic, and, most importantly, revelatory power of the Catholic system of faith. 
Religion as religare still maintains a function in late Romantic thought as a technique of 
discursive and practical binding, but it is no longer primarily a matter of amalgamating art and 
religion as in Kunstreligion. The binding operation is now displaced onto Catholicism’s potential 
as a political resource, as an expressive vehicle not primarily of a psychosomatic poetics (as in 
the Brief), but of foundational acts of political will and communal formation.471 One could thus 
speak of the birth of late Romantic Religion + Politik out of the methodology of early Kunst + 
                                                 
470 Novalis, 3:276); Schlegel’s own early theory of a politics based on a founding fiction is found in his Versuch 
über den Republikanismus. 
 
471 Schlegel’s colleague Adam Müller, for example, would pursue his symtheocratic system of Catholic thought 
alongside the other Spätromantiker always in the spirit of dialectical synthesis and reconciliation, bringing absolute 






Religion. Darstellung glauben can be understood as a kind of master signifier of this specifically 
Romantic evolution from its early to late stages.  
It is not incidental that Catholicism plays such an outsized role within this specific 
genealogy. For Schlegel, Catholicism becomes the major diagnostic framework within which to 
properly evaluate the historical background and contemporary status of political power in the 
post-Napoleonic dispensation. But, more importantly, it is also a deep source of symbolic 
traditions, images, narratives, and prophecies that help chart the future course of a pax Europaea 
out of a modernity increasingly riven by more general crises. Schlegel’s Religionspolitik is the 
attempt to theorize—or merely indicate—what he calls “eine wunderbare und magische 
Revolution”472 that shows the experiment of the French Revolution, for example, to be mere 
child’s play. This “kleine, kindische Menschen-Revolution,” as he puts it, becomes one symptom 
among many in a far greater world historical transformation that indexes a “große, ernste, 
Gottes-Revolution”473 to come, the apocalyptic revolutionary crisis that introduces eternal peace 
in the Kingdom of God. Schlegel’s last major published text, which is also the last manifesto of 
Romanticism, the 1820 Signatur des Zeitalters, is the most emphatic testament to what I examine 
below as an increasingly apocalyptic turn in his notion of Religionspolitik. But as we will see, the 
Signatur essay-manifesto can only be understood in its fullest scope and intention when read 
alongside the esoteric notebooks Zur Geschichte und Politik from this same period.  
The exploration Schlegel’s work in the Signatur and related notebooks—what he called 
“mein zweites, neues, höheres Lehramt”474 (i.e., after his tenure as Hofsekretär and Legationsrat 
                                                 
472 Schlegel, 22:365. 
 
473 Ibid., 182. 
 






for Metternich at the 1815 Congress of Vienna and during his most imaginative engagement with 
theological discourse, lasting until his death)—a study of this period necessarily includes the 
kind of physiological hermeneutic first formulated in the grammar of the Brief: necessarily 
because the status of the material body takes on an unmistakeable importance in the development 
of Schlegel’s Religionspolitik. The attempt to think a form of religare from the eschatological 
perspective, one that would lead Europe out of the revolutionary era and restore cosmic order to 
a society torn apart, appears inseparable from a certain alternative doctrine of the body. 
Redefining the nature and potential of the body—not just as the individual organic vessel of the 
human soul, but also as a communal object, a body politic enframing and expressing the 
collective Geist of humanity—is for Schlegel the first step to realizing the utopian world order 
that follows after the apocalyptic end of history. 
As already touched on above, the young painter of the Brief seeks a way of living 
dedicated to aesthetic and religious convertability, a search through the signs of the 
psychosomatic body as it attunes itself to transcendent forces, transforming in the moment of 
crisis. Schlegel’s late Religionspolitik pushes this search into different fields of exploration, 
elaborating on a kind of generalized natural science (Naturkunde) of the entire social body as it 
approaches the coming revolutionary eschaton. Just as in the Brief, there is also a certain irony or 
para-discourse (the irony of the young painter’s converting as much to art as to Catholicism) at 
play in Schlegel’s Signatur essay: there Schlegel’s own version of a wunderbaren 
Aufmerksamkeit or physiological hermeneutic reveals itself, above all through its unspoken 
dialogue with the late notebooks Zur Geschichte und Politik, not merely as as part of a historical 






metapolitical analysis that projects the late Romantic program into uncharted conceptual and 
practical territories.  
The last sections take up this secondary or latent framework of wild political 
apocalypticism by further examining the concepts of Spiritualismus and Siderismus475 already 
briefly mentioned above in the discussion of Schlegel’s signature of the age. In the late 
notebooks these interrelated paradigms of thought and practice indicate Schlegel’s appropriation 
and translation of the contemporary discourse of the spiritist body around 1820 into a religious 
politics, and the specific ways in which his on-going investigation into spiritist phenomena 
intersect with an apocalyptic political imaginary. But equally in both texts, the program of 
amalgamating the practical and symbolic world of Catholic traditions with modern restoration 
politics (as a Religionspolitik whose characteristic structure evokes earlier models of 
Kunstreligion in the Brief) proceeds above all through a sweeping redefinition of the physical 
body (as a spiritist physiology whose characteristic experience also reminds us of the ecstasy of 
the young painter). Schlegel’s exposition of world history and contemporary developments in the 
                                                 
475 Here at the outset, it suffices to note that for Schlegel spiritualism and siderism are in many ways just different 
general names, working definitions or lemmas, for the same phenomenon of divine esoteric force breaking into the 
course of everyday contemporary life, causing individual and collective bodies and thoughts to descend into various 
modes of crisis, and ascend again out of crisis in rejuvenated transformations and new networks of powers and 
relationalities (a more detailed discussion of the movement and function of this critical-productive process, and of 
the terms Spiritualismus or Spiritismus and Siderismus, follows in the next sections). For example, Schlegel looks at 
the sideral (das Siderische) as the “allumfassende Entdeckung” that “alles zu umfassen und neu zu gestalten 
beginnnt.” He continues: “Nur auf dem ψ[psychischen] Wege,” meaning only through spiritualism, siderism, 
magnetism, and what he will also call psychism: “kann alles Wissen in Eins verschmolzen, und dieses zugleich activ 
werden” (Schlegel, 25:XXII). We will also return to this last particular sentence in more detail. As to his 
contemporaries, Schopenhauer would echo Schlegel’s insistence on the epoch-forming importance of spiritism and 
magnetism, as Henry F. Ellenberger notes: “Schopenhauer, who had been deeply impressed by the public 
performances given by the magnetizer Regazzoni in 1854, repeatedly expressed his interest in magnetism in his 
writing. [Schopenhauer writes] ‘Although not from an economical or technical, but certainly from a philosophical 
point of view, Animal Magnetism is the most momentous (inhaltsschwer) discovery ever made, even if, for the time 
being, it brings more enigmas than it solves’” (Henry F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The 
History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry [London: Fontana, 1994], 159). Hegel would express a similar 
assessment of this potential breakthrough in experimental scientific knowledge. Writing to Goethe in 1807, Hegel 
notes: “Diese Kraft, Siderismus genannt, soll noch einen viel höhern Aufschluß über die Rätsel der Natur gewähren 







post-revolutionary period, prepared between the Signatur and Zur Geschichte und Politik, is thus 
also a kind of exegetical mode of reading centered on a novel form of the body-spirit 
interconnection in the present moment, and on the resulting vision of an utopian body politic to 
come. 
4.2 Metapolitics and Eschatology 
The mark of political radicality may not just be a redefinition of the reigning patterns and 
forms that characterize a community, although a radical politics does indeed often result in a 
testing and transforming of the dominant set of theories and activities of a given polity. By 
contrast, political radicality may just as much be marked by an absolute break, by an open-ended 
escape drive oriented away from the various dominant, codified, or institutionalized norms of 
social and political life. As such, the radical political (speech) act often relies on what can be 
called a metapolitical orientation: its conditions of possibility are located outside the horizons of 
the historical status quo, even while it cuts to the “roots” of the structure of sociality and political 
consciousness as such. It often simply does without, for example, the traditional form of the 
monarchical state or party in a parliamentary body; eschews absolute formal juridical concepts 
such as legality, property, and constitutionality; or refuses the binary oppositions embodied in 
conservative versus revolutionary worldviews that have constituted the poles of the modern 
realpolitical dynamic from at least the end of the eighteenth century. Metapolitics is not a self-
reflexive discourse of the political—such as when political discourse poses the general question 
of what politics is—as much as a movement outside the domain of conventional political 
thinking that nevertheless projects back onto contemporary reality, a standpoint outside the 






For the radical political gesture to move beyond such normative horizons—whether in 
practical terms of organization, juridically, imaginatively, or in whatever way—it must move 
towards a position situated qualitatively beyond the reigning distribution of the sensible, 
positioned outside conventional forms of political participation and collective expression. The 
properly metapolitical in this sense plays out on “Another Scene,” as Slavoj Žižek has it, the 
vantage point of which renders the “realistic” social environment irrelevant or provisional, 
indeed recasts it as essentially false, deceitful, a “shadow-theater.”476 This would be a speculative 
paradigm of thinking that is metapolitical insofar as it introduces an exteriority with no proper 
place in the terms of the pragmatic reality principles of political modernity, a kind of shock of 
the irreal or futural applied to the present constitution of things. Metapolitical radicality, then, 
can be understood as the drive towards an imaginative notion of subject, community, and state, a 
commitment to a different world to come. 
To put this differently: whatever the exact position or status of this “beyond” may be in a 
given metapolitical vision, it does not merely proceed out of an intensification of political issues 
within the framework in which they presently appear and exert their various reality-effects. It is 
not, in other words, as if the metapolitical position could only begin in the here and now and 
develop outward from it. As a formal structure of political imagination through which a certain 
                                                 
476 In his afterword to Rancière’s Politics of Aesthetics, Žižek describes this “beyond” of meta-politics, glossing 
Rancière’s notion of the same: “meta-politics: the political conflict is fully asserted, as a shadow-theatre […] [its] 
proper place is on Another Scene […] the ultimate goal of ‘true’ politics is thus its self-cancellation” (Rancière, 71). 
Bruno Bosteels also paraphrases Rancière on the concept of metapolitics: for Bosteels, the metapolitical consists in 
the will to go beyond contemporary forms of political theorization and activity to reach a kind of limit-thinking “in 
which society would reach its true fulfilment that would also be its immanent end” (Bruno Bosteels, The Actuality of 
Communism [London: Verso, 2011], 86). Probably the most well-known locus classicus of the secular metapolitical 
gesture is Karl Marx’s insistence (and later Vladimir Lenin’s) that the bourgeois state would automatically wither 
away and be replaced by a classless society after the communist revolution. On the history of metapolitics as a term, 
and for some alternative definitions and discourses, see Roberto Esposito and Matt Langione, “The Metapolitical 







socially transformative escape drive finds expression, the metapolitical, by contrast, is most often 
uncoupled from the set contours of its natural and historical environment from the outset, 
manifesting itself in a space of estrangement that is less a reactive disavowal of the here and now 
than it is a positing of a self-sufficient, virtual world operating according to a fundamentally 
different existential order. The metapolitical has always already escaped from its embedded 
sociopolitical surround inasmuch as it reveals some of the most extreme manifestations of wild 
political imagination in (modern) literary cultures.  
Metapolitical figures of thought consist in utopian (or dystopian) dreams of communal 
life (or death), whether in images of past or eternal peace, pure communication, and non-
antagonistic social relations, or alternatively in the breakdown of society into sheer chaos or 
regression to an elemental state of anarchy.477 Like the manifesto in which it often finds its form 
and genre, the metapolitical gesture constructs a virtual world in thought so as to push it into 
actuality, depending on a rhetoric that simultaneously calls-forth and acts-on. Such gestures both 
call for and act on the change that results from confronting the virtual or sheerly possible, 
attempting to perform the imaginary situation, the representation of an impossible past or not-yet 
existing future world as preparation for its realization in the present.478  
                                                 
477 Although such instances fall far beyond the scope of the present dissertation, today one common or popular 
example of a negative metapolitical gesture is the rhetorical invocation of an absolutely or hyper-evil Nazism. 
Historical Nazi fascism—and especially the paradigmatic site of the concentration camp—is often understood as so 
far beyond the pale of common (political, ideological, ethical, etc.) sense that it relativizes, undermines, and violates 
our understanding of the normative or law-bound nature of modern society as such, resetting the very horizons of 
(negative) possibility of modernity. An example of a negative metapolitical gesture oriented, by contrast, not 
towards the past, but instead towards the future, is the invocation of the hyper-object of environmental destruction, 
total planetary death, and associated concerns and fears about the possibility of post-apocalyptic natural life. 
 
478 Martin Puchner argues along these lines, claiming that the ultimate funtion of the manifesto, poised between 
theatricality, performativity, and the need to rhetorically fashion itself as its own authority, is to “project a scenario 
for which it must then seek to be the first realization” (Martin Puchner, Poetry of the Revolution [Princeton: 
Princeton University, 2006], 29.) Metapolitical imagination works in the same way, and can be understood as a kind 






An exemplary form of the metapolitical can be found in the Bible, whose eschatology 
constitutes one of its most important political, or more exactly metapolitical, traditions. Biblical 
eschatology, as the discourse and vision of apocalypse in the Christian tradition, provides a 
revaluation of the mundane according to which the government of the worldly sphere by 
mankind is reconceived as an intermediate or transitory state awaiting the Last Judgment and full 
revelation of God’s Kingdom of Heaven, the ultimate religious polis and utopian Golden Age.479 
The Book of Revelation becomes from this standpoint the metapolitical manifesto par excellence 
of the New Testament. First, it imagines a new Christian state that evacuates or renders 
inoperative the political reality principles of its own age (i.e., the social, legal, and governmental 
system of policies and practices characteristic of the ancient Roman world as they come into 
conflict with Judeo-Christian values and forms of community). Second, it also provides its own 
performative action plan, calling for the manifestation of the divine kingdom in the future, as 
detailed in the addresses to the seven churches. 
Schlegel tries to identify the elementary conditions of possibility of the political—the 
political a priori, as Novalis puts it480—in a metapolitical foundation: he posits religious 
                                                 
479 Robert Jenson notes that the “scriptures’ eschatology and the classical eschatology of the Christian church are 
directly and almost exclusively a discourse about politics, so that no extrapolations are needed to move between 
eschatology and politics, in either direction. In the promise to Abraham and in the writings of the prophets, the 
eschaton is the fulfillment of Israel’s political structures; in the Gospels it is a ‘kingdom,’ which precisely as a 
kingdom ‘of heaven’ is a political entity also in this age, as the Roman authorities quickly perceived; elsewhere in 
the New Testament it is a polis (Heb. 13: 14) which, unlike this world’s would-be polities, is genuinely a structure of 
peace and justice […] Indeed, biblical and classical Christian eschatology can be taken directly as political theory, if 
we do not allow the modern West’s secularized constructs to stand paradigm for what is meant by ‘theory.’ 
Eschatology is thus the initial form and should be a principal guide for Christian reflection on politics” (Robert 
Jenson, “Eschatology.” Blackwell Companion to Political Theology [Malden: Blackwell, 2004], 408). 
 
480 In the Brouillon, Novalis writes: “POL[ITIK]. Auflösung des hauptpolitischen Problems. Ist ein politisches 
Leben möglich? / oder / Sind Verbindungen der entgegengesezten politischen Elemente a priori möglich?” (Novalis, 
3:289). Vogl also draws attention to this fragment, arguing that Novalis’ statement here is representative of what he 
calls a “transzendental-politische Synthesis” that attempts, in establishing the conditions of the political a priori (the 
“Frage nach der Idealstatur [des Staates]” as Vogl puts it), to connect this ideal with the actually-existing political 






apocalypse as the Archimedean point from which to foray into the opaque and ambiguous sphere 
of contemporary development and to provide the fundamental etiology of its historical progress 
into the future.481 The significance of Schlegel’s theocratic system of thought in the 1820s—and 
its overt polemical nature—can be grasped insofar as it is in this transitional moment when 
transcendent or explicitly metapolitical foundationalism is increasingly understood as the fallacy 
which post-idealist modern thinking, and political activism especially, struggles to put behind 
itself. This paradigm shift becomes evident above all in the realpolitisch and historical-
materialist developments of the Vormärz period as the works of the Linkshegelianer and Junges 
Deutschland movement gradually emerge in a general tendency away from Idealist and 
Romantic frameworks of political aesthetics.482 It is exactly this emphasis on religious 
                                                 
Signatur work is still attempting just this connection. For him, there is only one answer to the question of the true 
nature of the state: theocracy, albeit a highly idiosyncratic one in the Schlegelian form, if not entirely speculative 
and seemingly impossible to enact. In essence: somehow we are all to become spiritist subjects in sidereal 
communities, traversed by a series of accumulating micro- and macro-crises, always orienting our activity and 
knowledge towards the coming destruction and rebirth of human life in apocalypse. 
 
481 Instead of an Archimedean point, Schlegel speaks instead in the terms of a related figure: the Catholic Church is: 
“das feste Hypomochlion [i.e., the center of rotation of a joint, whether in an organic or mechanical body] der feste, 
ruhende Punkt, um welchen sich alles dreht.” He goes on immediately to refer to Siderismus or “die psychischen 
Entdeckung” as “die Höhe, wie die Kirche der Grund und Boden.” We will return to this figure of thought in 
Schlegel’s works below. Jocelyn Holland and Edgar Landgraf refer to a geopolitical discourse associated with the 
topos of the Archimedean point—a code for an exterior point of view, essentially a transcendent one, from which to 
view a given system—noting that its conceptual use around 1800 “increasingly gave way to skepticism, but the shift 
did not happen overnight” (Jocelyn Holland and Edgar Landgraf, “The Archimedean Point: from Fixed Positions to 
the Limits of Theory.” SubStance, vol. 43, no. 3 [2014], 4-5.) 
 
482 The first side in this shift is philosophically represented by Hegel, whose Rechtsphilosophie posits an ideal 
bureaucratic state capable of affirming—and thus transcending—the necessities of the real-historical present in the 
progressive actualization of rational freedom. God generates this process for Hegel, just as it does for Schlegel, 
notwithstanding their open enmity and respective assertions of their fundamental differences (see Ernst Behler, “Der 
Wendepunkt Friedrich Schlegel’s.” Romantikforschung seit 1945 [Königstein: Athenäum, 1980] on their mutual 
misrecognition of the similarity of their political systems.) In more directly political aesthetic terms, the second side 
is represented above all by Heinrich Heine, whose 1833 Romantische Schule polemicizes against what he takes to be 
the reactionary Catholic influence of Schlegel and other Romantics in the name of an emergent Junges Deutschland 
movement with increasingly atheistic commitments (Ludwig Feuerbach being a philosophical ally, so to speak, to 
Heine in this respect). This period, or better transitional moment in political aesthetics, spanning the end of the 
revolutionary era in 1815 and the onset of a new one in 1848, can be understood as a kind of watershed between 
Idealist and historical materialist frameworks of political application. Heine’s Romantische Schule straddles this 
edge exactly. Georg Büchner’s Hessischer Landbote (1834) exemplifies it in a truly wild political manner between 






foundationalism or theological positivism in Schlegel’s work that led his commentators—most 
notably and at the outset Heinrich Heine, but also Johann Heinrich Voß, Arnold Ruge, Gottfried 
Gervinus, and later Georg Lukacs and Carl Schmitt, among many others—to characterize 
Spätromantik as an irrational fossil of a movement, a “restaurative Schließung”483 as Detlef 
Kremer puts it, betraying itself as nothing more than a regression to medieval-feudal forms of 
political thought with no basis in reality, much less relevance for an increasingly secular modern 
age.484  
In fact, Schlegel’s project in the Signatur and Zur Geschichte und Politik draws on 
historical ideals, imagery, and traditions (in large part relying on the Book of Revelation) for a 
decidedly futurological purpose, in order to develop a framework for a politics centered on 
apocalypticism. He postulated the Christian vision of apocalypse and its associated 
eschatological tradition, and drew metapolitical consequences out of what he took to be the 
impending event of apocalyptic transformation. If the apocalypse is indeed coming, as Schlegel 
insists throughout the last decade of his life, then everything must be rethought, including the 
very nature of political consciousness, properly revolutionary commitment, and utopian 
                                                 
Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 bring this era of transition to a close. In a brief gesture towards an imaginative 
anthropological revolution, here Marx’s materialist turn still evokes a decidedly Romantic program in the 
“vollständige Emanzipation aller menschlichen Sinne und Eigenschaften” (Marx, 710). 
 
483 Detlef Kremer, Romantik (Stuttgart: J.B. Metler, 2007), 23. 
 
484 For a description of the broadly critical reception of late Romanticism, see Kremer’s Selbstorganisation in der 
romantischen Ästhetik und Theorie des Staates: Fredrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel und Adam 
Müller, MLN 123 (2008), 551-554. Ironically, the apocalyptic framework of Schlegel’s late system of thought is far 
more speculative and dogmatic than his critical reception has yet realized, or at least Schlegel’s most extreme wild 
political arguments, the strongest form in which he puts forward his case for a new religious transformation of 
Restoration life (i.e., as a program of eschatological politics tied to the esoteric doctrine of the spiritist body), have 
never become the object of sustained treatment. From this perspective, Schlegel is probably far more open to the 






community building at the highest-order level of conceptuality, according to an eschatological 
concept. 
4.3 The Second Signature 
Two years before the publication of the Signatur, Schlegel formulated more specifically 
what would become the centerpoint of his eschatological reflections moving forward. In the 1818 
notebook of Zur Geschichte und Politik he notes: “Die Erkenntnis der siderischen 
Einbildungskraft und die Wiederherstellung der christlichen Vernunft sind die beyden Elemente 
desjenigen, was jetzt zunächst geleistet werden soll, und an der Tagesordnung ist.”485 
Undergoing many changes but never essentially deviating from this dual intention, the program 
above was to constitute, as Schlegel often intimates in the notebooks, the material of his never-
completed magnum opus.486 But this exploration of what will later be more comprehensively 
theorized as Siderismus (here “siderische Einbildungskraft”), and then to elaborate a Christian 
Wissenschaft that bases itself on this theory, appears nowhere explicitly in his public lectures or 
publications. Accordingly, the full extent and intention of Schlegel’s Religionspolitik has always 
remained esoteric (both in the sense of a secret doctrine and unpublished work), waiting for 
posthumous excavation from a bundle of notebooks.487 Schlegel himself provides the best 
assessment of his late Religionspolitik for his own contemporaries as much as for present-day 
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486 Schlegel is clearly planning a book on the subject (see fragments 198 and 200 from the 1820 Zur Geschichte und 
Politik notebook; on the evidence of an uncompleted last work, see Behler, “Der Wendepunkt Friedrich Schlegels.” 
 
487 Except for the editors of the Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe Ernst Behler, and after him Ursula Behler (and 
this only in short introductions to the volumes containing Zur Geschichte und Politik), no one to my knowledge has 






scholarship: writing in 1820, he notes: “Die EIGENTL[ICH] religiöse Politik ist noch ganz 
esoterisch.”488  
What he viewed as a philistine public around 1820, Schlegel reasoned not incorrectly, 
was as yet unprepared for prophetic insights corroborated by claims centered on the spiritist, or 
what he alternately calls sidereal, body. Even if for many researchers such mysterious 
phenomena were precisely at issue in the nascent development of the natural sciences, at least for 
a short period at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Schlegel understandably balked at the 
publication of an explicitly esoteric Christian science, biding his time for the “Symptome der 
Gegenwart” to appear more favorable for his metapolitical gospel.489 And yet, the trace of this 
program can still be detected in the Signatur. In fact, it was exactly its presence, among other 
aspects, that drew public criticism in the reception of the essay. Few wanted to believe (his 
brother August Wilhelm included, but also, with disastrous consequences for the Concordia 
journal, Metternich himself) that the famously ironic Romantic author was advocating for a 
serious turn towards religious-prophetic signs in the contemporary moment, signs that in the late 
notebooks, as we will presently see, point much more clearly towards an encroaching 
apocalyptic crisis.490  
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489 According to Osinski, Schlegel: “hielt […] sich in der Öffentlichkeit mit allem Esoterischen so weit wie möglich 
zurück, weil er die Menschen religiös für noch nicht reif genug hielt, ihm in die tieferen Gehimnisse des 
katholischen Glaubens und höhere Wissens zu folgen” (Osinski, 84). 
 
490 Contemporary reception of the Signatur noted its dark, prophetic tendency, and many readers were unimpressed. 
In part one of the essay (to which the present discussion limits its focus), Schlegel gestures towards the major 
features of what he would later systematize as Siderismus elsewhere. And it is most evident here that the wild 
politics of the notebooks filters through the controlled text of the Concordia. Such features were what some 
commentators found the most to object to. On the history of the reception of the Concordia, see Ursula Behler, 






The interpretion of the Signatur thus depends on first understanding its manifest content 
only insofar as it references what remains latent or unspoken within it; what Schlegel does not 
say here, or what is only intimated and never developed fully (except in the notebooks), is 
precisely what provides the essay with its true impetus. In this sense the interpretive task 
becomes a reading of the second-order signature of the Signatur. Those parts of the published 
Signatur that betray the traces of the esoteric project—that is, the parts that open onto what will 
become a full-blown religious metapolitics in the later notebooks—constitute the code of the 
essay-manifesto at its initial departure-point. There are, accordingly, two senses in which the 
essay provides a signature of its age, the latter in turn providing an opening towards an 
apocalyptic Religionspolitik.  
In Schlegel’s first or manifest sense of signature in the essay, which is mainly a 
metaphorical one, it indicates the general contours of the age, contributing to a kind of historical 
analysis that, furthermore, strives for the empirical objectivity proper to scientific norms of 
method. In this way, the generative principles of the revolutionary epoch are identified as 
interconnected and unified, making possible an intelligible narrative constructed in a network of 
diverse fields and across various conceptual and practical scales. In this first sense of signature, 
world history becomes a coherent text with an imprimatur at the bottom, so to speak, that gives 
evidence of a teleologically progressive course to all things that is, if not divinely guided, then at 
least not entirely arbitrary and contingent. The signature of the age is the identification of its 
dominant intellectual and social tendencies, and the attempt to generalize them in a recognizable 
image—in a historical signature. 
But the second or latent sense of signature in the manifesto relies on a different 






“author” of history from the first sense of signature reveals itself to be nothing but a pseudonym 
of God. In this sense, the objective analysis of history—if accurate from a scientific standpoint 
and revelatory from a religious one—automatically becomes a biblical exegesis. Of course, this 
is only the case provided that the proposition is accepted that the Bible, or codified religious 
knowledge more generally, is capable of totally describing the world, or at least the most 
significant aspects of human existence documented in the historical record up to the present, 
from the viewpoint of God (including the meaning of history and science).491 Accordingly, 
historical reconstruction, the reading and writing of historical signatures in Schlegel’s terms, 
only restates in a different register, in a cloaked form, so to speak, the prophetic insights of the 
Bible and God’s ultimate agency, insights that are themselves encoded but decipherable in a 
“Hieroglyphensprache” that reveals the total record of humanity as part of divine nature.  
This kind of signature, i.e., the true one, constitutes a kind of prophetic historiography of 
the traces of God’s work in the world, traces that are visible in all things but nowhere more 
explicitly than in the political arena. For it is above all as a metapolitical issue that Schlegel sees 
the contemporary moment suffering under a general crisis, and indeed he understands every 
historical epoch as poised at a point of bifurcation between the secular and the religious, where 
the collective fate of all humanity is decided according to two diametrically opposed options. 
Modernity, in other words, can decide to represent itself in terms of transcendent cosmic 
foundations, as religious belief—Darstellung glauben. Or it could opt, as would increasingly 
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hermeneutic of the “siderische Sprache” of the events and intellectual developments of the contemporary epoch. 
Such a sidereal language and associated interpretive practice constitutes the analyst’s proper relationship to the true 






prove to be the case, to organize itself according to the dead letter of the law—a false, deceptive, 
and heretical iconography (either as a secular constitutionalism, a Buchstabendienst as slavish 
dedication to the master’s code, or as a bourgeois capitalism, “einen unsichtbaren allgemeinen 
Weltstaat, der auf der Circulation des Geldes beruht.”)492 For Schlegel, everything hinges on the 
choice between the organicist (but also dynamic) model of affective and spiritual attachment 
associated with the family and extended into corporate bodies such as the Church, or, by 
contrast, to lose oneself in what he calls the atheistic absolute of “Staatsmaterialismus,”493 in a 
nascent capitalist subjectivity as the dominant performance principle of modern governmentality.  
The significance of this decision, however, remains equivocal throughout Schlegel’s late 
works. The former option, retrenchment in a transformed notion of Catholic faith, prepares 
humanity for a more graceful approach to the Final Judgment, whereas the latter potentially 
accelerates its violent coming through the spread of secular evils, or what Schlegel calls the 
principles of destruction (Zerstörungsprincipien) of modernity. From either perspective, 
everything amounts to different prefigurative forms tending towards the final apocalyptic crisis. 
The question remains only as to the determination of the path of approaching apocalypse and our 
(or Schlegel’s) ability to properly read it. As the Signatur and late notebooks suggest, the 
evidence of this signature will include a diverse set of bodies, and lead to a further elaboration of 
the Romantic physiological hermeneutic. But it will only become legible when set against a 
backdrop of generalized crisis, in a vision of modernity as a Babel organized by principles of 
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destruction, with the collective body of society traumatized by the accelerating course of 
sociopolitical dissolution.  
4.4 Crises and Principles of Destruction 
The Signatur essay declares a world historical crisis at terminal velocity around 1820, 
approaching complete rupture, whether one posits justification for the present course of things in 
a transcendent teleological (religious) system of signification or not. The evidence of this 
catastrophic acceleration in world history is both micrological, or rather micropolitical, and 
international in scale: “in jedem großen und kleinen Verhältnisse” a “tiefes und allgemeines 
Uebel” has long since begun to surface, spreading across “alle Kreise des menschlichen Lebens 
[...] ja auch jeden Einzelnen in der eigenen Brust mit sich in Zwiespalt und inneren Unfrieden 
verfeßte.”494 Schlegel’s analysis in the Signatur, and indeed the function of the whole series of 
binding operations in Religionspolitik, rests on a dual movement towards the limit-points of 
conceptual scale: either towards the extremes of the physiological body, “in der eigenen Brust,” 
or towards the global maximum. In this projection of the social situation at hand, all circles of 
human life must be understood as part of an organic expression at the most general level.  
From the collective to the individual, symptoms of the crisis are omnipresent as Schlegel 
reconstructs them in the Signatur manifesto. The consequences of the French Revolution and 
Napoleonic imperium, for example, are not only geopolitical and institutional, effecting a rapid 
transformation of the international community and popular concepts of political agency, but far 
more physiological, leading to a kind of schizophrenic Zwiespalt and depressive Unfrieden 
                                                 






across the population base (as is corroborated in the rash of psychological sickness the spiritist 
movement sought to “heal”). Political traumas thus lead to total psychosomatic crises:  
wer wird nicht auf irgend eine Weise vom Zeitalter mit berührt und ergriffen, so daß er 
gewiß auch an irgend einer wunden Stelle in seinem Innern das allgemeine Weh 
schmerzlich mitempfindet? Ein jeder wird davon durchdrungen, ein jeder ist mitbefangen 
in diesen weitern oder engeren Kreisen der innern Beunruhigung und erschütternden 
Bewegung, wenn auch nur in der nachklingenden Rückwirkung.495  
The structure of understanding and even the specific language of what Schlegel describes in this 
passage are the same as in the Herzensergießungen, only here with a negative connotation: the 
crisis cuts through to the innermost core of body and soul, spreading its insidious influence 
everywhere, throughout the literal organs of the body. As already noted regarding the Brief, the 
young painter’s description of his own transformative event appears as a protocol of crisis: the 
“unsichtbares Wesen” at mass had, as the young painter puts it: “mein ganzes Wesen 
durchdrungen […] und alle meine Adern durchlief.” Schlegel describes the political crisis of the 
age as a matter of Durchdringung as well, an “alles durchdringende und verzehrende Principien 
der Zerstörung,”496 a penetration or saturation of the entire physical and spiritual being as it 
registers the shock of sociopolitical violence. But this is not merely a phenomenon limited to the 
individual, as if “ein jeder” consciously experiences the stress of change characteristic of the 
times in his or her own individual terms (or even unconsciously and belatedly, in a kind of mode 
of Nachträglichkeit whose echoes only later manifest themselves psychosomatically: “wenn auch 
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496 Ibid., 492. Compare this to Novalis’ formulation of Durchdringung: “Der Sitz der Seele ist da, wo sich Innenwelt 
und Außenwelt berühren. Wo sie sich durchdringen, ist er in jedem Punkte der Durchdringung” (Novalis, 2:331). 
Between Wackenroder, Tieck, Schlegel, and Novalis, the concept of Durchdringung thus describes a kind of 
permeable membrane in which life flows between and penetrates inner and outer realms of being, psychology and 
environment, personality and politics, constituting the force that forms and impacts the soul, and therefore the most 
crucial activity of any human life. As we will see with Schlegel’s concept of the body-soul interface below, an 
important aspect of the Romantic trope of both Körper and Seele is that neither is intelligible without the other. 
Rather, both reveal themselves in “Punkte der Durchdringung,” which for the late Schlegel are to be found above all 






nur in der nachklingenden Rückwirkung”). Rather, what Schlegel draws attention to is a shared 
reaction that in its collective form binds all members of society together, connecting them 
through the same set of historical traumas. As such, “das allgemeine Weh” functions both 
symbolically and physically as a kind of operation of religare analogous to the passion of Christ, 
creating a community in the mutual receptivity to the crisis-events of the age.  
Schlegel argues that the recuperation of the suffering body politic can only be found in a 
retrenchment of all things in a “christliche Republik,” that the task of Restoration reunification is 
to establish order “aus der Anarchie” of the Revolutionary period,497 a positive theocratic 
foundation for cohesive collective knowledge and cultural productivity moving forward into the 
nineteenth century. The creation of this utopian Christian order is as much a matter of complete 
spiritual as sociopolitical reorganization, but this sweeping demand on contemporary life is also 
supposed to be a pragmatic one, a desideratum of the historical moment. What is needed in the 
most immediate or strategic sense is only an intensification of existing anti-revolutionary, anti-
secular Restoration governmentality, a completion of the limited changes set into motion through 
the Congress of Vienna and the establishment of the Heilige Allianz.  
The essential problem, the collective wound of modern society that the future religious 
regime will suture, is specified further in the Signatur. As already mentioned, Schlegel presents 
the situation around 1820 as a kind of modern Babel. There is a total dispersion of intellectual, 
spiritual, and material forces: the unitary “language” of the age has become atomized, a pure 
heteroglossia or babble of criss-crossing, conflicting, and mutually-cancelling ideological 
traditions that leave the modern subject in more or less complete confusion, unable to affirm 
                                                 






present life or reject it in clear and distinct terms. The historical moment is filled with “irrige und 
verderbliche Systeme aller Art, die philosophischen wie die politischen.” These are “so auf die 
Spitze gestellt worden [...] so ins Unendliche vermehrt,” that only the end-point of a 
“fortschreitende Vermehrung der Kampf Aller gegen Alle so vervielfältigt und chaotisch 
verwickelt”498 appears as the necessary progression of modern life. The contemporary takes on 
the mode of elegy, indeed its reigning atmosphere is predominantly epigonic. Before, at the peak 
of the feudal system of the Holy Roman Empire, for example, the enemy appeared as one 
monolithic negative presence, as a singular Unwahrheit against which the community organized 
itself and cohered (although Schlegel is not exactly clear as to who or what concept constitutes 
this oppositional figure in the premodern era; in the main it seems to be any elements of 
atheisim, all inner and outer enemies). Whereas now, “nachdem die Wahrheit nicht mehr in 
einem festgeschloßnen Körper und bestimmten Systeme auftritt,” the historical situation is 
atomized and dispersed, in “zahllose Atome zertheilt und aufgelöst,” appearing as a “chaotische 
Fluth vorüberfliehender Meinungen.”499 The enemy, Schlegel suggests, is now this very field of 
chaos, the breaking up of self-enclosed bodies and rigorous systems and their flood of different 
conflicting codes, ideologies, and social behaviors. 
For example, in “Symptome und Gefühle eines allgemeinen inneren Unfriedens,” what 
Schlegel calls the phenomenon of useless crime (“uneigennütziges Verbrechen”)500 increasingly 
asserts itself onto the contemporary scene. Because such criminality does not follow out of 
egoism—not being eigennützig it apparently follows the logic of an abnormal criminality without 
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clear personal profit-motive—it must be a result of a more general cultural development which 
considerations of individual utility cannot explain. It is not so much an “individuelle That, 
sondern […] ein allgemeines Zeitphänomen und aus der Finsterniß hervorbrechende dämonische 
Gewalt.”501 Here Schlegel posits a violent collective unconscious peaking in the revolutionary 
era but then not subsiding, locally sparked by the nationalistic fanaticism fomented by Napoleon 
in particular and the French Revolutionary forces in general.502 With this rhetorical shift in the 
essay from the sphere of the individual (the individual subject, like the stateman—Napoleon, 
Metternich—or individual nation—as in revolutionary France) to that of the collective, pan-
European, or global “subject,” Schlegel’s diagnosis can now identify the general 
“Krankheitszustand” of the age: the entire world body (that is, the entirety of Europe) is infected 
with a contagion of destructive tendencies (Tendenzen) at all conceptual and practical orders of 
existence.  
The proliferation of non-egoistic or useless crime is thus immediately connected to the 
phenomenon of the “Ultrageist” and “Ultragedanken,”503 another major pathology of the age. 
According to this phenomenon, abstract political ideals, whether revolutionary-liberal or 
reactionary-conservative, are pushed to their limits not as means to an end, but as ends in 
themselves, becoming a pure excess of thought and activity unmoored from any real sense of 
foundation, whatever its form. The Ultrageist of the Restoration era is, in turn, understood as 
part of what Schlegel calls the more general “Streben nach absoluter Freiheit und nach absoluter 
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Einheit,”504 a principle of destruction evident in the pre-revolutionary period as well as across all 
historical development:  
Alles was absolut ist, wirkt seiner Natur nach anorgisch, die Elemente entbindend und 
zerstörend. Und insofern darf man wohl sagen, das Absolute ist der eigentliche Feind des 
Menschengeschlechts, wie überhaupt in allen Zeiten, so auch in der jetzigen; und hier 
trifft das revolutionäre Streben und die ihm entgegengesetzte Ultragesinnung in diesem 
einen gemeinsamen Zerstörungsprincip.505 
Streben, Absolut, Freiheit, Einheit: in Schlegel’s view, these all refer to terminological markers 
in the essentially pathological genealogy of the contemporary moment. Characterizing the 
generations preceeding and following the revolutionary caesura around 1800, Schlegel provides 
a schematic periodization of the evolution of this common principle of destruction. Avoiding the 
use of proper names, he traces a projectory from 1763, at the end of the Seven Years’ War, to 
1820 and the writing of the Signatur itself, through Sturm und Drang, German Idealism, and his 
own Romantic movement (which he now ambiguously distances himself from). Beyond varying 
degrees of innocent lightheartedness and deep-felt pathos, heady philosophical speculation, and 
kunstreligös aestheticism, identified respectively in each of these three generic historical 
microperiods, Schlegel sees a revolutionary striving for absolute freedom and unity as the 
collective trait that binds this generational series together. Insofar as he characterizes the absolute 
impulse as a Zerstörungsprincip running throughout the immediate historical (philosophical and 
aesthetic) record, one can see the distance—but not unbridgeable gap—covered between his 
early Romantic phase and that of late Religionspolitik. Schlegel’s own early program of 
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revolutionary striving becomes “grounded” in a wild political concept of apocalyptic 
emancipation and community, now in direct opposition to idealist forms of absolutism.506  
The maximal conceptual scale of Schlegel’s principles of destruction of the age arises in 
the figure of the Anti- and its taxonomy of individual forms. Species of this figure do a 
considerable amount of work within the system of Religionspolitik, taking into account both the 
Concordia manifesto and the notebooks; they can be found further in Schlegel’s on-going 
formulation of the Anti-Staat, Anti-Ehe, Antichrist, Anti-Kirche, and Anti-Föderalismus, among 
other terms. In the subsections of Zur Geschichte und Politik in which Schlegel most directly 
expands on the Signatur essay’s initial gestures (always headed with the title “Signatur des 
Zeitalters”), the Anti-Staat, for example, is “Der falsche Staat […] welcher nur nach der höchst 
möglichen Anhäufung der materiellen Kraft strebt.”507 Just as there is the phenomenon of the 
Anti-Staat, “der sich durch den rechten Staat überall mit hindurchschlingt,” 
                                                 
506 In his discussion of Schlegel as the figure par excellence of political Romanticism, Maurice Blanchot writes: “as 
a young man he is an atheist, a radical, and an individualist. [Evident is the] freedom of spirit he displays, the 
intellectual richness and fantasy that each day lead him to invent new concepts […] Some years pass: the same 
Schlegel, converted to Catholicism, a diplomat and journalist in the service of Metternich, surrounded by monks and 
pious men of society, is no longer anything but a fat philistine of unctuous speech, lazy, empty, his mind on food, 
and incapable of remembering the young man who had written: ‘A single absolute law: the free spirit always 
triumphs over nature’” (Blanchot, 353). After which follows Blanchot’s question, already cited: “Which is the real 
one? Is the later Schlegel the truth of the first? Does the struggle against a bourgeois who is banal engender no more 
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works?” A possible answer to Blanchot’s rhetorical question is simply that Romanticism is in both places in 
different but not unrelated forms, as only one example—the transition of early Kunstreligion to late 
Religionspolitik—suffices to show. Furthermore, pace Blanchot, it is precisely in the Signatur essay that Schlegel is 
immersed in a thinking of the absolute (albeit as an object of criticism) alongside an acute consciousness of the 
dangers of bourgeois capitalism. And while it is true that his belief in God constitutes an absolute that somehow 
escapes his anti-foundationalist critique of Ultragesinnungen, religious belief functions for him far more as an 
impetus for the invention of new concepts, leading above all to the concept of political Einbildungskraft in 
Spiritualismus and Siderismus. The conclusion will take up Blanchot’s concerns again. On Schlegel’s shifting 
relationship to the figure of the Absolute—early on its proponent, later in life, as shown here, its relentless critic—
see Blumenberg, 272. 
 






so giebt es auch eine Anti-Ehe (nicht zunächst das Concubinat, sondern der anerkannte 
und tolerirte Hurenstand), ferner eine Anti-Kirche (die falschen Secten pp.), dann eine 
Anti-Gilde (Wucher—PapierGeldschwindeley—Lotto und Lotterie); dann auch eine Anti-
Schule, <d.h.> die falsche Doctrin.508 
Anti- concepts identify the particular philosophical, political, and cultural institutions to be 
criticized and negated in Schlegel’s positive vision of the future Christian state and science. But 
the historical specificity of such institutions is of less importance for him than their general sign-
character as expressions of primary or primordial forces winding through (hindurchschlingen) 
the entire field of human experience. To be sure, for Schlegel each antithetical entity achieves 
part of its significance in its specific historical efficacy, but they function more forcefully in his 
analysis as individual vessels of transhistorical Zerstörungsprincipien (whose social and 
intellectual manifestations, as we have just seen, take the interrelated forms of non-egoistic 
violence, ultra-thinking, and striving for absolute freedom and unity). As a dynamic force, the set 
of all negative tendencies or principles of destruction—something like the death drive of world 
history captured by the Antichrist—may itself be destroyed, or rechanneled and dissipated, but 
only if an equal and opposite symbolic force can be (or has already historically been) marshalled.  
This constitutes Schlegel’s gnostic-political mandate—a mandate shared by his 
colleagues in the Concordia journal—that the organic body politic at all times moves to 
counteract the given Anti-principles it is confronted with under modern conditions. This body, 
constituted just as much by its many individualized subjects, does not only establish legitimate 
and just institutions, although that is indeed one of its functions, but also leads to a psychic 
revolution that rescues the positive elements, ideals, and images of past epochs (what Schlegel 
calls “das Positive” later in the essay) even while it preempts the establishment of all false 
                                                 






institutions in the future. By effecting a continuous equilibrium between negative (demonic, 
materialist, rationalistic) and positive (Christian) principles, it works towards realizing the order 
in which principles of destruction no longer obtain at all. Such is the symtheocratic program of 
Spätromantik as a theory of dynamic stasis for the collective body, a moving balance held up by 
God and the ultimate fact (but not Ultragedanken) of eschatological progression towards the 
“last things.”  
The negative principle at the core of the postrevolutionary state and society has expanded 
and intensified, effecting a general deterritorialization of all traditional values and institutions. 
The sign of evil reigns supreme over modern times, subjecting and corrupting the modern 
subject; the Antichrist is installed as the head of the Antistaat, armed with a doctrine of the 
Antischule. In this sesnse, the critique of the Signatur essay thus appears in no small part as a 
conservative and indeed metaphysically conspiritorial analysis of the age. As already noted, 
Schlegel follows a characteristically gnostic approach, he always proceeds by delineating a 
negative/evil principle operating behind the scenes, so to speak, as the true motor of historical 
progression. The notebooks will make this even more explicit, claiming evil as the ontological 
basis of the politics of the state: “der Staat schon ursprünglich ein böses Princip in sich 
enthaltend.”509 The state—at least its contemporary form, the Anti-state as opposed to the wahrer 
Staat—is fundamentally evil, and only with great critical effort can a glimmer of hope be 
recognized for a politics based in the positivity of Christian doctrine. The reigning tenor of the 
Signatur will in this way become a certain standard of modern political discourse: everything, to 
paraphrase the entirety of the essay, is rotten, above all the youngest generation is “vom Wurm 
                                                 






zerstochen.”510 A vector for the contagion of destructive Anti-principles, the negative sign of the 
age is everywhere manifest, wound micro- and macropolitically throughout all cultural, 
socioeconomic, philosophical, and political bodies. 
The complaint of the old against the new, the flattening of historical reality in favor of a 
revisionist ideal, is clearly heard in such arguments. The judgment is close at hand that would 
take these arguments as mere justifications for an unwillingness or inability to adapt to changing 
circumstances. One is easily drawn to the conclusion that Schlegel’s attempt to write the 
signature of the age resolves into a series of gestures of political decripitude. This is where the 
reception of Schlegel’s critique in the essay has usually halted, not believing it to merit further 
examination. But the wild political imagination of Religionspolitik begins most forcefully at this 
point, albeit, as regards the Signatur essay specifically, in the cloaked form I alluded to at the 
beginning of the previous section above, namely: as a discourse of the apocalypse and the 
second-order signature of divine history. For what reveals itself to constitute a far more positive 
political thinking than Schlegel’s conservative exhortation of das Positive (as against the 
Principien der Zerstörung) is a possibility only briefly apparent in his glancing discussion of 
eschatology in the Signatur. This possibility builds on the provisional status of the present 
historical moment—as awaiting the Final Judgement—even seeking to accelerate it so as to 
bring forth the ultimate crisis, leading to the Kingdom of Heaven. And even if it appears as only 
one of a set of minor discourses in the essay, its recognition transforms the scope of the Signatur, 
opening up a metapolitical perspective or Religionspolitik that is carried forward in the late 
notebooks in a variety of new fields. 
                                                 






4.5 Apocalypse and Naturkunde 
For Schlegel, the ideal Christian republic can also be understood as the state of the post-
apocalyptic future: the Kingdom of God whose event alone brings about the changes Schlegel 
demands for modern life. The Restoration is a necessary but not sufficient indication of this 
utopian religious polis, a mere step in the right direction, even while it itself stands on the brink 
of losing its way, in crisis. The wild political paradigm arises here again in the Signatur in the 
open break with contemporary reality principles, the departure from any sense of Realpolitik 
through a qualitative shift towards a metapolitical orientation in apocalypticism. In an entry from 
Zur Geschichte und Politik of the same year, this point of departure is given more explicit 
formulation: “Ein solches System und organisches Ganzes von christlichen Nationen [...] scheint 
auch die Apokalypse z.B. wohl vorauszusetzen.”511 And although such apocalyptic discourse is 
encoded with some amount of rhetorical care in the Signatur, only surfacing briefly or tentatively 
in its course, eschatology represents the general framework of intelligibility informing Schlegel’s 
late system of religious politics.512 
The late notebooks definitely state that the “Geist des Christentums in politischer 
Hinsicht ist eine allgemeine <aber stille und indirekte> Opposition gegen den Staat 
überhaupt.”513 The apocalyptic standpoint shows itself here as a quiet, indirect, but total 
opposition to the worldly state, as a critique levelled against the Interregnum of postlapsarian but 
                                                 
511 Ibid., 22:19. 
 
512 By 1823, Schlegel has extended this insight into an understanding of apocalypse as the hermeneutic key to all 
historical, political, and religious consciousness: “Die höchste geschichtliche und moralische Krisis ist das 
Weltgericht. Nicht ‘die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht,’ wie Schiller sagt; sondern umgekehrt das Weltgericht 
ist der Schlüssel zur Weltgeschichte” (Ibid., 123). He provides a further gloss on this inversion of Schiller’s famous 
phrase (from his 1786 poem Resignation) in another notebook entry three years later: “Das Weltgericht ist die 
Weltgeschichte, nämlich die Vollendung der Weltgeschichte, der Schluß und Erklärung derselben; gleichsam das 
Wort des Räthsels, das Wort, was zu errathen war, und bis jetzt nicht erraten werden konnte” (Ibid., 259). 
 






pre-apocalyptic historico-political development. As such, this standpoint recognizes the 
contemporary political sphere as a merely provisional phenomenon or moment, as an insufficient 
and illusionary organization of present reality (indeed as an essentially anti-Christian one, a 
leidende Organisation in the Signatur’s terms) that awaits critical correction in the future. In 
Schlegel’s account, the desired full revelation of spirit/soul/Geist as a form of metapolitical 
political opposition and activism can never fully slot into any existing system of contemporary 
historically-determined understanding: the very condition of political modernity is necessarily 
provisional in the face of the coming religious transformation, the absolute rupture that will 
render the conventional state obsolete: “Unser Zustand ist und bleibt provisorisch.”514 The sheer 
fact of apocalypse thus immediately relativizes, if not entirely trivializes, the political 
environment of Restoration Europe around 1820. In turn, its prospective event allows the vision 
and eventual manifestation of the true community to come, the post-apocalyptic world, the 
regime of utopian New Jerusalem opening onto the rejuvenated world community.  
The introduction of a metapolitical tendency in this narrative of the Christian political 
Geist evolving, a religious-political commitment to a doctrine of the body-soul complex directed 
against the state form as such (centered around the inevitability of a break in world history 
through apocalypse and a reconfiguration of the very nature or a priori of modern political 
possibility), is only briefly apparent in the Signatur essay. There the true eschatological signature 
is figured as either obvious and clearly identifiable, overdetermined to the point of 
unintelligibility, or deferred to the future in a gesture of resignation and open acknowledgment of 
the imperfection of human cognition. As we will see, Schlegel’s discussion of the signature vis-
à-vis apocalypse is developed much further in the Zur Geschichte und Politik fragment corpus 
                                                 






that at all points affirms the Signatur manifesto’s implicit metapolitical point of departure and 
extends it further by connecting it with the spiritist phenomenon. 
The quietly eschatological analysis of world historical change up to the present appears, 
as mentioned already, in essentially pathological terms in the Signatur. We have already seen 
that profound political and psychosomatic crises mark humanity’s self-formation through various 
stages of collective illness. Starting with the exile from Eden and continuing all the way into the 
revolutionary turbulence of the modern epoch, the signs of crisis are ubiquitous and perennial; 
their negative impact has been the determinative factor in the evolution of humanity from its 
very beginnings. The ultimately destructive developments of the French Revolution, the 
charismatic demagoguery of “jener Gewaltmann”515 Napoleon, the ensuing pan-European 
wars—these are just recent moments in the process of a far greater revolutionary rupture, 
pregnant signatures of the apocalyptic event increasingly visible on the horizon. The manifesto 
opens by insisting on the need to properly identify and prepare for the next imminent 
catastrophe, this time perhaps the final one: 
Manche drohende Anzeichen an dem Horizonte der irdischen Weltentwicklung sind wohl 
dazu geeignet, die ruhige Betrachtung auf den gegenwärtigen Zustand der menschlichen 
Angelegenheiten mit ganzem Ernst hinzulenken; damit nicht das Gemüth von üblen 
Vorbedeutungen und Ahndungen vergeblich geängstet werde, und damit die große 
Veränderung und Katastrophe, welche in diesen entscheidenden Wendepunkt der 
welthistorischen Entwicklung einzutreten und ihr bevorzustehen scheint, uns nicht 
unvorbereitet finde.516 
 
In contrast to many of his contemporaries, for whom the close of the Congress of Vienna 
represented the beginning of a lasting political order in Europe, Schlegel sees only a looming 
                                                 
515 Ibid., 7:488. 
 






disaster marked by a host of threatening indicators (“drohende Anzeichen”). Now more than ever 
must the present moment—1820, five years after the end of the Napoleonic era—be considered 
as the “entscheidender Wendepunkt der welthistorischen Entwicklung.” Whereas the fall of 
Napoleon is taken to represent the “’Anfang vom Ende,’” as the statesmen of the Congress of 
Vienna declared, Schlegel understands this moment as only the “Ende vom Anfang” of the 
greater world historical (r)evolution of all things.517 The end of this first phase is just “der Schluß 
[...] des ersten Acts in dem furchtbaren Drama unserer durch große Katastrophen mit 
beschleunigtem Lauf dahin eilenden Weltgeschichte.”518 What is needed is to prepare the body 
politic at an affective level for this impending historical trauma, to not overwhelm it with 
unnecessary premonitions and phobias (“damit nicht das Gemüth von üblen Vorbedeutungen und 
Ahndungen vergeblich geängstet werde”), but still to render it conscious of the actual 
revolutionary situation confronting it in the present moment. 
This negative apocalyptic logic in the Signatur shifts the practical or pragmatic rhetorical 
aims of the essay into a different light. Reformulating the foundational conservative platform of 
the manifesto, the historico-political Restoration doctrine of Metternichean practice around 1820 
it was supposed to espouse, a decidedly eschatological, indeed fatalistic critique of the modern 
sociohistorical conjuncture arises in its place. By way of a commentary on his fellow 
Spätromantiker Johannes Müller, Schlegel reformulates what he earlier saw as a kind of general 
epigonic depression—a backwards-facing consciousness of alienation from the premodern state 
of social unity—as now a future-oriented sense of approaching doom. He notes a certain 
                                                 








“Abendgefühl vom bevorstehenden Untergange”519 as the dominant mood of the age, an 
atmosphere of encroaching darkness and dissolution: “Es war ein Gefühl, daß alles locker und 
lose, weich und hinfällig werde, daß alle Fugen und Bande nachlassen und auseinander gehen, 
weil die wesentlichen Stützen und der Grund und Boden selbst, morsch und faul geworden.”520 
With reference to Müller, Schlegel speaks of feelings of collective regret and loss detectable 
even before the catastrophe has occurred, a kind of prospective melancholy attached to a future 
disastrous event. The ideal past, be it a biblical Eden or a mythologized Holy Roman Empire—
the two main historical ideals for Schlegel in his last period of work—are forever unreachable, 
and the immediate future seems to have little promise, or rather promises only further decline.  
Modernity is therefore stuck in an agonizing crisis-mode that manifests itself in a variety 
of attendant forms;521 the contemporary subject’s consciousness of its own historical position, its 
individual understanding of the general Zeitgeist and its role within it, is now hopelessly 
convoluted, reduced to incomprehensibility in the crucible of an all-encompassing crisis 
inscribed on the body and spirit of modern society. Hence the generalized traumatic wound or 
schizophrenic self-delusion Schlegel posits as the marker of the revolutionary age. Loudly 
announcing its own novel progress while unconsciously suffering from an endless return of the 
same historical failures, only able to look forward to the inevitability of the future frustration of 
its plans and hopes, the various Zerstörungsprincipien Schlegel draws attention to are the “truth” 
                                                 




521 In the Signatur and to a greater extent in the late notebooks, Schlegel will develop an interpretive framework for 
a universal “weltgeschichtliche Krisis, oder des Weltgerichts” that finds expression in myriad localized or sub-crises 
as well (Ibid., 22:171). Thus in the notebooks one finds increasingly complex reflections on the interrelation of a 
variety of crises: “So wie nun die Völkerkrisis [...] entwickelt und dargestellt wird [...] so sind.beyde Arten der 
Krisis, im Körper, die Krisis im Blute, und die Krisis im Nervenäther oder der magnetische Zustand 






(Wahrheit) of an age propelling itself towards its final critical end, but unable to confront this 
fact. This false truth amounts to nothing more than a host of pathological symptoms evident in 
recent historical events; the French Revolution—which for Schlegel effectively recoded the 
contemporary age—is only the most acute and obvious of such signs.  
The public signature of the age, the self-image of the post-revolutionary period, as 
Schlegel understands it, is thus deformed, deceptive, the signature of an ideological imposter, 
indeed of the Antichrist, the forceful imposition of revolutionary doctrine onto the consciousness 
of modern society. And it will only reveal itself as such, as essentially false, when the age 
rediscovers its hidden religious basis and turns its focus towards the accumulation of apocalyptic 
signs, to the obscure indices of the coming utopian community, the Kingdom of God. For 
Schlegel, this actual, real Wahrheitsgehalt, the second-order or divine signature that invisibly 
subtends but actually determines the image of the age, is the metapolitical truth pointing to the 
“beyond,” an index of the far side of history revealed after the apocalypse, or it is nothing more 
than a lie. The crisis of the age—in both individualized-corporeal and collective-ideological 
forms of expression—reveals this true or positive eschatological insight only to those who know 
how to read it correctly. 
But when the apocalypse is directly addressed in the Signatur, Schlegel usually maintains 
a careful rhetorical distance. In the notebooks, for their part, such reticence falls entirely away 
(toggling, as it does in the latter, between despair and an unrestrained excitement at the eventual 
prospect of apocalyptic transformation). As it stands in the Signatur, however, Schlegel draws 
attention to contemporary apocalyptic discourse often only with equivocation.522 He lends the 
                                                 
522 For this reason, the mystic apocalyptic writings of Johann Heinrich Jung-Stilling from this period meet with both 






possibility of apocalype a measure of credence, speculating on its arrival, but he also withdraws 
behind the protected position of Christian resignation, arguing that whatever one thinks about the 
imminent end of the world, not to mention the possibility of calculating its exact date of arrival, 
one must wait for the revelation of God’s judgment and not assume to know the divine will in an 
act of hubris. Still, Schlegel is secure in the knowledge that the apocalypse will eventually come, 
sooner or later; he even asserts that we already find ourselves in the final approach: “nur das 
Eine [läßt sich] darüber sagen: daß die Welt schon lange dem Gerichte entgegen reift.”523  
In a key passage of the Signatur, both its essential concerns and those of Zur Geschichte 
und Politik arise as a problematic of echatological exegesis, as a rigorous reading practice 
centered on the “Beschluß der Weltgeschichte,” the true, religious hermeneutic of world history 
in its total pathological progression. But this reading practice must be continually deferred and 
developed further, or, alternatively, abandoned as a hubristic pursuit, for only God knows the 
                                                 
Schlegel observes that Jung-Stilling’s works are “nicht minder wichtig […] für die Charakteristik und Signatur des 
Ganzen” because they contribute to the “häufiger als je verbreiteten Prophezeyungen von dem nahen 
Weltuntergange” whose full force only increases by being associated with the ubiquitous sociopolitical and 
philosophical crisis around 1820 (Ibid., 7:501). On the other hand, however, Jung-Stilling’s exemplary eschatology 
is no less part of the generally deceptive or ideologically false nature of the age, apparent in the series of negative 
signs and symptoms (Zerstörungsprincipien) examined throughout the Signatur. For Schlegel, too many other 
contemporary indicators of rejuvenation contradict Jung-Stilling’s prophecy of apocalypse occuring in 1836. First 
and foremost there is the American phenomenon, the “amerikanische Zukunft” to explain (Ibid., 502). Here the new 
American republic is attributed a utopian function as the potential future salvation of humanity itself, the land of 
new beginnings for the traumatized European world: “Sollen also diese amerkanischen Berechnung wirklich werden 
und eintreffen, so kann es mit den erwähnten apokalyptischen Auslegung [of Jung-Stilling] von sehr nahen 
Weltuntergange nicht ganz richtig seyn” (Ibid., 503). If America proves to be such a utopian possibility for the 
modern age, the calculation of apocalyptic arrival must be pushed further into the future than Jung-Stilling’s exact 
dating would allow. The world historical project of America thus postpones the coming of the apocalypse: 
humanity, Schlegel suggests, has more to do in America before its ultimate end. 
 
523 Ibid., 504. Nowhere more than here would Schlegel’s contemporary secular readership (and probably also his 
religious audience as well) have been struck by the apodictic tone of the Signatur manifesto, for no evidence for 
such certainty is provided, no justification following from the perspective of faith or a strict biblical reading. 
Furthermore, the argumentative register of the passage is historical and empirical, neither religiously dogmatic nor 
particularly pious. The apocalypticism of the essay stands out in a series of such wild speculative moments, 
rhetorical gambits and hypotheticals without grounding. One could easily have expected a more moderate or 
circumspect editor to have culled such apocalyptic excurses, given the context of the Concordia journal as a political 






ultimate course of things, choosing the day and manner for humanity to conclude its evolution 
through time. Schlegel alternates between the vision of a materialist-religious science centered 
on the investigation of apocalypse, on a kind of confident apocalyptic futurology, and the 
apophatic nature of divine intention, an acceptance of the inscrutablity of God’s plan: 
Wenn es übrigens aber auch möglich wäre, mit der gleichen Wahrscheinlichkeit, wie 
etwa der Naturkundige die weitere Krankheitsentwicklung einer leidenden Organisation, 
bis zu ihrem Absterben und endlichen Erlöschen, nach allen ihren Stadien und Krisen 
angibt, eben so den Beschluß der Weltgeschichte sogar chronologisch im voraus zu 
bestimmen; so bleibt hier doch als einzig richtiges Resultat nur jene fromme Resignation 
übrig, daß niemand als Er allein es wissen kann, inwiefern die Allmacht (der Vater) hier 
eingreifen, hemmen oder zulaufen, den Lauf der Zeiten aufhalten und aus Gnade 
verzögern, oder auch zum endlichen Gericht unaufhaltbar beschleunigen will.524 
 
Schlegel only suggests here that there could be a kind of natural history or investigation of nature 
(“wie etwa der Naturkundige”) that could track the “Krankheitsentwicklung” of humanity as it 
develops towards its final crisis-event. But the Signatur as a whole is an open, albeit not 
explicitly stated attempt to provide such a scientific etiolology of the “Stadien und Krisen” of the 
world historical body evolving in time: the manifesto provides the Naturkunde or natural 
analysis of the contemporary moment it itself calls for, focusing on a specific image of the 
individual and collective subject in pathological crisis-mode. 
The main gesture of the Signatur’s chronological exposition of Zerstörungsprincipien, 
from pre-revolutionary Sturm und Drang to post-revolutionary Restoration, outlines a kind of 
physiology of Weltgeschichte as a “leidende Organisation,” one that the notebooks will explore 
in much more detail. More specifically, the notebooks suggest that the investigation of the 
spiritist body above all else—which for Schlegel produces a “Krisis des Leibes” in the individual 
as much as in the collective, and at the heart of the state itself—reveals the dangerous status of 







the times. The age is poised at the brink of a totalizing sense of death, downfall, and depression, 
but this experience of crisis is itself the key to the necessary transformation of future life.525 As 
in spiritist practice, the crisis of the era is ambiguous, double-sided, or more exactly, 
pharmacological: it can both lead to further pain and the risk of death—as it has throughout 
history—or it can function as a curative event for the modern body politic, but only provided it 
has been properly prepared for.  
What is briefly gestured towards here in the Signatur, i.e., a reading of the traumatic 
progression of world history as an affliction of the historical body politic, but also as its sense of 
possibility, will be essentially affirmed and extended in a variety of different directions 
throughout the late notebooks. They all circle around elaborating a doctrine of spiritist 
experience as a kind of meta-physiological crisis, as a signature expressed through the 
movements and speech-acts of the tranced physical body, expressing the apocalyptic movement 
of history and all things. In the fragments of Zur Geschichte und Politik, what is at stake is a 
mode of reading the individual bodily crisis—and thus the collective body politic as well—not 
only as pathologically afflicted, but also as inspired or psychically possessed by divine currents 
of energetic Geist, by the force-field of the Christian apocalyptic spirit.  
4.6 Spiritism and Religionspolitik 
The metapolitical turn in Schlegel’s Signatur, i.e., its brief discussion of a certain guarded 
religious-political apocalypticism around 1820, resurfaces in the notebooks as one of their most 
significant leitmotifs. And, important for the present study, when this metapolitical commitment 
                                                 
525 This crisis of the body is also understood within the framework of Siderismus as its proper object of study: “Von 
der siderischen Anschauung—Krisis des Leibes” (Ibid., 22:124). Here it should be noted that siderism refers to the 
sidereal, or that force or phenomenon that discloses the distant and invisible effect of stars, constellations, planetary 
bodies, etc. on everyday human life and the natural environment. In the late notebooks, Siderismus comes to stand in 
for a variety of phenomena in which an immaterial (or divine) force seems to directly influence a given body, as in 






does resurface there it is translated into a scientific discourse of the physical body—a discourse 
of the body’s proper nature, but also of its undiscovered transcendent potentials (transcendent 
inasmuch as the body is linked to a world beyond the sensible)—that both draws on and departs 
from the desired Naturkunde of eschatological history envisioned first in the Signatur manifesto. 
In this way, Schlegel’s metapolitical reading of the apocalypse is linked to the late Romantic 
physiological hermeneutic discussed above: in the late notebooks, certain bodies under certain 
conditions, when interpreted properly, reveal the signature of the contemporary age, the total 
trajectory of world history as such, as a movement towards apocalyptic closure and collective 
rebirth.  
More specifically, the articulation of a political eschatology in the Signatur coincides 
with Schlegel’s last attempt (in a series of efforts stretching throughout his body of work and 
culminating in Zur Geschichte und Politik) to ground speculative thought in a materialist-
physiological system, the final version of that “grenzenloser Realismus” he envisioned already as 
early as 1800. In Schlegel’s late religious-political reflections, the search for a universal 
framework of knowledge seizes on the emergent Christian science of the spiritist body, and 
thereby invests the figure of the Romantic subject/collective with an explicitly metapolitical 
significance. 
The historical context of spiritism begins most immediately with the work of Anton 
Mesmer, the “Columbus” responsible for the discovery of animal magnetism and an early form 
of dynamic psychotherapy in the 1770s.526 In contemporary German discourse, Spiritualismus or 
Spiritismus came to be known as the general term for the practice of mesmeric seances and 
                                                 






magnetic medical treatments popular at that time. Mesmeric therapy was supposed to address 
common physical and psychological maladies and, more importantly, trigger communication 
with incorporeal spirits and prophetic visions of the future. In a kind of equal parts therapeutic 
and revelatory practice, the seances, laying-on of hands and magnets, and milk baths associated 
with spiritism were thought to rechannel and potentialize the magnetic fluid present in all 
physical bodies, leading to a cataleptic sleep state in which clairvoyent visions, often of an 
Christian-apocalyptic or prophetic nature, were conveyed from almost always female patients to 
male observers.527 Schlegel was one of these observers (Clemens Brentano, more publicly, as 
well), and his experiences of mesmeric practices, as we will see, had a major impact on his life 
and late system of thought.528 What is now considered the pseudoscientific discourse of 
mesmerism—balanced between premodern humorism, religious exorcism, and modern empirical 
medicine—was then taken up by the proto-psychiatrists and healers of the early nineteenth 
century. Mesmer’s disciple and later rival, the Marquis de Puységur, introduced the notion of 
“crisis” into spiritist discourse that, as noted above, would be taken up by Schlegel as an equally 
physiological as political phenomenon.529 
Schlegel connects the physical body in spiritist crisis with a metapolitics of apocalypse, 
routing the emergence of the first—the (meta)physical significance of spiritism as an object of 
                                                 
527 For a detailed description of typical spiritist practices, see Behler in Schlegel, 35:xxxi-xxxiv. 
 
528 On the interesting conjunction of spiritism and German Romantic literature and philosophy, see Ellenberger, 77-
81 and 158-160. Of note here is the role E.T.A. Hoffmann played as the most important literary popularizer of 
spiritism and magnetism around 1800. 
 
529 Ellenberger, 72. By the end of the nineteenth century, mesmeric practices would become forerunners of the 
theory of hypnosis that, through Jean-Martin Charcot, would go on to inspire Freudian psychoanalysis (see Laurie 
Johnson, “The Romantic and Modern Practice of Animal Magnetism: Friedrich Schlegel's Protocols of the Magnetic 
Treatment of Countess Lesniowska.” Women in German Yearbook: Feminist Studies in German Literature & 
Culture, vol. 23 [2007]). The impact of Mesmer’s work extends throughout Romantic thought, particularly in the 
interest in electromagnetism and galvanism in the scientific discourse of Johann Wilhelm Ritter and other Romantic 






natural-scientific and philosophical investigation, and indeed as the method and methodology of 
a collective healing-process or therapeutic social practice—into a system for eschatological 
political speculation. For him, the tranced subject in magnetic sleep becomes an ecstatic body 
that can briefly communicate with a field of incorporeal divine being otherwise blocked from 
quotidien experience and perception, in the process finding connection with other bodies 
participating in the natural religious manifold subtending all being.530 When the spiritist body 
speaks during mesmeric crisis-experience, it channels natural-physical forces whose source 
ultimately lies in the utopian time and space of the post-apocalyptic future. Thus the 
representative phenomenon of spiritism, its revelatory epistemology and physics of action at a 
distance expressed at the site of the modern body, helps Schlegel construct a complex discourse 
between the Signatur and late notebooks: its moving parts consist in, on the one hand, 
metapolitical imagination (apocalypticism), and, on the other, an idealist/materialist physiology 
exemplified in spiritist body-hermeneutics, in spiritist Christian science.  
Laurie Johnson points to the imbrication of these concerns in a succinct formulation of 
late Religionspolitik: “Schlegel’s fascination with magnetism [read: spiritism] in the later part of 
                                                 
530 To return to the Herzensergießungen: Schlegel would have immediately recognized the young painter’s 
conversion event in the Brief as a fictional dramatization of the kind of spiritist experience he was most interested in, 
where the body-in-trance operates according to a physical sixth sense attuned to supernatural religious forces, 
beings, and communities. Ellenberger expands on this point: the “German Romanticists were interested in animal 
magnetism for two reasons: the first being the attraction of Mesmer's theory of a universal, physical ‘fluid.’ 
Romantic philosophers visualized the universe as a living organism endowed with a soul pervading the whole and 
connecting its parts. Mesmer's physical fluid—had its existence been demonstrated—would have furnished evidence 
of the Romantic conception. The second reason was Puységur's discovery of magnetic somnambulism with its extra-
lucid manifestations. Mesmer had already spoken of a ‘sixth sense’ revealed in the sensitivity to the fluid; Puységur 
had added that this sixth sense provided humans with an ability of describing distant events and predicting future 
happenings. The Romanticists now assumed that somnambulic lucidity would enable the human mind to establish 
communications with the World Soul” (Ellenberger, 77-78). Further: the trace of this spiritist process in terms of its 
secret, revelatory capability, its transcendent organ—precisely as the young painter describes it—is precisely what 
Schlegel calls an example of a Signatur. For him, however, a signature always also betrays a metapolitical 
significance, indicating one unsurpassable future fact: namely, that the apocalypse is surely coming (an 






his career went hand in hand with his idealization of a resurgent Catholic church as the locus of a 
new, beautiful body politic. He envisioned the patient’s body as a site where inexplicable, 
transcendent phenomena became, if only briefly, visible and palpable.”531 This vision of the 
utopian religious body politic, arising only as a consequence of the metapolitical event of the 
Final Judgment, is both empirically corroborated and speculatively postulated—indeed, 
prophesized—in the anthropological type embodied in natural Spiritismus. It is found in its 
signal model of subject-formation and somatic-corporeal expression, as well as in the 
metapolitical forms of community and sociality Schlegel associates with spiritist forms of life.  
The late notebooks consider how the coming of this world order, provided one applies the 
correct hermeneutic framework to its interpretation, is only briefly legible (as Johnson puts it), 
and this precisely through the spiritist body’s unique form of communication. Zur Geschichte 
und Politik provides a sustained investigation into how the expression of divine nature as a kind 
of total signature, ultimately intelligible from the perspective of the end of history, can only be 
read in certain modes and through specific forms of experience and sensation, namely: in the 
eschatological dimension of spiritist life. Spiritist body language is the natural expression of the 
religious-political telos of world history, spiritist bodies build physical-spiritual bridges to the 
ultimate system of signification, revealing God’s plan. Subjects in mesmeric crisis speak from a 
position located in the time and space of the utopian, postapocalyptic future, from the perspective 
of prophetic omniscience that makes sense of all things to come. But spiritism as a scientific 
practice will also constitute the method through which such “last things,” post-apocalyptic forms 
                                                 
531 Johnson, 11. Johnson’s is one of the few scholarly investigations into this conjuncture of politics and spiritism in 
Schlegel’s late works, providing a reading of Schlegel’s diaries on magnetic-spiritist treatments insofar as they bear 






and frameworks of future life, can be approached and studied (and even accelerated in its 
approach).532  
Late Romantic Religionspolitik thus emerges as a kind of eschatological Naturkunde 
tracking the crisis-nature of human historical evolution as it tends towards its final end, but this 
is also to be a natural science of directly sociopolitical significance, a hermeneutics of the 
spiritist body that could have real impact on the present constitution of modern society (i.e., 
through the inherently critical intervention of a metapolitics). Throughout this text corpus we 
find a complex notion of crisis as a general concept, but also as a differentiated identification of 
the present historical-sociopolitical crisis at hand, in all its particular multi-faceted and 
polysemic figurations (as discussed earlier in regards to the Signatur essay): “Es ist also,” 
Schlegel concludes in 1821, “eigentlich Eine große Krisis, die sich über ganz Europa […] 
                                                 
532 Thomas Pfau identifies a certain problematic of teleology in literary figurations of Bildung around 1800, noting 
that the Romantic attempt to provide a unified account of historical (and thus individual/collective) progression 
necessarily has recourse to a totalizing or transcendent system of signification posited outside history as such. 
Romantic teleological Bildung always seeks and requires a kind of metahistorical and/or eschatological 
Archimedean point from which the development of humanity can be observed, and more importantly, intervened in. 
“To posit the immanence of teleological ‘meaning’ (Sinn) within finite, temporal existence,” Pfau writes, “remains a 
hypothesis for which historical narrative itself can never furnish the requisite warrant. While historical facts and 
developments may be construed teleologically, validating that approach requires, indeed presupposes, a meta-
historical, speculative framework. Any conception of historical life as intrinsically purposive and meaningful rests 
on metaphysical assumptions concerning the end of history, both in the (teleological) sense of end qua ‘intrinsic 
purpose’ and in the (eschatological) sense of end as the utter cessation of temporal life and its contingent strategies 
of justification” (Thomas Pfau, “Romantic Bildung and the Persistence of Teleology.” Brill’s Companion to German 
Romantic Philosophy [Leiden: Brill, 2019). Here it should be added that in the late reflections on history and 
politics, Schlegel offers a specific figure of spiritist Bildung with reference to the speculative teleology Pfau draws 
attention to. Schlegel’s notion of Bildung in this sense has transcended the conditional or determined character of 
historical embeddedness: spiritist practices of self- and community-formation are grounded in the apocalyptic future, 
and thus liberated from the strictures of present life. The intrinsic purpose of humanity, or the modern framework of 
knowledge and understanding, is to confront the vision of its end, to allow the thought of the “utter cessation” of 
history, and of the entire set of “strategies of justification” that ideologically support the conventional image of 
historical reality, to impact the present moment, repositioning the contemporary Zeitgeist in relation to the true 







erstrecken soll. In Deutschland eine Krisis der neuen Geburth und Wiedergeburth des innern 
Lebens; eine hellsehende, siderische, psychische Krisis.”533  
Krisis exists in the contemporary articulation of Spiritismus as the site of emerging 
clairvoyant, sidereal, and psychic powers, namely: as an important phenomenon of modern life 
around 1820 centered on bodily-spiritual crises of a specific kind (and one that any account of 
the age must, in Schlegel’s view, include). But it also appears at the highest-order analysis of 
world historical evolution, as the crisis of accelerating apocalyptic approach visible in the 
second-order signature of all things, “Eine große Krisis” of the divine revolutionary end-point of 
all temporal, mundane being. It is both a phenomenon of diachronic movement, or rather a 
disruption of transhistorical progression, and a serial instantiation of this disruption in dispersed, 
embodied moments of life, evident in the on-going revolutionary development of the modern era 
at a macropolitical scale, and at the level of the individual physiological body, registering and 
suffering under the changes it senses in the wider environment that surrounds it. The Schlegelian 
notion of crisis is, then, a simultaneous micropolitical/corporeal and cosmic/transcendent one; 
Schlegel’s claim is that this must be understood and intrumentalized if there still exists the 
possibility to transform modern society. 
4.7 Spiritualismus = Siderismus = Magnetismus = Psychismus 
In both method and content, intensity and breadth, Zur Geschichte und Politik represents 
one of the most sustained fragment-works of German Romanticism as a whole, a status made all 
the more intriguing as it has so consistently escaped the purview of Schlegel scholarship in 
particular and Romantikforschung in general. Interwoven in a massive collection of critical 
                                                 






observations on contemporary philosophical, political, and scientific developments, the late 
notebooks on history and politics outline a program dedicated not just to a specifically modern 
exegesis of the Bible and the Christian tradition, but also to applying a biblical exegesis—an 
eschatological exegesis—to a sweeping reinterpretation of world history, a mode of diagnosing 
the apocalyptic condition or conditionality of human history up to the present totalizing crisis (as 
we have already seen in reference to the Signatur manifesto). In chains of recurring intertexts, 
not the least of which focus on refining the paradigm of the true, religious-political “Signatur des 
Zeitalters,” the notebooks identify an increasing accumulation of apocalyptic signatures 
adumbrated by the Bible itself, indicated in forms of religious faith and social organization 
around 1820, but also in contemporary scientific research (animal magnetism, mesmerism, 
siderism, etc.). But perhaps more striking to the twenty-first century reader of the late notebooks 
are their long sections on numerology, with lists of dates calculating the apocalyptic trajectory of 
the world up to the twenty-second century AD and beyond, not to mention their easily most 
idiosyncratic element: a politicized bestiary of biblical animals and monsters, drawn mainly from 
the Book of Revelation, that serve as representative figures for entire historical epochs, symbolic 
avatars for different ancient cultures and modern political regimes. 
But Schlegel’s project is not entirely sui generis. It echoes Novalis’ earlier attempt to 
draft a scientific “Bible” in the Brouillon. Similar to Novalis’ attempt there—and indeed 
Schlegel’s late notebooks can be understood as a direct extension of the early Romantic approach 
in this sense—the work in progress of Zur Geschichte und Politik aims towards the total 
statement, the final programmatic vision that was to be expansive enough in its mythopoetics 






generic text for an increasingly secular and disenchanted modernity (a “Keim aller Bücher”534 as 
Novalis described his own vision of the modern Bible work).535 And similar to the Brouillon, the 
notebooks never left their inchoate, unfinished state, they never appeared in the systematic 
exposition they prepare in increasingly concentrated formulations and plans throughout their 
course. But Schlegel departs from the scope of Novalis’ work most emphatically in the 
notebooks’ singleminded dedication to the eschatological framework, in the reformulation of 
apocalyptic crisis as the key to historical understanding and religious-political activism. With its 
prophetic vision of the past and future up to the end of historical time at its apocalyptic closure 
and beyond, Zur Geschichte und Politik represents the most forceful universal assessment, the 
wildest or most totalizing Versuch that Schlegel—perhaps Spätromantik as a whole—would 
produce. The programmatic but unfulfilled pretension of the late notebooks is to offer a modern 
version of Jakob Böhme’s 1612 De Signatura Rerum, an insight into the basic signature of all 
things, the ultimate significatory horizon of which can only be seen from the perspective of the 
                                                 
534 Novalis, 3:563. 
  
535 For a discussion of the formulation “Keim aller Bücher” and its role in Novalis’ larger encyclopedia project, see 
Blumenberg, 238-239. Around 1798, Novalis and Schlegel simultaneously hit upon the idea of a new Bible, but, as 
David W. Wood notes, whereas Schlegel draws his “gospel project” out of a strict fidelity to Lessing’s notion of a 
new, modern religion (for example, from Lessing’s 1777 Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts: “Sie wird gewiß 
kommen, die Zeit eines neuen ewigen Evangeliums, die uns selbst in en Elementarbüchern des Neuen Bundes 
versprochen wird” (Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 1778-1781 [Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker, 2001], 96), 
Novalis did not entirely. Novalis, for his part, was interested in the Bible as a potential Gattungsbegriff for a 
metabook of philosophical science, i.e., the Book of Books that would combine all the empirical and theoretical 
sciences alongside the arts in a comprehensive system; the Christian Bible served for Novalis as a stimulating model 
for literary-philosophical production, but not exhaustively so. On the commonalities and divergences between 
Novalis’ and Schlegel’s respective bible projects around 1800, see David W. Wood, “Introduction.” Notes for a 
Romantic Encyclopedia (Albany: State University of New York, 2007), xvii-xix; O’Brien, 222-224; and for a more 
general discussion, Blumenberg, 238-245. While beyond the purview of the present chapter, I would suggest that 
Schlegel’s late unfinished work—the planned but never actually published work of Religionspolitik—first brings the 
“two distinct [Bible] projects” of the Athenäum period into a symphilosophical correspondence (Wood, xviii). In 
other words, I think that what the Romantics were already planning around 1800 as a sequel to Lessing’s new 
gospel, but also as a new comprehensive science in Novalis’ sense, bears full fruit, so to speak, in Spätromantik. 
Schlegel’s attempt to provide a universal paradigm of all theoretical and empirical sciences in Christian Spiritismus 
casts Novalis’ encyclopedics in new form, even while it departs by politicizing, and historicizing, modes of biblical 






end, of apocalypse.536 For Schlegel, this absolute signature can be clearly discerned in the 
emergence of a new kind of physiological crisis-event, a signature written in the crises of the 
magnetized body he calls Spiritismus. 
As early as 1818, Schlegel began to establish a form and object of inquiry in the 
notebooks that could not be addressed within the kind of critical historical framework outlined 
later in the Signatur, a method of approach that no longer finds value in the mere practical 
taking-stock of recent crisis-events. But the possibility of a kind of eschatological Naturkunde 
attuned to contemporary development, as suggested in the manifesto-essay, remains the central 
concern. In this metapolitical turn away from the contemporary, only to redefine a more 
penetrating depth-analysis of the present situation, we witness the inception of Religionspolitik in 
the form it would sustain throughout the project of Zur Geschichte und Politik: “Es giebt noch 
gar keinen Stützpunkt der Hoffnung,” Schlegel writes, “gar nichts Göttliches mehr in der Politik, 
nichts wofür man sich interessiren könnte.”537 Confronted with the increasing disability of 
reigning political (but also philosophical) discourse to give insight into the true determinant of 
reality, into the apocalyptic or “Göttliches” inherent not only in human historical progression but 
in all things (as Böhme would say), Schlegel’s focus therefore shifts to beyond the here and now 
around 1820, to an identification of the prophetic index of the apocalypse. Spiritism supplies this 
                                                 
536 On Schlegel’s unique reception of Böhme, see Paola Mayer, Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation of Jakob 
Böhme (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s, 1999).  
 
537 Schlegel, 22:14. Such complete frustration with the given or historical status quo political situation is often the 
precondition for metapolitical “leaps” beyond the present state of affairs. Schlegel frequently expresses a certain 
desperation in this respect, as for example in the 1826 notebook: “So viel ist einmal ganz klar und ausgemacht, daß 
nichts in der jetzigen Zeit und für die jetzige Zeit mehr helfen kann, als nur allein das, was unmittelbar vom heiligen 
Geiste kommt; und das soll und muß eben recht klar werden vor aller Welt, daß nichts mehr helfen und nutzen kann 
als nur der heil.[ige] Geist und was von ihm kommt; keine menschliche Abhülfe gibts mehr, noch mag auch 






privileged index. Relinquishing the terms and concepts of the present political, but also, as will 
be discussed below, philosophical environment, Schlegel finds a “Stützpunkt der Hoffnung” in 
what appears at first glance as a decidedly non-political phenomenon, in the science of spiritism 
and the related fields of animal magnetism, mesmerism, and above all siderism.  
The novel appearance of spiritism around 1820 is given a number of potential names in 
the late notebooks, shifting through different appellations as Schlegel attempts to decipher the 
significance of the spiritist phenomenon, judging its capability to serve as the central datum or 
object of inquiry for the metapolitical Naturkunde gestured towards in the Signatur manifesto. In 
a fragment that helps connect what appear as so many disparate strands in the notebooks, these 
interests are simply bundled up into one compound concept: “Spiritualismus = Siderismus = 
Magnetismus = Psychismus.” This conceptual assemblage—and the empirical natural 
phenomena and contemporary practices it defines—is taken as an epochal insight into the nature 
of reality, a fresh manifestation in modern life with revolutionary historical, epistemological, and 
political implications. Providing what would be the guiding thread of the notebook cycle, and 
thus of the project of Religionspolitik in general, in the 1818 notebook Schlegel begins to discuss 
the transformative possibilities of this novel naturephilosophical field of investigation: 
Der sogenannte animalische Magnetismus [...] kündigt sich vollkommen an, wie eine 
Epoche machende Begebenheit der innern esoterischen Weltgeschichte. Wir hatten bis 
jetzt nur ein materielles Wissen [physisch-mathematisches—oder philologisch-
historisches] und ein dialektisches oder ideelles. Hier tritt nun ein neues magnetisches 
und magisches Wissen auf, ein Geisterwissen; aber kein ideell erdachtes, sondern ein 
ganz factisches. Noch ist es in Hinsicht seines Charakters der Aechtheit oder Falschheit 
von ganz unentschiedner, oder vielmehr zwiefacher und doppelter Natur; kann 
dämonisch mißbraucht werden und göttlich der Religion dienen. Als beginnendes 
Geisterwort aber ist es die erste Regung der neuen Zeit, und der eigentliche Wendepunkt 
der gegenwärtigen Entwicklung.538 
 
                                                 






Here the emergence of previously hidden sources of energy, and the knowledge practices that 
conceive of them (the “neues magnetisches und magisches Wissen […] ein Geisterwissen”), 
mark a twofold crisis in the post-revolutionary and post-idealist episteme. On the one hand, as to 
be discussed in a moment, this break or “eigentliche Wendepunkt der gegenwärtigen 
Entwicklung” is to become the object of philosophical extension in a combined conceptual 
framework of ideal-materialism (the factual magic based, for example, in the physical 
discoveries of animal magnetism).539 On the other hand, the doctrine of magnetic and magical 
spirit is also to inform historical consciousness, the (spiritual, metaphysical) paradigm of 
“esoterische Weltgeschichte.” In Schlegel’s view, this latent or inner presence of esoteric world 
historical evolution had only been obliquely registered by 1818; its true indication had long been 
drowned out in the Babylonian confusion of contemporary revolutionary development. More 
generally, however, he considers the traditional Western historical record—in the various annals 
of ancient republics and city states, royal dynasties and regimes, peasant uprisings and religious 
movements, all subtended, as he sees it, by a perceived unproblematic ontological realism—
Schlegel sees conventional historiography as only presenting an ideological surface, a superficial 
                                                 
539 Magic is also an operative concept in Novalis’ own encyclopedic project, and here again a parallel emerges with 
Schlegel’s Zur Geschichte und Politik. Leif Weatherby explains Novalis’ concept of “magical idealism” in terms 
that will resonate with Schlegel’s interest in the factual magic of animal magnetism. Citing its “classical statement” 
in fragment 1075 of the Brouillon (“Der thätige Gebrauch der Organe ist nichts, als magisches, wunderthätiges 
Denken, oder willkührlicher Gebrauch der Körperwelt—denn Willen ist nichts, als magisches, kräftiges 
Denkvermög[en]”), Weatherby writes: “’Magic’ functions for Novalis as a way of talking about real interactions 
between seemingly opposed entities, like body and soul. Novalis thus reads the history of metaphysics as the search 
for an organ of intervention in the world, the first site of which will be our own bodies” (Weatherby, Transplanting 
the Metaphysical Organ, 233). I would argue that the kind of interaction between the body and soul Schlegel is 
interested in—the way in which animal magnetism or Spiritismus reveals an interface and interpenetration between 
divine forces and physical bodies that is efficacious, that intervenes in the political and historical environment—
exemplifies another aspect of what Weatherby calls Romantic organology. Spiritism, in other words, is a proper 
organ (in Weatherby’s sense) of Religionspolitik. Of interest here is also how Novalis’ concept of will as a magical, 
forceful capacity of thought seems to align with the definition of animal magnetism offered by Puységur: “The 
entire doctrine of Animal Magnetism,” Puységur writes, “is contained in the two words: Believe and want. I believe 
that I have the power to set into action the vital principle of my fellow-men; I want to make use of it; this is all my 






history, as it were, having never confronted head-on the subterranean apocalyptic import of all 
sociohistorical change.  
The intention is to uncover this deeper level, to detect the inner esoteric historical process 
that determines all being, revealing the status quo of historical understanding—and thus the 
status quo of modern sociopolitical reality—as what it actually is: a shadow theater, a fabricated 
fiction or counterfeit of the true, hidden, (meta)historical dynamic of divine nature. Animal 
magnetism, spiritism, siderism, the inner development of the psyche (Spiritualismus = 
Siderismus = Magnetismus = Psychismus), all appear as the present embodied forms of life of 
this “Epoche machende Begebenheit der innern esoterischen Weltgeschichte.” As fields of 
investigation for the transformative Naturkunde, they give evidence of and expression to the 
cosmic system of signification unfolding in present time. They are manifestations of the same 
esoteric signature of all things, rendering nature legible from the perspective of religious science, 
contemporary heralds and signs of the future apocalyptic crisis. 
But what is most crucial to note in the passage above is Schlegel’s insistence on the 
political, or rather metapolitical consequences of spiritist knowledge as a becoming-flesh of the 
Logos, as Ursula Behler puts it.540 This expansive interpretation of spiritism is to accelerate the 
approaching divine revolution, provided it is seized upon for the correct ends: “in Hinsicht seines 
Charakters der Aechtheit oder Falschheit,” the material and completely factual manifestation of 
the spirit around 1820 is “von ganz unentschiedner, oder vielmehr zwiefacher und doppelter 
Natur; kann dämonisch mißbraucht werden und göttlich der Religion dienen.” It must therefore 
be mobilized by a religious metapolitics, taken up such that the phenomenon of Spiritualismus = 
                                                 
540 Behler notes that the “hier angestrebte Umbildung und Überhöhung des animalischen Magnetismus oder 
Mesmerismus in eine christliche Magnetotherapie […] ist bei Schlegel begründet in einer spiritualistischen 
Naturphilosophie und paulinisch-johanneischen Theologie, die auch den Kosmos einbegreift: Jesus Christus, der 






Siderismus = Magnetismus = Psychismus contributes to the disclosure of the “erste Regung der 
neuen Zeit,” but only as part of Schlegel’s notion of the proper Christian religious-political 
program. Spiritism itself, in other words, is in transition, experiencing crisis, a provisional 
phenomenon capable of capture by either divine or diabolical parties. It is what is essentially at 
stake in the desired transformation of modern society. 
 In this passage, as already briefly indicated, the critical potential or crisis-orientation of 
spiritism arises just as much as an epistemological problem, a problem of the proper synthethic 
form of Wissen. Schlegel understands spiritism as an experimental conceptual phenomenon, but 
also as a physical or corporeal practice that transcends the dominant philosophical binarism 
influencing contemporary notions of what knowledge essentially consists in, and how we gain 
access to it. In a synthesis of idealist and materialist doctrines (at least in the schematic 
formulations given above), spiritist knowledge collapses the distinctions between the plasticity of 
an evolving or dialectical-ideal subject, on the one hand, and the rigid facticity of the physical-
historical object on the other (hence the possibility of a “Geisterwissen” as also “ein ganz 
factisches”). Schlegel maintains that in principle and practice dogmatic materialism has always 
been overly obtuse as regards Geist, while idealism, in exact contrast, suffers from a neglect of 
raw materiality or Körper. Strong versions of idealism and materialism both lack the requisite 
balance of the real and ideal in their operations of thought, albeit in opposite ways; both thereby 
appear as only degenerate forms (Abarten) of philosophical thinking; such conceptual extremism 
is exactly the kind of Ultradenken warned against in the Signatur essay.  
But beyond this, absolute, pure, or exclusive forms of materialism and idealism 
(scholastics or rationalism in Schlegel’s terms) never truly obtain in the first place; for him, there 






or less prevalent, and the system proves unable to suppress the presence of the opposite it seeks 
to avoid. The above fragment continues: 
Eigentl[ich] giebt es in der φσ[Philosophie] wohl keinen realen Id.[ealismus] und 
Re[alismus]; von beyden findet nur ein Uebergewich Statt—die ganze zwischen 
Id[ealismus] und Re[alismus] schwebende und auf diesen Gegensatz sich beziehende 
φσ[Philosophie] ist Scholastik oder Rationalismus, und das ist die Eine Abart der 
φσ[Philosophie]; die andre ist der Materialismus.— 
 
Falsch also ist die φσ[Philosophie] des Geistes, OHNE Seele; denn da wird nur ein eitles, 
nichtiges, leeres abstractes Denken zum Vorschein gebracht; falsch ist ferner die 
φσ[Philosophie] des Körpers ohne Seele und Geist, oder der Materialismus.541 
 
The framework of equilibrium arises here again, an equilibrium that is possible only by paying 
attention to Seele, the third term incorporating the opposing presence of Geist and Körper into 
itself. Immediately following this claim, the fragment concludes with the vision of the 
transcendent position of combination: “Einzig wahr aber ist der Spiritualismus oder die 
φσ[Philosophie] der Seele und des Geistes und durch Seele und Geist auch sogar des 
Körpers.”542 This position, for Schlegel, conceives of antithetical forces—and their associated 
paradigms of philosophical practice—as sustained in a balance of opposing presences; but it is 
not a matter of supplying what is lacking to the given system of thought, as if the idealist needs 
merely to introduce more consideration of the material body/object, and the materialist vice 
versa. Rather, an entirely new, dynamic position of combination must be found—one that 
corresponds to the ideal-material being of Seele, the third or synthetic term.543 
                                                 
541 Ibid., 22:69. 
 
542 Ibid., 69. 
 
543 In the Freiheitsschrift, Schelling articulates an alternative, but closely related philosophical position. In what has 
become one of naturephilosophy’s most essential dicta, Schelling writes that: “Die ganze neu-europäische 
Philosophie seit ihrem Beginn (durch Descartes) hat diesen gemeinschaftlichen Mangel, daß die Natur für sie nicht 
vorhanden ist, und daß es ihr am lebendigen Grunde fehlt […] Idealismus ist Seele der Philosophie; Realismus ihr 
Leib; nur beide zusammen machen ein lebendiges Ganzes aus” (Schelling, 2369). For more on the role of this 
“living basis” in Schellingian Naturphilosophie, see Daniel Whistler, “The New Literalism.” Symposium, vol.19, 






 Thus from a theoretical perspective the need for a reciprocal idealism-materialism 
becomes indispensable merely by attending to their respective shortcomings: on their own, 
neither can fully address the transcendent realities of the soul, the interface of all cosmic being. 
But were this to be the entirety of the value Schlegel attributes to spiritism’s epistemological 
innovation, it would effect nothing more than yet another abstraction (a “leeres abstractes 
Denken”) combining two seemingly antithetical doctrines; and this in a manner that was by no 
means unique in Schlegel’s own philosophical context.544 Were it to stop at this point, in other 
words, the call for a “Realspiritualismus,”545 as Osinski puts it, an empiricism of the soul that 
collapses the ideal and material into each other, would only bring together divergent 
epistemological positions—and, to be sure, with them one of the foundational philosophical 
antitheses that motored the aftermath of the Kantian Copernican revolution—but only in thought. 
The Schlegelian position, however, is different. It is also grounded in what are recognized as 
material-physiological facts; not just the results of philosophical critique, but far more the 
mounting accumulation of physical evidence points to the fact that such a synthetic position is 
already and increasingly embodied in actual practices, in real life: in the emergent activity of the 
spiritist body-soul complex.  
 This philosophical framework centered on the soul has its exact material analog in natural 
phenomena such as mesmeric animal magnetism, in the magnetic force of the anima. The 
presence of such natural forces already indicates a hidden source connecting all aspects of 
mundane and cosmic reality; electromagnetism expresses the force of the soul, the spiritual 
power of the world-organism permeating all things. For Schlegel, such a doctrine of the soul is 
                                                 
544 Here one thinks above all of Hegel’s dialectical-dynamic mode of philosophizing. 
 






evident in the present moment, it is already encapsulated in a spiritist praxis uniting the polar 
opposition of ideality and materiality in an encompassing dynamic or energetic system. Here 
physical phenomena are invested with a transcendental-spiritual force, and the transcendent 
breakthrough of esoteric revolution into contemporary history finds its embodied form in 
physical phenomena. This version of spiritism serves as the mediating doctrine in the postkantian 
problematic. The doctrine of the soul thus reconfigures the idealist system of Geist in relation to 
the materialist tradition of Körper, bringing both together, or rendering them indifferentiated, 
within the space of an alternative form of being and reflection, namely: within 
naturephilosophical or Romantic spiritism. Spiritism already performs the philosophical, but also 
practical synthesis: it already is an ideal-materialism without the need for an explicit doctrine or 
theory—it already acts.  
 The spiritist Seele is, in this sense, its own manifesto. The soul manifests itself actively, 
once as an automatic communication stimulated in magnetic sleep, in the physiological processes 
and movements of the tranced religious body, and again in the ecstasy of the body politic 
registering and expressing signs of the coming apocalyptic transformation. 
Conclusion: Christian Political Science 
In the above discussion, one sees a characteristic tendency of the late Romantic discourse 
of the body emerging in greater clarity, a physiological hermeneutic that increasingly tends 
towards a revelatory figure of the body, physical corporeality expanded into a literal and legible 
vessel of the soul, in contact with the field of transcendence in which all (in)organic being 
actually resides. In this respect, the reconciliation of the body and soul in the Christian tradition 
is near at hand in Schlegel’s reading of the unique nature of spiritist bodies: the flesh becomes 






animated by magnetic religious forces—and magnetism is nothing but the stirring of the 
supernatural presence of the One, the divine monistic principle of all things as given by God. The 
stated aim is to articulate how a contemporary Christian science could embody, and therefore 
activate the gospel of the Bible in a specifically modern form, attuned to the specific conjuncture 
of the Restoration moment.546 The motto of spiritism in this sense could be taken from the Book 
of John: “Word became flesh and dwelt among us,”547 perhaps the best example of the object and 
aspiration of Schlegel’s “Wiederherstellung der christlichen Vernunft”548 as a metapolitical 
project. Put differently, one could say that Schlegel’s spiritism raises the base materiality of the 
body to transcendence—especially in its moments of crisis, trance, and sickness, in which the 
abject and pathological nature of bodies becomes most evident—but the flesh is thereby invested 
with a surprisingly expressive Word, indeed a prophetically communicative Seele that helps the 
contemporary observer identify the eschatological element always present, but frequently hidden, 
in world historical teleological progression.   
The notebooks develop a physiological hermeneutic, a reading practice focused on the 
signature of the spiritist body, one that is designed above all to registering the divine 
revolutionary event of the future expressing itself, speaking out, around 1820. More exactly, as 
Zur Geschichte und Politik extends through the decade, Schlegel takes the concept and practice 
of spiritist crisis and translates it into an equally political as physiological register under the 
                                                 
546 Schlegel writes of a “Rechtfertigung des jetzigen Magnetismus: “obwohl er [magnetism] größtenteils nur noch 
der bloß natürliche ist, wie im heidnischen Alterthum, läßt sich sagen, daß eben jetzt auch dieser natürliche 
Magnetismus durch den christlichen Glauben und das Gebet wiedergeboren, neu belebt und zu einer höheren 
geistigen Bedeutung und Beziehung verklärt werden kann und soll.—Der natürliche Magnet ist jetzt indifferent, d.h. 
der guten und himmlischen Richtung ebensowohl fähig als der bösen (Schlegel, 19:345). 
 
547 John 1:14. 
 






aforementioned field of Siderismus, creating an analogy (“Uebergang”) between the individual 
and collective crisis out of which a new body politic will emerge as the apocalypse draws nearer:  
Die Grundsätze des Spiritualismus <(mit andern Worten)> sind noch bis jetzt gar nicht 
auf den gegenwärtigen politischen Zustand und Kampf anwendbar—wenigstens ist mir 
noch kein Uebergang dahin klar. <Man müßte denn nach den Grundsätzen des 
Spiritualismus—das dreyfache Leben in Geist, Seele und Leib—oder vielmehr das 
vierfache in Leib, Seele, Gott und Geist—auf die Gesellschaft und Gesellschaftsarten 
übertragen.549  
This is the most specific binding operation of the notebooks, or its most developed articulation: 
the analogy of the spiritist body with a speculative vision of an ideal future society, or the 
instrumentalization of spiritist knowledge practices in the present political struggle by 
reconceiving them in essentially sociological terms. The experimental transition between these 
two seemingly disparate discourses—Spiritualismus and the possibility of a transformative 
sociopolitical intervention—reveals a method in which the physiological hermeneutic of 
spiritism leads to insights into the theocratic redefinition of modern society. To return to das 
Siderische in this context: the sidereal constitutes the object of the hoped-for religious 
Naturkunde only briefly mentioned in the Signatur, the manifold of spiritual energy that also 
discloses a novel taxonomy of forms of sociality and sociability. When spiritist-sidereal bodies 
communicate in mesmeric trance, they become mediums of an esoteric but natural power that 
manifests itself everywhere, the real causal dynamic of existence whose signature they read and 
communicate. The real and imaginary communities that surround and build off such spiritist 
experience are just as much transformed. 
The ancient and early modern project of developing a hermeneutic reading practice, one 
that would be able to discern a total signature of all things as given by God in the diversity of 
                                                 






apparent forms,550 is intimately related to Schlegel’s interest in Siderismus (although the sidereal 
is not explicitly addressed in the Signatur manifesto). For him, siderism and signature represent 
different but interrelated natural-physical and religious-transcendent phenomena, types of 
bodies/forces and methods of reading them, that together constitute the same essential field of 
inquiry into the cosmos. The historical discourse on the concept of signature would have 
probably been best known to Schlegel through his (and the general Romantic) interest in Böhme, 
but as Giorgio Agamben points out in his study on the signature paradigm,551 the Böhmean 
figure of the signature itself has its roots in the work of such earlier thinkers as Paracelsus, with 
whom Schlegel was also familiar. Indeed, after reading Schlegel’s own contributions from the 
1820s to this longer tradition of the signature, one wishes that Agamben had dedicated a section 
of his own study to Schlegel’s late Religionspolitik, thereby filling a gap in the discourse-history 
Agamben seems to prematurely bracket. Agamben asserts, for example, that the theory of the 
signature “disappear[s] from Western science at the end of the eighteenth century,” (ibid. 43) 
when in fact Schlegel revivifies it with increasing intensity up to his death in 1829, and this 
precisely in his interest in siderism. Furthermore, attention to Religionspolitik would have 
provided a more concrete meaning and instantiation to the efficaciousness that Agamben asserts 
is central to signature theory—i.e., the function of the signature, as he details, not just as a 
signfiying body of knowledge that accurately represents or reflects reality, but as a 
transformative, indeed interventionist hermeneutic praxis that reveals a fundamentally different 
mode of being—namely: in the kind of politicization to which Schlegel submits signature, in the 
variety of explicitly politically-effective figures of signature-reading in the late system of 
                                                 
550 On signature as a discursive practice or organizing episteme in the premodern context, see Michel Foucault, On 
the Order of Things (London: Routledge, 1989), 28. 
 






thought. Schlegel would have perhaps also been familiar with the discussion of the signature in 
the work of the physician, medical historian, and botanist Kurt Sprengel—with whom Goethe 
met and Novalis engaged with in the Brouillon. Sprengel’s popular Versuch einer pragmatischen 
Geschichte der Arzneikunde (1792-1794) deliveres a commentary on exactly that kind of 
theoretical constellation Schlegel and Agamben are interested in between signature, divinity, 
history, and sidereal bodies.552  
The term Siderismus can be understood to bring Schlegel’s project in the late notebooks 
into the orbit of contemporary Romantic scientific discourse as well. The term siderism, just as 
with spiritism, is not Schlegel’s invention. Its direct provenance emerges out of the constellation 
of naturephilosophical experimentalism around 1800, of which the connections between animal 
magnetism and spiritism are but one aspect: Schlegel, for his part, would mobilize this scientific 
discourse of siderism in the speculative system of Religionspolitik. It would be Johann Wilhelm 
Ritter’s journal Siderismus (1808) which would propose a program most similar to Schlegel’s in 
this respect. As the new organ of scientific knowledge, in what Ritter considered a cutting-edge 
physics, the Siderismus journal was to become a kind of eclectic compendium of esoteric natural 
                                                 
552 In the Versuch, Sprengel writes: “Even in Galen’s time, the strange theories of magic from Persia, Arabia and 
Egypt, had penetrated into the now flourishing city of Alexandria [in the late notebooks, Schlegel returns constantly 
to ancient Persia in his reflections on siderism]. Here everything good was viewed as an emanation from the 
Godhead; thus in the whole of Nature everything is interconnected. Everything has an effect on everything else, and 
one thing signifies another thing […] This was one of the fundamental principles of the first branch of secret 
wisdom in astrology, which was fervently practiced by the Persians and Chaldeans, and subsequently became united 
with medicine. The constellations of the zodiac are in sympathy with the members of the human body.” Sprengel 
goes on to connect this ancient science of sympathy or correspondence to the theory of the signature in terms that 
Schlegel would have labelled sidereal: “The system of emanation is based on the general harmony of everything in 
Nature, especially on the correspondence of the stars with sublunary things […] It is at a higher stage of theosophy 
that the Magus knows the meanings of these signs, and can recognize the being, nature and characteristics of a body 
from their signatures […] Adam, the first man, had a deep knowledge of the Cabbala. He knew the signatures of all 







investigation.553 The journal construes modern scientific work in its ideal form as the 
development of a cosmic insight, an aesthetic experience of vision into a holistic “Ganzes.” This 
would be a metascience based on the notion of the One universal phenomenon as the ground of a 
constantly self-revitalizing existence or Lebensprozess. Inquiry into the nature of this universal 
but still hidden phenomenon—for Ritter as for Schelling, Novalis, and Schlegel, among others—
constitutes a foundational practice of Romantic Naturphilosophie at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.  
For Ritter, scientific thought should conceive of itself as an experimental process of ever-
greater scalability; accordingly, chemistry must expand into a physics, which, in turn, must 
ultimately raise the scope of its field to a cosmics, the most universal scientific framework: 
“Physik in ihrer allgemeinsten Bedeutung, wo sie zuletzt Cosmik wird.”554 For Ritter, Siderismus 
represents a sub-discipline of cosmics, albeit one of the most promising developments of modern 
scientific inquiry. But between Ritter and Schlegel’s investigations of siderism, the term 
ultimately serves as a hypernym, an umbrella concept referring to a host of emergent physical, 
spiritual, and sociopolitical phenomena articulated at the utmost level of generality and 
universality. It is a catchall, describing what has not yet fully manifested itself—be it a 
galvanism of the earth and the body politic as an electrical circuit, as Ritter experiments with in 
                                                 
553 Strickland provides a detailed discussion of the Siderismus journal, writing that Ritter’s plan was to define a 
“space where the new science [i.e., galvanism, magnetism, siderism] would set its own laws. Siderismus was to be a 
sanctuary, a Freistätte, but also something of a Freistaat, an autonomous republic beyond the jurisdiction of 
academic censors” (Strickland, Circumscribing Science, 189-193). The journal presents a boldly formulated research 
program. Ritter’s brief list of the different scientific phenomena he plans to investigate in future volumes of 
Siderismus is exemplary in this respect: “unterirdische Electrometrie und Rabdomantie […] Verhandlungen über 
den physiologischen Theil des Galvanismus, über spontane organische Elektricität, thierisches Leuchten bis zur 
menschlichen Selbstverbrennung herauf, physische Dignität der Willkühr, thierischen Magnetismus, Zeugung, 
Krankheitsverpflanzung, Sympathie und tausend zusammen mit diesen ein Ganzes bildende andere Dinge [...] 
(Johann Wilhelm Ritter, Siderismus [Tübingen: J.G. Cotta, 1808], xxvi). 
 






the Siderismus journal and elsewhere, or a galvanism of the human body, a psychic electricity 
expressed in bodies-in-crisis and the communities that surround them, as Schlegel’s treats in his 
concerns with the spiritist body in the late notebooks. 
Siderismus points to the need for a fundamentally new Wissenschaft. For Schlegel, as for 
Ritter, such a science would have to be able to provide a signature of all things at the cosmic 
level, and thus also include knowledge of the soul. The soul is a privileged entity in Ritterian 
cosmics as well, the level or site of total interconnection of all things. The assumption of the kind 
of Wissenschaft shared between Ritter and Schlegel’s notion of siderism is that the 
phenomenality of the Seele cuts through the perceived mind-body dichotomy; the soul in 
siderism represents an empirical fact—the fact of electromagnetic cosmic force—that does not 
depend on any distinction between ideal and material reality, transcendent and sensible 
experience. In the foreword to the first (and last) volume of Siderismus, Ritter describes, in a 
page and a half parataxis of remarkable poetic density, a vision of science based on the 
immanence of the cosmic Seele that Schlegel, as we have seen above, would develop some 
twenty years later in the notebooks. For Ritter here, light and darkness, figured respectively as 
knowledge and that which threatens it, are no longer opposites but dialectically entwined through 
conflict—or should emerge as such in a cosmics that would finally recast the soul as a proper 
object of scientific inquiry:  
Erst fremdes Dunkel bringt das eigene des Lichts zur Klarheit […] [light and darkness 
should] im Conflicte in Eins verschmelzen, und nun auch so Eins nur fort sind…ganz wie 
Geist und Körper etwa, deren jeder für sich nichts, verbunden—Etwas, und in diesem 
Einen Alles und im Allen Eins: —die Seele.555      
 
                                                 






For his part, Schlegel will also figure the conceptual and practical operations of siderism as a 
Verschmelzung of opposites: “Nur auf dem ψ[psychischen] Wege,” Schlegel writes, echoing 
Ritter above, “kann alles Wissen in Eins verschmolzen, und dieses zugleich activ werden.”556  
Siderismus in Schlegel’s formulation can therefore be understood to constitute a strand of 
(late) Romantic science: a Naturkunde with a basis in the physical and spiritual experience of 
magnetic bodies. To refer to the experience of the magnetic body—in magnetic sleep, in the 
religious-ecstatic trances witnessed and recorded by spiritists—is for Schlegel just as much to 
refer to the physical dynamics of the Seele as opposed to the theoretically isolated experiences of 
either solely Geist or Körper. The assemblage-character of spiritism, i.e., its inablity to conform 
to a set conceptual framework or terminology, unable to be isolated as a stable or non-dynamic 
phenomenon of either philosophy or physics alone, instead suggesting a flux of appelations 
(animal magnetism, psychism, and ultimately in the main: Siderismus)—this fuzzy definitional 
set of spiritism is a result of the fact that it refers to a novel development in world history. Its 
signature is not yet fully identifiable; its appearance and import is conditional, open-ended, it 
awaits to be seen. Spiritism, as a characteristically Romantic concept, must therefore be 
understood as a term under erasure, inadequate for the moment, under current conditions, 
awaiting further development (“Mehre Namen,” as Novalis notes in Blüthenstaub, “sind einer 
Idee vortheilhaft”).557 For Schlegel Siderismus can be understood as the first stirring or 
announcement of a novel anthropological model, a “siderisch begabter Mensch”558 animated by a 
                                                 
556 Schlegel, 22:70. 
 
557 Novalis, 2:428.  
 







“siderisch anima,”559 but knowledge of this human type is as provisional as the contemporary 
historical circumstance. As he turns his attention more and more to the emergent phenomenon of 
the spiritist body—and by extension to those spiritist figures and communities that literally 
embody and express Siderismus—he begins to sketch the outlines of something like an esoteric 
organ of sidereal force, an organic capacity of the human being to register divine-natural forces, 
and one that calls for its own physiological hermeneutic. 
As with Ritter, it is the unique activity (“aktiv werden”) of Siderismus that will occupy 
Schlegel the most in the notebooks, its ability to animate bodies and communities with a natural 
immaterial and invisible force—a Seele—one capable of manifesting the already existing but 
latent, hidden bond between divine and creaturely life. But the sidereal or spiritist bond for 
Schlegel is also one that connects disparate social groups and institutions. Investigation into the 
phenomenon of Siderismus therefore consists in discerning its activities of political religare, its 
function to bind together the entire scale of community formations in social cohesion. He is 
interested in the emergence of bonds that express the telos of esoteric historical progression 
towards the utopian, post-apocalyptic community, in which the body, mind, and collective social 
organism—and then again the soul of all cosmic life—resonate through the same divine 
signature. This is the signature of a new Bund:  
Der einzig Bund, welcher ein wirklich innres Leben hat, und von selbst durch die Sache 
entsteht <und besteht>, auch ohne alle Form und Absicht—ist der ψ [psychische] Verein 
[...] dieses ist eine eigene und besondere Gesellschaftsform und Vereinsspecies. Der ψ 
[psychische] Verein (der auch durch keine Uneinigkeit aufgelöst werden kann) steht in 
der Mitte zwischen Ehe und Kirche, als das Centrum des Seelenvereins.560 
                                                 
559 Ibid., 107. 
 
560 Schlegel, 22:22. Schlegel notes of the ideal Bund later in the same notebook: “Die ψ [psychischen] Mysterien 
sind der lichte Mitelpunkt und geheime Lebenskern in jenem <in> offener Kampf daliegenden Quadrat der 







Schlegel’s complex architecture of a future Christian community (evident in the fragment above 
and developed elsewhere in more detail both in the Signatur essay and the late notebooks) 
describes, but also invokes or initiates the utopian Kingdom of God or New Jerusalem in the 
present, accelerating its coming by preparing its way. Here the “psychische Verein” or 
“Seelenverein,” the true Bund, functions as “das feste Hypomochlion” or grounded point around 
which all else turns and is propelled along its trajectory towards the eschaton, the dynamic motor 
of present historical progression towards divine revolution. The tradition of marriage and the 
institution of the (Catholic) Kirche radiate out from or bracket the centerpoint of this “eigene und 
besondere Gesellschaftsform und Vereinsspecies,” but they too will be transformed in the 
realization of the coming post-apocalyptic world community, the universalization of spiritist 
Seelenvereine.  
 There is a kind of purity to the virtual community built around the crises of magnetic 
sleep. The spiritist Bund emerges and exists “von selbst durch die Sache.” The tripartite spiritist 
community—the healer, observer, and the magnetized subject in trance, intertwined in an 
invisible galvanic chain with God—bring an autopoetic community into existence, a sovereign 
and self-sufficient group not determined by any “Form und Absicht” except that of itself and the 
sheer drive-nature of religious enthusiasm, the ecstasy of religious trance that leaves the 
conventional self behind. For Schlegel, such is God revealing Himself to humanity at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, and this in ways only a religious metapolitics can properly 
interpret. 
The notebooks provide a concrete instance of this speculative communal form, situated 
right at the hinge of future transformative change: it is not the Catholic laiety, all connected 






around, but the community of the spiritist séance in which magnetized bodies drift in and out of a 
sleep-like state, punctuating their catatonic trance with privileged insights into the true and holy 
Bund of humanity. Schlegel was even supposed to become one of the leaders of this nascent 
universal community, a prophecy communicated to him during a mesmeric crisis he observed.561 
 In the late notebooks, the crisis theory of the Signatur is reformulated; Schlegel begins to 
see positive emergence in the spiritist “Krisis des Leibes” whereas before, in the last Romantic 
manifesto, he concentrates on a negative series of Principien der Zerstörung, the destructive 
paradigms of thought and practice overtly determining the course of history up to the 
postrevolutionary era. Accordingly, it is only through the spiritist-sidereal-magnetic-psychic 
crisis of the body—which is just as much a crisis of the body politic, given that for Schlegel the 
individual is the microanthropos of the collective—it is only through such a binding of individual 
and collective crisis that insight into the esoteric record of approaching apocalypse can be 
gained. And, Schlegel concludes, this eschatological science is ultimately to be accompanied by 
its own form of political praxis:  
Das Verfahren des Staats ist jetzt wiewohl auf eine unbewußte Art dem magnetischen 
sehr ähnlich. Die Staatsmänner selbst wollen nichts andres als Calmiren, Ableiten.—Die 
Revoluzionärs wollten und wollen immer noch falsche Krisen herbeyführen und machen; 
so soll der christliche Staatsmann eine wahre, heilsame Krisis zwar nicht machen wollen 
[...] aber auf sie gefaßt und vorbereitet seyn.562  
 
                                                 
561 In his Tagebuch über die magnetische Behandlung der Gräfin Leśniowska (1820-1826) and fragments Aus den 
Aufzeichnungen über Cäcilia P (1824-1828), Schlegel provides the fullest documentation of the mesmeric 
treatments he frequently observed and recorded during the 1820s. In one of these sessions, he found confirmation of 
what he called his “zweites, neues, höheres Lehramt” (Schlegel, 35:xxxviii)—his role as interpreter of 
eschatological Spiritismus in the postrevolutionary age—from Leśniowska herself, who proclaimed Schlegel’s 
“zukünftiger Beruf” as the “Stellvertreter Gottes” (Ibid., xliv). At least five other spiritist patients announced 
Schlegel’s privileged role in the psychic community, or rather, this prophecy was revealed to them during magnetic 
trance (Ibid.). 
 






Similar to the ambiguity confronting the spiritist physician-healer vis-à-vis the patient’s 
mesmeric trance, the role of political action or praxis (i.e., what specific activity or “Verfahren” 
is proper to achieve the desired practical result in the sphere of the state) is also ambiguous. Like 
the stateman with his citizen-subjects, the healer wants to calm, redirect, or otherwise ameliorate 
the given crisis, but crucially it is only in trance that the body functions as a medium for 
divinely-inspired speech-acts, unconsciously expressing esoteric wisdom, prophesies, 
apocalyptic prognostications, etc., that the healer and observers can then record. Only the state of 
extremity and traumatic experience communicates the true import of the crisis. For both 
statesman and healer, this is to say, the respective crises they treat—whether in the public sphere 
of politics or in the private zone of a lady’s chamber—are complex, in need of an intervention 
that, given the situation, must either becalm, incite, or do both at once in an experimental pursuit 
of knowledge. Schlegel asks: what kind of crisis must be triggered in the present moment? And 
how to trigger the true crisis? Both statesman and healer must be prepared for crisis by patiently 
learning to read the signs of its approach, thereby advancing their own diagnostic skills.563 But in 
each case, it must ultimately remain a question as to whether the crisis should be averted or 
cured, or whether it should be intensified and prolonged not only so as to further examine it, to 
plumb its depths for further esoteric wisdom: but also to effect the total revolution of the subject 
at hand, to intervene in a life on the brink of total change. Still, in the end, what is at stake for 
this prospective “christliche Staatsmann,” in Schlegel’s view, is above all the preparation for the 
last trigger-event, the apocalypse or “wahre, heilsame Krisis.” 
                                                 
563 This can be related to late 18th century concept of Polizeiwissenschaft and the Polizei as an institutional 
organization of social physicians or clinicians occupied with a “cura advertendi futura,” a task, as Joseph Vogl puts 
it (already cited above): “in der Zukunft zu lesen […] die Zukunft des Staates vorhersehbar zu machen.” Schlegel, 
for his part, envisions the statesman-healer as the augur of a political future of the apocalypse. A kind of inversion of 






In this synthesis of the activities of statesman and healer, Schlegel fashions his personal 
role or “zweites, neues, höheres Lehramt,” and that of his system of Religionspolitik as a whole, 
as a kind of clinical practice, as that of a spiritist healer practicing on the world historical body 
politic. One of these spiritist crisis-observers himself, in his last phase of production Schlegel 
connects the esoteric knowledge of divine natural phenomena to the late Romantic model of the 
“christlicher Staatsmann”—a reader, writer, and legislator of signatures—who could understand 




























CONCLUSION: THE SECRETION OF WILD POLITICS 
Of all Schlegel’s fragments, the following one has merited perhaps the most attention, not 
only from a scholarly reception fond of its recitation, but also from Schlegel himself, as he 
repeatedly revisited and modified it throughout his life: 
Die Französische Revolution, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre und Goethes Meister sind die 
größten Tendenzen des Zeitalters. Wer an dieser Zusammenstellung Anstoß nimmt, wem 
keine Revolution wichtig scheinen kann, die nicht laut und materiell ist, der hat sich noch 
nicht auf den hohen weiten Standpunkt der Geschichte der Menschheit erhoben. Selbst in 
unsern dürftigen Kulturgeschichten, die meistens einer mit fortlaufendem Kommentar 
begleiteten Variantensammlung, wozu der klassische Text verloren ging, gleichen, spielt 
manches kleine Buch, von dem die lärmende Menge zu seiner Zeit nicht viel Notiz nahm, 
eine größere Rolle als alles, was diese trieb.564 
Its exemplary status as a locus classicus of the Romantic fragment, mainly established through 
its first sentence, has usually resulted in obscuring the mention of “manches kleine Buch” at its 
conclusion, something that should immediately spark our attention. The figure of Schlegel’s little 
book appears doubly minor from this perspective: first, or negatively, insofar as its scholarly 
reception has overshadowed it with the famous initial sentence on the three greatest tendencies; 
but then again, positively, inasmuch as the little book plays “eine größere Rolle” than the 
“lärmende Menge” of its times, even while—or precisely because—it retains a certain 
unnoticeable or imperceptible form. A work becomes a little book when it expresses a secret 
development of epochal significance: its own status vis-à-vis the popular public sphere, 
appearing neither “laut” nor “materiell,” is precisely in line with the revolutionary content it 
                                                 
564 Schlegel, Fragmente der Frühromantik, 44 (my emphasis). The fragment first appeared in the Philosophische 
Lehrjahre, then in the Athenäum journal in 1798, and in 1800, in the essay “Über die Unverständlichkeit” at the end 
of the Athenäum. Its last appearance, greatly modified, appears in 1820 in Schlegel’s late notebooks, discussed 
further below. As Pikulik notes, “Dieses Fragment ist neben Athenäums-Fragment 116 das bekantesste Friedrich 






communicates. The little book is, as it were, the all-important afterthought of the fragment 
itself.565  
When Schlegel re-visits the fragment two years later in 1800, using it as an intertext in 
the essay “Über die Unverständlichkeit,” the fragment has now taken on the status of the little 
book. At this stage of its reception, the fragment—or the fragment as a generic literary form of 
Romanticism, but also this fragment in particular—is understood by popular society and the 
cultural establishment as the product of an incomprehensible literary clique. According to 
Schlegel, it has been barely registered—just like the Athenäum journal in which it twice 
appears—and more often than not it has been profoundly misinterpreted. But, unsurprisingly, 
this is also exactly what he suggests the future value of the fragment should or will be, and thus 
also the lasting impact of the Romantic movement as a whole, namely: the profusion of 
incomprehensibility throughout everyday life, the wild productive energy unleashed in creative 
misinterpretation. “Warum soll ich Mißverständnisse darbieten,” Schlegel asks, “wenn niemand 
sie ergreifen will?”566   
The source of its popular obscurity and misrecognition, but also the fragment’s strength, 
is connected to the meaning of Tendenz at its fundaments. Having just (ironically) noted that “ein 
bekannter Jakobiner, der Magister Dyk in Leipzig, sogar demokratische Gesinnungen darin hat 
finden wollen,”567 Schlegel turns immediately to a discussion of the fragment’s implicit doctrine 
of tendencies, carrying this suggestive political content forward into the association of tendency 
                                                 
565 See, for example, Ernst Behler’s discussion of the fragment in which he only refers to the Tendenzen, observing, 
furthermore, that “no text of early Romanticism is mentioned in it” (Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory, 55). 
By contrast, I want to argue that its mention of a little book can be read, as we will see, as an allusion to 
Romanticism as a whole. 
 
566 Schlegel, 2:367. 
 






and irony: “Etwas andres freilich ist noch in dem Fragment, welches allerdings mißverstanden 
werden konnte. Es liegt in dem Wort Tendenzen, und da fängt nun auch schon die Ironie an.”568 
The French Revolution, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters 
Lehrjahre represent significant events of the age in Schlegel’s view, but they too are nothing 
more—nor less—than Tendenzen in flux, barely conceivable in terms of a “hoher weiter 
Standpunkt der Geschichte der Menschheit,” and certainly not yet understood in their full 
implications by the general public. This leads to their miscomprehension: their secret content 
remains, in this sense, necessarily ironic. This is more directly expressed in an earlier version of 
the fragment in which tendency again designates a constant but always inchoate procedural 
movement in form and content: “Die drei größten Tendenzen unsres Zeitalters sind die 
Wissenschaftslehre, Wilhelm Meister und die französische Revoluzion. Aber alle drei sind doch 
nur Tendenzen ohne gründliche Ausführung.”569 
Schlegel suggests that the constellation of irony and incomprehensibility surrounding all 
true tendencies will only increase in power with historical progression: it will come to mark the 
                                                 
568 Ibid. For a discussion of Schlegel’s use of irony as both form and content of his essay, see Edgar Landgraf, 
“Comprehending Romantic Incomprehensibility. A Systems-Theoretical Perspective on Early German 
Romanticism,” MLN 121 (2006): 606-608). Appearing as the last piece in the last issue of the Athenäum, effectively 
bringing Frühromantik to a culminating point, “Über die Unverständlichkeit” formulates incomprehensibility as the 
central concept of the romantic system (or anti-system) of the fragment. Elsewhere Schlegel approaches 
incomprehensibility in terms of dramatic parabasis. In ancient Greek drama, parabasis is the technical term for the 
moment when the chorus directly addresses the audience in an extradiegetic and often satirical aside on the plot or 
characters, exemplified in Aristophanes’ theater—and perfectly in Nachtwachen, as noted already. Paul de Man 
describes parabasis as “the interruption of a discourse by a shift in the rhetorical register […] the constant 
interruption of the narrative illusion by intrusion” (Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology [Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1996], 178). Schlegel takes this one step further, understanding Romantic incomprehensibility to be a 
kind of “permanente Parekbase,” a constant interruption of the flow of thinking and writing that, paradoxically, 
never stops, constituting a permanent interruption. For a more detailed discussion of the politics of Schlegel’s use of 
irony, incomprehensibility, and parabasis, see Michel Chaouli, The Laboratory of Poetry: Chemistry and Poetics in 
the work of Friedrich Schlegel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2002) and “The Politics of Permanent Parabasis,” Studies 
in Romanticism 42, no. 3 (2003). 
 
569 Cited in Pikulik, Frühromantik, 131. Pikulik describes Schlegel’s use of Tendenz as “Ausdruck nicht des 
Vollendeten, sondern des Ergänzungsbedürftigen, nicht als Errungenschaft der Gegenwart, sondern als Versprechen 
für die Zukunft, nicht als Haben und Sein, sondern als Werden” (Ibid.). See also Frank’s more general discussion of 






coming social, political, and aesthetic revolutions of the nineteenth century, all of which 
represent transformative changes already in preparation around 1800. Schlegel is explicit, albeit 
in a tone saturated with irony, about this epochal aspect—about, in other words, the futural and 
directly political aspect of Tendenz as an operation of ironic incomprehensibility: “Aber ist denn 
die Unverständlichkeit etwas so durchaus Verwerfliches und Schlechtes?—Mich dünkt das Heil 
der Familien und der Nationen beruhet auf ihr.”570 The Romantic movement will itself become 
the ultimate tendency in a “Zeitalter der Tendenzen”: “Ich lasse demnach die Ironie fahren und 
erkläre gerade heraus, das Wort [Tendenzen] bedeute in dem Dialekt der Fragmente [in the 
Athenäum], alles sei nur noch Tendenz, das Zeitalter sei das Zeitalter der Tendenzen.” He 
continues:  
Ob ich nun der Meinung sei, alle diese Tendenzen [the French Revolution, Goethe’s and 
Fichte’s works, but also Kant’s philosophical revolution] würden durch mich selbst in 
Richtigkeit und zum Beschluß gebracht werden, oder vielleicht durch meinen Bruder 
oder durch Tieck, oder durch sonst einen von unsrer Faktion, oder erst durch einen Sohn 
von uns, durch einen Enkel, einen Urenkel, einen Enkel im siebenundzwanzigsten 
Gliede, oder erst am jüngsten Tage, oder niemals; das bleibt der Weisheit des Lesers, für 
welche diese Frage recht eigentlich gehört, anheim gestellt.571 
 
This ironic assessment of Romanticism as an epochal tendency, and the age in general as one of 
(as yet) incomprehensible tendencies, is already rendered wild in Schlegel’s use of the term. But 
it will be restricted again, even as it shifts further, within German political aesthetic discourse in 
the following decades. As in the rise of the so-called Tendenzpoesie characteristic of the 
                                                 
570 Schlegel, 2:370. For Schlegel there is a need to deliver the foundational “Heil” or salvation of society—in its 
basic social and political organization, the family and nation—through the invention or discovery of a concept upon 
which it could securely rest (“beruhet”). But this is a seemingly perverse need, given his exposition of the 
foundational significance and function of incomprehensibility: Unverständlichkeit, a kind of material anarchic force 
that constitutes an always present element of life, can only ironically deconstruct itself and any order or signifying 
regime it comes into contact with. Hence socio-political organization, inferring from Schlegel’s statement, must 
remain dynamic, in-process, determined as a continual self-evolution or self-ironization or else risk stasis, blockage, 








movement of Junges Deutschland (above all in the works of Heinrich Heine and Karl 
Gutzkow),572 the theorization and practice of politically engaged literature between the French 
Revolution and the 1848 revolutions is inserted into a strictly delineated literary genre and 
characterized by its adherence to and advocacy for a specific political, ideological, or moral 
program. But for Schlegel, at least in 1800, the establishment of a Romantic literary practice 
does not entail dedication to a coherent program, but rather precisely to a tendency, a notion of 
the anarchic imagination as the secret key to revolutionary existential transformation.  
 In 1820, Schlegel will update the fragment one last time: 
Die katholische Kirche, die deutsche Wissenschaft und die französische Revoluzion sind 
die wahren drey Tendenzen des Zeitalters; eigentl[ich] nur zwey; die katholische Kirche 
ist das feste Hypomochlion, der feste, ruhende Punkt, um welchen sich alles dreht. Die 
vierte Potenz dazu sind die psychichen Entdeckungen. Dieses ist die Höhe, wie die 
Kirche der Grund und Boden.573 
The French Revolution still retains its place, but Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre becomes a more 
general “deutsche Wissenschaft,”574 and, most significantly, Goethe’s Meister drops away to be 
                                                 
572 Although Heine will also ironize the engaged literature of his time, as in his poem “Die Tendenz” (on the 
formation of Tendenzliteratur in the Vormärz period, see Eiden-Offe, “Literatur des Frühsozialismus.” Handbuch 
Literatur und Ökonomie [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019], 518-520). The political valence of a given literary work 
understood in terms of its revolutionary “tendency” remains a problematic in German cultural discourse up to the 
twentieth century well: for example, in his 1934 address “Der Autor als Produzent,” Walter Benjamin recuperates 
the now century-old discussion of tendencies and applies it in an analysis of the contemporary political artist (e.g., 
Sergei Tretyakov) working in the material context of a new revolutionary organization. While beyond the scope of 
the present concerns, it can be noted here that Benjamin’s conflation of the senses of political and aesthetic 
tendency—alongside what he calls “literarische Qualität”—and of their necessary relation or alignment moves close 
to Schlegel’s concept of Tendenz: for both of them, the form and content of a socially-effective work express a 
shared tendency insofar as the methods and operations of literary production must themselves reproduce or embody 
the political material they take up, defend or attack, and thereby transform (Benjamin, “Der Autor als Produzent.” 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977]). Indeed, for Schlegel, Romanticism is nothing more than 
a kind of republicanism in aesthetic form, a free democracy of literary subjects and objects: “Die Poesie ist eine 
republikanishe Rede” (Schlegel, Ideen). 
 
573 Schlegel, 22:17. 
 
574 In 1824, Schlegel will elaborate on this “deutsche Wissenschaft” not in terms of Fichte’s breakthrough 
philosophy, but as part of early Romanticism, and in his own contributions: he writes: “die wahre NEUE Zeit 
herbeyzuführen; wie ich dieses wohl richtig ahndete, aber auf einem falschen Wege herbeyzuführen suchte ao 






replaced by the “katholische Kirche.” There are actually only two true tendencies to the age in 
Schlegel’s final assessment: one of them is the Catholic church, the other is either German 
science or French revolution. What is more important, in any case, is that there is an esoteric 
epochal emergence at hand—another new tendency—that both regrounds modern humanity in 
religious organization (der feste, ruhende Punkt), and extends its potential to reach new heights 
in psychic discoveries (spiritism, siderism, etc.), the fourth potentiation (vierte Potenz) offered in 
the present historical conjuncture.  
 The little book thus appears as a kind of Romantic minor literature.575 All the iterations of 
the fragment on tendency point to different scenes of intervention—in aesthetics (Goethe), 
philosophical science (Fichte), politics (the French Revolution), or religion (the spiritist 
church)—but beneath their obvious historical impact, there is the possibility of an unnoticeable 
work binding them all together, a secret but transformative tendency that quietly redefines the 
entire era in a near imperceptible revolutionary becoming: a new emotion, science, spirituality, a 
                                                 
aber bloße IDEEN-Religion.—Eine Erneuerung, Verjüngung und glorreiche Entfaltung—der katholischen Kirche 
(Ibid., 210).  
  
575 Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a “minor literature” refers to a paradigm of literary production “cut off from 
the masses, like a ‘paper language’ or an artificial language” (Gilles Deleuz and Félix Guattari, Kafka [Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1986], 17). For them, a minor literature is the expression of a subject and/or collective 
formation “in the margins or completely outside [their] fragile community,” thus allowing “all the more the 
possibility to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and sensibility 
[…] another science” (Ibid.). Novalis’ Glauben und Liebe also offers a succinct expression of this drive to 
communicate the secret, or to find existential transformation in always mysterious forms and to share this 
knowledge with one’s select fellows: “Viele haben gemeynt, man solle von zarten, mißbrauchbaren Gegenständen, 
eine gelehrte Sprache führen, z.B. lateinisch von Dingen der Art schreiben. Es käme auf einen Versuch an, ob man 
nicht in der gewöhnlichen Landessprache so sprechen könnte, daß es nur der verstehn könnte, der es verstehn sollte” 
(Novalis, 2:485). This latter is actually a specific poetic image of a “minor language” in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
sense: “minor languages: they are not simply sublanguages, idiolects or dialects, but potential agents of the major 
language’s entering into a becoming-minoritarian of all of its dimensions and elements” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
Thousand Plateaus, 106). And elsewhere they write: “There is nothing that is [...] revolutionary except the minor. 
To hate all languages of the masters [...] What interests him [Kafka, but we speak here of the Romantics as well] 
even more is the possibility of making of his own language [...].a minor utilization. To be a sort of stranger within 
his own language” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 26). Schlegel’s problematic of the little book appears in this 
context, mutatis mutandis, in the pattern of a minor literature, or a minor Tendenzliteratur, but only with the 
exception that it is not “cut off from the masses,” or rather only appears as such because its vision of a new mass 






novel language and hermeneutic applied to the problems and repressions of modern society. 
Romanticism, in Schlegel’s formulations, consists in the development of just this sort of 
productive secrecy as a general social activity, indeed the messianic activity of humanity. At its 
end, the Athenäum announces itself as a little book of revolutionary dimensions, even while 
valorizing—or ironizing—the esoteric but absolute nature of its own literary circle and self-
proposed tasks.  
By proposing a counter-majority and a counter-program to address the pathological, i.e., 
overly comprehensible and controlled, state of modernity, the Romantics can be understood as 
consciously mobilizing an element of the minoritarian—and this precisely to lead humanity out 
of its self-imposed immaturity, away from its previous minority status, towards its future 
flourishing. Of this kind of constitutive process of minoritization at the heart of the alternative 
imagination, Deleuze and Guattari write: 
we must distinguish between: the majoritarian as a constant and homogenous system; 
minorities as subsystems; and the minoritarian as a potential, creative and created, 
becoming. The problem is never to acquire the majority, even in order to install a new 
constant. There is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is never becoming. All becoming 
is minoritarian […] Minorities [in the social sense], of course, are objectively definable 
states, states of language, ethnicity, or sex with their own ghetto territorialities, but they 
must also be thought of as seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger 
uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majority.576 
 
Blüthenstaub is what Novalis calls his fragments, which he defines only as processes of 
becoming, whatever their specific content. Romantic texts—if they can be understood as a 
coherent body of wild politics—appear as a minoritarian movement, a diverse program of 
imaginative poiesis that everywhere seeks to “trigger uncontrollable movements and 
                                                 






deterritorializations,” reconfiguring the establishment status quo of knowledge and social 
organization not in a new majority, but in a process of Bildung without end. 
Only the initiated reader of such a minor literature, in a minor language (i.e., the 
romanticized subject-citizen and community), sees the real tendency of the age in its secret 
aspects of change, and pursues the investigation and alteration of reality only in order to increase 
its mystery, and to communicate it onwards. Schiller’s vision of a pure church (reine Kirche), the 
secret society of a select few, a vanguardist group, reappears in Schlegel’s late thought as a 
community of spiritist subjects, but also in Novalis’ vision of a utopian society of transmundane 
agents or citizen-monarchs, and in Ritter’s proposal for a future institutional body of 
cosmopolitical scientists. All of these speculative social figures contain and express a certain 
secret (which Nachtwachen ironizes in turn). Or, put differently, knowledge of their essential 
being, and of the need to produce them in actual deed—whether formulated in terms of love, 
natural insight, religious revelation, or nihilism—is what makes makes the select circle and 
science special in the first place. The Romantics were the ones, as they understood it, to discover 
or invent the necessary fields and activities of collective metamorphosis, as yet unannounced and 
unrealized, and deliver them in the form of an envoy, as a prospective task of the future that is 
already obliquely evident at the core of modern development.  
Their activity is, then, to propagate a secret throughout society, but never in such a way 
as to exhaust its secrecy, its special power and potential, but rather to extend and intensify it. For 
Schlegel, the essence of the literary practice of fragmentation, and the genre of the fragment, is 
to discover the esoteric signature of all things already given in reality, reading the associative 






through a new “Chiffernsprache,” as he puts it, echoing Novalis.577 Romantic fragments become 
in this sense a kind of cryptological text that should not be completely deciphered, but rather re-
coded over and over again in each historical epoch’s engagement with them: “Alle höchsten 
Wahrheiten jeder Art,” Schlegel writes, “sind durchaus trivial und eben darum ist nichts 
notwendiger als sie immer neu, und wo möglich immer paradoxer auszudrücken, damit es nicht 
vergessen wird, daß sie noch da sind, und daß sie nie eigentlich ganz ausgesprochen werden 
können.”578 
To return to the beginning, the departure point of wild political Romanticism: Schiller, as 
noted at the outset of this study, also refers to the secret circle, the select initiate, the 
Geheimbund as a revolutionary cell of political aesthetic alternatives, magical: “Die ganze Magie 
[of the appearance of beauty] beruht auf ihrem Geheimnis, und mit dem notwendigen Bund ihrer 
Elemente ist auch ihr Wesen aufgehoben.”579 Schiller maintains the need for a kind of 
continuous containment of the secret, its protection and isolation in a private space—within the 
mode of subjectivity of the proper reader of the letters and the journal in which they are 
                                                 
577 Novalis’ political fragments and aphorisms can be read like a pendant to Schlegel’s thoughts on the little book, 
strikingly so, as for example in the first lines of Glauben und Liebe. A “Rätselsprache,” as Novalis calls it there, is to 
be employed “wenn man mit Wenignen, in einer großen, gemischten Gesellschaft etwas heimliches reden will” 
(Novalis, 2:485). This secret language of initiates can be aligned with Schlegel’s notion of an “ewige Hieroglyphe” 
in “Über die Unverständlichkeit” (Schlegel, 2:364). And where Schlegel offers the idea of a “Chiffernsprache” as a 
potential response to or result of incomprehensibility, so too does Novalis in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais, where he begins 
this text with the idea of a “Chiffernschrift” that both orders and perturbs a manifest reality riven by intrinsic 
incomprehensibility and chaos, indexing the existence of an autonomous language and world of signs beyond human 
control, but not entirely closed off from human knowledge practices. Indeed, learning to read the secret language or 
signature of the world constitutes the messianic task of modern life for all the authors in question in the previous 
chapters. 
 
578 Schlegel, 2:366. 
  
579 Schiller, 8:307. To be sure, at times the late Schlegel will also affirm a certain restricted domain for the secret, as 
in the Signatur where he argues that the “kleine Minorität der Edelsten und Besten”—the generation that grew up 
under the destructive sign of the absolute in philosophy and politics, but now has found a new orientation in 
Religionspolitik—must be protected from impurity (“vor allem Störenden zu bewahren und von jedem Flecken rein 







addressed, as the proper subject of play circumscribed within the operations of the aesthetic state, 
and finally, as the proprietary project of an elitist cell. The Romantics, by contrast, will affirm 
the necessity of a secret, of understanding the “mute language of things” as a more general 
communication of an essential truth of life: present existence can and must be radically 
transformed at the level of its basic distribution of sense, but only to stimulate its dimension of 
mystery, its productive incomprehensibility, and this at every point of life. And they will do so 
precisely in the attempt not to dispel or disclose the secret, giving it up, so to speak, but to 
universalize it as a tendency of becoming in all sectors of modern society, in all modern 
knowledge practices and occupations, activating all subjects and their communities in a shared 
sense of mysterious productive power. 
The secret, in this sense, does not divide people from each other—separating them into 
those who know the truth and those who cannot detect its evidence, i.e., into the opposition of 
the Romantic or the bourgeois philistine—as much as bring everyone together in a fundamental 
insight, namely: there is, and always will be, a secret waiting to be discovered that liberates the 
human individual and collective.580 A political imagination based on such a sense of secrecy, at 
least in its Romantic form, turns into an on-going process of secretion:581 everyone will be in on 
the secret, but only insofar as everyday experience is constantly made more mysterious, its 
oblique communication, its material and immaterial messages and media, potentialized for the 
stimulation of life itself. This is a progressive generation of secrets with social impact, or a 
                                                 
580 Herbert Uerlings notes of Novalis’ Rätselsprache that “sie zielt nicht auf die bleibende Trennung zwischen 
denen, die ein Geheimnis haben, und der Öffentlichkeit, sondern verrätselt das Mitzuteilende, um es zu schützen und 
eine Kommunikation allererst zu ermöglichen, deren Zeil es ist, ‘alle’ einzuweihen. Der Rätselsprache impliziert 
also auch die Aufforderung an alle, das Rätsel zu lösen: ‘Der mystische Ausdruck ist ein Gedankenreiz mehr’” 
(Herbert Uerlings, Novalis [Stuttgart: Philipp,1998], 81). 
  






politics of enchantment that reinvests present life with the sacredness that is stripped from it 
through processes of modernization—or as Marcuse puts it: when the content and validity of the 
aesthetic function is whittled down (“beschnitten und verflacht”).582 
It is unsurprising that a such an evident desire to spread secrecy, and this as a dedicated 
program of social transformation across the Romantic movement, relies on a diverse and often 
surprising set of fields to pursue its different trajectories. Reality itself is understood as an 
infinitely mysterious domain of transformation, every foray into it necessarily reveals this. These 
wild political Wissenschaften are themselves a kind of a minor literature within Romantic 
discourse. The paradigm and textual body of wild politics is the little book of political 
Romanticism, its manifesto and secret tendency, exactly where its most revolutionary 
speculations lead. From within the conventional discursive boundaries of the objects and ways of 
life they treat—whether as affect, nature, and religion, or as fairy tale, physics, and apocalypse—
Romantic texts attempt a series of conceptual and practical experiments that expand them from 
the inside, pushing the ideal Kunst des Lebens into purely virtual territories, new speculative 
practices and utopian, heterotopian, and dystopian (non)spaces. They deliver the special content 
of the desired existential transformation and plan its actual realization in combined social praxis. 
From this perspective, Carl Schmitt’s reading of political Romanticism is correct, if only 
for the wrong reasons of ideological emplotment, and also because it does not identify the crucial 
next step in the Romantic system of thought, namely: collectivization, or the multiplication of 
individuals as a body possessing the secret. Concentrating on the what he takes to be the 
overweening individualism of the movement—and thus its basic bourgeois apoliticality that 
                                                 






actually affirms the present status quo—Schmitt concludes with the figure of the private 
priesthood. He situates it within the sociopolitical context of contemporary modernization 
against which the Romantics polemicized, but then negates its dedicated centrifugal social force 
as evident in the texts themselves: 
It is only in an individualistically disintegrated society that the aesthetically productive 
subject could shift the intellectual center into itself, only in a bourgeois world that isolates the 
individual in the domain of the intellectual, makes the individual its own point of reference, 
and imposes upon it the entire burden that otherwise was hierarchically distributed among 
different functions in a social order. In this society, it is left to the private individual to be his 
own priest. But not only that. Because of the central significance and consistency of the 
religious, it is also left to him to be his own poet, his own philosopher, his own king, and his 
own master builder in the cathedral of his personality. The ultimate roots of romanticism and 
the romantic phenomenon lie in the private priesthood.583 
With this last point, Schmitt is no doubt thinking of one of Schlegel’s early statements:  
Wenn jedes unendliche Individuum Gott ist, so gibts so viele Götter als Ideale. Auch ist das 
Verhältnis des wahren Kunstlers und des wahren Menschen zu seinen Idealen durchaus 
Religion. Wem dieser innre Gottesdienst Ziel und Geschäft des ganzen Lebens ist, der ist 
Priester, und so kann und soll es jeder werden.584 
Nevertheless, here in this last fragment, in a moment that Schmitt has productively 
misinterpreted, the emphasis on the individual is not merely solipsistic or inward-facing (even 
when material social forces push it to be so): it is also expressed as a challenge that every 
individual transform themselves, and do so together in the production of an infinite series of gods 
and ideals. The priest maintains the secret of the truly religious life, embodying it in a 
heterotopic space that stands outside the everyday world at a critical distance, but he also 
communicates it to the public as a form of practical education. In the Romantic sense of religion, 
all individuals—and thus political society as a whole—become priests when they recognize the 
                                                 
583 Schmitt, Political Romanticism. Translated by Guy Oakes (Cambridge: MIT, 1991), 20. 
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